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Abstract 
 
This doctoral project explores the evolution of regional uneven development in 
Jiangsu province under China’s growth-oriented state ideology during the 
economic reform era. Based upon a set of political-philosophical and historical 
analyses, it is argued that, as the foundation of China’s regime legitimacy in 
the reform era, the growth orientation of China’s dominant state ideology 
consisted of two key rationales, those are, China’s utilitarianism and its 
pragmatism. And, in order to concretely study the evolution of the regional 
unevenness between the south and north of Jiangsu province, two city-
regions were selected as the basis for detailed empirical research. They are 
Changzhou city in the south and Nantong city in the north. Both the theoretical 
and empirical analyses were conducted under a three-stage periodization of 
economic reform. These are: the first stage (the late 1970s – the earlier 
1990s), the second stage (the mid-1990s – the earlier 2000s), and the third 
stage (the earlier 2000s – 2013). 
 It is found that, generally speaking, the dominant growth-oriented state 
ideology exercised key influences on regional unevenness in Jiangsu through 
a set of utilitarian and pragmatic institutional expressions and practices. And, 
corresponding to the influence of the growth-oriented state ideology, there are 
different kinds of strategically inscribed structural selectivities being expressed 
during different stage of the economic reform. Such selectivities are mainly 
exhibited by, and practised through, the dominant local growth patterns of the 
respective stage of the reform. Those are: TVE-driven growth, development 
zone-driven growth, and state-led, urbanisation-driven growth. Whilst the 
actual practices of these local growth patterns all decisively (re)produced and 
(re)shaped regional unevenness, they also exhibited, and were subject to, 
polymorphic and multidimensional sociospatial relations and processes which 
may be explored from the perspective of the so-called TPSN framework. It is 
proposed that whilst regional unevenness in Jiangsu province was increasing 
during the first two stages of reform, it was reduced during the third stage, 
though in a highly unsustainable and socially unjust fashion.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Brief information on the research objects in sociospatial terms 
This doctoral project seeks to understand and evaluate the evolution of 
regional uneven development in Jiangsu province in China during China’s 
economic reform era from the late 1970s to date. Before clarifying the basic 
structure of my research, it is helpful to set out a brief introduction to the 
empirical case study areas. Jiangsu province, as one of the most developed 
regions in China, covers an area of 102.6 thousand sq. km. (which is quite 
close to the territory of England), and has around 79 million residents. The 
following maps will show the location and some brief information on Jiangsu 
province. 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Jiangsu province within China 
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Figure 1.2: The territory of, and major cities in, Jiangsu province 
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Figure 1.3: The satellite night view of Jiangsu province  (NASA, 2013) 
 
It can be seen from Figure 1.3 that, whilst the south of Jiangsu is full of lights 
that reflect the prosperity in this region, the north, on the contrary, is less 
developed and the darkness suggests a lagged regional development in 
terms of industrialisation and urbanisation. By referring to the north and the 
south of Jiangsu province, I am referring to the geographical demarcation 
made by the famous “Changjiang River”, also known as the “Yangtze River”, 
which is the third longest river in the world. In fact, not only does the Yangtze 
River regionally demarcate the south and north of Jiangsu province, it also 
runs across the whole territory of China, acting as the conventional borderline 
that demarcates the south and north of China in both a geographical and a 
cultural sense (and occasionally in a political sense). This geographical divide 
complicates other factors that foster and sustain regional unevenness. As we 
shall see such unevenness was not only shaped by, and subject to, path-
dependencies of distinct socioeconomic circumstances, but was also 
influenced by the path-shaping effects imposed by various domestic and 
extra-local relations and processes.  
If we apply the borderline of the Yangtze River to demarcate the south 
and north of Jiangsu, the south geographically includes five cities, namely, 
Nanjing, which is the provincial capital city of Jiangsu, Zhenjiang, Changzhou, 
Wuxi, and Suzhou city. However, the south of Jiangsu in this research is more 
narrowly and conventionally defined, and thus only refers to the latter three 
cities, those of, Wuxi, Suzhou, and Changzhou city. It is commonly accepted 
4""
culturally to label these three cities as one regional group within the south of 
Jiangsu. Moreover, these three cities not only share similar cultural and social 
origins and habits, but have also, since China’s economic reform, possessed 
highly homogenous local growth patterns, industrial structures and major state 
institutional arrangements and functions. Together they have contributed to 
the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ (Fei, 1984). Hence, the south of Jiangsu in this 
research will indicate the conventional regional grouping of Changzhou, Wuxi, 
and Suzhou city, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
In order to specifically study the evolution of regional unevenness 
between the south and the north, two city-regions (one in the south and 
another in the north) have been selected as the basis for detailed empirical 
research. They are Changzhou city in the south and Nantong city in the north. 
The socioeconomic situations of these two city-regions will be outlined in 
more detail later in the introduction to the case study chapters.  
 
1.2 The analytical stance of the present research 
The three decades of China’s economic reform since the late 1970s has 
drawn much global attention in recent years, with China gradually becoming 
an increasingly important and influential economy, to which the current global 
economic order is interdependently subject and susceptible. The rapid and 
sustained growth achieved by China has drawn many compliments such as 
the so-called ‘China Model’ and ‘Beijing Consensus’ which summarise and 
promote certain prominent respects of China’s economic reform. However, 
these references to a broad ‘model’ and ‘consensus’ may also disguise and 
distort developmental heterogeneities expressed across different spatial and 
temporal horizons of China’s economic reform. Put differently, it is advocated 
that, subject to path-dependencies of various types and degrees, China’s 
economic reform and regional development cannot be understood as a 
systematic whole. Instead the thesis argues that we need to concretely 
identify and articulate the different dominant growth engines, patterns and 
projects adopted by different localities in different periods of the economic 
reform. This analytical stance to some extent resonates with the advocacy of 
looking more specifically into the heterogeneous particularities and regional 
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styles of Chinese capitalist development (Zhang & Peck, 2014), and also 
responds to the recent call of adopting a polymorphic, multidimensional 
perspective such as the ‘TPSN’ framework when studying current sociospatial 
relations and processes (Jessop, Brenner & Jones, 2008).  
 But this analytical stance of focusing on the evolution of regional 
development across certain concrete spatial and temporal horizons in China, 
does not lead to some sort of isolated local findings. Rather, there exists a set 
of fundamental ideological logics and institutional dynamics, the practices of 
which have commonly shaped and affected, in top-down and reflexive 
fashions, the institutional and industrial causalities of regional and local 
development in China. And, it is the critical enunciation of these supra-logics 
and institutions of China’s economic reform that will constitute the first key 
element of the analytical framework of this research. In the second element, 
that is, the empirical case studies, the roles of these supra-logics in shaping 
development at various local scales, and across different temporal horizons, 
will be specifically elaborated. The presence of such supra-logics, which are 
subsequently referred to as China’s growth-oriented state ideology, is in both 
an ontological and an analytical sense.  
Briefly speaking, the ontological presence of the growth-oriented state 
ideology mainly derives from the political judgment of using economic 
performance to replace the largely collapsed Communism and Maoism-
oriented state ideology following China’s legitimation crisis after the Cultural 
Revolution. Although the political imaginary of claiming itself as a socialist 
country means that the party/state of China could only give a vaguely defined 
recognition and content to its growth-oriented state ideology, this quasi-state 
ideology does hold an ‘ecological dominance’ in Bob Jessop’s (2000: 319) 
words, thereby acting as a superior system which exerts ‘its developmental 
logic on other systems operating through structural coupling, strategic 
coordination and blind co-evolution to a greater extent than the latter can 
impose their respective logics on that system’.  
As it will be seen in later chapters, although local growth patterns have 
been essentially shaped by, and are subject to, this growth-oriented state 
ideology, central policies have also had to yield to local practices, especially 
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when the latter can better embody the growth-orientation. Moreover, it is not 
only from the view of China’s state institutions that the growth-oriented state 
ideology can be appreciated and conceived. The general public, even setting 
aside the institutional selectivities to which they may be subject, widely 
recognised and supported this ideology. The growth-oriented state ideology is 
in this sense to some extent identical with ‘a reasonably just modus vivendi’ in 
Rawls’ (2005: xl) sense, which constitutes an arrangement supported by all 
sides, as it keeps the balance of forces, and happens to be just to each side 
in the context of given historical circumstances. But, just as Rawls (2005) 
observed, although a modus vivendi has the potential of becoming a stable 
overlapping consensus, its instability, nonetheless, distinguishes it from a 
stable consensus. China’s growth-oriented state ideology has been arguably 
revealed to be unstable. It keeps losing public consensus as regional and 
local uneven development and social injustice evolves in China.  
From an analytical perspective, the present research does not merely 
serve to attain an empirical record of depicting regional (uneven) development 
in China. More importantly, it aims to critically elaborate and decipher those 
fundamental, decisive ideological properties and their institutional 
expressions, which have acted as supra-logics in promoting regional uneven 
development. And this has practical relevance to the ideological constructions 
and institutional arrangements for China’s prospective regional development. 
In other words, this research has the ambition of clarifying the basic structural 
and strategic elements of China’s economic reform and also presenting some 
key reflections on China’s potential ideological and institutional development 
over the next 30 years.  
This attitude of my research reverses Marx’s observation that ‘in 
politics, the Germans have thought what other nations have done’ (Bottomore, 
1964: 51, cf: Giddens, 1971). This observation, if reversed, leads to the 
conclusion that, in politics and economics, the Chinese have done what other 
countries have thought, especially during the century that has elapsed since 
the collapse of China’s final dynasty. As Giddens has (1971: xiii) stated, while 
‘Marx initially shared the view that the rational criticism of existing institutions 
was sufficient to provoke the radical changes necessary to allow Germany to 
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match, and to overtake the two other leading western European countries’, 
Marx then soon perceived, ‘this radical-critical posture merely preserved the 
typical German concern with theory to the exclusion of practice’. In an 
opposite situation to that of Germany, China’s economic development during 
the last three decades has arguably been based on practice to the exclusion 
of theory, with the purpose of allowing China to match, and to overtake the 
leading Western developed countries. If viewing China’s high, rapid and 
persistent growth in purely economic terms, China’s emphasis on ‘practice’ 
has to some extent achieved the objective of holistically matching and 
overtaking many developed countries. This achievement, however, cannot 
conceal the severe costs and problems in terms of regional/local unevenness 
and socioeconomic disparities. It is therefore argued that China’s practice-
oriented experiences have now reached the stage where they need to be 
theoretically summarised and refined, in order to secure a long-term 
sustainable and just model of development. This corresponds with the notion 
of ‘top-level design’, which has been recently rather popularly used by many 
Chinese scholars and practitioners1. This notion was first invented by, Liu He, 
the current Deputy Director of the National Development and Reform 
Commission of China, who is also leading the project of designing China’s 
future development path, and is recognised as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 
core consultant and brainpower. According to Liu He (2011), the notion of top-
level design includes basic value-orientation, principal aims, and the order of 
achieving these aims; and the reason for calling for top-level design is that 
China’s reform and development has now passed the stage of having 
extensive, non-strategic testing.  
In a word, this research does not aim merely to present a historical-
empirical record of the regional uneven development in China. Rather, it 
possesses an analytical ambition of critically reflecting on some key issues, 
which are of immediate importance to contemporary China as well as to 
prospective regional development in the near future. It is under this objective 
that I propose to undertake the doctoral research of analysing and evaluating """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
1 See, for example, Li, Y. N. (2013), ‘Chinese economy in dual transition’, Beijing, Renmin University 
of China Press. Notably, Li was the doctoral supervisor for China’s current Premier Li Keqiang, and 
the master supervisor for China’s current Vice-President Li Yuanchao.  
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the evolution of regional developmental unevenness between the south and 
the north of Jiangsu province in China during China’s economic reform. In 
other words, this research demonstrates how uneven development within a 
given regional spatiotemporal fix is, in practice, revealed to be a ‘complex 
synthesis of multiple determination’2. In this sense it provides an example of 
how the traditional struggles with the modern, how the domestic interacts with 
the global, how the local/regional coordinates and conflicts with the central, 
and how all these institutions, forces and actors interconnect and co-evolve in 
a dynamic, relational fashion within a specified spatiotemporal fix so as to 
orchestrate regional uneven development in Jiangsu province. 
 
1.3 The structure of the present research 
Regarding the analytical structure of articulating this research, there are eight 
chapters including this introductory one. In the next chapter, a series of 
contextual and theoretical reviews will be presented. These reviews mainly 
target two primary issues, namely, the renaissance of the cities in the era and 
context of neoliberal globalisation, and the evolution from the functional 
specificity of sociospatial units to a multi-dimensional polymorphy of 
sociospatial relations and processes. It will build some rudimentary analytical 
and theoretical positions through reviewing these two issues to clarify one of 
the most basic research questions -- how to look at and analyse the vital 
parameter of the national state in a way that reflects both its own causal 
powers and behavioural logics, and its relations with, and influences on, 
actors and systems of different scales, places, territories and networks. In 
other words, this chapter, whilst critically reviewing the relevant literatures and 
practices, aims to conceptualise and justify some key analytical parameters, 
positions and propensities of this research, such as conceptualising the 
national state of China mainly in terms of the dominant state ideology, from 
which the institutional practices generate and produce a series of political and 
developmental strategies which in turn exert structural selectivities that may 
privilege certain actors/actions and simultaneously derogate the pursuit of 
other interests in utilitarian and pragmatic fashions. In addition, it also explains """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
2 See Marx (1857), cf: Jessop (1997) 
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why this research targets the sociospatial scale and site of the city-region as 
the main empirical research objects, through which the developmental and 
institutional derivatives can be investigated. This leads to discussions about 
the TPSN framework, which will be heuristically and adaptively deployed in 
the later case study chapters.  
 The third chapter lays out a delineation of the methodology that is 
adopted for conducting primary and secondary research. Notably, apart from 
those conventional policy research methodologies such as library- and 
documentation-based analyses, the field-work conducted for this research 
involved access to a variety of internal political and policy documents that are 
usually confined to Chinese state officials3. The case study chapters are also 
based on a series of interviews with various Chinese local officials, whose 
observations and opinions are measured against publically released official 
documents. These issues will be elaborated in detail in Chapter Three.  
 Chapter Four sets out the key political and ideological contexts for the 
research. It deciphers the supra-logics and hegemonic projects of China’s 
economic reform. It consists of two parts. The first part takes a historic-
abstract approach to examine how the political philosophy and forces 
underlying Mao’s reign of virtue was reversed and replaced by China’s 
growth-oriented state ideology. It is argued that, as the guiding logics of the 
pre- and post-reform state ideologies are contradictory, but institutionally 
tangled in path-dependent terms, a brief glance at this essential transition of 
state ideology helps, from a holistic perspective, to outline some important 
ideological and institutional incentives and constraints, to which the regional 
(uneven) development at issue has been subject. And, it is argued that, unlike 
the conventional alteration of political strategies and institutions, which does 
not change the fundamental property and pattern of state ideology and regime 
legitimacy, China’s economic reform is triggered by a thorough alteration in its 
dominant state ideology, which politically reconstitutes the entire regime 
legitimacy. This in turn resulted in a substantial number of modifications to the 
objective, function, and structure of state institutions at various scales. In this """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
3 It is noted that Ms. Gao Yu, a famous Chinese journalist, has recently been arrested for leaking state 
secret documents to overseas websites. See: BBC News on May 8th, 2014: 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-27321241 (Accessed on May, 14th, 2014) 
10""
sense it is proposed that China’s economic reform is guided by, and serves, 
the pragmatic consideration of how to restore and strengthen the authorities 
and functions of the party/state of the CPC (Communist Party of China), which 
had been severely vitiated by the Cultural Revolution. 
 The second part of Chapter Four outlines and deciphers the two core 
ideas of China’s growth-oriented state ideology, namely, utilitarianism and 
pragmatism, which exhibit specifically unique Chinese characteristics. The 
significance of utilitarianism and pragmatism to regional uneven development 
in China has three key dimensions, namely, providing the core philosophical 
rationales for envisioning and formulating general, national developmental 
guidelines and strategies; constituting the ideological and political foundations 
and justifications for institutional expressions and practices at different scales; 
and, shaping and mobilizing public recognition, and individual and collective 
behaviors, in accordance with the growth orientation. Notably, it is argued that 
the institutional practices of China’s utilitarianism and pragmatism, revealed 
prominent spatial and temporal elements and effects at different scales during 
different periods. Thus, apart from political and philosophical analyses, the 
articulations of time-space relations in socio-economic systems and 
developments are also of importance to these critical readings of China’s 
utilitarianism and pragmatism. In addition, the analyses and articulations of 
the two ideas are to be, though not in a highly precise fashion, embedded 
within a three-stage framework that largely reflects not only the evolution and 
transition of China’s economic reform as a whole, but also those hegemonic 
growth patterns/engines of regional development during respective different 
periods. Suffice it to say that China’s economic reform since the late 1970s is 
divided into three stages, those are, the first stage (the late 1970s – the earlier 
1990s), the second stage (the mid-1990s – the earlier 2000s), and the third 
stage (the earlier 2000s – 2013).  
 Chapter Five, Six, and Seven present two empirical case studies that 
critically reflect, test, and corroborate the theoretical part of this research. In 
other words, these two case studies in relation to the south and north of 
Jiangsu province respectively serve to empirically demonstrate how China’s 
growth-oriented state ideology had, in practice, resulted in, and interacted 
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with, various socioeconomic productive forces and processes, producing 
major impacts and outcomes in terms of regional uneven development at 
different local/regional scales. In geographical terms, these two case studies 
are based on the analyses of two county-level units and the municipality-level 
cities to which they belong. These refer to Changzhou city and its sub-area – 
Wujin district which are located in the south of Jiangsu, and Nantong city and 
its sub-region, Haian county which are located in the north. Due to the 
difference in the meaning of the term of ‘county’ between Chinese and 
English, we need to outline certain general information on the governance 
structure and the key considerations for choosing these two municipal-level 
cities and their respective counties as the research objects.  
Generally speaking, there are a number of ways of scaling China’s 
governance structure. For example, according to the official data of China’s 
National Statistical Bureau (2006, cf: Xu, 2010), there are five scales to the 
governance structure of China, which are, in sequence:  
1. the central government and 2128 central state-owned enterprises;  
2. 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 4 provincial-level municipalities;  
3. 333 municipality-level units, which include 283 municipal-level cities;  
4. 2862 county-level units, which include 374 county-level cities and 2488 
other standard counties; and  
5. 41636 town-level units4.  
Cheung (2009: 63) in his outstanding analysis of the locality-competing 
system5 of China proposes a seven layer-structure, according to which China 
consists of seven geographically determined layers, and each lower layer falls 
within its upper layer. As Cheung (2009: 63) states, ‘The top layer is the 
country, then comes the provinces, the cities, the xians, the towns, the 
villages, and finally the households’, and ‘xian’ here means county-level 
units/cities. In a word, cities in Chinese are thus usually referred to municipal-
level cities or municipalities. A municipal-level city usually covers and 
regulates several municipal districts and county-level units. But it must be 
pointed out that the scaling of China’s regional governance structure is in 
many aspects dynamic. This can be reflected by the rescaling practices which """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
4 A governance structure/scale chart can be seen in Appendix 2. 
5 This can also be referred to inter-urban competition. 
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emerged during different stages of the economic reform. Indeed, it is this 
dynamic of rescaling that constitutes a key incentive for local governments to 
promote economic performance. As Xu (2010: 24) observes, some county 
units with relatively better economic performance have been rescaled into 
municipal-level units since the mid-1980s. A more prevalent type of rescaling 
practice lies in the collinear upgrading of normal county-level units into 
county-level cities. During the period between 1994 and 1996, most normal 
county-level units in the south of Jiangsu province were rescaled into county-
level cities thanks to their rather outstanding economic performance. The 
institutional differences between a standard county-level unit and a county-
level city can be contextually variable and complicated. In general terms, 
county-level cities usually possess more autonomous powers over matters 
such as personnel control, taxation and finance, and state approval authority, 
whereas normal county-level units concentrate more on the governance and 
growth of rural areas and their population, and can be subject to more 
extensive and tighter controls from their municipalities. Furthermore, there 
also exists another type of rescaling practice that transforms a county-level 
city into a municipal district, although such practices are more restricted by 
central government. Local municipal governments seeking approval of this 
sort of rescaling usually aim to expand their urban territories in order to 
sustain urbanisation-driven growth. As we shall see, Jiangsu province 
became widely recognised as a successful pioneer of initiating such rescaling 
practice. 
 As regards the two cities and their sub-regions, it is helpful to set forth 
at the outset some general geographical and socioeconomic information 
about them. In the south, Wujin district is located in the southern part of 
Changzhou city, and is widely known as one of the founding places of the so-
called ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ because of the blooming of township and 
village enterprises (TVEs) during the 1980s and 1990s. Wujin covers 1242 sq. 
km., within which there are 22 subsidiary towns, two sub-districts, one 
national high-tech industrial development zone, one national export process 
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zone, and one provincial development zone. The ‘civic population’6 of Wujin is 
around 1 million, among 1.6 million permanent residents. Since the early 
1990s, Wujin has been continuously ranked as one of the top 10 counties in 
China. After being rescaled into the municipal district of Changzhou city in 
2012, Wujin was in the top 6 in an evaluation of the top 100 most developed 
municipal districts in China. The annual regional GDP of Wujin in 2012 was 
about 153 billion RMB7. The annual average incomes of urban residents and 
rural residents in Changzhou in 2012 were respectively 33587 RMB and 
16890 RMB. 
Changzhou city has a total permanent residential population of 4.5 
million, and covers 4385 km², consisting of 5 municipal districts and 2 county-
level cities. By 2012, the urban area of Changzhou covered 461.79 sq. km., 
which is ranked as the 12th by size among all municipal cities in China8. 
Among the 13 municipal-level cities in Jiangsu province, Changzhou has the 
second smallest population and territory, indicating a high urbanisation rate. 
The annual regional GDP of Changzhou in 2012 was about 400 billion RMB, 
which was ranked as 6th in Jiangsu province, and its annual per capita GDP 
of the same year was 85036 RMB, which was ranked as 5th in Jiangsu.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
6 This refers to local residents with standard urban welfares and rights, whereas other residents (usually 
migrant labourers) do not enjoy same level of public goods and services.  
7 A table of the annual average exchange rates between RMB and USD in a series of years is attached 
in the Appendix.  
8 The territory of a city in China usually covers both urban and rural areas. Although the whole 
territory of Changzhou city is relatively small, its urban area is notably large than that of many cities 
which cover much larger territories.  
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Figure 1.4: Wujin district 
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Figure 1.5: Changzhou city 
 
  
 
In the north, Haian county of Nantong city is located in the middle of 
northern Jiangsu province. Haian covers 1180 km², within which there are 10 
towns/districts, including one national economic and technological 
development zone, one provincial new and high-tech zone, and one new 
county district. The total population of Haian is about 0.96 million, which is 
close to the civic population of Wujin.  In 2012, the regional GDP of Haian 
reached 50.3 billion RMB, approximately one third of that of Wujin. Haian is 
famous for a variety of local specialities, which include silks and textiles, 
balloonfish, laver, and its architecture and construction industries. Since 
ancient times, Haian has been seen as a pivotal place for transportation. 
16""
Nantong city is located at the north of the Yangtze River Delta, opposite 
Shanghai. Nantong city covers 8001 km², almost twice as large as 
Changzhou city, and has a population of 7.3 million, which is about 1.7 times 
larger than that of Changzhou city. The municipality of Nantong governs 2 
counties, 3 county-level cities, 3 municipal districts, and one national 
economic and technological development area. In 2012, the gross GDP and 
per capita GDP of Nantong were 455.8 billion RMB and 62506 RMB 
respectively, and the annual average incomes of urban and rural residents 
were respectively 28292 RMB and 13231 RMB. 
 
Figure 1.6: Haian county  
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Figure 1.7: Nantong city 
 
 
 As noted before, a three-stage framework is adopted in this research in 
order to put the relevant analyses into contexts that reflect the evolving 
regional (uneven) development as characterised by the major and hegemonic 
growth patterns/engines of respective different periods. This delineation is 
also applied in the case studies. Arguably, whilst the institutional and 
industrial tendencies within each stage are revealed, more often than not, to 
be of national phenomena, their respective features are particularly prominent 
and typical in the context of Jiangsu province. In brief, the first stage of 
China’s economic reform in Jiangsu is characterised by the rise and blooming 
of TVEs, though largely in the south rather than across the whole province. 
The second stage witnessed the rise of development zone-driven growth at 
various local scales in both the south and north of Jiangsu. And the extension 
of this growth pattern, in turn, led to rather intense inter-urban competition for 
inward investment, and entailed derivative urbanisation thanks to the 
industrial agglomerations that simultaneously concentrated human, capital, 
and other resources in development zones. Finally, the third stage has seen a 
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broken nexus between industrialisation and urbanisation, which is indicative of 
a local growth-pattern that is driven by state-led urbanisation.  
 It is argued that all these characteristics of the regional (uneven) 
development in Jiangsu at respective stages were more or less critically 
shaped and affected by the growth-oriented state ideology and its institutional 
expressions, which are articulated in Chapter Four. On the other hand, the 
case studies in Chapter Five, Six, and Seven also show how regional 
unevenness had evolved and been shaped across the relevant spatial and 
temporal horizons. It is under the growth-oriented state ideology that the path-
dependent practices of all the major local growth patterns have led to the 
current developmental outcomes.  
 The final chapter is both a conclusion to the research, and a meta-
evaluation of China’s economic reform. Apart from summarising the key 
findings of this research, some key assumptions and views are proposed to 
inspire research and practice concerning future reform and development in 
China.  
 
1.4 Research questions 
While I have sought to sketch out the chief issues and objectives of this 
research, it will be helpful to outline a set of key research questions with the 
aim of providing a context for the chapters which follow.  
Generally speaking, there are three major questions that are 
addressed in this research. The first research question is what is the nature 
and effects of the growth-oriented state ideology and its critical institutional 
expressions/practices, in relation to uneven development at regional/local 
scales in the context of China’s three decades of economic reform. In order to 
address this, a historical perspective will be adopted at the beginning to 
explore the ideological and political fractures and continuities between the 
pre-reform state ideology and the guiding logics that have legitimatised and 
sustained the economic reform. This is followed by more detailed political-
philosophical analyses in order to decipher the strategic/structural dimensions 
and spatial/temporal effects of the growth-oriented state ideology. This 
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question is largely addressed in Chapter Four, and the findings are then 
critically applied and reflected in the two case studies which follow.  
The second research question can be framed as: what are the 
dominant local growth patterns and dynamics underlying the regional uneven 
development in Jiangsu province during the respective stages of China’s 
economic reform. The identification of these essential trends, institutions, 
strategies, and actors is partly processed through those theoretical analyses 
and deductions in Chapter Four, and partly based upon the empirical case 
studies. Thanks to the semi-authoritative nature of China’s governance and 
growth model, it is relatively easy to confine the answers to this question to 
state institutions of different scales and to those relational actors and actions, 
which are subject to state institutional capacities and selectivities, though in a 
reflexive fashion. In other words, this research question adopts a somewhat 
neo-institutionalist view, looking at the critical functions, capacities and 
orientations of local state institutions under those state-led local growth 
patterns, since the party/state, after all, has been the leading force throughout 
the economic reform.  
The third research question in some senses integrates the first two 
questions in a mutually resonating way. It asks in what ways and to what 
extent the developmental unevenness between the south and the north in 
Jiangsu has been critically shaped by institutions and actors in different 
places, at different scales, and with different socio-economic networks, under 
the growth-oriented state ideology. And, it is hoped that the answers to this 
question can in some respects lead to a critical summary of China’s 30 years 
experiences, which may inspire future regional development and research.  
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Background and Literature 
Review 
 
This chapter serves to provide a series of contextual and theoretical reviews, 
which, in general, articulate as well as justify certain phenomena and 
conceptions, on which the primary analytical body of this research is based. 
Two issues are to be particularly addressed: the renaissance of cities and 
city-regions in the era and context of neoliberal globalisation, and the 
analytical evolution from functional specificity of sociospatial units to 
multidimensional polymorphy of sociospatial relations and processes. Since 
the early 1970s, we have witnessed a proliferation of debates and ‘turns’ in 
relation to the ontological and methodological foundations of articulating the 
dynamics and dimensions of modern sociospatial relations and restructurings. 
And, alongside the decline of Atlantic Fordism and Spatial Keynesianism as 
well as the subsequent rise of neoliberalism and globalization, there have 
been multifarious neoliberalism-oriented restructurings and rescalings of state 
spatiality and economic development. There are corresponding trends in 
sociospatial theories, which shift from delineating the relatively static, 
functional specificity of sociospatial units towards deciphering the dynamic, 
multidimensional polymorphy of sociospatial relations and processes. These 
two related trends and their implications for the present research would thus 
be critically reviewed.  
The analysis of these two issues aims to build some rudimentary 
analytical and theoretical positions by clarifying how to look at and analyse the 
vital parameter of the national state in a way that reflects both its own causal 
powers and behavioural logics, and its relations with, and influences on actors 
and systems operating at different scales, and in different places, territories 
and networks. 
 
2.1 The renaissance of cities and city-regions  
2.1.1 Neoliberal Urbanism and its implications for this research 
Since the 1970s the world has witnessed and experienced a wide-ranging and 
long-enduring neoliberalization process which was at the outset initiated in 
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response to the economic inefficiency of the Fordist growth regime, and the 
accompanied political crises of Keynesian-welfarism (Peck, Theodore & 
Brenner, 2009). This process of neoliberalization did not proceed in a linear, 
consistent fashion. In practice it triggered and brought about changes and 
transitions to both the structural and strategic dimensions of ‘state spatiality’9. 
Thanks to the rise of neoliberalism and its later dominance in a wide range of 
fields at global scales, many countries have either actively or passively 
experienced an ‘institutional and scalar turn’ in relation to the changing 
strategic roles of cities and city-regions in the governance of sociospatial 
relations, processes, and economic development. Some of these ‘turns’ may 
possibly be conceptualised, according to Aihwa Ong (2006), as the examples 
of ‘neoliberalism as exception’ and/or ‘exception to liberalism’, especially in a 
number of Asia countries, including China. As Ong (2006: 1, 3) suggests, 
many ‘Asia governments have selectively adopted neoliberal forms in creating 
economic zones and imposing market criteria on citizenship’. In more specific 
terms, neoliberalism as exception means that it is ‘introduced in sites of 
transformation where market-driven calculations are bring introduced in the 
management of populations and the administration of special spaces’. On the 
other hand, ‘exceptions to neoliberalism are also invoked, in political 
decisions, to exclude populations and places from neoliberal calculations and 
choices’. As we shall see in the empirical chapters, this does have some 
resonance with the situation in China, although the role of the state made it 
difficult to speak of ‘neoliberalism’ as it is commonly understood.  
In a comparison with their positions as mere agencies and relays of 
national state institutions and policies within largely state-oriented, self-
contained economies under the Fordist growth model and the Keynesian 
welfare regime, cities and city-regions under the neoliberalism trend have, 
from a prima facie view, institutionally gained and/or been endowed with 
enhanced roles. These take the form, for example, of more autonomous and 
expanded institutional and financial capacities, derived from a hollowing-out of 
national state, to directly embed in, and interact with, increasingly globalised """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
9 The notion of ‘state spatiality’, according to Brenner (2004), refers to ‘both the geographical 
configuration of state’s territory and the spatial dimensions of the state’s intervention in socioeconomic 
processes within that territory’. cf. P. Breathnach (2010): 1180. 
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markets and mobilised capitals and resources with the purpose of securing 
their own endogenous growth, and promoting aggregate national 
competitiveness in the global economic arena (Jessop, 2000; Breathnach, 
2010; Storper, 1997).  
From a more practical perspective, it is argued that the increasing 
importance of cities and city-regions reflects their vital positions as 
strengthened socioeconomic clusters within network arrangements, which are 
highly compatible and complementary with the operational patterns of many 
leading sectors of contemporary capitalism such as high-tech and financial 
service industries, which are both ‘organized as dense and intensely localized 
networks of producers with powerful endogenous growth mechanisms and 
with an increasingly global market reach’ (Scott, 2001: 820). Urban and 
regional scales are thus recognised by, inter alia, new regionalism as vital 
supply-side growth machines in fostering and promoting social capital, 
innovation, learning and other forms of development (Logan & Molotch, 1987; 
Florida, 1991; Morgan, 1997; Storper, 1997; Scott, 2001).  
In articulating the restructuring and rescaling effects of neoliberalism on 
state spatiality, Jessop (2000, cf. MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999) argues that 
there have been three interrelated processes: ‘the denationalization of the 
state’, ‘the destatization of the political system’ and ‘the internationalization of 
policy regimes’, occurring in and through various scales and contributing to 
new forms of inter-urban competition, and thereby the rise of so-called 
‘entrepreneurial cities’. Notwithstanding the uneven and contradictory nature 
of the ongoing neoliberalization process, it is hardly deniable that the thematic 
tone of the contemporary era in terms of development has made cities come 
to the fore, becoming the key sites, in and through which actors, forces and 
coalitions with different forms and scales, can cooperate, and conflict with 
each other as they seek objectives such as economic growth and political 
legitimation.  
The growing prominence of cities does not, however, necessarily result 
in any guaranteed outcome of economic prosperity and social cohesion, that 
is in the interest of any city or region engaged in the process of neoliberal 
urbanism. Or, it does not in Cox’s (2004) words compulsorily lead to the 
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outcome of raising all boats. Rather, many have argued that the resurgence of 
entrepreneurial cities in terms of enhanced competitiveness is, more often 
than not, secured and sustained through a variety of multi-scaled uneven, 
selective processes that are characterised by displacing and/or deferring the 
costs and expenses of securing growth and prosperity to other spatiotemporal 
horizons as well as to certain marginalised social entities, groups and 
stratums (Jessop, 2000, 2004; Peck, Theodore & Brenner, 2009; Harvey, 
1989; Scott, 2001). The seeming triumph of neoliberalism in sociospatial 
processes and relations at urban scales, as Scott (2001: 823) has pointed out, 
leads to ‘greatly increased social inequalities and tensions within city-regions 
and exacerbating the discrepancies in growth rates and developmental 
potentials between them’.  
While Scott’s observation is rightly indicative of the critical weakness in 
the philosophy of neoliberal ideology, and of certain concrete-complex 
phenomena that were emerging and coalescing along with ongoing 
neoliberalisation processes, there is clearly a missing link in both logical and 
practical senses in this observation, that is, a link between ideological 
assertions and practical outcomes. This link is embodied by various 
institutions and policies for realising the neoliberal assertions and rhetorics de 
jure, on the one hand, and, by de facto practices and outcomes of such 
institutions and policies, on the other. Whilst it is highly controversial and 
beyond the scope of this research to address whether the raison d’etre of 
neoliberalism per se may intrinsically lead to developmental unevenness and 
polarization, neoliberalism in practice is far more than a monolithic ideal-
pattern standing alone, but a process coevolving with and being distorted by 
polymorphic ideologies, institutions, and movements. As Peck et al. (2009: 
51) observe, rather than being a singular, ahistorical and ‘fully actualized 
policy regime, ideological apparatus, or regulatory framework’, the practical 
restructuring and rescaling projects of neoliberalism in relation to state 
spatiality and regional development are contextually-embedded and path-
dependent, appearing as multi-dimensional, spatiotemporally-specific and 
concrete-complex processes of sociospatial transformation, which are defined 
by Peck et al. (2009) as so-called ‘actually existing neoliberalisation’.  
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This conception of actually existing neoliberalisation has two 
implications. First, in studying neoliberalisation processes, in particular, the 
trends and practices of neoliberal urbanism in relation to the growing strategic 
importance of cities, a multi-dimensional perspective must be adopted for 
approaching a systematic analysis of the logics and effects of a dominant 
state ideology, and of its institutional expressions at various scales and across 
different temporal horizons in order to identify and decipher the institutional 
and individual causes and dynamics that shape and/or affect, either in a 
strategic or a contingent fashion, regional uneven development. This 
implication raises a further consideration as to the actual role and position of 
seemingly ‘hollowing out’ nation-state institutions and strategies in the 
governance and promotion of city-oriented regional development. As this point 
will be later addressed in detail, suffice it to say here that research on regional 
unevenness in the context of China especially requires a multi-dimensional 
view that goes beyond local and regional institutions and growth-led coalitions 
of forces for securing a proper, precise conceptualisation of, not only the 
causal mechanisms behind the uneven development at issue, but also the 
true strategic and structural dynamics underlying the vaguely defined ‘China 
Model’. This to some extent echoes with Neil Smith’s (1984: xi) observation 
that ‘one cannot probe too far into the logic of uneven development without 
realizing that something far more profound is at stake’. In addition, by recalling 
Neil Smith’s (1984) critical theory of uneven development, which conceives of 
uneven development as a dialectic process continuingly and simultaneously 
shaped by the two contradictory tendencies/processes in terms of sociospatial 
differentiation and equalization, it is thus necessary to look at the different 
scales at which those processes take place in shaping uneven development. 
According to Neil Smith (1984: xi), the uneven development of capitalism is 
structural, and it is the systematic geographical expression of the 
contradictions inherent in the very constitution of structure of capital. Thus, the 
process of, for example, sociospatial differentiation takes places at different 
scales, such as the general societal division of labour and capital into different 
departments, the division of labour and capital in particular different sectors, 
the division of the social capital between different individual capitals, and the 
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detail division of labour within the workplace’ (ibid: 108). The processes at 
different scales exert influence of different degrees on the shaping of uneven 
development. However, as we shall see, in the case of China, the state exerts 
a more active role on uneven development that goes beyond what Smith has 
articulated in his assumed ‘see-saw’ process of capital.  
The second implication is that the practice under neoliberal urbanism 
and new regionalism, in terms of inter-urban competition and restructuring of 
state spatiality, can be recognised as ‘an ongoing creative destruction of 
political-economic space at multiple geographical scales’ that both ‘exploits 
and produces sociospatial difference’ (Peck, et al., 2009: 50, 53). It is in this 
sense argued that urban and regional uneven development manifested by the 
rise of neoliberal urbanism and new regionalism, in practice, results in a 
socioeconomic outcome, which is not necessarily institutionally optimal and 
politically justifiable.  
In brief, three practically and analytically intertwined phenomena, which 
are on the one hand, indicative of certain contextual backgrounds and 
potential values of the present research, and, on the other hand, constitutive 
of the main researching objects of the research, can be highlighted. These 
are: the rise of cities and regions as the key sites and stakes in restructuring 
and rescaling processes of state spatiality, the immanent unevenness 
purported by and resulting from concrete-complex practices of neoliberal 
urbanism and new regionalism which can be institutionally manifested in and 
through multifarious spatiotemporal horizons, and, finally, the changing role of 
the nation-state in the seemingly market-driven and city-oriented processes of 
spatial uneven development. Notably, it is particularly the final phenomenon 
that critically reflects those distinctive politically constructed characters of the 
‘China Model’ and its entailed regional uneven development. The distinctive 
prominence of the roles of the nation-state in terms of dominant state 
ideologies and institutional expressions in shaping and governing regional 
development in China, triggers the need to frame a set of tailored analytical 
and methodological approaches that are distinguished from those which, 
arguably, either ‘suffer from an underdeveloped notion of the state’ (MacLeod 
& Goodwin, 1999: 504) or provide ‘a poor framework through which to grasp 
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the real connections between the regionalisation of business and governance 
and the changing role of the state’ (Lovering, 1999: 391). It is in this sense 
that a brief review of certain conventional approaches on the governance of 
urban and regional development will be conducted with the aim of critically 
assessing the potential explanatory light they may shed on the analytical 
framework of this research.  
 
2.1.2 Deciphering urban growth beyond urban/local scales 
The proliferation of theoretical approaches for analysing and deciphering the 
institutional arrangements and growth mechanisms that lead to economic 
success of some cities and city-regions to a large extent reflects concrete 
trends like the process of denationalization and the rise of entrepreneurial 
cities/learning zones, all of which are proceeding in and through the context of 
neoliberal-oriented globalisation. While these trends and practices as well as 
their factual consequences may be highly empirically observable, they are 
‘contingent upon particular contexts, structures and agencies’ (MacLeod & 
Goodwin: 506). This references a general ideology of neoliberalism, which is 
in practice by no means a unified coherent process, but can only be realised 
through multifarious institutional contextual embeddednesses and path-
dependencies. Such contingency is, on the one hand, indicative of high 
degrees of analytical and applicable limits inherent in those approaches which 
construct and base their explanatory approach to regional uneven 
development exclusively upon the insights from those empirically generalised 
but not generalisable trends, and on the other hand, suggestive of the need of 
having a new analytical approach that embraces, in a systematic, coherent 
fashion, not only global tendencies and local states, but also other 
strategic/structural actors such as dominant state ideologies, institutions and 
state strategies in order to delineate and decipher a more real reality.  
There has been, arguably, a growth-oriented political consensus at 
urban and regional scales purported by many conceptual approaches that 
focus on the roles of local economic development and local political-economic 
alignment in the discourses of urban politics and governance. For example, as 
Logan and Molotch (1987: 50, 51) have argued, ‘one issue consistently 
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generates consensus among local elite groups and separates them from 
people who use the city principally as a place to live and work: the issue of 
growth’. This seeming platitude of growth is distinguished from its old sense 
under the Fordist-Keynesian growth regime in two respects.  
First, there is a strengthened diversity of participation at urban and 
regional scales in the governance of economic development, characterised by 
the rise of so-called urban privatism (Peck, 1995). According to ‘urban regime’ 
theory, which is rooted in US experiences and analyses, there exists, beyond 
the capacity and catch of formal government mechanisms, a de facto regime 
constituted by an informal public-private partnership between local 
governments and local business elites which cooperate and coordinate with 
each other through multifarious interdependent forms of collective 
organisation to make governing decisions only in their mutual interests 
(Stone, 1989; Peck, 1995; Ward, 1996). Whilst urban regime theory 
emphasises that the governing capacity of informal partnerships enables a 
‘power to act’ rather than laying stress on conflict and resistance between 
different groups, having regard to the business-oriented nature of the 
presumed informal partnership, the purported variations in the patterns of 
urban governance are, unfortunately, more often than not, confined to the 
singular form of growth-oriented development regime, which somewhat 
ironically reflects Peterson’s (1981) so-called ‘City Limits’. This narrowly 
defined growth-oriented urban regime, which concentrates on alignments of 
internal actors at urban scales, arguably leads to ‘an undertheorization of 
causative forces and properties’ (Cox, 1993: 436) that operate in and through 
institutions and spatial scales beyond the urban (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999). 
In other words, while urban regime theory’s behavioural microeconomic-
oriented analytical perspective enjoys relatively strong explanatory strength in 
dealing with contingent American cases, its analytical strength and 
applicability may to various degrees be constrained in contexts beyond the 
US, particularly in contexts where urban regimes are shaped by, or 
orchestrated through, forces and institutions of nation-state scales, and where 
growth in economic terms is indeed initiated and utilised subject to, or as 
constitutive of, some selective political strategies and pseudo-ideological 
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legitimations, the ascendance of which can institutionally distort the market-
oriented logics of economic dynamics, and will in turn give rise to an outcome 
of urban and regional (uneven) development that cannot be fully understood 
and explained by growth-oriented urban regime theory10.  
The second difference from the Fordist-Keynesian regime lies in the 
change of the role and orientation of urban and regional institutions that transit 
from suppliers of extended public goods/services and collective consumptions 
to so-called growth machines. In general terms, as Molotch (1976) says, 
growth has become an overriding commonality to all available options for local 
initiatives in socioeconomic reform. It is in accordance with this overriding 
commonality that a growth coalition consisting of various partners and 
agents11 thereby comes into existence. In more specific terms, the kernel 
upon which a ‘value-free development’ (Logan & Molotch, 1987: 33) purported 
by the growth machine model rests, lies in the ‘commodification of place’ (Ibid: 
1), that is, a growth pattern primarily led by property rentiers and related 
agents which seek and derive interests from tensions between the use value 
interests of residents and the exchange-value interests of local entrepreneurs 
(Harding, 1995; cf. MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999: 508).  
While sharing with urban regime theory the similar weakness of 
concentrating solely on institutions, actors, and forces at urban scales, it is 
argued that another effect of growth coalitions purported by the growth 
machine model, namely, providing ideological hegemony and political 
legitimacy to such coalitions through cooperating with cultural institutions, 
media, and local government, also merits criticism in terms of contextual-
specificity. In the situation where substantive representative democracy such 
as locally elected governments and independent medias are absent, a 
consensus around urban and regional-wide growth as a public good can """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
10 It is proposed that the situation in China since its economic reform in the late 1970s exemplifies how 
the idea of economic growth, as a normative ideology as well as an institutional imperative, has been 
utilised by the party/state to strengthen and complement legitimation and other political strategies. This 
will be elaborated in detail in later chapters.  
11 As MacLeod (2011: 2634) delineates, growth coalition partners and agents cover a wide range of 
actors include: ‘local and metropolitan capital in construction, finance and banking; professional 
practices in law, architecture, design and planning; city politicians keen to acquire sponsorship; other 
indirect beneficiaries of development like local media and utility corporations; and ‘auxiliary players’ 
with compelling local attachments including universities, theatres, professional sports clubs, small 
retailers and labour and community groups’.  
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hardly be a sufficient, solid political legitimacy, to say nothing of the potential 
and negative effects to such legitimacy brought about by inevitable local 
unevenness. In this situation, a higher-level source of legitimation like a 
dominant state ideology is thus required together with nation-state institutions, 
to endow, in a top-down fashion, solid political legitimacy so as to mitigate 
social discontent and public criticism of developmental unevenness12 . In 
addition, as MacLeod and Goodwin (1999: 509) point out, the growth machine 
model makes little effort ‘analytically to integrate the strategies of urban 
growth coalitions within national political projects or accumulation strategies or 
shifts in global flows of accumulation’. If taking into consideration Jessop’s 
(2004) conceptualisation of the state as a complex institutional ensemble 
whose strategically inscribed institutional selectivities may shape and be 
recursively responded to by actors and their respective structurally oriented 
strategic calculation, the growth machine model may be called into question 
as to the original motivations and practical logics of those actors that make up 
a growth coalition. It is therefore not surprising that Lake (1990: 180) observes 
that the stress made by the growth coalition model on property rentiers, 
politicians and other related professional indeed ‘begs the question of why 
society gives rise to these particular kinds of actors’. By pointing out that the 
application of the growth coalition approach by Lloyd and Newlands (1988) in 
the studies of the Aberdeen Beyond 2000 project indeed fails to integrate into 
their study the relevant wider political contexts and spatial scales, MacLeod 
and Goodwin (1999: 509) suggest that both regime and coalition approaches 
‘display insufficient sensitivity to spatial scales above the local/urban to 
provide a causal explanation of the UK experience’ since state controlled and 
orchestrated strategies and projects, more often than not, tend to ‘take 
precedence over the overtly dynamic activitism of entrepreneurs’. It is in the 
same sense proposed that any attempted application of these two 
approaches in the present research needs to be treated cautiously because of 
the political, institutional and other differences between the USA and China, 
although it may be maintained that the growth coalition approach merits some """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
12 China, for example, has in recent years suffered the problem that the public consensus on the 
growth-oriented economic reform is rapidly collapsing. This point will be revisited in detail in later 
chapters. 
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applicable and analytical strength due to its emphasis on the role of property 
developers as well as on the struggle over land and property value, both of 
which are of critical significance to reading China’s urbanisation-driven growth 
and its side effects, particularly in the last decade. In addition, it is argued that 
the analytical weakness of the growth machine approach may, arguably, be 
addressed if the strategies and operations of urban growth coalitions can be, 
in a subtle, logical fashion, institutionally integrated within nation-state 
institutions and their development strategies. This is one of the vital aims 
which my own analytical framework attempts to achieve.  
Whilst the explanatory strength of these two growth-oriented 
approaches for analysing urban and regional governance and development is, 
arguably, more or less limited by their context-dependent applicability and 
their relative overlooking of state institutions and strategies, there are certain 
other approaches and trends, which pay more attention to institutions and 
policies of the state dimension in explaining urban/regional politics and 
development. For example, the policy network approach, which, as Rhodes 
(1990) articulates, relies on the meso-level concept, namely, ‘policy network’, 
has advocated a vertical, structural perspective to reflect and comprehend 
how actors and participants with various types and degrees of 
interdependence and interest-orientations cooperate and conflict with each 
other in and through the interest mediation of integrated policy communities.  
This approach is applied to decipher the political networks and 
governance of both regional- and urban-levels (Midwinter et al., 1991; 
Bomberg, 1994; Bassett, 1996). Indeed, the principal line of reasoning of the 
policy network approach can be used to assess regional uneven development 
in China, in particular, the operation of the urbanisation-driven growth, which 
is in most cases an outcome of the policy integration process that operates to 
mediate multi-scaled competing policy-trajectories and interest-orientations 
within a spatiotemporal fix. Notwithstanding the constructive light shed by the 
policy network approach on multidimensional state spatiality and regional 
politics, the explanatory power and use value of the policy network approach 
may also be over-shadowed by the same problem suffered by regime and 
growth machine theories, that is, failing to integrate the broader 
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socioeconomic and political contexts by and within which policy networks are 
shaped and operating. As MacLeod and Goodwin (1999: 512) pointed out, the 
assumption of seeing meso-level policy networks as mediators that merely 
react to the dynamics of institutions and strategies beyond local and regional 
political networks, ‘plays down the constitutive role which policy communities 
and networks, and other local and regional hegemonic blocs, have in the 
actual structural coupling of accumulation regimes, regulatory modes and 
societal paradigms…and their particular national and subnational inflections’. 
It is based on this consideration that my analytical approach is modified to 
emphasis more the roles of nation-state and socioeconomic and political 
contexts at meta- and macro-levels in order to integrate all these parameters 
into the critical analysis of regional uneven development.  
 
2.1.3 Institutionalist view on regional development 
 The emphasis on the dynamics and actors at various scales, by which 
regional uneven development is shaped, is in this research complemented 
with a strong institution-orientation, that stresses the role of institutional 
presence and practice in shaping both regional/local growth models. This 
emphasis on institutional presence/practice to some extent resonates with the 
so-called ‘institutional turn’ in studies of urban and regional development, 
although the integral theoretical framework constructed for the present 
research has endeavoured to make certain further steps so as to go beyond 
the modest explanatory capacity of institutionalist thinking and approaches to 
secure an ultimate analytical strength to explain the evolution of regional 
uneven development in China under China’s growth-oriented state ideology. 
Before laying out these further steps in detail in a theoretically coherent 
fashion, it is important to critically examine certain influential neo-
institutionalist approaches.  
 Notwithstanding its explicit focus on the nature and effect of 
institutionally associated social relations and institutionalised processes, it is 
argued that the new institutionalist thinking which has emerged since the 
1990s also reveals a growth-orientation which is recognised by both regime 
and growth coalition approaches as a political consensus or a common 
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agenda, the realisation of which vitally underpins and determines actual 
economic performance. On the contrary to the two US-oriented approaches 
which stress the essence of specific forms of public-private partnership, and 
dominant players with respect to developmental trajectories and 
performances at urban scale, neo-institutionalist thinking, in interpreting 
economic growth through the lens of institutions, is concerned more with the 
processive and relational endogenous root of urban/regional economic 
dynamics, that is, what Amin and Thrift (1994; 1995) termed as ‘institutional 
integrity/thickness’, or what Storper (1995) conceptualised as ‘relational 
assets’.  
In other words, the growth-orientation upheld by institutionalist 
approaches is primarily manifested as a series of efforts to reveal more often 
than not in a normative way, ‘regularities in the relationship between 
institutions and economic development’ (Farole, Rodriguez-Pose & Storper, 
2010: 60), through inspirations and reflections of empirical studies of certain 
successful regional innovations and learning zones 13 . The paramount 
importance conferred on institutions in local economic matters, naturally, 
raises questions as to the key properties and functions of institutions. 
According to Amin and Thrift (1992, 1994), ‘institutional thickness’ or ‘integrity’ 
can be forged through four constitutive elements, those are, a strong 
institutional presence, a high level of multifarious interactions among 
institutions, an optimal social atmosphere fostering effective structures of 
domination that minimises sectionalism and rogue behaviour, and a common 
agenda upon which the collection of institutions depends upon and develops 
(MacLeod, 2004; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999).  
While having structurally sketched the notion of ‘institutional thickness’ 
in a somewhat functionalist way, Amin and Thrift (1995: 102, 103), however, 
stressed that, the presence of a collection of institutions per se does not 
naturally leads to such thickness. It is the process of institutionalisation """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
13 For example, Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (1994) advocated that the successful 
economic growth of Santa Croce sull’ Arno in Tuscany provides a sample picture 
illustrating the importance of having an effective ‘institutional thickness. And 
Michael Storper (1997) takes inspiration from the institutional arrangements of 
Silicon Valley and Ile-de-France.  
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matters, as it ‘establishes legitimacy and nourishes relations of trust’, and also 
underpins and stimulates ‘a diffused entrepreneurship – a recognised set of 
codes of conduct, supports, and practices which certain individuals can dip 
into with relative ease’. In other words, the ‘institutional thickness’ approach 
by Amin (1999: 370-374) gives much weight to institutionalising processes 
and regular practices of ‘building clusters and local economies of association’, 
encouraging learning and adaptability, ‘broadening the local institutional 
base’, and ‘mobilizing the social economy’.  
And, it is noteworthy that the ‘wealth of regions’ identified by 
‘institutional thickness’ bears an explicit functionalist orientation resonating 
with and responding to the renaissance of regions in the context of economic 
globalisation. This functionalist orientation, whilst in Amin’s (1999: 370) words 
referring to the objective of making regional sociospatial sites into ‘key staging 
points or centres of competitive advantage within global value chains’, is also 
present in Storper’s (1997) conceptualisation of ‘relational assets’ or ‘untraded 
interdependencies’, as well as in actor-network theory (ANT) (Coe et al., 
2004). To Storper, ‘relational assets’ analysis puts the localisation of 
economic activities in an analytically and practically consistent position within 
globalisation through emphasising the importance of fostering good 
untradeable and unsubstitutable ‘relational assets’ as part of a region’s 
competitive potential (Amin, 1999). This consistency between globalisation 
and local economic growth is also addressed by actor-network theory, 
according to which regional and local endogenous institutional structures 
focus on integrating and fitting a region into the transnational production 
systems through a ‘strategic coupling’ between regional assets and global 
production networks with the purpose of creating, enhancing and capturing 
values for promoting regional development (Coe et al., 2004).  
While this functionalist orientation towards the operation and influence 
of globalisation to some extent successfully built an analytical perspective of 
explaining and encouraging interactive embedment of regions into the global 
economic order, it is maintained that it is also this very emphasis by new 
institutionalist thinking on normative patterns of institutional arrangements and 
practices in linking the global and the local that can ignore some actual 
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strategic intentions and roles of the state in underpinning processes of 
building ‘institutional thickness’. This analytical lacuna in terms of failing to 
‘connect urban-regional change with the changing nature and scalar 
configurations of the state’ has already been addressed by many theoretical 
discourses (MacLeod, 2004: 68; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Brenner, 2000) 
and by empirical reflections (Cox, 2004; Breathnach, 2010; Jones, 2004). 
Suffice it to say in the present context that the neglect of the state by new 
institutionalist analysis makes its analytical applicability highly context-specific 
and leads to the danger that both academic analyses and realistic practices of 
urban governance and growth stop at the point of identifying and realising 
‘institutional thickness’ or ‘relational assets’.  
As MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) noted, the ‘institutional thickness’ 
approach somewhat overlooks the diversities between various institutions in 
their capacities to deploy policy and resource for cementing or dismantling 
institutional thickness, and also neglects various forms of social and political 
exclusions generated by the process of local institutionalisation. This arguably 
further undermines the explanatory strength of the ‘institutional thickness’ 
approach in deciphering the causes of regional uneven development. Yet, it is 
also maintained that certain institutionalist views such as the ‘institutional 
thickness’ analysis and actor-network theory, if been constructed in the 
context of, and integral to, the supra-logics of China’s state ideology and 
national strategies, can shed informative lights on the deciphering of some 
meso-level issues in this research. Indeed, while it is analytically misleading to 
assume that ‘institutional thickness’ is the reason for, and the end of, 
successful urban/regional growth and governance, it is argued that this 
assumption has been widely institutionally realised in reality in a top-down 
fashion in China, contributing to the growing unevenness of regional 
development. It is in this sense that some new institutionalist thinkings are 
adopted and reflected in the analytical framework of this research subject to 
necessary amendments.  
In summary, all the approaches and views on the governance of 
urban/regional development reviewed above possess respective explanatory 
strength in deciphering regional/local uneven development, but suffer from 
35""
various analytical incapabilities due to contextual specificity, phenomenonal 
contingency and, most importantly, analytical incompleteness. As MacLeod 
and Goodwin noted, these approaches make their explanatory strength rely 
too much upon contingent, empirical trends towards destatization, 
denationalization and internationalization. They (1999: 515) argue that, ‘to 
understand the structures, mechanisms and events that actually constitute 
these processes in specific places, and then to understand, in turn, the ways 
in which they impact unevenly upon the structures and processes of urban 
and regional governance, requires a more conjunctural account: one which 
stresses the complex articulation of social, economic and political forces 
through space and across time’.  
 
2.2 From functional specificity of sociospatial units to polymorphy of 
sociospatial relations/processes 
2.2.1 The conventional conception of urban scale and the critiques to it 
Regarding the conception of the ‘social content’ and functional specificity of 
urban spatial units, Castells (1977: 89) proposed that spatial units at urban 
scales must be delimited and defined in accordance with their roles of 
collective consumption and the reproduction of labour power, and, therefore, 
be understood as spatial expressions of specific social functions. This attempt 
at establishing a self-enclosed and coherent spatial definition of the urban by 
linking functional specificity with geographical scale was later criticised by 
Saunders (1986), according to whom sociospatial processes operate on a 
contingent base and thus bear a supra-urban character rather than being 
functionally specific to a pre-given geographical scale.  
Neil Brenner (2009), however, observes that both Castells and 
Saunders have over-emphasised the functional content of the urban from an 
empirical perspective, and have failed to conceptualise how geographical 
scale is itself socially produced and reproduced. Brenner (2009) conceives of 
an intrinsic interlinkage between urban and supra-urban scales, and then 
opposes the view that supra-urban scales and broader social processes are 
merely external parameters to the sociospatial relations of a given urban unit. 
This multidimensional view of urban scale and specificity has extensively 
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been upheld and developed by a variety of works14, which have, arguably, as 
David Harvey’s (1989) study exemplified, transformed the social process of 
urban scale into a subsystem that is intrinsic and subordinate to the 
ecologically dominant system of increasingly globalised capitalist economies.  
The increased mobility of capitals and other resources under 
globalization not only entailed multifaceted and interscalar capital 
accumulations in practice, but also rendered the restructuring and proliferation 
of urban studies to view and conceptualise interscalar roles and relations of 
sociospatial dynamic in more systematic manners. In other words, the urban 
question, as Brenner (2009: 67) observed, was then addressed and 
reconceptualised ‘with direct reference to diverse supraurban rescaling 
processes’ at both vertical and horizontal levels. This trend in the 1990s 
viewed the urban scale as a product of interscalar networks linking with, and 
subject to, various supra-urban political-economic institutions, forces, and 
actors at multifarious scales. This situation of ‘scalar flux’ in terms of ‘local-
global interplay’ implies two assumptions. First, inherited scalar fixes and 
institutional arrangements characterised by nationalised formation, and the 
Fordist-Keynesian pattern are being destabilised in multifarious manners at 
various scales. Second, new development strategies and patterns are being 
formed and implemented, subject to institutional and substantive path-
dependencies, to rescale and reproduce more inter-dependent and inter-
related sociospatial relations with the purpose of securing new forms of 
spatiotemporal fix and structural coherence (Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner, 
2009).  
This literature proposes that these new forms of spatiotemporal fixes 
can help to advance further capital accumulation, and to displace, defer, and 
externalise crisis-tendencies and costs of securing structural coherence, and 
meanwhile to recalibrate, reweave and reconstitute political-economic 
governance and power relations (Harvey, 2001; Jessop, 2004; Brenner, 
2009). It is in this sense that Scott (1998; cf: Brenner, 2009: 68) advocates 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
14 Such works, according to Brenner (2009: 66), include ‘David Harvey’s (1989) capital-theoretic 
account of urban built environments, Allen J. Scott’s (1980) neo-Ricardian theorization of the urban 
land nexus, Michael Storper and Richard Walker’s (1989) post-Weberian analysis of industrial 
agglomeration and territorial development’.  
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that ‘city and city-regions have become increasingly strategic sites of 
regulatory experimentation, institutional innovation, and sociopolitical 
contestation’.  
While the mainstream of studying sociospatial questions since the 
1990s had appeared to be embedded within increasingly tangled interscalar 
contexts of modern geo-economic and political transforms, Brenner (2009: 69) 
has, however, maintained that, the tasks of deciphering the nature, roles and 
implications of geographical scale and interscalar institutional arrangement 
are still at an embryonic stage, and thus pose many challenges to critical 
urban and regional studies. After asserting the conceptual ambiguity and 
incompetence of scale-attuned approaches in deciphering the changing 
concrete-complex sociospatial relations and processes, Brenner (2004, 2009), 
on the one hand, articulates his own conceptualisation of scale for elaborating 
contemporary patterns of urban and regional development, and on the other 
hand, advocates together with others a polymorphic and multidimensional 
sociospatial theory as well as related ontological and methodological 
approaches (Jessop, Brenner & Jones, 2008; Dicken, et al., 2001; Sheppard, 
2002), which adopt and use four intertwined spatial lexicons, namely, territory, 
place, scale, and network. Both of these propositions are reviewed in 
sequence, in relation to this research on China. 
 
2.2.2 Brenner’s conception of scale and the TPSN framework 
First, regarding the conception of scale, Brenner (2009: 70) asserts 
that, whilst scales are ‘the temporarily stabilised effects of diverse sociospatial 
processes’, these diverse sociospatial processes are indeed being scaled and 
rescaled subject to relevant path-dependency. In more specific terms, 
Brenner (2009: 71, 72) claims that social relations and institutional forms are 
vertically differentiated and redifferentiated; and scales should be seen as the 
hierarchical expressions of such vertical structuration. In other words, ‘scales 
are the provisionally stabilized outcomes of scaling and rescaling processes; 
the former can be (relationally) grasped only through an analysis of the latter’ 
in the broader interscalar contexts in which a scalar unit is embedded 
(Brenner, 2009: 71, 72). And it is in this sense that Brenner (2009) advocates 
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that the analytical focus of urban and regional studies should be the 
processes of scaling and rescaling.  
One of the implications of the scaling and rescaling of sociospatial 
processes particularly attracts my attention. This refers to how ‘rescaling 
processes rework the positionalities of sociospatial formations and therefore 
recalibrate the geographies and choreographies of power relations’ (Brenner, 
2009: 73). The recalibration of power relations through modifying the 
relational positionalities of a given sociospatial unit, arguably, lead to what 
Brenner (2009: 73) termed as ‘geographies and choreographies of 
inclusion/exclusion and domination/subordination’, which empower and 
privilege certain actors at the expense of others, and also, to what Jessop 
(2004: 37) defined as the ‘structurally inscribed strategic selectivities’, which 
privilege certain spatial and temporal horizons of actions over others. Suffice it 
to say here that the scaling and rescaling of sociospatial processes at local 
and regional scales in the context of China appeared to be directed, facilitated 
and shaped by the trajectories of dominant state ideologies and institutions. 
Hence, the regional uneven development in question was emerging and being 
reproduced as both ideological and institutional expressions of geographies 
and choreographies of inclusion/exclusion and domination/subordination, and 
therefore, as outcomes of the interactions between structurally inscribed 
strategic selectivities and structurally oriented strategic calculation. These 
presumptions will be both theoretically examined and empirically explored in 
later chapters. 
Regarding the second issue, as Brenner (2009) expressly noted, the 
process-based multifaceted conceptualisation of scale does have its analytical 
limits because the processes of scaling and rescaling, in practice, are 
occurring in conjunction, and interplaying with, some other processes and 
forms of sociospatial structuration and restructuring. Such analytical limit has 
in turn led to the advocacy for introducing a polymorphic, multidimensional 
sociospatial theory, which has led to, inter alia, the ‘TPSN’ framework 
(Jessop, Brenner & Jones, 2008).  
Putting forward the TPSN framework was, to a large extent, motivated 
by the very attempts of transcending the analytical and methodological 
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limitations inherent in conventional one-dimensional sociospatial theories and 
approaches, and of seeking ‘an approach that can grasp the inherently 
polymorphic, multidimensional character of sociospatial relations’ (Jessop, 
Brenner & Jones, 2008: 389). In order to secure such an approach that has 
better explanatory and evaluative strength, the starting point lies in viewing 
territories, places, scales, and networks as ‘mutually constitutive and 
relationally intertwined dimensions of sociospatial relations’ (Ibid: 389).  
Similar with Brenner’s process-based conceptualisation of scales which 
argues that scales of sociospatial relations should be understood as 
processes of scaling and rescaling that are embedded within broader, 
polymorphic interscalar configurations, the parameter of place also merits this 
kind of conceptualisation (Cresswell, 2004). The traditional nationally bounded 
territorial sociospatial relations have likewise been confronting increasingly 
expanded and deepened penetrations forced by various forms of globalised 
trends, and by multinational corporations. These had led to multifaceted 
changing, unstable, and often acute tensions between retaining state 
sovereignties and regulatory controls over domestic territories and exerting 
transnational governances and denationalised interventions towards the 
Westphalian nexus. Such tensions were to various degrees reflected by, for 
instance, the more moderate interplays between the EC and its member 
states on competence issues15, and also by the more contentious conflicts 
within the WTO system16. In addition, the conceptualisation of networks in 
terms of transversal and rhizomatic interspatial interconnectivities, was also 
addressed by some scholars in relation to territories, places, and scales 
(Amin, 2002, 2004; Taylor, 2004).  
Given the dynamic, structural interconnection between the four 
dimensions of sociospatial relations, it is thus advocated by Jessop, Brenner 
and Jones (2008: 392) that the explanatory strength of sociospatial theory is 
most powerful if a study ‘refers to historically specific geographies of social """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
15 The issues on EC/EU’s exclusive competences, shared competences and non-competences have 
since the founding of the EEC, been consistently accompanyed with, and indeed vitally underpinned 
the ongoing process of EC/EU integration. See, e.g. Panos Koutrakos (2006).  
16"The tension between the expanded institutional legitimacy which may enable the WTO law to 
penetrate into domestic regulatory authorities, and the resistance of WTO contracting parties who wish 
to maintain their decisional capacities can well be illustrated in cases such as the EC—Sardines case, 
and the US -- Shrimp-Turtle case. See: S. Huang (2008) (unpublished LLM dissertation)"
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relations’ and ‘explores contextual and historical variation in the structural 
coupling, strategic coordination, and forms of interconnection’ under the 
TPSN framework. This seems to suggest that in explaining the concrete-
complex phenomena of sociospatial relations/processes in the context of the 
contemporary global capitalism, it is analytically and methodologically optimal 
to adopt at least two or more dimensions of the TPSN framework. It is also 
noteworthy in some cases that the logics and dynamics of the emergence and 
combination of new TPSN can be shaped and determined by the change 
and/or reverse of dominant state ideologies and dominant institutional 
practices. It is proposed in this research that this is particularly so in the 
context of China’s successive periodizations from the Cultural Revolution to 
the different stages of the economic reform era. It must also be pointed out 
that, whilst suffice it to say at this stage that all the four dimensions of the 
TPSN framework would be involved in this research, particularly, in the 
second explanatory structure of empirical analyses, it is argued that the 
deployment of this heuristic TPSN framework alone does not suffice to reveal 
and decipher the supra ideological logics, to which regional (uneven) 
development in China has been subject. The over-reliance on TPSN bears 
the risk of making this research a mere empirical observation that describes a 
series of contingent, synthetic phenomena, which are not the casual forces of 
regional uneven development, but are the very things that require 
explanations. In other words, the use of the TPSN framework without 
clarifying first a foundational ontological entity in terms of dominant state 
ideology and/or strategic institutional practices at the state scale, runs the 
tendential risk of deliberatively identifying actors, relations, and/or practices 
that may happen to match the systematically interconnected sociospatial 
dimensions of TPSN. This is likely to lead to an empirically observable and 
analytically coherent explanation, which is nevertheless hardly sustainable 
when viewing changing urban/regional development over time and space.  
It is in this sense I partly agree with Malpas’s (2012: 230) assertion 
that, apart from developing heuristic frameworks to allow a polymorphic 
sociospatial analysis, ‘what is needed is more careful analysis of the 
ontological underpinnings of the very concepts at issue’. For, without a clear 
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understanding of the presence and influence of such ontological 
underpinnings, analyses of TPSN dimensions may be reduced to an ordering 
of empirical observations that has partial, or contingent relations to the very 
phenomenon under observation. In tackling this tendential risk, this research 
adopts a more concrete-complex approach which differs from Malpas’s (2012) 
effort of reconstructing the philosophical conceptualisation of the ontological 
notion of ‘space’.  
Based on a set of empirical observations and reflexive cognitions of 
China’s regional uneven development in various spatiotemporal contexts 
during the last three decades, I thus propose that China’s current dominant 
state ideology and its essential institutional expressions in terms of state 
institutions and strategies can, arguably, be recognised as a quasi-ontological 
presence. It, on the one hand, possesses and exerts strategic structural 
selectivities, either in the form of social imaginary narrative, or in that of 
concrete political and socioeconomic outcomes. On the other hand, this 
quasi-ontological presence provides a basic arena with a set of principal and 
prior rules and principles, upon which all actors and actions of the TPSN 
dimensions are resting and operating. The latter function partially resonates 
with Jessop’s observation of the state’s role as a crucial institutional site and 
discursive framework for political struggles. The essence of my analytical 
perspective goes back to the seemingly unavoidable question as to the actual 
role of the state (the party/state in the context of China), which also is of 
critical significance to the construction of the overall theoretical framework of 
this research. And, it is for this reason that the conceptualisation of the state 
in the context of this research is to be reviewed in the next section.  
 
2.3 An outline of the theoretical framework  
As noted above, one of the core premises underpinning the analytical 
framework of this research starts with the question of how to treat the 
parameter of the state in a way that can precisely reflect its own causal 
powers, on the one hand, and its relations with the actors and systems of 
other different scales, places, territories, and networks. As the present 
research particularly targets the regional uneven development problem in 
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China, it first adopts a meta-physical perspective to conceptualise the national 
state in terms of China’s dominant state ideology and its key institutional 
expressions at the national scale.   
Whilst outlining a specific discussion of justifying this conceptualisation 
goes beyond the scope of this section, suffice it to say that even setting aside 
the concrete effects of a dominant state ideology in pure political realms, 
China’s growth-oriented state ideology had successfully managed during the 
last three decades to reconstruct the foundational, collective sociospatial 
imaginaries of politics and society. And, the wide public recognition of China’s 
growth-oriented state ideology thereby enabled it, either in informal or in 
institutional ways, to exert enduring, extensive influences on multifarious and 
multidimensional socioeconomic matters in China.  The prominence given to 
the dominant state ideology and its institutional expressions in China will be 
analytically deciphered and elaborated, and then be empirically reflected in 
the later chapters. This section only serves to articulate the two approaches 
through which the properties and functions of the state can be conceptualised 
in the context of China.  
 
2.3.1 The approach based on the conception of ecological dominance 
The first one adopts the conception of ‘ecological dominance’ to articulate the 
functions and influences of the dominant ideological and institutional 
expressions of the state of China. It is argued that through the lens of 
Jessop’s notion of ecological dominance (2000: 329), China’s growth-oriented 
state ideology has been acting as the superior idea that holds ecological 
dominance in political and socioeconomic senses, and, accordingly, exerts ‘its 
developmental logic on other systems’ operating through structural coupling, 
strategic coordination and blind co-evolution to a greater extent than the latter 
can impose their respective logics on that system’. 
The idea of ecological dominance at first derives from the discipline of 
plant and animal ecosystems. Jessop (2000: 328) adapted it to delineate the 
‘co-presence of operationally autonomous systems and the lifeworld – with 
the structural coupling and co-evolution of these systems and the lifeworld 
mediated by various competitive, cooperative and exploitative mechanisms’. 
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As an ecological dominance is manifested through an operationally 
autonomous system exerting superior logics and capacities to which the 
performance of all other systems are more or less subject, Jessop (Ibid) takes 
a regulationist view, further articulating certain characteristics of an 
ecologically dominant system.  
Two characteristics are revealed to be of particular importance to this 
research and also, to Jessop’s strategic-relational approach. As Jessop 
(2000: 329) argued, an ecologically dominant system is capable of spatially 
and temporally distantiating and compressing its operations to sustain an 
expanding self-reproduction. And, secondly, it can secure the internal 
coherence of a given spatiotemporal fix by displacing and deferring 
contradictions, paradoxes and dilemmas to other spatiotemporal horizons. 
These two characteristics (or capacities) indicate that the production and 
sustaining of the ecological dominance of a given system may only be 
possible at the expense of subordination and externalisation of the interests of 
other non-dominant, unprivileged systems and actors through institutionally-
oriented spatial and temporal arrangements.  
If taking this line of reasoning into consideration in studying regional 
(uneven) development, it is argued that the presence of an ecological 
dominance is, either in a strategic, or in a contingent fashion, directly or 
indirectly shaping regional uneven development of sociospatial processes and 
relations across (institutionally defined) temporal horizons. As the later case 
studies of this research will show, there has existed in China since the mid-
1990s a dominant institutional time, the length of which covers less than five 
years, and, more importantly, the temporal horizons of which decisively 
compressed the operations of local state institutions, and thus made them 
only seek short-term, utilitarian objectives which exhibited privileges and 
selectivities to a few actors whilst displacing as well as deferring costs and 
contradictions to other parties and spatiotemporal horizons. These issues will 
be specifically explored in Chapter Four and the case study chapters.  
Regarding the constitution and orientation of an ecologically dominant 
system, Jessop (2000), while maintaining that other systems do have 
reciprocal impacts on the primacy of ecological dominance, made it clear that 
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it is the contemporary capitalist economic system, especially in its neo-
liberalising form of globalisation, that presents and possesses the relational, 
relative ecological dominance.  
 The constitution of ecological dominance perceived by Jessop is 
arguably not thoroughly applicable in the context of China, which presented, 
during its economic reform era, a somewhat unique picture that differs from 
conventional capitalist development. In more specific terms, the ecologically 
dominant system in modern China reveals itself to be a complex of the 
growth-oriented state ideology and a set of institutional expressions that were 
established for realising this state ideology.  
The uniqueness of this system lies in the fact that its economic growth 
orientation is not motivated and activated by the usual end of continuingly 
advancing capital accumulation. Instead, it is proposed that economic growth 
and capital accumulation are both recognised and utilised as measures and 
tools subject to the thematic political aim of restoring and strengthening the 
Chinese party/state’s authorities and functions, which had been severely 
undermined and vitiated by the aggressive social-ethic movements of the 
Cultural Revolution. In other words, the quasi-capitalist characteristics of 
China’s ecological dominance are ideologically and institutionally bundled with 
the superior task of sustaining the regime legitimacy of the party/state. Suffice 
it to say here that with the vacuum of the orthodox socialist legitimacy, and the 
absence of representative democratic legitimation, the party/state of China in 
the reform era has no other choice but to rely on the performance legitimacy 
in terms of consistently promoting national economic growth. Growth, as Deng 
himself addressed, is not only a pure economic issue, but also a politically 
vital task17. And, the national political and strategic selectivity towards growth 
has in many respects been recognised and accepted by the general public 
who in turn gave their consents to such way of legitimation through their 
participation in socioeconomic activities in more liberalised and multifarious 
manners albeit with a somewhat narrowly defined objective of profit-
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
17 As Deng said, ‘why do the people support us? Because over the last ten years our economy has been 
developing’. ‘if the economy stagnated for five years or developed at only a slow rate, for example, at 
4 or 5 percent, or even 2 or 3 percent a year, what effects would be produced? This would be not only 
an economic problem but also a political one’. See, Vogel (2011: 667). 
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maximization. It is in this sense that the reflexive-recursive unity in Jessop’s 
strategic relation approach can be adaptively embodied in the context of 
China’s economic reform. These will be more specifically elaborated in 
Chapter Four, in the case study chapters, and in the conclusion.  
 
2.3.2 The approach of seeing the state as political strategy 
The second approach for conceptualising the national-state resonates with 
the proposition of seeing the state as political strategy, and, more clearly, with 
the light shed by crisis theory on the connections between the renaissance 
and outcomes of urban/regional growth, and the restructuring and rescaling of 
state institutions. The starting point for this proposition, according to, inter alia, 
MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) and Jessop (1995), is neo-Gramscian theory 
which puts capitalist accumulation processes into the relational context of 
certain specific hegemonic state projects. By doing so, neo-Gramsican state 
theory advocates an integral perspective to understand the presence and 
operations of the state at various spatial scales, thereby concentrating on how 
state authorities are ‘mediated through a complex ensemble of institutions, 
organizations and forces operating within, orientated toward or located at a 
distance from the juridico-political apparatus’ (Jessop, 1997: 52).  
Neo-Gramscian theory seems to conceive of urban and regional 
growth and governance as dynamic integral parts of the continuing 
implementation and sustaining of a political project and a scalar fix across 
some specific temporal horizons. From a domestic institutional perspective, 
this integral approach, as Jessop (1995) observes, works to translate 
economic forces and activities into those susceptible to, and relational with, 
state actions in terms of structurally inscribed strategic selectivities. In a 
historical sense, this approach enables an integral, multidimensional 
perspective to encapsulate the broad contextual shift and transition from the 
Fordist-Keynesian pattern to the neo-liberal regime, into the narratives of ‘the 
ideas, spaces and times of particular state projects, representational regimes 
and societal paradigms’ (Jenson, 1993; cf. MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999: 516).  
In terms of the present research, it is argued that it is this analytical 
position of putting the evolution and expression of regional uneven 
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development into a set of historical and contextual political and 
socioeconomic regimes, projects and paradigms, that leads to proper and 
precise understandings of regional uneven development in particular, and the 
‘China Model’ at large. Whilst this broad-contextual analytical perspective of 
the neo-Gramsican approach can be plausible in studying regional growth and 
governance in China, it must be noted that the next analytical step proposed 
by Jessop (1990: 260) in viewing the state ‘as the site, the generator and the 
product of strategies’ requires vital amendments and adaption before it can 
reflect and grasp the underlying logics and the concrete-complex situations of 
China. 
As Jessop et al (1988: 159; cf. MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999) argued, 
state strategy refers to patterned state intervention which ‘(a) favors the 
course of [a particular] accumulation strategy and the flow of material benefits 
to the requisite social base; and (b) constructs forms of representation that 
systematically favor the access of the key sectors and social groups to sites of 
political and economic power’. This in turn entails that the structural and 
strategic dimensions of state may thus be institutionally privileged and 
selective to the actions and strategic calculations of certain political agents 
and interest groups within a specified spatiotemporal fix. Indeed, Jessop 
(1990: 10) gives a summarising definition of this process of structurally 
inscribed strategic selectivity, according to which: 
Particular forms of state privilege some strategies over others, privilege 
the access by some forces over others, some interests over others, 
some time horizons over others, some coalition possibilities over 
others. A given type of state, a given state form, a given form of 
regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according 
to the strategies they adopt to gain state power. And it will be more 
suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy 
than others because of the modes of intervention and resources which 
characterize that system.  
So far so good, the conceptualisation of the state as a site of strategy then 
leads attention to the particular way of practising such structural selectivity. To 
Jessop (1990), the key of arranging and tackling different interest-orientations 
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and appeals lies in the effort of constructing and realising a ‘hegemonic 
project’ which ‘mobilizes support behind a concrete program of action that 
asserts a contingent general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly 
or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) 
and thereby privileges particular economic-corporate interests compatible with 
this program while derogating the pursuit of other interests that are 
inconsistent with the project (Jessop, 1997: 62).  
Through the lens of ‘hegemonic project’, MacLeod and Goodwin (1999: 
517), based on the case study of London’s successive mode of governance, 
advocate that dominant social and political forces will search for a particular 
hegemonic project in order to build ‘the state form and associated scalar fix – 
the institutional site suitably organized along functional and territorial lines – 
which can best further their particular strategies’; and such state form and 
scalar fix thereby play a critical role in the restructuring of urban and regional 
governance. Notably, it is this application of conceptualising the state as 
political strategy and hegemonic project in the concrete case of British context 
and experiences triggers the need to critically amend and adapt this 
conceptualisation as well as the strategic relational approach to cope with 
China’s historical-contextual uniqueness.   
After laying out a brief analysis discussing the evolution of London’s 
urban governance in relation to the adoption and operation of various state 
institutions with different state selectivities in his 1999 article with MacLeod, 
Pemberton and Goodwin (2012) later wrote another unpublished paper, which 
more specifically and fully explores the changing governance of London in 
terms of the politics of state rescaling, scale periodization and political 
strategy. In resonating with Brenner’s (2009) call for a greater focus on the 
periodization of state rescaling, Pemberton and Goodwin (2012) 
demonstrated how London’s successive governance modes were connected 
to a set of political strategies, showing how successive central governments 
have institutional and rescaling arrangements to secure the realisation of 
primary and prior national party objectives and state strategies. Whilst the 
essential property of state strategy in each successive periodization of state 
rescaling is roughly invariant in abstract terms, that is, building a particular 
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hegemonic state form that privileges some actors, groups and accumulation 
strategies over others, it is, however, argued that it is the very methodology of 
periodization and its entailed analytical approach, which gives rise to the 
necessity of restructuring the conceptualisation of viewing the state as political 
strategy to making this conceptualisation and the related ‘strategic relational 
approach’ to be analytically compatible and plausible with China’s concrete-
complex situations. 
Based on the consideration of having a multidimensional perspective 
that can grasp the polymorphic manifestations and nature of sociospatial 
relations under the ‘TPSN’ approach, this leads to the advocacy of identifying 
and explaining the politics of ‘place’ in terms of state practices, which is 
behind both the rescaling processes of state governance and their 
implications for structures/networks of governance (Cox, 2009). And in 
Brenner’s (2009) terms, this turns out to be a focus on the periodization of 
state activity, which illustrates the underlying processes and actual 
consequences of the different phases of state rescaling, and, as Pemberton 
and Goodwin (2012: 4) observed, differentiates ‘rescaling effects from other 
dimensions of state spatial restructuring as well as considering the influence 
of a variety of factors – including state spatial strategies, political territorial 
alliances and social forces – on the evolving sites, objects and means of 
governance emerging at particular scales and working through particular 
networks’.  
 The analytical objective of Pemberton and Goodwin (2012) in the case 
study of London’s changing political and economic governance over the last 
50 years has been plausibly achieved through articulating the connections 
between trajectories of state rescaling practices and a set of political 
strategies. It is, however, argued that the analytical strength of their 
periodization approach is premised on a set of assumptions in relation to state 
regime and the foundation of political legitimacy, which cannot be taken for 
granted to be sustainable in the context of China. For example, one essential 
assumption lies in that the state is acting as the generator of political 
strategies. While this assumption may prima facie be sustained in both China 
and Britain, there is indeed a radical difference in concrete terms underlying 
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this assumption; and it may arguably distort to a severe extent any derivations 
of this assumption.  
This difference lies in the question that, upon what political foundation 
the legitimacy of a national state’s political strategies and hegemonic projects 
is justified and premised. Central governments in Britain usually derive their 
power to justify and undertake state strategies from the result of a general 
election. The construction and implementation of state strategies in Britain 
thus do not interfere with the central government’s political legitimacy at least 
during its term of office.  
China’s somewhat authoritarian political regime, however, presents a 
radically different situation. In general terms, whilst there exists the system of 
change in office, the CPC, as the sole ruling party in China, has during the 
economic reform premised its regime legitimacy, for more than three decades, 
largely on its performance in terms of constructing and implementing growth-
oriented institutions, strategies and policies. In other words, rather than having 
gained legitimacy before laying out state strategy, the party/state of China 
was making the hegemonic project of focusing on economic growth and its 
entailed state strategies as the indispensable means for their political 
legitimation and crisis management.  
Suffice it to say here that this difference triggers the necessity of paying 
more attention to the actual objectives, properties, and operational logics 
underlying China’s growth-oriented state ideology and its entailed state 
strategies in order to secure a precise, comprehensive understanding of the 
supra logics, by and to which regional development is shaped and subject. 
This would thus be elaborated in detail in the next chapter.  
Another key assumption in the case study of Pemberton and Goodwin 
(2012) is one which resonates with Jessop’s (1990) assertion that whilst the 
state can be the generator of state strategies, it can never be the absolute 
guarantor. As Jessop (1990: 261) clearly observes, the ‘structure and modus 
operandi of the state system can be understood in terms of their production in 
and through past political strategies and struggles’. This is, inter alia, 
indicative of the key reason that prevents the state from being an absolute 
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guarantor of the constructions and operations of its institutions, policies, and 
strategies.  
Putting this into the concrete context of Britain, it may, for example, 
refer to that the change of office, which results in a new government 
possessing no proper institutional arrangements that are suitable and 
compatible with implementing its new state strategies; and many strategies 
and policies are being conducted subject to various path-dependencies. In 
MacLeod and Goodwin’s words (1999: 517), ‘the present state form is partly 
the product of past strategies or, more accurately, the product of the 
interaction between past patterns of strategic selectivity and the strategies 
currently adopted for their transformation’.  
If we place the above assumption in terms of institutional path-
dependency into China’s concrete situation, it surely sustains; yet its 
manifestations in practice have, arguably, proved to be much more 
complicated as to the incompatibility between the change of office and state 
strategy and the existing institutional structures. Suffice it to say here that the 
reverse of China’s dominant state ideology shifting from Marx-Leninism and 
Maoism to the growth-oriented ideology, on the one hand, justified, from the 
very top, a substantial restructuring of state institutions, of which the strategic 
functions and structural presences had been ineffective in and/or incompatible 
with promoting the normative value of economic growth. And, on the other 
hand, it authorised, also in a top-down fashion, a great deal of path-shaping 
powers and actions, which were, at least in nominal terms, serving to realise 
the growth-oriented state ideology through various institutions, strategies, and 
policies. In other words, under China’s single ruling party authoritarian regime, 
the growth-oriented state ideology has, prima facie, enabled the governance 
and growth of urban/regional development to be less subject to the influence 
of institutional path-dependency. Yet, this does not mean that the state in the 
context of China can be the guarantor of state strategies. On the contrary, if 
taking a broader integral perspective to view China’s economic reform and 
development, it is argued that, whilst the same growth objective and similar 
state institutional arrangements formed at regional/urban scales under the 
growth-oriented state ideology, have established many sets of relative 
51""
structural coherence, which are sustaining the so-called ‘China Model’, such 
relative structural coherence has itself become an unsustainable, powerful 
path-dependency to tackling the high costs of achieving this structural 
coherence (for example: increasing regional uneven development and social 
discontentment), and, to transforming the so-called ‘China Model’ into an 
environmentally more sustainable, socially more just, and politically more 
democratic development regime.  
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Chapter Three:  Methodology 
 
3.1 General description of the methodology of this research 
This chapter mainly aims to lay out and decipher some methodological 
approaches and issues in relation to this research. As noted in Chapter 2, 
MacLeod and Goodwin (1999) expressly maintained that the attempt to 
integrate macro-theories of the state into policy network approaches may fail 
because of ontological and methodological incompatibilities between these 
theories and approaches. Though there is a danger that this research also 
encounters such incompatibilities in constructing its analytical framework for 
studying and understanding state actors at different scales, it is argued that 
this methodological incompatibility is to some extent overcome by the 
adoption of a multi-layered framework, in which different research methods 
can be embedded. It is also less of a danger in the context of China, where 
national level policies are more closely connected to actual behaviour in a 
variety of concrete structures.  
 Generally speaking, the composition of the methodological framework 
is like a funnel-form hierarchy. The empirical reflection of each layer/scale of 
this hierarchy involves different types of methods. It is under this funnel-form 
framework that those essential actions and interactions of the ideological, 
institutional and industrial objects of this research at different layers/scales are 
to be analysed with reference to academic discourses, and be reflected by the 
outcomes of the fieldwork. Within this funnel-form hierarchical framework, we 
can therefore accommodate a bottom-up approach that contrasts with, and is 
complementary to, a top-down theoretical analysis. 
This at first allows a methodologically feasible fieldwork, which starts at 
the lower scales and grasps regional-specific concrete issues, for there exist 
great barriers and risks in accessing primary data at higher scales in the 
context of China. The bottom-up approach helps to reflect and articulate the 
outcomes of the empirical studies in a way that sees them as causally 
traceable as well as analytically derivable primary data, which can be related 
to the theoretical assumptions made in this research. A general, brief 
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illustration of this funnel-form, methodological framework is presented as 
follows: 
 
 Research Objects Adopted Methodology 
Meta-Level  Dominant state 
ideologies 
Documentation-based 
analyses on: 
1.top political 
judgements and 
statements, 
2.national strategies and 
policies. 
 
Macro-Level Relevant institutional 
expressions and 
practices at the central 
scale  
 
Documentation-based 
analysis on: 
1.policy papers and 
issues of the central 
scale,  
2.national institutional 
expressions and 
practices in relation to 
regional development of 
Jiangsu province. 
 
Meso-Level Key institutions and 
growth patterns in 
Jiangsu province, and in 
Nantong city and 
Changzhou city  
1.Documentation-based 
analysis on 
regional/local policies 
and institutions, 
2. Interviews with local 
state officials and 
businessmen. 
Micro-Level Leading growth engines 
and events underlying 
the regional uneven 
1.Documentation-based 
analysis on 
regional/local policies 
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development between 
the south and the north 
of Jiangsu province 
and institutions. 
2. Interviews with local 
state officials and local 
businessmen. 
 
 
 In more specific terms, regarding the methods for each level 
respectively, it is first proposed that most meta- and macro-level issues will be 
dealt with in Chapter 4 through a series of critical analyses and articulations of 
top political judgements and statements, national strategies and policy 
papers, and institutions at the national scale or with national applicability. It is 
impossible to personally access national leaders for interviews. It is therefore 
more valuable in analytical terms to extract from published political statements 
and policies papers essential information and views that may inspire and infer 
reasonable or arguable ideas and propositions. Because of China’s unique 
authoritarian regime, top leaders such as Mao and Deng’s works and words 
are given particular attention and prominence, as their orders and opinions 
can on most occasions shape the basic path of development for the country, 
and also take priority on most policies or even constitutional rules in practice. 
In other words, we can reasonably recognise their core ideas as important 
parts of China’s state ideology. In addition to Mao and Deng’s political 
decisions, central policy papers such as the Five-Year Development Plans for 
National Economy, Notices issued by the State Council and different 
Ministries, and the CPC resolution papers are also of significance to this 
research. These policy papers reflect various crucial state institutional 
practices and expressions that shaped or affected regional (uneven) 
development in China. Most of these policy papers are available on line 
through accessing the official websites of central government and ministries.  
Regarding the meso- and micro-level of this framework, most of the 
primary fieldwork of this research took place at these levels. In order to obtain 
some primary data from those who personally experienced or are currently in 
charge of the issues which I wish to address, I thus conducted a series of 
interviews and some group seminars with: 
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1.local state officials working in the relevant departments, committees, and 
offices of the provincial government of Jiangsu, the municipal governments of 
Changzhou and Nantong, the district government of Wujin, and the county 
government of Haian;  
2. managers working in state-owned enterprises in Changzhou and Nantong 
city; 
3. managers and staff of powerful local stakeholders such as large private 
companies and local professionals in Changzhou and Nantong city.  
Notably, some group seminars were held by Nantong municipal 
government and Haian county government, thanks to the kindness of the local 
head officials. These seminars were participated in by local officials who are 
in charge of different departments, including, for example, the local 
government office, the local Commission of Reform and Development, and 
the local Merchant Bureau. It is quite rare for a local government in China to 
hold such seminars for a student. I grasped this chance, obtaining much 
valuable information through communicating with different local head officials 
and learning their official views and elaborations on regional uneven 
development at large and local development in particular. These seminars 
were based on particular themes, and usually lasted for two to three hours. 
For example, the first group seminar held by Nantong municipal government 
mainly concerned the roles of Nantong government in promoting local 
development in recent years and the major local growth engines/sectors. The 
first group seminar held by Haian county government was mainly concerned 
with local development zones in Haian and the local sociospatial rescaling.  
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way, and the notes 
made during the interviews were translated into English. The transcripts were 
then used to identify major themes and issues, and these were then woven 
together with policy and documentary material. The interviews usually started 
with a set of prepared questions, the contents of which varied according to the 
aim of the interview and the position of the interviewee. For example, in 
interviewing Mr. Y who is a state official in the Labour Bureau of Wujin, the 
questions I prepared were primarily about migrant labourers in Wujin district. 
And, in talking with Mr. S who is a former head official of the Planning Bureau 
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of Wujing district, my questions were mainly concerned with local planning 
and development. In addition to local state officials, I also interviewed 
businessmen and other professionals. For example, I interviewed Ms. J who 
is a senior journalist working in Jiangsu Broadcasting (the official provincial 
broadcasting). As Ms. J specialises in reporting the real estate industry and 
markets in Jiangsu province, our conversation mainly focused on the state-led 
urbanisation process in Jiangsu during the third stage of economic reform.  
In addition, as this research is in some respects adoptive of the TPSN 
method, it must be pointed out that the actual practice of my fieldwork has 
also been shaped in accordance with this orientation. In more specific terms, 
while the general research object refers to regional uneven development in 
Jiangsu province, the term ‘regional development’ refers to different outcomes 
during different stages of China’s economic reform, and to different local 
growth patterns and engines, which were also operating at different scales 
and in different places. Accordingly, the methodological practice of this 
research also recognises the parameters of scale, place, and network. For 
instance, my interviews with local state officials and businessmen were 
conducted at township-, county-, and municipal-scales respectively. 
Interviews at different scales involved discussions of different core topics, 
subject to the specific roles and experiences of the interviewees. At township- 
scale, conversations focused more on TVEs’ development whereas at county- 
or above scales, issues regarding various local development zones were 
emphasized. And, at municipal- and provincial-scales, particular attention was 
given to state-led, urbanisation-driven growth.  
Similar strategies were also adopted with respect to different 
interviewees in the south and north of Jiangsu. But it must be clarified that 
while such methodological calibrating owed much to theoretical analyses and 
deductions before the fieldwork, it was by no means achieved at the outset. 
Rather, three rounds of fieldwork were conducted during the last three years 
(one was in the summer of 2012, and the other two were in the summer of 
2013, and in the winter of 2014 respectively). It was this progression, with the 
data being gathered in a dynamic fashion, that shaped the forms and contents 
of interview and seminar questions. In essence, each round of fieldwork 
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added further interviewees, until I felt I could reflect and grasp the processes 
of uneven regional development.  
 It is also worth noting that apart from the interviews and group 
seminars, this research also benefited from my previous experience of serving 
as the senior manager of Shanghai People Enterprise (Group) Ltd. (a top 500 
Chinese company). I was involved in a large number of inward investment 
invitation campaigns, communicating and negotiating with local governments 
which attempted to invite the company to establish manufacturing bases in 
their localities. These local governments included, inter alia, Gangzha district 
government of Nantong city, Xuzhou municipal government, Huangshi 
municipal government, Haierbin municipal government, Panan county 
government of Jinhua city, Panshi county government of Jilin city, Wenling 
county government of Taizhou city, Dandong municipal government, and so 
on. These experiences provided me with a concrete understanding of how a 
development zone-driven growth pattern was operated by local governments 
with respect to a set of key aspects of inward investment campaigns, inter-
locality competitions as well as the actual practices of enterprises in 
development zones.  
 
3.2 Issues of methodological feasibility in the particular context of China 
The party-state bureaucracy of China always exerts strong and extensive 
controls over information regulation and security, based on ideological and 
practical considerations. Therefore, any access to China’s state officials will 
usually be declined as most state officials are uncertain about whether their 
discussion with civilians, in particular, researchers with foreign backgrounds 
can be ratified by their superiors, and it may result in a negative impact on 
their careers. Pursuant to the ‘Confidential notes for Party and Government 
Functionaries’ published in 2009, the provision of government information and 
official data to external individuals/entities must be ratified by the relevant 
state institutions, and such provisions shall only be made by state institutions 
rather than by individual functionaries. In a word, there are a series of 
legislations and policies, which tightly regulate data provision by state 
institutions and functionaries.  
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These policies and regulations, not surprisingly, caused me many 
difficulties in conducting interviews and discussions with local state officials. 
Fortunately, as one of the most socioeconomically developed provinces in 
China, Jiangsu has built up a relatively open and plural atmosphere. However, 
certain connections were necessary for securing smooth access to state 
officials and information. Changzhou city is my hometown, and my experience 
of being the national champion in a competition of Chinese studies held by the 
China Central Television (the national broadcasting of China) also contributed 
to my access to local state institutions and functionaries, as my name was 
well known and trusted. 
My fieldwork in Nantong city was also facilitated by my personal 
connections with the Executive Vice-Mayor of Nantong, for whom I had 
served as a personal interpreter. It is impossible to obtain any key information 
from the local governments of Nantong and Haian without ratification by high-
ranking local officials.  
A key issue must be pointed out here in relation to the interviews. 
Because of the high political sensitivity of expressing views and observations, 
most state officials and functionaries I interviewed did not wish to be recorded 
according to the ‘Confidential notes for Party and Government Functionaries’. 
Accordingly, full notes were taken, and most of the expressions and views 
made by interviewee officials were not recorded, as such recording would 
have breached the relevant regulations of state security. As noted before, Ms. 
Gao Yu, a famous Chinese journalist, has very recently been arrested for 
leaking state secret documents to overseas websites18. This meant I had to 
proceed using my own notes rather than full transcript, but I caught the main 
thoughts and key opinions of each interviewee, and managed to identify a set 
of themes and issues stemming from each interview.   
While most state officials are not allowed to disclose politically and 
ethically sensitive information, topics and issues such as corruption and 
insider dealing are not part of my research objectives, and thus do not affect 
my research outcomes. For example, if one local head official assigns an 
infrastructure project to a related person without complying with the proper """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
18 See: BBC News on May 8th, 2014: 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-27321241 (Accessed on May, 14th, 2014)"
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biding procedure, there can be corruption problems involved in terms of a 
bribe. But this does not affect local development in a strict sense because no 
matter which company conducts this project, similar GDP and employment 
contribution will be achieved, and the project will be done in accordance with 
the local growth pattern. Thus, those state officials whom I had interviewed 
generally placed with no constraints on the conversations they had with me, 
and those issues, with which they are not allowed to touch, do not necessarily 
impact the data I collected.  
In addition, most state officials will release their full name, and some 
wish complete anonymity. Those state officials who were prepared to be 
identified by their positions were as follows: 
Mr. A is a chief manager of a large chemical factory. 
Mr. D is the current Mayor of Haian county. 
Ms. C is a chief officer in the Municipal Bureau of SMEs of Nantong 
Mr. D is the current Mayor of Haian county. 
Mr. G is the former leading official of Changzhou high-tech zone. 
Mr. J is a state official in the Office of Provincial Government of Jiangsu. 
Mr. L is a head state official of the Municipal Office of Nantong city. 
Ms. M is a state official in the Office of Wujin district government. 
Mr. S is a former head officer of the Planning Bureau of Wujing district. 
Mr. T, a head state official of Jiaze village of Wujin district. 
Mr. U is the Director of Haian County Office. 
Mr. X is the director-general of Haian government office. 
Mr. W is a state official at the Administration for Industry and Commerce of 
Wujin district of Changzhou city. 
Mr. Y is a state official in the Labour Bureau of Wujin 
Mr. Z is the director-general of Haian Development and Reform Committee. 
A further 11 state officials were interviewed but did not want to be identified 
even by their position, because of political considerations 
.  In addition to local state officials, local businessmen and professionals 
were also interviewed during the fieldwork. Those willing to be identified by 
position were: 
Mr. is a chief manager of a large chemical factory in Nantong city. 
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Mr. Dai is local entrepreneur in Wujin district. 
Mr. G is a senior local entrepreneur in Changzhou city.  
Ms. J is a senior journalist in the provincial broadcasting company of Jiangsu. 
Mr. L is a senior architect in Changzhou city. 
Ms. S is a vice-president of the Shanghai People’s Enterprise Group. 
Mr. Yuan is a local entrepreneur of ironwork in Wujin district. 
Mr. Z is a senior manager in an IT company in Changzhou city. 
Indeed, I also interviewed a further 19 businessmen and professional who 
wished to remain completely anonymous.  
 
Despite the obvious difficulties of conducting fieldwork in very sensitive 
political conditions, I was able to acquire a set of primary data which gave me 
firm insights into the processes of uneven regional development in Jiangsu. 
When coupled with the policy documents and political announcements at a 
national scale, I was able to build a strong picture of the way that national 
level policies were implemented within Jiangsu Province.  
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Chapter Four: Towards a contextual framework: 
utilitarianism, pragmatism and China’s state ideology 
 
This chapter serves to articulate and decipher some supra-logics and 
hegemonic projects of China’s economic reform to provide the context for an 
understanding of the evolving regional unevenness in China. This chapter 
consists of two parts. The first takes a historical-abstract overview, glancing at 
the political philosophies and forces underlying how the ‘reign of virtue’ 
characterised by the Cultural Revolution was reversed and replaced by the 
growth-oriented state ideology. It is argued that, as the guiding logics of the 
pre- and post-reform state ideologies are highly contradictory but 
institutionally tangled in path-dependent terms, a brief glance at this 
fundamental transition of state ideology helps outline some significant 
ideological and institutional incentives and constraints It is then argued that, 
unlike the conventional alteration of political strategies and institutions, which 
does not change the basic property and pattern of state ideology and regime 
legitimacy, China’s economic reform was triggered by a thorough alteration of 
its dominant state ideology, which politically reconstituted the regime 
legitimacy. This in turn resulted in a substantial number of modifications to the 
aim, function, and structure of state institutions at various scales. It is in this 
sense proposed that China’s economic reform is indeed guided by and serves 
the pragmatic consideration of how to restore and strengthen the authorities 
and functions of the party/state of the CPC, which had been severely vitiated 
by the Cultural Revolution. 
 The second part of this chapter lays out a set of articulations, which 
outline and decipher the two core ideas of China’s growth-oriented state 
ideology, namely, utilitarianism and pragmatism, which both exhibit unique 
Chinese characteristics. The significance of utilitarianism and pragmatism to 
regional uneven development in China has three dimensions. First, they 
provided the core philosophical rationales for envisioning and forming general 
developmental guidelines and strategies at national scales. Second, they also 
constituted the key ideological and political foundations and justifications for 
various institutional expressions/practices at different scales. Third, they 
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shaped and mobilised public recognitions and individual/collective behaviours 
in accordance with and towards the growth orientation in order to promote 
growth and governance simultaneously. Notably, it is proposed that the 
institutional practices of both utilitarianism and pragmatism revealed 
prominent spatial and temporal elements and effects at different scales and 
during different periods. Thus, apart from political and philosophical analyses, 
the articulations of time-space relations in socioeconomic systems and 
developments are also of importance to the critical readings of China’s 
utilitarianism and pragmatism. In addition, the analyses and articulations of 
the two ideas are to be, though not in a highly precise fashion, embedded 
within a three-stage panorama that reflects not only the evolution and 
transition of China’s economic reform as a whole, but also those hegemonic 
growth patterns/engines of regional development during respective different 
periods. In brief, China’s economic reform since the late 1970s can be divided 
into three stages, those are, the first stage (the late 1970s – the earlier 
1990s), the second stage (the mid-1990s – the earlier 2000s), and the third 
stage (the earlier 2000s – 2013).  
 
4.1 From Mao’s general will to Deng’s growth-oriented state ideology  
The starting point lies in the assumption that the dominant state ideology 
underlying China’s economic reform since the late 1970s was derived from, 
and shaped by, a re-balance between Mao’s reign of social virtue, and Deng’s 
growth-oriented regime. This re-balance has profoundly directed, steered and 
shaped, though by no means in a straight-line fashion, China’s growth and its 
sociospatial relations and processes at a variety of scales during the last three 
decades.   
 Obviously, the growth-oriented state ideology does not come into being 
from a vacuum or by a sudden inspiration. And, it is argued that this state 
ideology, in the particular context of China, bears relatively far less systematic 
guidance and localised theoretical legitimacy compared with conventional 
Marxism-Leninism and Maosim. But, rather than being merely a coincidental 
result of power struggles, the emergence of this state ideology profoundly 
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reflects a long and persistent conflict of ideas and values, and the choice 
made by China under the impacts of various external dynamics.  
 If we first take a long-term perspective exclusive of any external 
influences to look into the inception of the growth-oriented state ideology in 
China, it is arguably conspicuously incompatible with the previous state 
ideology. Such incompatibility is mainly expressed through a sharp turn from 
focusing on abstract social virtues to stressing the paramount importance of 
developing the economy and science. Though balancing the conflict between 
economic efficiency and social justice has been quite common a practice in 
many modern developed countries, the key political-ideological turn in China 
is particularly noteworthy because of its thoroughness and persistency19.  
Contrary to conventional alterations of party policy strategies and 
institutions, which do not involve changes to the fundamental nature and 
pattern of state ideology and regime legitimacy, China’s economic reform was 
triggered by a thorough alteration of its dominant state ideology, which 
substantially reconstituted the regime legitimacy. It is thus argued that the 
alteration of, and the conflicts between, the state ideologies of different 
administrations and reigns constituted and provided the context for all other 
essential institutional factors and parameters at various scales.  
If looking more specifically into the key differences in the theoretical 
root and political assertion between Mao’s reign of social virtue and the 
growth-oriented state ideology, two questions deserve particular attention. 
These are: what constitutes the origin and essence of the regime legitimacy 
purported by Mao’s reign of social virtue, and who could constitute the social 
and political bearer of such legitimacy. These two questions will hence be 
addressed in order to decipher Mao’s reign of social virtue. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
19 Regarding the character of thoroughness, it is argued that the founding of the growth-oriented state 
ideology amounts to a thorough decline in the reign of virtue, the ascendancy of which was largely 
based on collective social virtue, and sustained by the moral, ethical progress of the society. In more 
specific terms, the state ideology during the period of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) was 
characterised by a subordinacy of technico-economic developments and institutions to the social-ethic 
progress of embodying and bearing the so-called ‘general will’. The growth-oriented ideology 
repudiates this subordinacy and meanwhile introduces a thoroughly reversed subordinacy, which 
makes growth the highest imperative prior to all other values. And, it is helpful to clarify here that the 
thoroughness of the ideological turn does not mean that China’s economic reform signifies a thorough 
transition from socialism to capitalism, and the persistency does not indicate that the social and 
economic institutional embodiments of the growth-oriented ideology have persisted in similar forms 
since the inception of the economic reform. 
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4.1.1 The theoretical origin and political nature of Mao’s reign of social 
virtue 
The pre-economic reform period of China, in particular, the so-called ten 
years of Cultural Revolution, as Benjamin Schwartz (1968, 1978) profoundly 
observed, was characterised by the reign of virtue, of which the regime 
legitimacy revealed a strong moral orientation, and was premised on the 
constitution and embodiment of a general will in a Rousseauist sense subject 
to both the Marxist-Leninist theory and the Maoist ideas. Generally speaking, 
the notion of ‘general will’ in a Rousseauist sense refers to an ontological 
moral entity consisting of a set of abstract integral principles and qualities. 
This ‘general will’ allegedly transcends the accumulated sum of ‘particular 
wills’. This implies a transition of quality in a teleological sense, as the 
‘general will’ should reflect a societal moral orientation, and only serves public 
and collective interests whereas ‘particular wills’ appeal to personal or private 
benefits, and the sum of which still serves the same end20.  
According to Rousseau, the general will bears certain inherent moral 
qualities of subordinating the private and the individual to the public and the 
collective, and a strong emphasis on -- contrary to his contemporaries Diderot 
and Voltaire -- a society’s moral progress prior to the progress of arts and 
sciences. In contemplating the question of how to realise the general will, 
Rousseau refuted the possibility that individuals may self-realise the 
potentiality of virtue, concluding that ‘the individual can realise his moral 
potential only by submerging himself in that larger moral entity, the people’ 
(Schwartz, 1968: 9). This conclusion seems to give prominence to the entity 
of the state, since it is only the state that can play the role of politically and 
socially establishing and sustaining the general will through universally 
internalising it in its own people. This rudimentary and ambiguous solution 
proposed by Rousseau as to the realization of the general will was later 
accomplished and developed by others in theory and in practice.  
The effort made by Robespierre in the French Revolution constituted 
an initial attempt to realize Rousseau’s general will within the framework of a 
modern nation state (Schwartz, 1968). In contrast to Rousseau’s idea that """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
20 It is worth at this stage making an early note that the sum of ‘particular will’ presents a key respect of 
the utilitarianism, which constitutes a vital characteristic of the growth-oriented ideology. 
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only an abstract integral complex of people that transcends the quantitative 
sum of citizens can be the bearer of the general will, Robespierre himself 
became the founder and bearer of the general will through acting as both a 
‘legislator’ and a ‘magistrate’, as he realised that it was practically inapplicable 
to comply with and follow Rousseau’s distinction between the legislative and 
the executive when he attempted to enact good laws, and to eliminate old 
orders simultaneously.  
 The failure by Robespierre as well as by the French Revolution to 
establish a reign of virtue through realising Rousseau’s general will, was 
subsequently reflected by Marx who integrated Rousseau’s idea into his own 
theories by asserting that the task of embodying and bearing the general will 
was destined to be undertaken by a specific class, namely, the well-known 
industrial proletariat. As Marx (1934: 166) asserted, ‘It is only in the name of 
the general rights of society that a class society can claim general 
supremacy’. It is worth noting that, whilst asserting the importance of 
embodying the general will, Marx did not endow the general will with any 
particular metaphysical political transcendency or practical function. Not 
surprisingly, having regard to his historical materialism orientation, Marx 
conceived that the dynamic force of history, together with the inherent 
deficiency of the capitalist mode of production, would inevitably enable the 
proletariat to realize and sustain the general will, and also achieve prosperous 
technico-economic and cultural development. Marx, in constructing his ideal 
society, did not lay out a clear inclination as to whether moral or technico-
economic progress should take priority in constituting and sustaining the 
regime legitimacy of a state. Instead, as Schwartz (1968: 11) suggested, Marx 
‘fuses together… in an unstable complex the concepts of technico-economic 
and moral progress’. 
 Whilst Marx’s vision as to the realization of the general will may have 
proved to be inapplicable or at the very least sluggish in practice, his assertion 
that it is the proletariat that is destined to embody and bear the general will 
was later politically reorganised and facilitated by Lenin. Pursuant to Lenin, a 
highly organised party institution on behalf of the interest of the proletariat as 
well as the general public should be the bearer of the general will. Although 
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Lenin’s idea of using organisational efficacy to realise the general will did work 
in practice, it is argued that it was still the party leader rather than the party as 
a whole that worked to embody the general will. This was caused by his 
emphasis on the professionalism and organisational efficacy without paying 
much attention to how to build proletarian virtues and a party’s institutional 
charisma. And, for Stalin, the major task of ‘building of socialism’ had naturally 
led him to emphasis the ‘social engineering aspect of the party function rather 
than its moral virtues’ (Schwartz, 1968, p. 13). In other words, both Lenin and 
Stalin, while nominally declaring that their legitimacy was derived from the 
party, which as a whole embodied the proletarian general will, had failed, or 
simply did not intend to enable the party institution or other collective entities 
to bear and embody the general will21.  
 
4.1.2 The implications of the reign of virtue to the regime legitimacy of 
the CPC 
After briefly glancing at the theoretical evolution and the practical experiment 
of the general will, if we shift our attention back to the situation in China during 
the Cultural Revolution period, the attempts of achieving a reign of virtue and 
embodying the general will had arguably led to an ever more complicated 
phase that involved most of the previous problematic issues besetting the 
realisation of the general will. In order to clarify the mist clouding the socio-
political progress and the ideological essence of the time, we need to trace 
back the two questions with a critical reference to the conception and practice 
of the general will. In other words: what constitutes the origin and essence of 
the regime legitimacy purported by Mao’s reign of social virtue, and who could 
constitute the social and political bearer of such legitimacy. 
 Regarding the first question, the regime legitimacy of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) since its founding in 1949, had no doubt been 
premised on a series of practical performances in terms of achieving concrete """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
21 A strong justification in a pragmatic sense may seem to be applicable, particularly to Lenin, with 
respect to the problematic relationship between the leader and the party. This refers to the external 
pressures to the survival of the party and, later, to the state ruled by the party. The priority of sustaining 
the party and the state left little space to build a reign of virtue through the realization of the general 
will. This point goes, however, beyond the topic of the present research. "
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state unification and national independence, and restoring through the Korea 
War Chinese national dignity, which had been continuously and fatally 
damaged, from the view of China’s general public, since the First Opium War 
in 1840.  
All these achievements endowed the CPC (Communist Party of China), 
as the ruling party of the country, with some sort of unchallengeable regime 
legitimacy. The strength of such achievement legitimacy largely derives from 
the social recognition of China’s conventional pattern of dynasty reign 
alternation22. Indeed, this achievement legitimacy still constitutes a key pillar 
underpinning China’s current regime. While the conventional public 
recognition truly supported the existence of such legitimacy, the CPC reign 
encountered the problem that this achievement legitimacy was to some extent 
incompatible with the socialist state framework and the conventional Marxist-
Leninist ideology. The CPC, as the representative of the proletariat, and of the 
general public, realized that it ought to find some other legitimacy bases to 
persistently renew and sustain its political regime in the absence of any 
concrete democratic elections. In spite of the great efforts of seeking 
economic growth as complementary legitimation throughout the 1950s, those 
attempts suffered severe setbacks, partly because of the unrealistic 
aggressive state policies, and partly due to enduring natural disasters. In 
short, during the decade prior to the Cultural Revolution, the attempt to 
strengthen the CPC’s regime legitimacy through achieving better economic 
performance and living standards to a large extent failed.  
As Montesquieu observed23, ‘In the birth of societies, it is the chiefs of 
the republics who frame the institutions, and afterwards it is the institutions 
which mould the chiefs of the republics’. But, the situation in PRC was 
somewhat different. The leader who at the outset produced the institutions 
was holding ideological ascendance and political powers that can effectively 
reproduce again the institutions. This leader refers, of course, to Mao Zedong, 
known as Chairman Mao.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
22 The legitimacy of most Chinese dynasties in history was established through achievements in terms 
of unifying the country and scattered local authorities, and more often than not expelling foreign 
invaders.  
23 See: J. Rousseau, (1998), ‘The Social Contract’, Ware, Wordsworth Editions Limited, p. 40 
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It is not difficult to see a clear persistence of emphasising the prior 
importance of class struggle in Mao’s ideas throughout his life. Within China’s 
socialist state framework, this emphasis on class struggle was ideologically 
and institutionally expressed as the so-called ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. 
And, it was through this dictatorship of the proletariat that Mao formed his own 
view as to the realisation of the general will, which was different to Marx who 
linked the revolutionary role of the industrial proletariat with the impersonal 
force of history and production, and to Lenin and Stalin who stressed the 
efficacy and expertise of proletariat party institutions. Mao gave a series of 
popularised interpretations to the method of embodying and bearing the 
general will, and saw the task of embodying and bearing of the general will as 
a requisite virtue, which should be possessed by the CPC. The qualities and 
capacities of such virtue refer to, for instance, Mao’s famous dictum of 
‘serving the people with heart and soul’24.  
There was less doubt that during the long period of time before the 
Cultural Revolution, Mao was quite certain that the CPC institutions were 
morally qualified to embody and bear his own version of the general will. But 
when China’s growth had suffered a series of institutional and natural 
difficulties, Mao surprisingly realized that the CPC itself seemed to have 
manifested a strong tendency of alienation that was, in Mao’s language, a 
tendency of taking the Capitalist path. To Mao, such alienation in the party’s 
ideological orientation had severely transformed the CPC into a party that 
served, and acted on behalf of, the ‘partial interest’ in the Rousseauist sense. 
This could, in Mao’s view, inevitably lead to an alteration of the dominant state 
ideology, and to a corruption or even collapse of the social moral foundation 
of the general will. The anxiety of Mao arguably led him, in a somewhat 
uncompromisingly aggressively fashion, to reiterate the role of the general will 
as the fundamental regime legitimacy, and more severely to re-orientate the 
social bearer of the general will. In other words, it is argued that Mao seemed 
to invoke the Cultural Revolution to address the second question noted 
before, namely, who actually acts as the bearer embodying the regime 
legitimacy.   """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
24 This dictum was first put forward by Mao in his speech of ‘Serving the People’ on Sep. 8th, 1944.  
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Notably, neither Marx nor Lenin had attempted to locate a new bearer, 
and to enable this new bearer to embody the general will through an enduring 
aggressive social political movement. Mao’s personal cognition had indicated 
that the CPC had fatally deviated from its key roles and position as the sole 
bearer for embodying the general will. In reaching this judgment, Mao 
questioned whether the CPC still possessed the moral qualities and 
capacities for the interests of the general republic in order to sustain the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, Mao saw that the CPC’s regime 
legitimacy should be premised on its moral ascendancy, and all other 
socioeconomic activities should have been subject to, or subordinate to, this 
reign of virtue. However, because the CPC had, in both human composition 
and organisational structure, revealed a strong inclination to the ‘Capitalist 
Path’, Mao thus triggered, in Schwartz’s terms (1968: 1), ‘one of the most 
arresting aspects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, namely, the 
sharp confrontation between Mao and the CPC.  
In agitating and encouraging the people, or the so-called revolutionary 
masses to break down and ‘dethrone’ the existing state institutions, Mao 
revealed his primary aim, that is, enabling the revolutionary masses to replace 
the CPC to embody and bear the general will through an aggressive social-
ethical progress, and thus to establish a reign of virtue. This reign of virtue is 
premised on a dualistic structure consisting of Mao on the top, who acted as 
the origin of ideological ascendancy that legitimises the institutions to which 
he consented, and the revolutionary masses on the bottom who should 
collectively reshape their ideas and actions so as to establish a social 
container for holding the ideological virtue of the proletariat, which was 
previously possessed by the CPC institutions (Schwartz, 1968, 1978).  
As the progression of the Cultural Revolution severely vitiated the 
authorities and functions of the CPC institutions, the Mao-Masses structure 
therefore began to be able to embody and sustain the reign of virtue, which 
was largely based on ideological legitimation. As Schwartz (1968: 17) 
observed, by being an active and dynamic moral force consolidated in the 
service of the nation and public interests, the revolutionary masses were, from 
Mao’s perspective, ‘the masses not necessarily as they are but as they ought 
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to be’, and it is in this sense, ‘both the nationalist motif of Rousseau and 
transnational image of Marxism-Leninism are united into one’. And the 
masses, based on a secular perception, also sanctified Mao as of 
omnipotence to the development of the state and nation. Arguably, it is upon 
this bilateral sanctification, the Mao-Masses structure was founded, providing 
consolidated social forces for sustaining the regime legitimacy of China during 
the Cultural Revolution25.  
All these then lead to a key question that what were the roles and 
position of the CPC institutions after this dualistic structure of the Cultural 
Revolution collapsed, and, more importantly, during China’s subsequent 
economic reform. Arguably, the answer to this question in some senses 
critically deciphers the nature and purpose of China’s reversed state ideology, 
that is, a concentration on economic growth. 
In a summary, there are two notable points that can be drawn from the 
above historical-political analyses of Mao’s reign of virtue. First, the political 
idea and practice of Mao in the Cultural Revolution eventually failed in 
realising his vision of the general will. And, this failure soon led to the collapse """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
25 Some further implications of the Cultural Revolution to the late practices of China’s economic 
reform are noteworthy. First, it is argued that although the Cultural Revolution exhibited how a key 
politician within a set of established institutions profoundly reshaped state ideology and regime 
legitimacy without resorting to military violence, this is indeed a unique case. Any attempts by an 
individual to radically repudiate existing institutions, replacing them with new ones that bear new 
ideological orientation and human composition require that individual to be not only a ‘legislator’ or a 
‘magistrate’, but also to be a publicly recognised origin of ideological ascendancy that stands above 
existing institutions, who thus can legitimize any institutions. If putting this requirement in the context 
of Chinese culture, it may be read as being both an emperor and Confucius. In this sense, Mao is, 
arguably, rather unique a political individual who happened to possess such transcendent capacities to 
undertake a radical socio-political experiment for reshaping existing institutions by changing the 
regime legitimacy and altering the bearer of that legitimacy. This radical socio-political experiment in 
the name of Cultural Revolution was successfully initiated by Mao, and lasted for ten years until his 
death. The death of Mao signifies the extinction of the personal incarnation of ideological ascendancy, 
and implies that no one any more under existing institutions could stand above and radically repudiate 
or reshape existing dominant institutions. This view seems to be in some ways inconsistent with my 
previous presumption that the growth-oriented state ideology of China’s economic reform constitutes a 
thorough reverse to the reign of virtue. If no other individual after Mao possesses counterpart 
ideological ascendancy and political power, how has the thorough alternation of state ideology been 
achieved? The answer to this question leads to the second implication of the Cultural Revolution. In 
claiming that no one after Mao stands above existing institutions and can reproduce the institutions, it 
is argued that the reversed dominant state ideology of ‘concentrating on economic development’ is, 
rather than an entirely fresh new deal, in fact an institutional revival to the pre-Cultural Revolution 
growth pattern, which had already been clearly expressed in the official report of the CPC’s 8th Party 
Congress. The inception of China’s economic reform thus served to rebuild some previous state 
institutions, development strategies and state ideological assertions. It is in this sense that the thorough 
reverse to the reign of virtue became feasible.  "
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of the ideology-oriented regime legitimation following his death. The political 
vacuum of dominant state ideology and regime legitimacy then triggered the 
necessity of having a new state ideology, one that does not exhibit too many 
rigid political dogmas in order to secure a strong public consensus. And 
second, the sharp confrontation between Mao and the CPC institutions in the 
Cultural Revolution had severely undermined the authorities and functions of 
the latter. It was also a party consensus that whatever reforms26 might be 
undertaken after the Cultural Revolution should serve to restore and 
strengthen the CPC’s undermined authorities and functions27. This can be 
exemplified by the constitutional and political imperatives of the ‘Four Cardinal 
Principles’28, which include, as Deng claimed in 1979, upholding the socialist 
path, upholding the people’s democratic dictatorship, upholding the leadership 
of the CPC, and upholding Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. As Coase and 
Wang (2012: 75) noted, a dilemma faced by the Chinese government in the 
early 1980s was ‘how to keep the private sector and prevent it from squeezing 
out the state sector’ 29 . This dilemma indeed reflects the CPC’s attitude 
towards economic reform; that is, economic development shall by no means 
threaten the CPC’s authority and legitimacy. 
 
 
4.2 The political-philosophical nature of China’s growth-oriented state 
ideology 
In scrutinising China’s growth-oriented state ideology, on which its recent 
economic reform is primarily premised, a core proposition is put forward here 
that there are two core ideas that can be identified with respect to the nature """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
26 The 1980s witnessed some efforts of undertaking certain democracy-oriented political reforms for 
legitimation purposes. These attempts were later ceased, and had been severely restrained since the 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. 
27 Clarifying this basic aim of the party/state in undertaking economic reforms arguably helps to set 
aside aspects irrelevant to studying regional uneven development, and makes it possible to grasp from 
the changing socioeconomic and political complexities the principal forces and the crucial aspects of 
such forces by which the regional uneven development in question was decisively shaped. 
28 The Four Cardinal Principles were first proposed by Deng in 1979, and was later written into the 
constitution of the PRC in 1982, and into the constitution of the CPC in 1992.  
29 As Coase and Wang (2012: 77) note, ‘At one point, the Economic Planning Committee of the State 
Council planned to absorb all township and village enterprises into the state production plan. The plan 
met strong resistance from Jiangsu and other provinces where the local governments were heavily 
involved in the development of township and village enterprises, and the proposal was quickly 
dropped’.  
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of this state ideology. Those refer to utilitarianism and pragmatism, both of 
which bear unique Chinese characteristics. It is the complementary 
combination of these two ideas that has, arguably, constituted the founding 
pillar as well as the crucial momentum shaping and sustaining the whole 
progress of China’s socioeconomic development during the last three 
decades. These two ideas will therefore be elaborated in sequence in the 
context of the three stages of China’s economic reform. The basic aim of this 
section serves to clarify the rationales of China’s growth-oriented state 
ideology in order to delineate and decipher the supra logics, by and to which 
individual and institutional dynamics were shaped and subject, in the context 
of the evolving regional uneven development in China, in particular, in Jiangsu 
province.  
 
4.3 China’s utilitarianism and its earlier form of pragmatism in the 
context of the economic reform 
4.3.1 A clarification of certain key points of utilitarianism through 
contrasting with the ‘general will’ conception 
Regarding the utilitarian nature of China’s growth-oriented state ideology, it is 
helpful to clarify at the outset some crucial notions and implications of 
utilitarianism through recognising a series of contrasts between the basic 
advocacies of the ‘general will’ and those of classical utilitarianism.  
Generally speaking, the ‘general will’ notion possesses an interest 
orientation that is collective and public in nature. And, more importantly, it 
implies an abstract, integral and somewhat unitary entity of social value that 
transcends the accumulated totality of the ‘particular will’ and ‘partial interest’. 
It is this asserted transcendency over private interests and particular concerns 
that confers on the bearer of the ‘general will’ some sort of moral ascendance 
and potential political legitimacy.  
Classical utilitarianism derives its rationality and legitimacy from the 
idea that the totality of good in a society consists of coordination and 
competition between all individuals’ particular interests and wills. And, this 
idea leads to a strong appeal to the realisation of a net balance of 
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satisfactions between these interests30. Based upon this brief introduction to 
utilitarianism, two notable points that may sharply be contrasted with the 
advocacies of the ‘general will’ may be noticed.  
First, unlike the ‘general will’ which solely focuses on a transcendent 
entity of public interest, and objects to ‘partial interest’, utilitarianism, on the 
contrary, gives great prominence to diversified personal and private interests, 
advocating that it is naturally as well as socially just for an individual to 
advance as far as possible his own well-being. It seems that this strong 
advocacy for private interest and individual right reveals a Lockean standpoint 
in the political sense as well as a market economy propensity, which are more 
or less incompatible with the political embodiment of the ‘general will’, and 
with the orthodox socialist planned economy accounts.  
It can thus be seen that the ‘general will’ conception pays its attention 
mainly to public value and national interests, concerning how to enable 
individuals to realise their potentiality for virtue and then cement these 
potentialities into an abstract moral substance, whereas utilitarianism is in 
essence based on sophisticated balancing and calculations of different 
concrete interests and well-beings without touching too much the ambit of the 
somewhat metaphysical social ethics. In addition, unlike the ‘general will’ 
conception which entails a definitely inclined balance between a specific 
public end and general personal private interests, classical utilitarianism 
seems to advocate a sole but ambiguous interest-orientation based on utility 
value and consequence. This may blur the absolute distinction between public 
and private interests. In other words, by putting forward a monistic value 
criterion, utilitarianism makes it possible for its major political institutional 
expressions to quantify, in a utilitarian fashion, individual and institutional 
behaviours, and then to institutionally encourage and/or restrict the specific 
utility values of those behaviours in accordance with the aim of achieving the 
greatest net balance of social satisfactions.  
In achieving this greatest net balance, utilitarian institutions arguably 
cannot produce an equal and pervasive subordination of private and personal """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
30 For a detailed discussion of classical utilitarianism, see, e.g. Henry Sidgwick’s ‘The Methods of 
Ethics, 7th ed. (London, 1907); Hume’s ‘A Treatise of Human Nature (1739); Adam Smith’s ‘A Theory 
of the Moral Sentiments (1759); and Bentham’s ‘The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). 
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interests in an equalitarian fashion, but may result in collective partial gains 
and/or losses over time and space. When such partial gains and losses are 
embodied in practice over time and space, they may arguably be expressed 
as regional uneven development.  
It must, however, be pointed out that notwithstanding the substantial 
difference in the basic concerns and ends between the ‘general will’ 
conception and classical utilitarianism, both Rousseau 31  and Sidgwick 32 
emphasised the role of the major institutions of a society, seeing that the 
basic orientation and arrangement of a society’s major institutions are of 
significance to achieving the respective aims of the ‘general will’ conception 
and utilitarianism.  
This consensus on the importance of institutions leads to the second 
contrast as to the functional orientations of, and the evaluative criteria on, the 
performance of institutions set forth by, respectively, the ‘general will’ 
conception and utilitarianism. In theoretical terms, to Rousseau, a society’s 
major institutions, in particular, the state institutions and his transcendent all-
wise ‘legislator’, are to be the ‘moralising agency of human society’ (Schwartz, 
1968. p. 9) which serves to politically internalise the ‘general will’ in 
individuals. Having regard to the public orientation of the ‘general will’ and the 
presumed priority of the ‘general will’ over private concern and partial interest, 
it reasonably comes to the assumption that state institutions, as a society’s 
moralising agency, may inevitably bend certain private and partial interests to 
the larger objective of realising the ‘general will’. This can collectively and 
institutionally undermine each individual’s welfare in a relatively equalitarian 
manner. Here we see a tendency inherent in the roles of state institutions to 
make universal nondistinctive subordination or sacrifice of personal and 
partial interests. It produces a net balance of societal good based on a public """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
31 Regarding the emphasis by the ‘general will’ on the role of state institutions, as Rousseau stated in 
his Confessions, ‘that everything depended basically on political science, and that no matter how one 
views the problem every people is just what its government makes it. What form of government is most 
suited to produce a nation which is virtuous, enlightened and wise—in short, in the highest sense of the 
word, as perfect as possible?’ Quoted from: E. Cassirer (1951, p. 154).  
32 As John Rawls observed, the clearest and most accessible formulation of the strict classical doctrine 
of utilitarianism is made by Henry Sidgwick, according to whom ‘society is rightly ordered, and 
therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of 
satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it’. See J. Rawls (1971), ‘A Theory of 
Justice’, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Massachusetts. p. 22 
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versus private consideration, though with an obvious inclination to the former. 
In concrete terms, if taking Mao’s reign of virtue as an example, it is argued 
that when the CPC strictly made the society’s moralising agency its major 
role, the CPC may be seen as a series of ‘local states’, which are socially and 
politically more even and just, but also simultaneously, economically less 
efficient, particularly in relation to agriculture and light industry sectors. When 
the performance of the CPC, from Mao’s cognition and judgment, had vitally 
deviated from its role as a moralising agency and suffered alienation to the 
socially equalitarian ‘local states’33, Mao thereby initiated aggressive social 
ethical movements to constrain the functions of, and ‘dethrone’ the authorities 
of, the CPC. It is not necessary here to fully discuss to what extent ‘local 
states’ and regional development under Mao’s reign were more even in the 
equalitarian sense than those in contemporary China. The key point lies in 
that major state institutions under the ‘general will’ imperative tend, though 
perhaps not intentionally, to subordinate personal and private interests to a 
moral political end. This thus resulted in a largely even starting point, 
particularly in terms of individuals’ socio-economic systems of desires, for the 
later evolution of regional uneven development in the economic reform era 
under the growth-oriented state ideology.  
The basic role of major institutions under classical utilitarianism, in 
abstract terms, is to ‘balance satisfactions and dissatisfactions between 
different individuals’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 24) to maximise the net balance of 
satisfaction. The most notable point here lies in the rationale by which the 
above assertion is reached. In theoretical terms, as John Rawls (1971) 
observed, in making itself the most rational conception of justice, classical 
utilitarianism indeed relies on a presumed extended application of the 
principles which are at first merely applicable to each individual. In more 
specific terms, as it is reasonable to suppose that an individual will, according 
to his rational expectations, advance his interests and fulfil his own systems of 
desires by calculating and balancing the increases, detriments and risks over 
time and space to the total good of his well-being, it is, therefore, equally 
reasonable, pursuant to utilitarianism, for an association of men, namely, a """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
33 The notion of ‘local states’ is explained by S. Duncan and M. Goodwin (1988, p. 30)  
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society, to construct and advance to the greatest extent its well-being through 
balancing diversified interests and interest appeals of different members of 
the society across spatial and temporal horizons, in order to achieve the 
largest net balance of satisfaction to these interests and interest appeals34. As 
this presumed social justice based on the net balance of satisfaction should 
be realised by proper institutional arrangements, major institutions of a society 
are hence endowed with the task of establishing institutional privileges that 
are, within defined spatial and temporal boundaries, preferentially selective to 
certain interest appeals and actions.  
After attaining certain basic impressions on utilitarianism and its 
institutional expressions, we come back to the task of deciphering the political 
and socioeconomic manifestations of utilitarianism in China’s growth-oriented 
state ideology in relation to regional uneven development across different 
temporal stages of China’s economic reform.  
  
4.3.2 Assimilation between the public and private criteria of rationality 
during the first stage of the economic reform (the late 1970s – the early 
1990s) 
As Sen and Williams (1982) pointed out, utilitarianism tends to impersonalise 
each individual person into a utility bit, and then to merge these utility bits 
together as one total lump, the process of which serves to deprive individual 
persons of their identity, separateness and autonomy. While this presumptive 
indifference to the separateness and identity of individuals and to their 
personal desires and actions, pursuant to Sen and Williams, to a large extent 
contributes to the neglect of a person’s autonomy and to the lack of interest in 
a person’s integrity, it is argued that when utilitarianism is practiced as a state 
ideology in a modern society to synchronise and coordinate the criteria of both 
private actions and public rationality toward one single direction such as 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
34 It is noted that, in critically interpreting the rationales of classical utilitarianism, John Rawls (1971, 
pp. 223-224) merely focuses on the temporal balancing between the losses and gains of an individual 
and a society, and fails to take account of the spatial balancing of satisfactions and dissatisfactions 
between different persons and thus regions. It is argued that it is, however, by no means difficult to 
witness the presence and importance of such spatial balancing in practice; and it is thus necessary to 
make the spatial balancing a crucial parameter in discussing the rationales of classical utilitarianism.   
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economic growth, this indifference may become a condition that effectively 
leads to promotion of economic efficiency.  
Such coordinated value and action rationalities may become a socio-
political consensus, which enables an authoritarian government to liberalise 
and mobilise a massive number of indifferent utility bits to select and act 
under certain strategically inscribed institutional selectivities. And, this sort of 
growth may effectively exert a country’s relative comparative advantages both 
in its domestic circumstances and a global economy, at the expenses of 
institutionally and socioeconomically displacing and/or deferring the various 
costs of securing these comparative advantages to other spatiotemporal 
horizons and/or social classes and groups. It is in this way of cost 
displacement/deferral that the utilitarian aim of achieving the greatest net 
balance merits its justification, and also entails the outcome of uneven 
development.  
In more specific terms, the utilitarian condition of impersonalising 
individual persons into utility bits can give rise to the necessity of politically 
disseminating and legitimising a dominant, prior criterion of public rationality, 
and of institutionally liberalising the actions of individuals to the extent that the 
public and private rationalities can be coordinated to increase the impersonal 
sum of good or the net balance of satisfactions of all utility bits’ interests and 
desires. And, in viewing such necessity in the context of China’s first stage of 
economic reform, it is argued that the presence of China’s constitutional 
protection to rural property titles and its restrictive institutional arrangements 
on household movement35 make it difficult for more than 0.8 billion peasants 
living in rural areas (seen by utilitarianism as utility bits) to be organised and 
mobilised to migrate to urban areas to become industrial practitioners or 
labourers for increasing the totality of good in terms of national state 
economic performance. This lack of motivation largely derives from what Scott """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
35 For example, the household registration system represents one of China’s most controversial but 
effective barriers to the general public’s rights to free movement and equal social welfare. This system, 
since its implementation in 1958, deeply affected the interests of rural residents by imposing residential 
restrictions on inter-rural and urban movement in the pre-reform era, and through imposing some 
relative restriction on migrated labourers’ social welfare rights during the reform era. Notably, the 
present restrictions exerted by the household registration system amount to one of the key conditions to 
the presence of China’s massive number of low-cost labourers, and thus to the feasibility of exerting 
China’s comparative advantages on global markets.  "
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(1977) calls ‘subsistence ethics’, according to which peasants’ action logic is 
subsistence-oriented rather than interest-oriented, and their motivations are 
thus shaped by risk-avoidance consideration rather than by profit 
maximisation. It is argued that it is unlikely to trigger any massive social 
mobilisation to support economic growth without first securing the aforesaid 
necessity.  
In order to fulfill these requisites, utilitarianism shall be politically 
ideologised to set forth a prior ascendant criterion of public rationality, the 
strategic orientation of which can in turn be institutionalised into some 
corresponding structural selectivities. In the context of China, utilitarianism 
was adapted and ideologised, in an incremental yet very steady fashion, to 
define an ascendant criterion of public rationality, namely, economic 
construction, which not only serves as a legitimation for the state regime and 
institutional practices, but also liberalises and justifies a great deal of personal 
actions, which were previously limited or even prevented by the orthodox 
socialist ideology and the planned economy system, from pursuing 
personal/private economic interests. Such political liberalisation and 
justification helped in a top-down fashion to encourage and justify state and 
non-state institutions, entities and persons to engage in various economic 
activities that contribute to the state’s growth as well as to other public and 
private interests such as better state financial incomes, more effective and 
efficient state administration and social control, and higher business profits 
and personal well-beings. And, they also helped to foster extensive social 
recognitions and acceptances of the regime legitimation that heavily rests on 
national economic performance.  
In a word, it is argued that the erection of the growth-oriented state 
ideology amounts to applying ‘rule utilitarianism’ to the whole society. The 
conception of rule utilitarianism, as Harsanyi (1982: 41) states, differs from 
‘act utilitarianism’ which means that ‘each individual act must be judged 
directly in terms of the utilitarian criterion’, and instead ‘rule utilitarianism is the 
view that the utilitarian criterion must be applied, in the first instance, not to 
individual acts but rather to the basic general rules governing these acts’. 
Goodin (1995: 18) argues that as the utilities admitted by utilitarianism are 
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often produced by coordinated actions of a substantial number of individual 
agents, the best way of coordinating one’s actions with those of others for 
maximising total utilities in a society is therefore to ‘promulgate rules and to 
adhere to them’. In the context of China’s economic reform, the basic general 
rule, to which the utilitarian criterion may apply, obviously refers to the core 
issue of ‘concentrating on economic construction’, which has been reiterated 
by all the top leaders of China since Deng, and meanwhile widely recognised 
and accepted by the general public in China. In the general public’s view, the 
growth-oriented state ideology provides them with confidence and some sort 
of utility indicators, on which they could rely to shape the contents of their 
actions and to measure the importance of various alternatives. 
These social recognitions then widely reshaped the general public’s 
criterion of action, thereby laying out the potential and prospect of fostering, 
motivating, and mobilising a great number of indifferent utility bits towards 
certain strategically nominated sociospatial sites, institutional structures and 
industrial sectors. As Ronald Coase and Ning Wang (2013) assert, China’s 
economic reform would not have been initiated without the change of the 
political idea in China. Utilitarianism is thus in this regard interpreted in 
practice into a set of ideologically dominant external preferences, which then 
institutionally and socioeconomically penetrated and assimilated various 
personal preferences, and brought all these personal preferences into line 
with the sole, dominant criterion of public rationality, that is, ‘concentrating on 
economic construction’.  
In an abstract view, it is argued that China’s political effort of 
assimilating and coordinating multifarious personal preferences with one 
external preference in terms of the growth orientation entailed effects that 
went beyond conventional utilitarianism assertions. Sen (2004) argues that 
one objection to the utilitarian stance of measuring importance through utility 
lies in that the importance measure based on an impersonal metric of utility 
neglects a person’s own desirability to the important, valuable ideas or actions 
assumed by the metric of utility. This objection then raises the troublesome 
question of to what extent a person’s own desirability of something shall be 
weighted in determining whether something is valuable/important under the 
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impersonal metric of utility measurement. According to Sen and Williams 
(1982: 6), if utility is seen as an admission condition of moral importance 
rather than the measure of importance, there implies a priority of personal 
preference to external preference, leading to ‘a rejection of welfarism, and 
thus a fortiori of utilitarianism’.  
Notably, in adopting and applying utilitarianism in its economic reform 
and political legitimation, not only had China fenced with this troublesome 
objection, but also it even set aside the more controversial issue as to how 
utilitarian theories can handle and be sensitive to ‘what people want’. As 
Sen’s (2004) argued, three devices in terms of reduction, idealisation, and 
abstraction, may usually be used for treating desires/preferences. But, the 
practice of utilitarianism in China did not tangle with any attempts of reducing 
all interests, ideas, and desires to a specific way of realisation, or of assuming 
some sort of true or ‘perfectly prudent preferences’ and seeing them as actual 
rational choices. Instead, China’s utilitarianism exhibits a directionally clear 
but substantively uncertain growth-orientation. In more specific terms, during 
the first stage of China’s reform, the clarified growth orientation entailed the 
challenging tasks of liberalising a great deal of potential labourers and 
regional productivities at local scales, which were depressed by China’s 
conventional planned economy system, and then coupling them with a variety 
of global strategic resources. The key to fulfilling these tasks no doubt lies in 
liberalisation. It is in this sense that, under the utilitarian criterion of economic 
growth, individuals, business entities and state institutions were encouraged 
and enabled to pursue profit-oriented activities in order to establish sets of 
primitive and/or transitional industrial structures and sociospatial relations that 
could contribute to promoting economic growth. The transitional processes of 
creating these primitive new structures and relations served in effect to 
reorganise old sociospatial relations, scales, sites and networks in China, and, 
meanwhile, to bring about a set of new institutional and industrial 
establishments, which, in turn, laid out the pragmatic foundations for future 
social mobilisations. But for the liberalisations of institutional restrictions and 
social productivities and innovations at the first stage, there would not have 
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been the establishment and accumulation of the primitive foundations, on 
which regional uneven development could rest and evolve. 
However, it must also be noted that notwithstanding such liberalisation, 
utility bits under the growth-oriented state ideology are, to various degrees, 
deprived of their valuing autonomies, those are, their capability to choose. In 
other words, the general public of China was only endowed with the 
capabilities of dealing with the ‘content characteristics’ 36  of utility-related 
activities. They were confined at the very beginning of the reform to the realm 
of growth-related affairs and to the public rationality of utilitarian growth. It is 
for this reason that China’s reform has widely been regarded as conducting 
economic reform without political democratization. And, there witnessed a 
trend throughout the economic reform that the capabilities to choose of the 
general public were indeed more or less circumscribed and undermined in a 
progressive fashion. As we shall see, this trend corresponds with the 
trajectory and locus of the evolution of China’s major growth patterns and, 
more importantly, with the evolution of regional uneven development in 
Jiangsu province. 
It is thus proposed that there indeed exists an interactive dialectic 
relationship between the general direction manifested by China’s dominant 
state ideology and its institutional expressions on the one hand, and the 
recursive capabilities of utility bits to exercise choice over time and space on 
the other. This dynamic dialectic reveals certain key structural and strategic 
dimensions of the evolving regional uneven development in question. It is this 
dialectical dynamic that makes China’s growth-oriented state ideology rather a 
complicated one in terms of its nature, contents, and effects. Any overlooking 
of this dialectical dynamic is likely to result in a misreading of the objectives 
and functions of China’s state ideology and institutional practices as well as 
imprecise explanations of regional uneven development.  
Regarding the relevance of this dialectical dynamic to the present 
discussion, as utility bits under China’s utilitarian ideology were to various 
degrees deprived of their capabilities to choose, it is argued that the growth-
oriented state ideology thus acted, at this stage of the reform, as an ‘ideal """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
36 Discussions as to the conception of the ‘content characteristics’ can be seen in Harsanyi (1982) and 
Mirrlees (1982).  
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observer’ or an ‘impartial sympathetic spectator’, which is, according to John 
Rawls (1999: 163), ‘a person who takes up a general perspective’ and 
‘assumes a position where his own interests are not at stake, and he 
possesses all the requisite information and powers of reasoning’, thus being 
‘equally sympathetic to the desires and satisfactions of everyone affected by 
the social system’. In glancing at this definition more closely in the particular 
context of China, the position of the impartial spectator who does not consider 
his own interests at stake but is sympathetic, from a general perspective, to 
everyone’s desires and satisfactions, may indeed be reminiscent of, and 
resonates with, some fundamental reign ideas and policies reiterated by the 
CPC such as Mao’s ‘serving the people with heart and soul’, and the idea of 
‘representing the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the 
Chinese people’37. In other words, the CPC, in producing, disseminating and 
implementing the growth-oriented state ideology, put itself into the position of 
an ideal observer, thereby advocating the universal applicability of the growth-
oriented state ideology to multifarious individual and collective entities, and to 
the society at large.  
As Rawls observed (1999), the impartial spectator definition is different 
from his two principles of justice theory in the respect that the former makes 
no theoretical assumptions like his original position and veil of ignorance, but 
instead, singles out some key value orientations. It seems that it is this very 
absence of such assumptions that results in Rawls’ critique to the utilitarian 
use of ideal observer. Whilst the use of the ideal observer by China’s 
utilitarianism shared in some ways this problem of lacking sufficient theorem 
to justify the growth orientation, which was ideally observed by the CPC, 
some key empirical backgrounds and political considerations had, from both 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
37 This idea is part of the theory of Three Represents, which was first proposed by Jiang Zeming, the 
former president of China, and was written into the constitution of the CPC in 2002, and into the 
constitution of China in 2004. As Jiang reported at the 16th CPC Congress in 2002, ‘Our Party must 
always represent the requirements for developing China's advanced productive forces, the orientation 
of China's advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
people. These are the inexorable requirements for maintaining and developing socialism, and the 
logical conclusion our Party has reached through hard exploration and great praxis’. 
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the general public’s and the CPC’s perspectives, provided practical 
justifications38.   
Yet, it is noteworthy that, the CPC during the first stage of economic 
reform could find no precedent or path that they could consult with for 
changing the existing planned economy system and industrial structures 
towards a market-oriented system without invoking severe challenges to its 
reign and legitimacy39. And, the rise of neo-liberalism and other related trends 
such as liberal urbanism and new regionalism during the 1980s were of 
relative unfamiliarity to the party/state of China at that time. Thus, the 
party/state of China, during the late 1970s, the 1980s and most of the 1990s, 
though upholding an explicit prior value orientation towards economic growth, 
did not fully pretend to possess all the requisite information and powers of 
reasoning (an key characteristic of the impartial spectator defined by Rawls 
(1999)) in practising the growth-oriented state ideology.  
This deliberate omission is arguably indicative of a unique feature of 
China’s utilitarian state ideology, that is, to integrate, or balance between, the 
political effects of a dominant state ideology and the practical feasibility of a 
pragmatic belief system. According to Giovanni Sartori (1969, cf: Festenstein 
& Kenny, 2005: 11), ‘Pragmatic belief systems are practically-minded and 
open to revision in the light of experience, where ideological belief systems 
privilege the authority of theory over practice and are resistant to revision in 
the light of experience’. In the light of this observation, China’s growth-
oriented state ideology assumes that, as the masses need guidance, it thus 
takes the role of directing the masses toward some socioeconomic goals, 
whilst it does not purport to possess or exhibit any of Sartori’s (ibid) complex, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
38 It is beyond the scope of this research to fully outline all the practical backgrounds and political 
considerations that may amount to such justifications. In brief, there are both internal and external 
factors. Internal factors principally involve, for example, the CPC’s political consideration of restoring 
and strengthening, through economic reforms, its authorities and functions, which were severely 
undermined during the Cultural Revolution. External factors mainly refer to the changing position of 
China under the trends of neo-liberalism and economic globalisation. The reestablishment of the 
diplomatic relationship between China and the US in the late 1970s had thereby enabled China to get 
into, and embed within the global commodity, industrial, and commercial chains in a relatively rapid 
pace. And all these contextual and practical considerations to various degrees contributed to the 
shaping of CPC’s ideal observer’s view as well as to the initial and the later extensive public 
recognition and acceptance to the state ideology which revealed a strong inclination to growth-oriented 
utilitarianism.  
39 Indeed, there are views that some economic reform measures conducted by the party/state of China 
during the 1980s accumulated social discontentment that contributed to the Tiananmen square incident. 
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‘quasi-logical structure’. Put differently, the growth-oriented state ideology is 
purportedly open to revisions so long as they can help promote economic 
growth, and do no harm to the CPC’s reign. This open stance on the growth-
oriented state ideology arguably reflects, and corresponds to, the renowned 
metaphorical assertion made and upheld by Deng, that is, ‘crossing the river 
by groping the stones’40. This metaphorical assertion together with several 
other famous propositions by Deng, though not constituting an ideology with 
strict logical structures, or a political theory with scientific hypotheses, amount 
to the semi-instinctive ‘political judgment’ which is described by Isaiah Berlin 
(1996) as an outstanding political capacity of understanding a particular 
situation in terms of its full uniqueness in a particular place at a particular 
time, and of grasping the unique combination of characteristics that constitute 
this particular situation41.  
In concrete terms, the fact that the CPC moved from the position of an 
ideal observer enabled China’s utilitarian state ideology to be experimented 
with a variety of ways. Certain utility bit groups and individuals inspired by the 
utilitarian growth-orientation began to recalculate and reselect their tactics and 
acts towards a growth-orientation, underpinning some exemplar growth 
patterns, the experiences of which were then rapidly spread to other 
sociospatial sites. For instance, the starting point of the utilitarian growth in 
China lies in the so-called ‘household contract responsibility system’. Although 
this institutional innovation at the outset served to dramatically improve the 
performance of agricultural sectors, the key point here is the eventual 
acknowledgment of this system by central government 42  and the rapid """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
40 This renowned assertion was literally addressed in ‘Selected Works of Chen Yun’ (See. Chen, Y. 
(1986), ‘Selected Works of Chen Yun’, vol. 3, p. 279), and had been repeatedly asserted and upheld by 
Deng Xiaoping in many occasions to reflect his core spirits of China’s economic reform, namely, 
‘emancipating the mind, and seeking truth from the facts’ (See, Deng Xiao’s speech in the Working 
Conference ofthe CCP Central Committee on 1978 Dec 13th).  
41 According to Berlin (1997), political judgment refers to a capacity for integrating the multifarious 
relevant changing dynamics pragmatically in a single pattern with the purpose of making proper 
political decisions; and it is thus a special understanding of public life, which ‘Bismarck had, or 
Talleyrand or Franklin Roosevelt’, and ‘which is conspicuously lacking in men of more purely 
theoretical genius such as Newton or Einstein or Russell. It is interestingly to note that, resonating with 
Berlin’s observation that Russell lacked the capacity of political judgment for practical states of affairs, 
Chairman Mao, in his youth in 1920, also criticised Russell’s political ideas as ‘theoretically reasonable 
but practically infeasible’ after he listened to Russell’s speech in China on Oct 26th, 1920."
42 Although the household contract responsibility system had been implemented in a few small villages 
in China in the late 1970s, this system, due to its obvious incompatibility with the orthodox socialist 
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expansion of this system across the whole country led to the decollectivisation 
in sociospatial and productive senses of rural areas of China. Such 
decollectivisation in effect liberalised a substantial amount of peasants from 
the rigid people’s commune production system, thus endowing them with 
relative capabilities to choose under the utilitarian growth-orientation. These 
relatively liberalised rural labourers contributed to Coase and Wang’s (2012) 
so-called ‘marginal revolutions’, which, from their perspective, can be seen as 
the true force that pushed forward and secured economic reform and growth 
in China. In the official definition, Coase and Wang’s marginal revolutions are 
read as ‘incremental reform’, which means experimenting with more radical, 
market-oriented reforms on non-state sectors without infringing state-owned 
sectors (Wu & Ma, 2012: 82). From a long-term perspective, the 
decollectivisation brought about by the household contract responsibility 
system had not only liberalised rural labourers’ capabilities to choose, but 
also, more importantly, guaranteed a massive amount of labour reserve for 
the subsequent rural industrialisation and the rise of cities, all of which 
fostered and shaped regional uneven development in Jiangsu province.  
The most prominent outcome of the decollectivisation is that it gave 
birth to massive numbers of township and village enterprises (TVEs), which 
acted as both the major employers of industrialised rural labourers and the 
essential growth engines of non-state economies. As Deng appraised in 1987, 
‘the rise of township and village enterprises is a totally unexpected 
success…not only did these enterprises achieve more than 20 per cent 
annual output value, but they also employed more than 50 per cent of the 
surplus rural labours and built up many new small towns’43. Whilst being of 
critical importance to the first stage of the economic reform, the development 
of TVEs also began to reveal regional unevenness in economic and 
sociospatial senses44.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
ideas, was not acknowledged by the central government of China until 1982. Later household contract 
responsibility system became a legitimate state policy.  
43 Deng made this comment in his meeting with Stefan Korosec, member of the Presidium of the 
Central Committee of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia, on June 12th, 1987. This comment is 
included in the article—‘We Shall Speed up Reform in ‘Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 
44 As Coase and Wang (2012: 58) assert, ‘the rise of the private sector (in China) followed a marked 
geographic pattern, which further illustrates the marginal nature of this revolution’. 
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Notably, the region with the best TVE growth in China is indeed one of 
the case studies of this research, that is, the south of Jiangsu province. Based 
on his extensive fieldwork, Fei Xiaotong (1984) summarised the development 
of TVEs in the south of Jiangsu, proposing the well-known conception of the 
‘Southern Jiangsu Model’. Since then, this gradually became a role model for 
the growth of non-state sectors in other regions in China.  
The ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ in general refers to the local growth 
pattern, which is mainly driven by TVEs in the rural areas of the three cities in 
the south of Jiangsu, those are, Suzhou city, Wuxi city and Changzhou city. 
TVEs in these areas were established with support from local governments at 
village and township scales, and operated according to market demands. 
Notwithstanding the local governmental support, most TVEs were by no 
means state owned. According to the Annual Book of the Chinese Private 
Economy (1994: 71; 1996: 112), around 83 per cent of TVEs are private 
enterprises. The private nature of these enterprises has later been structurally 
affirmed by the shareholding reform and other types of privatisation since the 
state officially recognised private enterprises in the mid-1990s (Coase and 
Wang, 2012: 53). The blooming of TVEs in the 1980s and 1990s in the south 
of Jiangsu, however, revealed sharp sociospatial unevenness. Estimations 
show that, there were at its peak in Jiangsu about ten thousand TVEs, whose 
production amounted to four fifth of the provincial agricultural economy, two 
third of the provincial industrial economy, and contributed to one thirds of the 
national GDP by 2000. But, only around 10 percent of the TVEs in Jiangsu 
were in the north, whereas all the rest were in the south (Chinese Territory 
Resource News, 2012).  
It is thus argued that the Southern Jiangsu Model indeed established a 
set of spatiotemporal fixes in the south with its own spatiotemporal boundaries 
and relative structural coherence. This relative coherence of the south 
highlighted the isolation of the north. Yu (2010: 38) observes that, from a 
social structural perspective, there is an evident fracture in China’s social 
structure, which is reinforced by core groups, and serves to prevent 
peripheries from accessing core interests. The spatiotemporal fixes of the 
south also exhibited various institutional and physical obstacles to other 
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sociospatial sites such as the north of Jiangsu. But, from a utilitarian 
perspective, the salient growth in a net sum sense achieved by Jiangsu 
province endowed the emergent regional unevenness with some sort of 
political justification. In other words, although the marginal revolution in terms 
of TVE-driven local growth to some extent ‘operated outside state control’ 
(Coase and Wang, 2012: 1), the achievement in terms of rapid economic 
growth attained by the south of Jiangsu realised, as a practical example, what 
Deng had famously claimed, that is, ‘letting some regions and peoples get rich 
first’45.  
 Although the growth-oriented ideology and its utilitarian tendency 
liberalised and justified the institutional innovations that brought about TVE-
driven growth, it is argued that the regional growth attained by the south, from 
a utilitarian perspective, is also indicative of a paradigm of developmental 
unevenness that had later turned out to be a set of path-dependencies, which 
institutionally constrained potential innovations in the north and industrially 
undermined the north46. And, at the national scale, Coase and Wang (2012) 
pointed out that the state of China indeed faced a delicate dilemma in its 
intervention into institutional change. Although state interventions may help 
facilitate institutional changes and make such changes exemplars for other 
entities and regions, the authoritative/coercive nature of state actions may 
also inevitably reduce institutional diversity, which is of essence to future 
institutional innovation (ibid: 52). 
In summarising the above characteristics of China’s utilitarian state 
ideology, it is proposed that at the first stage of its economic reform, China’s 
growth-oriented state ideology mainly served to build a general criterion of 
public rationality which attempted to formulate a clear direction for 
socioeconomic values/preferences, while not prescribing and imposing too 
many specified, rigid restrictions that might impede the promotion of economic 
efficiency and the maximization of the net balance of total social satisfactions. 
Notwithstanding the importance of socioeconomic liberalisation, and, of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
45 This political assertion is widely recognised by both the party/state and the general public in China. 
And, Deng Xiaoping frequently made it in certain occasions. See, for example, ‘Selected Works of 
Deng Xiaoping’, Vol. 2, p. 152; Vol. 3, p. 23; Vol. 3, p. 52. Vol. 3, p. 166. Vol. 3, pp. 277-278; Vol. 3, 
pp. 373-374
46 This point will be extended in Section 4.3.3. 
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coordinating the public and private criteria of values and preferences towards 
a single utilitarian growth-orientation, it must be pointed out that these alone 
cannot guarantee and generate a considerable promotion of economic 
efficiency, neither do they lead to prominent regional uneven development. 
The continued economic growth and resulting regional unevenness in Jiangsu 
were caused and sustained by another aspect of the growth-oriented state 
ideology, acting together with an earlier form of China’s pragmatism through 
their respective but interrelated institutional expressions across relevant 
spatial horizons. These points will be specifically elaborated in the following 
section. 
 
4.3.3 Deng’s envision of the richness of commonwealth and his trial-
and-error strategy (the mid-1990s -- the early-2000s) 
The starting point of this section is one of the most popularly discussed 
objections to utilitarianism, that is, as Goodin (1995: 18, 19) stated, 
‘utilitarianism can never be implemented in practice because it requires us to 
engage in impossible interpersonal utility comparisons’. This problem of 
having interpersonal comparisons in practising utilitarianism was also 
encountered by China’s economic reform. It was at first solved by resorting to 
the application of a shared highest-order preference, which, according to 
Rawls (1982), exhibits a typical account of ‘interpersonal comparison’ in 
utilitarian tradition. More importantly, the issue of realising effective 
interpersonal comparisons had, at the first stage of the economic reform, 
been settled by the essential utilitarian political judgement made by Deng. 
This refers to, as noted earlier, Deng’s vision of ‘letting some regions and 
peoples get rich first, and then bringing along and helping other peoples and 
regions to eventually arrive at the richness of commonwealth’ 47 . As a 
prominent manifestation of the utilitarian ideology, this political judgement 
made by Deng became both a general, strategic guideline for later institutional """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
47 Deng Xiaoping had in several occasions during the 1980s put forward this statement, saying this was 
his persistent view of how to facilitate development toward the richness of commonwealth. It is notable 
that Deng’s political statements, since the late 1970s, always exerted strong authoritative importance to 
all the key political and socioeconomic affairs in China. As the actual Chinese top power, Deng was 
used to releasing his crucial decisions through his conversations and opinions in some meetings or 
surveys. And, the essence of his views would then be officially organised and published by the central 
government through a series of state policies and strategies. 
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practices, and a justification for various socioeconomic inequalities and 
developmental unevenness that emerged during the second and third stages 
of China’s reform. 
In general, Deng’s political statement raises two crucial implications. 
First, it reiterates the prior public rationality of concentrating on growth, and 
emphasises the integrative assimilation between this public rationality and 
each individuals’ interests and actions. That is to say, whilst the chief public 
actions of the state would serve for the sole rationality and orientation of 
economic growth, individuals should bring their actions in line with the growth-
orientation as all of them are constitutive of both the process and outcome of 
this political vista. Second, and more importantly, Deng’s political assertion 
explicitly put forward a general, flexible and, speaking critically, ambiguous 
and politically slippery horizon in both socioeconomic and spatiotemporal 
terms. It was then within this horizon that the state ideology, state 
institutions/policies and all developmental practices had been shaped, 
advanced and justified throughout the reform.  
Thanks to his own politically shaped horizon of institutions, Deng made 
his political assertion, on the one hand, a quasi-state strategy48 in Jessop’s 
(1988) sense that guided and justified various institutional expressions, which 
contributed to rapid but uneven development. On the other hand, this 
assertion acted as a quasi-‘ideological form of justification’ in Habermas’s 
(2007: 112) words, which provided state institutions and policies that had 
shaped developmental unevenness with crucial political legitimacy, which was 
necessary for securing wide public recognition, and motivating substantial 
social mobilisation.  
In a word, an assumption can be put forward here that, with the 
proposition of a shared highest-order preference that assimilates public 
rationality and the actions of the general public, and of relatively clear spatial 
horizons and an ambiguous temporal horizon for realising this, China’s 
utilitarianism began to, under the judgement of the general architect of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
48 As Jessop (1988: 159; cf. MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999) articulated, state strategy refers to patterned 
state intervention which ‘(a) favors the course of [a particular] accumulation strategy and the flow of 
material benefits to the requisite social base; and (b) constructs forms of representation that 
systematically favor the access of the key sectors and social groups to sites of political and economic 
power’. 
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China’s economic reform49, roughly express its spatial preference as a result 
of assessing the net balance of total social satisfaction. But, notably, such a 
calculation of the net balance of total satisfaction cannot be theoretically 
qualified and politically justified as utilitarianism without a temporal horizon, 
within which the true effects of utilitarian practices can be recursively 
evaluated. It is in this sense we argue that the spatiotemporal horizon inherent 
in Deng’s words is ambiguous and politically slippery in nature. The temporal 
horizon sketched by Deng largely rests on a political vision or a promise, the 
realisation of which is neither specified by ‘the theory on the initial stage of 
socialism’50, nor indeed answered by the recent assertion made by Xi Jinping 
(the new president of China) as to the ‘Two One Hundred’ objective51. But, 
this ambiguity in Deng’s theory was at later stages arguably complemented by 
a much clearer temporal horizon of dominant institutional time, which 
intensified the practice of utilitarianism in relation to regional (uneven) 
development in China. This point is fully discussed in Section 4.4. Suffice it to 
say here that the spatial expressions of utilitarianism in China explicitly 
presumed regional uneven development.  
Notwithstanding Deng’s political authority, his utilitarian judgement, as 
he personally admitted, generated suspicion and opposition too 52 . In 
responding to these, Deng adopted some sort of pragmatism, which is 
embodied as a series of institutional experiments and innovations at various 
sociospatial sites. And, the successful cases of these trial-and-error tests will 
be made as role models, which are then transplanted or spread to other 
sociospatial sites. In reading the earlier form of China’s pragmatism in this 
way, it can first be seen a clear growth-orientation in Deng’s ideas. In his """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
49 Deng Xiaoping is officially titled as the ‘general architect of China’s economic reform’. 
50 The theory on the initial stage of socialism is one of the cornerstones of Deng’s theory. In general, 
this initial stage does not refer to a stage that any socialist states have to experience, but indicates the 
stage that China, in particular, has to go through under the situations of less developed market 
economies and productivities. It roughly refers to the period between 1956 and the middle of the 21st 
century.  
51 The ‘Two One Hundred’ objective is proposed by Xi Jinping in the 18th Congress of the CPC in 
2013. As essential complementarities to Xi’s conception of ‘Chinese Dream’, this objective proposes to 
build a moderately prosperous society in all aspect in China in the year of the CPC’s 100th anniversary 
(2021), and to realise the revival of the Chinese nations in the year of the PRC’s 100th anniversary 
(2049). 
52 As Deng said, although the policy of letting some regions and peoples get rich first was opposed by 
some people, these oppositions should be tolerated and left to be judged by facts and practices. See: 
Deng, X. P. (1993), ‘Say upon facts’, in ‘Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping’, Vol. 3"
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recent book, Vogel (2011) sketches Deng as indeed a pragmatist, whose 
ideas and practices largely embodied pragmatism, and may be best reflected 
by one of his most important speeches in his southern survey. In this speech, 
Deng asserted that ‘market economy is not equal to capitalism, and planned 
economy is also not equal to socialism. Both market and plan are just tools 
and methods towards prosperity; hence, whether they are feasible or risky 
shall be tested and amended by practice’53. Cheung (2009) sees Deng’s 
words--‘give it a try and then take a look’, which in some ways summarised 
the above speech, as the actual guiding principle of China’s economic reform. 
As Deng said in 1990 (cf: Vogel, 2011: 667), ‘Why do the people support us? 
Because over the last ten years our economy has been developing’. Deng 
continued saying that ‘If the economy stagnated for five years or developed at 
only a slow rate, for example, at 4 or 5 percent, or even 2 or 3 percent a year, 
what effects would be produced? This would be not only an economic 
problem but also a political one’ (ibid.).  
After clarifying the growth-orientation in Deng’s pragmatism, it is 
argued that the institutional aspects of pragmatism reflected, in the context of 
China, a series of limited devolution and liberalisation practices. For example, 
after Deng affirmed the success of the Shenzhen Special Zone, and 
suggested that these working patterns and ideas should be passed on to the 
rest of the country, thousand of development zones were established 
throughout China. Coase and Wang (2012: 152) observed that China had to 
take an experimental approach due to its inexperience in building and running 
a market economy. Thus, Deng’s pragmatism provided not only a politically 
prudent and socioeconomically feasible way for promoting growth, but also ‘a 
solution to the ideological predicament that had constrained and confused the 
Chinese since the very beginning of reform: how could socialism and market 
reform coexist’ (Coase and Wang, 2012: 122). Ong (2006) suggested that the 
Shenzhen Special Zone not only plays the function of promoting local 
economic growth through attracting foreign capital and liberalising labourers, 
but also, more importantly, plays a political role that goes beyond the 
conventional functions of enterprise zones; that is, in establishing a space for """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
53 See ‘Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping’, Vol. 3, p. 373 
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the experiment of some new, flexible sovereign rules and governance 
technologies with the aims of spreading economic networks and fostering 
political integration. In this sense, the Zones in China can primitively be seen 
as some sort of ‘liberalism as exception’ in Ong’s (2006) sense. But, as we 
shall see, the situation was further complicated by the spatial effects of 
China’s pragmatism and the rising inter-urban competition54. 
As noted, the earlier form of China’s pragmatism also expressed vital 
spatial effects in relation to regional uneven development. Whilst the trail-and-
error strategy has the potential of fostering institutional successes, which are 
then transplanted to other regions, these successful institutions in one place 
may prove to be path-dependencies to other places, which adopt similar 
institutions. Once adopted, any attempts of revoking such institutions which 
have been proved successful in other places, can be highly risky in political 
senses. This is because that failure of operating such institutions would 
usually be ascribed to the capabilities of local head officials rather than 
institutions themselves. And, it is more politically prudent to adopt certain 
existing institutions rather than to make institutional innovations at local scales 
in the context of Chinese bureaucracy. In a word, it is argued that the rigid 
transplantation of successful growth patterns reveals the negative aspect of 
the empirical-orientation in the methodology of China’s pragmatism. For, 
endowing a parochial empirical case of success with clear political 
recognition, and presuming its wider applicability without context-specific 
analyses, may bear high risks in terms of whether such success can be 
generalised at wider scales. Arguably, this is perhaps why Coase and Wang 
(2012: 152) make the comment that ‘Success breeds failure, however, when it 
leads people to believe that they have fortunately stumbled upon a fault-proof 
formula that works everywhere and forever’. 
The following subsections will specifically articulate all the above 
arguments. It will first take an abstract perspective to analyse the political-
philosophical nature of Deng’s crucial political judgement of ‘letting some 
regions and peoples get rich first, and then bringing along and helping other 
peoples and regions to eventually arrive at the richness of commonwealth’. In """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
54 See also Harvey, D. (2005), for a discussion of neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics, which 
provides a broad review of China’s economic reform throughout the late 20th century.  
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addition, it will then attempt to elaborate how this utilitarian strategy and 
ideological form of justification had in practice amounted to an indispensable 
condition for the persistent promotion of China’s economic efficiency on the 
one hand, and how the chief local growth pattern of the second stage of the 
reform shaped regional unevenness under the influences of utilitarianism and 
the earlier form of pragmatism. 
 
4.3.3.1 A Critical reading of Deng’s political judgment 
As Habermas (2007: 111) suggested, justifiable norms based on a rational 
consensus express generalizable interests, whereas those norms, which are 
based on force and do not regulate generalizable interests may be termed as 
normative power subject to one indirectly justifiable exception. This exception 
refers to compromise, which manifests a normed adjustment between 
particular interests ‘under conditions of a balance of power between the 
parties involved’. What is notable here is that Habermas has made a 
distinction between generalizable interests, and non-generalizable and/or 
particular interests. It is this key distinction in the presence of some 
institutional arrangements that is of specific relevance to the present 
discussion. Habermas (2007: 112) further suggests that if any of the two 
conditions of the compromise formation is not satisfied, such a compromise 
shall be recognised as a pseudo-compromise. While pseudo-compromise can 
be of significance to a society’s legitimation, Habermas (ibid: 112) argues, ‘In 
traditional and liberal-capitalist societies, it is rather the ideological form of 
justification, which either asserts or counterfactually supposes a 
generalizability of interests, that is dominant’.  
If looking at China’s economic reform through the lens of Habermas’ 
views, it is argued that Deng’s utilitarian assertion indeed exhibits a seemingly 
generalizable interest, as well as a prospective generalizability of such 
interest which is claimed to be realised across some spatiotemporal horizons. 
In other words, the growth-oriented state ideology expressed by Deng’s words 
does at first admit the existence of a generalizable interest. But, in order to 
realise its generalizability, this interest tends to be unequally attainable and 
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differentially accessible, during an ambiguously defined period and across 
different sociospatial sites.  
In practice, it is argued that this politically asserted generalizability of 
interest was also subject to some particularistic interests concealed behind 
the state ideology. All those conditions for, and obstacles to, realising the 
generalizability of the interest are strongly characteristic of a utilitarian nature, 
and had, in turn, inspired a series of institutional selectivities to which regional 
uneven development in China was subject.  
Before we slide into discussions of more concrete-complex issues, it is 
worth returning a bit to the objection of interpersonal comparison to 
utilitarianism. If now introducing the conceptions of the asserted generalizable 
interest and the prospective generalizability of such interest to deal with the 
difficult problem of having proper, precise interpersonal comparison, this 
problem can in practice be solved by the application of these two conceptions. 
This solution is not only based on theoretical discourses, but also of practical 
importance to China’s rapid but uneven development.  
In more specific terms, as the growth-oriented state ideology has 
asserted the presence of a generalizable interest to both the state and the 
people, this generalizable interest then may be qualified as the Rawls’s (1982) 
‘highest-order preference’, which serves to secure both a public 
understanding and social unity through persuading and enabling all the 
people in a society to adjust their desires and abilities towards the 
advancement of the asserted one rational good, that is, the generalizable 
interest. In explaining how interpersonal comparison can possibly be 
undertaken in a society with a highest-order preference, Rawls (1982: 180) 
states that the notion of a shared highest-order preference implies a loss of 
individuality and personal distinctiveness, which leads individuals to become 
‘bare persons’ whose desires and capacities are adjustable according to their 
conceptions of the good which are ‘publicly commensurable via a shared 
highest-order preference’. Although Rawls’s conception of ‘bare persons’ is 
constructed in the light of individuals’ indeterminate desires and capacities, it 
seems that if looking at this conception from the state’s perspective in relation 
to practical utilities, ‘bare persons’, according to Rawls’s definition, are to 
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some extent equivalent to the ‘utility bits’ of classic utilitarianism. It is in this 
sense argued that ‘bare persons’ are presumed to bring their preference and 
measurement of the good into line with the public standards and ends set 
forth by the state, whilst the state is presumed to view each person as a utility 
bit in terms of his/her capacities for promoting the highest-order good in total.  
It must also be noted that although Rawls sees this solution to 
interpersonal comparison as characteristic of utilitarian convention, it is still 
theoretical in nature, and may not suffice in practice to achieve the essential 
role of liberalising and guiding a great deal of social productivity and 
mobilisation towards one highest-order good without entailing critical social 
discontent. In other words, it is argued that in the situation where the regime 
legitimacy of the government is not conferred and renewed by modern 
representative democratic election, the ideological assertion of one shared 
highest-order preference alone is not politically sufficient and logically 
coherent to maintain a socio-politically credible criterion of interpersonal 
comparison against any enduring uneven development in reality, let alone to 
secure political legitimation and rapid economic growth. This is because that 
when a political regime relies heavily upon economic performance for 
legitimation without having a democratic discursive will-formation, the general 
public’s initial beliefs and motives of pursuing the one shared highest-order 
preference can subsequently be undermined by their empirical observations 
on, and self-cognitions of, the actual divergence between state interests and 
their own interests, and the sociospatial uneven development between 
different city-regions. This may result in a severe crisis to regime legitimacy as 
well as to the state’s capabilities for social mobilisation.  
Therefore, it is argued that what Rawls missed, but which may, indeed, 
be of critical necessity to the practices of utilitarian state ideology in an 
authoritarian state such as China, is an explicit assertion with strong political 
credibility, which, at first, admits of the existence of temporary unjust, unequal 
and inappropriate interpersonal comparisons, institutional arrangements 
and/or socio-economic well-beings, but then guarantees a prospective, 
eventual realisation of the generalizability of interests and well-beings, on the 
condition that the general public recognises and accepts temporary 
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transitional inequality and unevenness. And, the strong political credibility of 
such an assertion does not refer to any rational consensus produced through 
discursive will-formation, but to the practical capacity of political judgment in 
Berlin’s (1997) sense together with an authoritative competence for effective 
execution. In viewing all these conditions and relating them to the context of 
China, it seems that not only does the contents of Deng’s political judgement 
fulfill the condition of putting forward both a generalizable interest and its 
prospective generalizability, but also Deng’s claim that ‘whoever does not 
carry out economic reform shall resign from the leadership’55. His actual 
enforcement of depriving two CPC general secretaries of the top leadership 
vividly demonstrates the credibility and authority of any of his essential 
political assertions and judgments. In a word, Deng’s political assertion as to 
the way of achieving the generalizable interest exhibits strong utilitarian 
orientation, and serves as a key legitimation to state regime and authority56.  
With this ideological form of legitimacy and justification, the subsequent 
task faced by the party/state obviously lies in how to shape and implement 
various state institutions and policies to guide social productivity and 
mobilisation towards the end of rapid economic growth, to which the 
party/state’s regime legitimacy is susceptible. Notwithstanding the strong 
authority and credibility of Deng himself and his political judgments, it is 
argued that Deng’s ideas are substantially ideological and political in nature 
rather than based on rigorous and precise scientific calculations. The 
credibility of his ideas and the entailed legitimacy were thereby continuingly 
undermined by the ongoing processes of regional unevenness in terms of the 
rise of development zone-driven local growth pattern and the entailed inter-
urban competitions on the one hand, and also by the growing social 
discontent towards some particular interests (this rise of party/state powers 
and special interest groups), and also the unrealizable generalizability of the 
interest on the other (witnessed by a dramatic growth of mass disturbances in """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
55 In his survey to the south of China in 1992, Deng made this strong claim, saying whoever does not 
carry out economic reform shall resign from the leadership. 
56 As Habermas (2007: 112) observes, legitimation in this case consists of ‘interpretations, of narrative 
presentations or of systematized explanations and chains of argument, that have the double function of 
proving that the validity claims of norm system are legitimate and of avoiding thematization and 
testing of discursive-validity claims’. 
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China during the last two decades). As Sun (2006a) points out, since the mid-
1990s, China’s powerful elite groups have increasingly exerted more and 
more controls on state institutions and policies, resulting in a salient 
imbalance between economic growth and social justice, and public policies 
showed clear preferences and inclinations towards the interests of those 
upper classes, neglecting the interests and demands of lower and middle 
social classes. In other words, Deng’s utilitarian assertion of ‘letting some 
regions and peoples get rich first’ gave rise to growing tensions between 
market-oriented economic efficiency and social justice, and has, since the 
mid-1990s, made economic growth somewhat of an antithesis to social 
justice, resulting in a distorted reform policy, and a challenge to social 
consensus. In Sun’s (2006a: 5) words, whilst China’s earlier economic reform 
was mainly pushed forward by institutional changes and innovations, which 
entailed new social structures and forces, the composition and margin of such 
new structure and forces, however, were getting to be more and more 
solidified during the 1990s, and they thus began to control and distort the 
progress and direction of China’s economic reform in their own interests. It is 
in this sense that Sun (2006: 73) observes that the mid-1990s constitutes a 
key turning point in China’s socioeconomic development, since in this period 
large scale poverty emerged, and the disparities between the rich and the 
poor became too large to be overlooked by the general public. These 
problems were later exacerbated during the third stage of China’s economic 
reform. But the task in this research is to narrow down these general issues, 
putting them into the context of regional uneven development in Jiangsu 
province with the aim of sketching a clearer picture that can decipher the 
critical institutional and individual forces underlying the socioeconomic 
unevenness at issue. In other words, it is argued that, whilst the growing 
social discontent in many ways reflects certain causes and outcomes of 
regional unevenness, it is the complex of the institutions, policies, strategies 
and growth patterns, which embodied and practised the growth-oriented state 
ideology at various scales, that constituted the very forces that directly and/or 
indirectly shaped regional uneven development in China. And, it is the rise of 
development zones in semi-urban areas and the resulting inter-locality 
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competitions that most reflected the growth-oriented state ideology and thus 
shaped regional unevenness in Jiangsu during the second stage of the 
reform.  
 
4.3.3.2 The rise of development zones and inter-locality competitions, 
and the earlier form of China’s pragmatism  
In March 2013, China’s new Premier Li Keqiang chose Jiangsu province as 
his first survey object after taking his office. It is noted that when Premier Li 
visited Xinqiao Town in the south of Jiangsu, local officials particularly 
stressed a core strategy in explaining their local growth pattern. This refers to 
the so-called ‘three concentration strategy’, which involves: concentrating 
agricultural lands for large-scale operations, concentrating enterprises into 
development zones, and concentrating rural households into towns. This 
‘three concentration strategy’ has indeed been widely implemented in Jiangsu 
and later in many other areas in China from the mid-1990s. The practice of 
the later two concentration strategies in fact served for one particular agenda, 
namely, development-zone driven local growth.  
The 1990s witnessed the expansion of development zones throughout 
China. As one of the most active regional growth engines, development zone 
not only played a paramount role in shaping regional economic 
performance57, but also then critically affected in a path-dependent way the 
subsequent urbanisation processes of different city-regions.  
There are in China seven categories of development zones58. The 
expansion of development zones initially derived from a series of trial-and-
error based pragmatic practices after Deng made a statement on the success 
of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. Following Deng’s comment that 
‘apart from the current special zones, a number of new sites could be opened 
in coastal cities for implementing special zone policies, though not be titled as 
special zones’ (Deng, 1984), the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
57 It is generally agreed that the average GDP growth rate of development zones in China secures 2 to 3 
times higher than China’s national annual GDP growth rate. See Coase and Wang (2012: 141), and Liu 
(2007). 
58 These are: special economic zone, economic and technological zone, tariff-free zone, high-tech 
industry development zone, national tourist resort, comprehensive development zone, and state pilot 
zone for overall reform.     
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and the State Council proposed, and then approved, the sequential 
establishments of 14 coastal open cities and 11 national economic and 
technological development zones.  
 The rise of development zones in China may be interestingly 
contrasted with the rise of Enterprise Zones in the UK under Thatcher’s reign. 
In brief, whilst both the zones served to promote better growth, the difference 
here is quite evident. Enterprise Zones were arguably established and 
operated partly for the UK central government to bypass elected local 
government (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988), whereas the rise of development 
zones in China witnessed the emergence of more active and powerful local 
governments at various scales towards the single growth-orientation.  
Coase and Wang (2012: 140), in accepting the importance of 
development zones, assert that ‘the national industrial parks 59  enjoy an 
economic growth rate three times as high as the national GDP growth rate’ on 
average. Apart from the national development zones, there are thousands of 
zones at provincial, municipal, and county-scales. Development zones indeed 
provided Chinese local governments with not only revenues, but also, more 
importantly, records of performance in terms of local growth which played a 
key role in deciding bureaucratic promotion. Local governments could thereby 
be regarded as active utility bits, which are institutionally encouraged by the 
growth-oriented state ideology to seek growth under the quantitatively 
measurable GDP criterion. It is in this sense that Cheung (2009) saw China’s 
local governments at county-scales as effective business firms which 
intensively competed with each other, since all local governments were 
seeking the greatest net balance of their local GDP growth records.  
In taking a closer glance at the rise of development in Jiangsu province 
during the second stage of the economic reform, it is argued that development 
zone-driven growth brought about some changes in spatial and scalar terms 
in shaping the regional uneven development at issue. In more concrete terms, 
as most township and village enterprises (TVEs) were at first located at 
township and village scales, development zones were then established to 
change such scattered industrial compositions through attracting and """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
59 The term of ‘industrial park’ used by Coase and Wang (2012) generally means the same thing as 
‘development zone’ used in this research. 
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concentrating TVEs and other types of manufactories into the zones at county 
scales or above. Cheung (2009: 63) observes that county-level cities in China 
have the chief economic power, for these cities ‘possess the right to decide 
and allocate the use of land’. Cheung sees this right of deciding and allocating 
land use as the key issue in local growth, as land acts as a basic condition to 
both survival and development, and takes priority over other considerations.  
In addition, concentrating various enterprises into development zones 
helped coordinate the primitive industrial forces and sociospatial relations 
fostered at the first stage of the reform, with the aim of creating industrial 
agglomerations, which exhibit lower transaction costs as well as higher 
competitiveness. In practice, the industrial agglomerations resulted from 
development zones to various degrees led to a series of derivative effects 
such as social mobilisation of migrant labourers, and concentrations of capital 
and other resources, which in turn triggered and shaped urbanisation at the 
county scale. In other words, some county-level units with strong development 
zones began to exhibit similar or even stronger socioeconomic 
competitiveness than some of the municipal-level units in China60. As the 
places which had got rich first according to Deng’s utilitarian strategy, those 
witnessed a trend that many such places were seeking for being rescaled into 
county-level cities, which possess much wider and stronger institutional 
capacities and autonomies. And, this was particularly so in Jiangsu province. 
The problem entailed by this rescaling practice lies in that not all counties 
were in fact qualified for being rescaled into quasi-cities. In other words, under 
the popular trend of county-to-county-level city rescaling practice, there 
existed many cases of incompatibilities and discrepancies between local 
institutions and local socioeconomic situations. These issues are discussed in 
detail in Chapter Five.  
Under the general phenomenon of having industrial concentration 
strategies at various local scales, all the local governments, which upheld the 
growth-orientation, produced homogeneous growth patterns (subject to their 
respect path-dependencies), and inevitably got involved in, and contributed to, 
increasingly intense inter-locality competitions. This is mainly because """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
60 The scalar governance structure of China is described in Chapter One. 
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development-driven growth is highly dependent on attracting external 
resources and investments to couple with local assets in order to promote 
local growth. An obvious asymmetry in terms of existing industrial bases can 
thus be seen here. Regions with better existing industrial bases or reserves 
such as local TVEs, reveal a great advantage in attracting or mobilising those 
enterprises that are located within their jurisdictions to local development 
zones, whereas regions that have lagged with respect to their rural 
industrialisation at the first stage of the reform tend to lag again under this 
growth pattern. And, since the development zone-driven growth pattern had 
proved to be successful in certain regions, other regions could face no choice 
but to adopt the same pattern. It is at this point that we have to introduce the 
earlier form of China’s pragmatism.  
Pragmatism at this stage can be summarised by Deng’s words of 
‘crossing the river by groping the stones’, which is indicative of a trial-and-
error strategy, which encourages local governments with devolved and 
liberalised powers to have a variety of institutional experiments for promoting 
growth. This trial-and-error strategy, whilst serve to test institutional 
innovations, can exercise strong path-dependent effects for other regions so 
long as an institutional innovation proves to be successful in one place. 
Indeed, the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ had at the first stage become some sort 
of institutional path-dependency to which the rural industrialisation of the north 
of Jiangsu province was subject (Yang & Zheng, 2006).  
And, the development zone-driven growth pattern was based on the 
even more prominent sample experience of the Shenzhen Special Zone in 
Guangdong province, which stands as a role model and a pioneer of China’s 
economic reform. It was Deng’s express decision to spread the success of the 
‘Special Zone’. It is thus by no means surprising that this growth pattern was 
quickly and pervasively expanded across China during the 1990s. But, as 
noted, although Deng’s political judgements revealed clear strategic 
considerations based on utilitarianism and pragmatism and did in practical 
terms work in many ways, they do not reveal many rational scientific 
analyses, but, instead, they are more often than not empirically oriented. This 
is, arguably, particularly so with respect to China’s pragmatism.  
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In concrete terms, whilst the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ and other 
growth patterns may prove to be successful practices from a national 
perspective, any rigid transplantations of such a success to other localities 
could be not only conflictual with national and provincial utilitarian propensities 
in terms of preferences for establishing and sustaining regional economic 
polarisation, but also incompatible with the regional or local specific 
endowments and institutions of other areas. The rigid transplantation of 
successful growth patterns reveals the parochial aspect of the empirical-
orientation in the methodology of China’s pragmatism. For, endowing a 
parochial empirical case of success with political recognition, and presuming 
its wider applicability without context-specific analyses, bears high risks61. In 
addition, as development zone-driven growth is primarily based on labour-
intensive manufacturing industries which require numerous labourers 62 , 
regions with better performance under this growth pattern tend to more or less 
draw on and deprive the human resources of other regions, which in turn 
weaken the capacities and opportunities of other regions for promoting local 
growth. This tendency evidently amounts to one of the core ideas of 
utilitarianism. These mechanisms will be articulated in detail in the latter case 
study chapters.  
Regarding inter-locality competitions in more specific terms, such 
competition was principally expressed in the form of competing for inward 
investments through a variety of investment invitation campaigns conducted 
by local governments. Most of these campaigns involved preferential policies 
on land price and taxation. Cheung (2009: 64) argues that as ‘economic 
power rests mainly with the xians (county-level cities in Chinese), competition 
at this level is the most intense’. While both the local governments in the 
south and the north of Jiangsu possess the planning power to determine land 
use, the presence of numerous TVEs in the south endowed the south with 
better resources and opportunities to facilitate development zone-driven 
growth. And, local governments in the south exhibited better institutional """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
61 This point may be compared with the issue of ‘policy transfer’ raised by Jamie Peck and Nik 
Theodore. 
62 Sun (2006b: 207) suggests that about 82.7% of migrated rural labourers were employed in secondary 
industry, among which manufacturing industry, construction industry, and mining industry absorbed 
66.2%, 13.0%, and 3.5% respectively. 
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capacities in terms of what Dicken et al. (2001: 100) defined as the concrete 
way that state institutions strategically couple regional assets with global 
production networks with the purpose of creating, enhancing, and capturing 
values for promoting regional development. Neil Coe et al. (2004: 469), also 
similarly state that regional development is ‘a dynamic outcome of the 
complex interaction between territorialized relational networks and global 
production networks within the context of changing regional governance 
structures’.  In addition, as Coase and Wang (2012: 142) observe63, ‘What the 
Chinese local governments did was essentially to provide organizational 
services – putting together all factors of production’; and ‘with industrial parks 
cropping up all over China to win investment, local governments had to 
convince investors that their industrial parks had everything needed to assure 
the success of a business’. Regarding ‘all factors of production’, Coase and 
Wang (2012) particularly address the factor of organization which is often 
inadequate in developing countries, but was provided by Chinese local 
governments which possess the power to mobilise various resources. But, 
although almost all local governments in China assert that they and their 
development zones could provide all the institutional and material elements, 
which may guarantee the business success of enterprises, it will be seen in 
the case studies that the implementation of organisational services by 
different local governments revealed many diversities in both substantive and 
procedural terms in reality. These differences in practice critically affected the 
growth of development zones, and, of course, local growth at large.  
And, regarding the specific economic entities located in development 
zones, it is observed by Coase and Wang (2012: 143) that ‘In the intensifying 
competition for investment, it did not take long for local government officials to 
realize that a winning strategy was to distinguish their industrial park from its 
peers by focusing on certain industries with a promising long-term growth, 
rather than accepting a group of unrelated firms’. Whilst Coase and Wang 
rightly point out this tendential practice of local governments, it is argued that 
in reality, not all local governments could have a certain choice in selecting 
firms with investing intentions because of the intense inter-locality """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
63 The term of ‘industrial park’ used by Coase and Wang (2012) generally means the same thing with 
‘development zone’ used in this research.  
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competitions. Thus, not all local governments could attract sufficient numbers 
of enterprises to establish industrial agglomerations with clear themes or 
coordinated divisions. In addition, many enterprises attracted to development 
zones tended to be those which could generate short-term growth rather than 
the guarantee of promising long-term growth. This is because any long-term 
growth would inevitably lie outside the records of performance that could be 
attained by the head officials who attracted investments into development 
zones. This issue will be specifically elaborated when discussing the notion of 
pragmatic institutional time in Section 4.4.  
One more notable point occurred at this stage of China’s economic 
reform is the emerging nexus between industrialisation at county and semi-
urban scales, and its derivative urbanisation. As noted, one of the ‘three 
concentration strategy’ refers to concentrating rural households into towns. 
This strategy in a prima facie view, served to mobilise migrant labourers for 
supporting labour-intensive manufacturing sectors at county or above scales, 
usually in development zones64. Coase and Wang (2012: 146) assert that 
China’s industrial agglomerations and economies of localization, although 
being inefficient with respect to internal economies in Alfred Marshall’s sense, 
gained external economies of scale from access to low-cost labour. This gain 
of external economies helped to exert the greatest competitive advantage of 
the Chinese economy within the global commodity chains, that is, a 
substantial amount of low-cost labour reserves. Whilst some regions and 
places with strong development-zone performance (such as the south of 
Jiangsu) did exert this advantage by making FDIs and exports their chief local """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
64 There existed in China a substantial number of so-called surplus rural labourers, the exact amount of 
which, according to different estimations, is between 0.1 billion and 0.5 billion (Wen, 2011). Since 
1992, there have been a series of official policies and institutional changes enacted by central and local 
governments to direct and regulate the mobilisation and migration of surplus rural labourers. For 
example, the foundational policy paper – ‘Decision of the CPC on some issues concerning the 
establishment of the socialist market economy system’ in November 1993, points out that the 
governments shall encourage and direct the flow of surplus rural labourers, incrementally transferring 
them between regions, and into non-agricultural sectors. Other essential policies papers on this issue 
during the 1990s include, inter alia, ‘The implementation plan concerning the promotion of labour 
market, and the improvement of employment service system’ enacted by the Ministry of Labour on 
August 8th, 1994; ‘The notice concerning the re-employment project, and the phrase one of the project 
of urban-rural coordinated employment – the ordering of the trans-regional flow of rural labour force’ 
enacted by the Ministry of Labour in November 1993, ‘The temporal regulation on the trans-provincial 
flow and employment of rural labour force’ by the Ministry of Labour on November 17th, 1994, which 
for the first time institutionalised the Employment card management system. 
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growth engines, it is argued that the interplay between social mobilisation in 
terms of migrant labourer supplies and development zone-driven growth had 
entailed not only the prosperity of export-oriented, labour intensive 
manufacturing industries, but also the changes in the regional/local 
sociospatial relations, which were concretely expressed as the processes of 
urbanisation. This kind of urbanisation could hence be seen as a derivative of 
local industrialisation. As Zhu et al. (2008) suggest, the actual theoretical 
foundation of the ‘Three Concentrations’ strategy rests on presumptive 
interactions between industrial agglomeration and urbanisation. Those 
interactions assume that successful industrial agglomerations can also 
promote concentrations of local households and lead to better construction of, 
and coordination between, infrastructure and other resources, which in turn 
push forward the urbanisation process (ibid.: 5). As the case study chapters 
will show, the development of derivative urbanisation also exhibited 
unevenness between regions, in accordance with the unevenness in local 
industrialisation. But, such unevenness was to various degrees overcome 
when urbanisation itself became an independent and chief endogenous local 
growth engine rather than merely a derivative of local industrialisation.  
Moreover, derivative urbanisation at the second stage of the economic 
reform also held a key implication for later regional (uneven) development. It 
inspired and began to shape local state institutional arrangements and 
capacities in a way that saw the element of land and the sociospatial relations 
attached to land as the most critical factors for local growth. In other words, 
although local institutions still made investment invitation campaigns and 
development zone operations their primary tasks at this stage, new local 
institutional selectivities and local growth patterns based on urbanisation-
driven growth were fostered in order to meet the state-led, urbanisation-driven 
growth-pattern, which pervasively dominated during the third stage of China’s 
economic reform.   
 
4.4 China’s Pragmatism and the third stage of the economic reform (the 
earlier 2000s – 2013) 
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John Keynes (1924) once said, ‘in the long run we are all dead’. 
Notwithstanding the various interpretations of the true meaning of his words, it 
is argued that when turning our attention to China’s economic reform, the 
prima facie essence of Keynes’ words seemingly reflected an essential aspect 
of China’s growth-oriented state ideology, of which the institutional 
expressions complemented the utilitarian practices of regional (uneven) 
development through establishing a dominant institutional time that replaced 
Deng’s ambiguous schedule as to preferential sociospatial growth65.  
 As noted before, the earlier form of China’s pragmatism can be 
summarised by Deng’s words of ‘crossing the river by groping the stones’, 
which indicates a trial-and-error strategy, which encourages local 
governments with devolved and liberalised powers to have a variety of 
institutional experiments for promoting growth. And, this strategy in turn 
expressed spatial effects in relation to regional uneven development. Whilst 
the trail-and-error strategy has the potential of fostering institutional 
successes, which are then transplanted to other regions, these successful 
institutions in one place may prove to be path-dependencies to other places, 
which adopted similar institutions. It is argued that at the earlier stages of the 
economic reform, China’s pragmatism had not yet produced any essential 
temporal effects through institutional expressions that could vitally affect 
regional uneven development. But, with the ongoing progress and maturity of 
the reform and state institutions, an alienated form of pragmatism66 began to 
emerge and spread in China. Deng’s pragmatic idea of setting aside any 
ideological debates on capitalism versus socialism, and concentrating on 
institutions and methods which can promote economic growth, was, at the 
third stage of the reform, alienated into a pervasive institutional tendency in 
terms of principally promoting local agendas that can pragmatically realise 
GDP-oriented economic performance and other related interests within the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
65 This refers to Deng’s strategy of ‘letting some regions and peoples get rich first, and then bringing 
along and helping other peoples and regions to eventually arrive at the richness of commonwealth’. 
66 In saying the alienation of China’s pragmatism, the notion of alienation resonates with Deng’s ideas 
as to the fundamental distinction between socialism and capitalism. According to Deng, this distinction 
lies in that ‘the biggest advantage of socialism shall be of the richness of commonwealth which reflects 
the core essence of socialism’ (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3, p. 364). And if this cannot be 
achieved, China’s socialism and reform will be alienated and failed (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping, 
Vol. 3, p. 139). 
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temporal horizon of a certain institutional time. In other words, the third stage 
of the reform witnessed that state institutions and related growth patterns at 
local scales were increasingly shaped by the temporal effects of China’s 
pragmatism. And, this institutional propensity was to a large extent 
socioeconomically working in concert with the phenomenal process of state-
led urbanisation, which spotlighted the discourses and practices of regional 
(uneven) development of China at the third stage.  
 This section and its sub-sections will thus at the outset articulate the 
political-philosophical rationales of the alienated form of China’s pragmatism, 
advocating that, based on the assumption of the primacy between different 
temporal planes, there can be a dominant institutional time, by which the 
strategic selectivities of the major state institutions are shaped, and to which 
the strategic calculations of various individuals and entities are oriented. It 
then puts the above arguments into the concrete context of China, analysing 
how the dominant institutional time entailed by China’s pragmatism operated 
in shaping regional (uneven) development through the state-led urbanisation-
driven growth pattern.  
 
4.4.1 The political-philosophical rationales of the alienated form of 
pragmatism 
In order to have an insight into China’s alienated pragmatism and its influence 
on regional uneven development, it is necessary to introduce time-space 
relations into the following analyses. This to some extent echoes Giddens’s 
(1981: 3) supposition that ‘the articulation of time-space relations in social 
systems has to be examined in conjunction with the generation of power’.  
As having noted before, China’s utilitarianism was expressed into 
sociospatial preferences through institutional practices, which could be 
justified by the proposition of the prospective generalizability of a 
generalizable interest, the realisation of which is, however, subject to an 
ambiguously defined temporal horizon. Notwithstanding the absence of a 
clear temporal horizon under China’s utilitarianism, it is proposed that if we 
view China’s alienated pragmatism through the lens of time-space relations, it 
will reveal a much clearer temporal horizon, which embodied China’s 
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pragmatism. And, it is within this temporal horizon that various preferential 
interests can be defined and realised, and the pursuance of generalizable 
interest may be subject and given way. In other words, China’s pragmatism at 
this stage constituted an essential complement to its utilitarianism, as the 
latter justified the presence of developmental unevenness, and the former 
delineated the fundamental temporal horizon within which unevenness was 
motivated and realised. Indeed, it is for this reason to say that it is the 
combination of China’s utilitarianism and pragmatism that more completely 
reflects China’s growth-oriented state ideology.   
In order to articulate the temporal effects of China’s pragmatism, a 
number of conceptions reviewed and used by Giddens (1981) must at the 
outset be adopted and adapted. According to his structuration theory, 
Giddens (1981: 19) advocates that ‘all social actions consist of social 
practices, situated in time-space, and organised in a skilled and 
knowledgeable fashion by human agents’, but ‘such knowledgeability is 
always bounded by unacknowledged conditions and action on the one side, 
and unintended consequences of action on the other’. Although Giddens 
pointed out that knowledgeable social practices/actions can be affected by 
unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of actions, his 
observation has arguably neglected the situation where both knowledgeability 
and unacknowledgeability can be ideologically and politically constrained and 
institutionally woven by the presence of a universal, imperative state ideology, 
and of an authoritative, powerful government.  
Saying this does not intend to rebut Giddens’s (1981: 19) duality of 
structure, which asserts that ‘the structured properties of social systems are 
simultaneously the medium and outcome of social acts’. Indeed, the actual 
practice of China’s alienated pragmatism revealed a series of dynamic mutual 
constitutions of structure and agency which are characterised by ‘sets of 
chronically reproduced, deeply sedimented, rules and resources which 
constrain, facilitate, and bind social actions in time and space’ (Giddens, 
1984: 17-25: cf. Jessop, 2004: 35).  
And the reason for asserting the above negligence derives from the 
uniqueness of China’s situation in terms of the prominent parameter of 
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‘institutional time’ in the practice of pragmatism. This parameter, whilst having 
twisted and alienated China’s pragmatism, served as a cornerstone, upon 
which institutional selectivities in terms of rules and resources were built, thus 
having become a supra-logic over other layers of temporality in relation to 
regional (uneven) development in China. Thus, the notion of ‘institutional time’ 
in the context of China, and its differences with what Giddens (1981) defined 
must be clarified.  
 Based on his theory of structuration, Giddens (1981: 20) suggested 
that there are, in general, ‘three intersecting planes of temporality involved in 
every moment of social reproduction’. These refer to: first, the temporality of 
immediate experience, which indicates to the continuous flow of day-to-day 
life; second, the temporality of Dasein, which means the life-cycle of the 
organism; and third, the longue durée of institutional time (ibid.: 20). In 
outlining these planes of temporality, Giddens puts his concerns primarily on 
the intersection and interaction between/among different social practices of 
temporality. As he (1981: 28) argued, ‘The structural practices of social 
systems bind the temporality of the durée of the day-to-day life-world to the 
longue durée of institutions, interpolated in the finite span of existence of the 
individual human being’. And, it is in this sense that Giddens (1981: 20) 
observes that no form of durée ‘has logical primacy over the other’.  
Giddens here seems to have taken a general, objective view in dealing 
with the intersected complex of temporal durée. However, whilst this objective 
construction of the temporal distanciation of social practice may have in a 
prima facie sense correctly delineated what the reality is like, it is argued that 
Giddens’s view is in some aspects flawed due to the failure of not 
institutionally distinguishing the different degrees and roles of the strategic 
conducts of various situated actors in producing and reproducing institutions. 
In other words, it is argued that, although it is right to say that, under the 
conception of duality of structure, social actors’ routine practices of using rules 
and resources as a whole result in and connect with structured social 
systems, it is overly simplistic to assume a pan-presence of practical and 
discursive consciousness in all social actors/agencies, and to presuppose that 
actors are, according to Giddens (1981: 18), ‘highly knowledgeable 
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(discursively and tacitly) about the institutions they produce and reproduce in 
and through their actions’.  
This view to some extent corresponds with Jessop’s (2004: 36) critique 
that Giddens’s mutual theoretical isolation of structure and agency results in 
‘little, if any, recognition (let alone adequate explanation) of the differential 
capacities of actors and their actions to change different structures’.  
In addition, although Giddens (1981) observes that human agents 
appear to be ‘cultural dopes’ in Parsons’ and Althusser’s senses, it is, 
however, argued that such ‘cultural dopes’, if ideologically reviewed through 
the lens of utilitarianism, may be adapted to be ‘bare persons’ or ‘utility bits’ 
that are indispensable components to the practice of an utilitarian state 
ideology and its institutional expressions. To adapt the conception of ‘cultural 
dopes’ in the present analysis does not intend to resort to functionalism. 
Instead, the key point lies in advocating and applying a more concrete-
contextual and subjective analytical view in deciphering and articulating the 
recursive properties of the consciousness and capacities of a social actor 
under authoritative, ideological/institutional interventions.  
More importantly, to adopt this concrete-contextual, subjective view 
entails a challenge to the view of Giddens that no form of temporal durée has 
logical primacy over the other. Although it is correct to see, from the 
perspective of an objective third party, the institutional longue durée of time-
space, which is constitutive of continuous flows of conducts and of human 
beings as a coherent ontology of time-space, to admit this coherent ontology 
of time-space, however, leads to a quasi-evolutionary scheme, to which 
Giddens himself tries to object. In order to uphold the duality of structure on 
the one hand, and also to avoid the tendency to evolutionism on the other, it is 
hence necessary to pay attention to the presence per se of the conflicts and 
contradictions between different forms of temporal durée, and of the resulting 
logical and de facto primacy of one temporal durée over the others.  
This recognition of the primacy is generally premised upon two 
presumptions, which are related in a logically progressive fashion. The first 
primitive presumption starts with the conception of Giddens’s second form of 
temporal durée, that is, in his words (1981: 19-20), ‘the temporality of Dasein, 
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the life-cycle of the organism’. As regards to the notion of Dasein, Giddens 
(1981: 34) relied on Heidegger’s ideas, stressing the factor of temporal 
finitude and arguing that only human beings are aware of temporal finitude. 
Giddens (ibid.: 34, 35) also points out Heidegger’s misleading implications, 
saying that Heidegger ‘concentrates too resolutely upon the individual as a 
futural being’, and fails to envisage ‘the problems of the generations – of how 
the dead make their influence felt upon the practices of the living’. Whilst 
Giddens (ibid.: 35) seems to have again taken a third party view to objectively 
delineate ‘institutional forms which persist across the generations’, it is, 
however, argued that the peculiar human consciousness of temporal finitude, 
from a subjective view, leads to a variety of conflicts and inconsistencies 
among different generations of institutions and human beings. In more 
specific terms, it is argued that a human being in the original position, due to 
the consciousness of his own finitude, tends to appeal to interests that can 
only be realised within the finite durée of his life-cycle. This tendency derives 
from that human’s own knowledge, capacities, and intentions in the original 
position. Then, if extending the situation of one single human being into a 
pure association of multiple human beings, the aims and contents of each 
individual tendency can be more or less diverse with each other because of 
the differences in the finite durée of life-cycle in cognitive and physical 
senses. Conflicts and collaborations may thereby be fostered and realised 
according to those cognitive and physical differences in the finite durée of 
humans.  
And, in the original position, humans with analogical cognitions to the 
length of their Dasein (the aggregation of these human beings forms, in a 
rough sense, a ‘generation’) tend to form a set of rules or institutions that 
reflect, and appeal to, their collective, though unnecessarily homogenous, 
interests within a collectively cognised finite durée, whereas other generations 
also tend to possess their own sets of rules. So long as there exists more than 
one generation, there are overlapped temporal durée, within which conflicts 
and collaborations can be mostly activated. It is from these conflicts and 
collaborations a logical primacy of temporal durée is derived. 
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The above primitive presumption is logically woven in an abstract 
context that deprives all social and natural parameters and moral 
considerations. If progressing the above presumption by introducing certain 
concrete-contextual factors, it is proposed that the rationale and applicability 
of the primitive presumption can be shaped by, and subject to, other vital 
logics, upon which a society’s operations may rely.  
These kinds of logics of intentions and actions include, for instance, 
inter alia, family-oriented considerations for posterity, environmental 
protection and sustainable development-related considerations for future 
generations, and charity considerations. Although all such considerations do 
reveal a common tendency of taking account of longer-term interests to which 
more than one generation can be susceptible, it must be seen that these 
considerations by no means represent the mainstream guiding logics of 
individuals or states in reality. If we adopt Maslow’s (1962) theory of hierarchy 
of needs, it can be seen that he labels most long-term considerations that are 
beyond a human’s Dasein as ‘high levels’ of needs. The satisfactions of these 
needs will not be realised until the lower levels of needs can be satisfied. And, 
satisfying these lower levels of needs may require actions and interactions of 
temporal co-presence. In other words, lower levels of needs are in most 
occasions concerned with the issues which can be realised within the finite 
durée of a human being.  
In further progressing the above presumption with an institutionalist 
view, the situation as to the logical primacy between different planes of 
temporalities can be even clearer in practical terms. It is noted that, in 
proposing the notion of the longue durée of institutional time, Giddens (1981: 
28) means ‘the long-term reproduction of institutions across the generations’. 
This ontological, holistic view of institution time, arguably, neglects the 
specific, subjective conflicts between institution time and finite durée of human 
life-cycle, and simply upholds the duality of structure by emphasising the 
intersections of the different planes of temporality. It is argued that institutional 
time shall be analysed with more contextual-specificity and subjectivity in 
relation to its production and reproduction. In other words, institutional time 
should not be seen as merely an objective durée. Indeed, it can be 
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conceptualised as a temporal horizon with vivid, practical boundaries and 
selectivities.  
Defining institutional time in this manner inevitably leads to a multi-
presence of various institutional times. But, arguably, it is possible in most 
cases to identify one horizon of institutional time, which acts as an ecological 
dominance to other actors and institutions within a given spatiotemporal fix. 
This view of institutional time is to some extent reminiscent of Jessop’s (2004: 
42) standpoints in the strategic-relational approach, according to which all 
institutions have a definite spatiotemporal extension, and ‘emerge in specific 
places and at specific times, operate on one or more particular scales and 
with specific temporal horizons of action, have their own specific ways of 
articulating and interweaving their various spatial and temporal horizons of 
actions, develop their own specific capacities to stretch social relations and to 
compress events in space and time’, and thus ‘have their own specific spatial 
and temporal rhythms’.  
Thus, if institutional time is seen as a definite temporal extension with 
specific temporal horizons of action, the relationship between institutional time 
and human lifespan may accordingly go beyond embedded intersection, 
revealing more realistic interactions between institutions and individuals.  
Moreover, if we can identify a dominant institutional time, to which all 
other systems and horizons of action are subject, it is proposed that the 
earlier primitive presumption can also accordingly be amended as: a human 
being in the context where a dominant institutional time exists, due to the 
consciousness of his own finitude and, of the dominant institutional time, 
tends to appeal to interests that can only be realised within both the finite 
durée of the dominant institutional time and his life-cycle.  
Arguably, this amended presumption is also applicable to actions that 
involve long-term interests that go beyond the length of one generation. This 
is because the realisation of long-term interests inevitably involves 
connections between temporally absent peoples and requires institutions to 
support interactions between temporally absent people. The existence of a 
dominant institutional time can therefore exert path-shaping effects at present, 
and become path-dependency in the future, to affect such institutions. In a 
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word, it is argued that an institutional time in the above sense tends to set out 
an artificially demarcated temporal horizon or boundary, by which relevant 
agents’ motivations are to a large extent shaped, and within which their 
actions can be enabled and/or constrained.  
In practice, institutional time may serve as a common agenda, which 
attracts a variety of entities, rules and resources which seek to realise 
interests within the given institutional time, and integrates them into dynamic 
institutional/industrial complexes. In most cases, the temporally finite nature of 
institutional time stimulates or catalyses the pursuance and realisation of 
particularistic interests because the more recognisable and shorter the 
temporal horizon of an institutional time is, the more preferential and intensive 
its institutional selectivities will be. To what extent institutional time may 
influence a region’s socioeconomic development at large and an actor’s 
motivations and actions in particular, mainly depends on how dominant this 
institutional time is in a political and socioeconomic system. Identifying the 
dominance and contents of an institutional time, arguably, helps to articulate 
the primacy between different temporal planes, and to decipher the causes 
and evolution of the conflicting interests that are expressed as developmental 
unevenness from a strategic, relational perspective that goes beyond 
Giddens’s division of ‘structural contradiction’ and ‘conflict’. Under this 
strategic, relational view, institutional time is a basic parameter, by which 
strategic selectivities are shaped, and to which strategic calculations are 
oriented67. In the case of China, it is argued that there exists a dominant 
institutional time, which is shaped and twisted by pragmatism and its 
institutional expressions, and thus plays a key role both in analytical terms in 
deciphering institutional and individual actions, and in practical terms in 
shaping regional (uneven) development.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
67 A notable effort partly involving the use of institutional time can be seen in the analysis by 
Pemberton and Goodwin (2012) as to ‘how successive governments have used institutional 
reorganisation and rescaling as a means of delivering different political strategies related to the primacy 
of politics at a national scale’. This analysis indeed resonates with Brenner’s (2009: 135) call of 
focusing on the ‘periodization’ of state activity ‘to generate…insights into the trajectories of state 
rescaling in different global regions and national state spaces’. The ‘periodization’ approach adapted by 
Pemberton and Goodwin serves to connect trajectories of state rescaling in London with the essential 
political strategies and approaches implemented by the governments over a series of successive periods 
of rescaling. In carving the different phases and periods of rescaling, Pemberton and Goodwin mainly 
rely on the particular dominant scale of institutional organisation during the relevant period, and the 
ruling party of the government at that time. 
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4.4.2 The dominant institutional time in relation to regional development 
in the context of China 
Having clarified the conception of institutional time, we can thereby connect 
institutional time with China’s alienated pragmatism in the more concrete 
context of China’s third stage of economic reform. In general terms, it is 
suggested that, as a key idea of the growth-oriented state ideology, China’s 
alienated pragmatism consolidates and considerably intensifies the tendency 
of trying and using any feasible methods to pursue economic growth and 
realise particularistic interests within a given dominant institutional time. 
Although this tendency can be regarded as part of Deng’s political legacy, the 
persistent growth-orientation, as a fundamental political task to which the 
CPC’s regime legitimacy is highly susceptible, has redefined Deng’s 
pragmatism in respect of the conditions and criteria for interest realisations, in 
order to accord with the changing economic structure and the dominant scale 
of institutional organisation. The dominant institutional time in the context of 
China shall thus be seen as a product of China’s growth-orientation.  
In more specific terms, following the institutional and industrial changes 
such as the tax redistribution system, strategic reorganisation of state-owned 
sectors, and, the rise of development zones, China’s economic reform at the 
third stage witnessed the revival of state-led economic development, which 
may be imprecisely defined as China’s State Capitalism68. Arguably, it was 
during this stage that the thematic tone of China’s economic reform69 was to 
the largest extent expressed and embodied, and the dynamic dialectic70 
revealed a sharp inclination to the party/state’s interests. And, the realisation 
of such interests in turn restricted peoples’ recursive capabilities to choose. In 
other words, the rise of state institutions, SOEs and related interest groups 
during the thirds stage of China’s economic reform made the dominant 
institutional time a key parameter in understanding regional uneven 
development, as the institutional time in China clearly reflects some most """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
68 See, ‘State capitalism in China, of emperors and kings’, The Economist, Nov. 12th, 2011.  
69 This refers to the proposition that China’s economic reform was indeed guided by and served the 
pragmatic consideration of how to restore and strengthen the authorities and functions of the party/state 
of the CPC, which had been severely vitiated by the Cultural Revolution. 
70 This refers to the interactive dialectic relationship between the general direction expressed by the 
growth-oriented state ideology and its institutional expressions on the one side, and the recursive 
capabilities of the general public (utility bits) to choose over time and space, on the other. 
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crucial incentives and contents of local state institutions and growth patterns 
in relation to regional development.  
Regarding the particular form and nature of the dominant institutional 
time in China, it is proposed that this dominant institutional time covers a 
temporal horizon of five years or less. It is accordingly within this less than five 
years temporal horizon that state institutional selectivities and strategies were 
shaped and operated in promoting regional development. This horizon of less 
than five years generally results from two largely overlapping institutional 
times.  
The first refers to the so-called ‘Five-year development plan for the 
national economy’ which has been successively renewed every five years 
since the PRC founded. These plans set out the general targets, directions, 
and strategies that guide the socioeconomic development of all regions and 
state institutions in China. And, local governments at all scales must draft and 
publish their local versions of the five-year plan, which shall comply, and be 
compatible with, the national plan, subject to sanctions and amendments by 
upper level governments.  
The second one refers to the term of party/government office in China, 
which also covers five years or less, according to the scale of the party/state 
institution, and the position of the state official. This limited term of party/state 
office is another essential political legacy of Deng, who for the first time 
rescinded the lifelong tenure. Thus, in a general sense, party/state officials in 
China are subject to a re-election for every five years, and officials at local 
scales tend on many occasions to change to different posts within less than 
five years. These two institutional times are notably overlapping. For example, 
the new CPC central committee was elected and formed in 2012, which will 
be re-elected in the 19th CPC congress in 2017, whilst the 12th national five-
year plan covers the term of 2011 and 2015, and it will be renewed in 2016. It 
is thus in this sense proposed that there exists a dominant institutional time, 
which covers a temporal horizon of five years or less.  
The reason for saying this institutional time is of dominance lies in that 
all the state institutions and functionaries are simultaneously constrained 
and/or empowered to deal with development matters in their jurisdictions 
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within this temporal boundary. In other words, thanks to Deng’s rescission of 
the lifelong tenure, the state officials in China have to realise either their 
political ambitions and tasks, or their other interests within their office term. 
This institutional time is also applicable to non-state entities and individuals 
since whoever intends to conduct socioeconomic activities are more or less 
subject to either the five-year development plans, or his personal connections 
with state officials whose positions and office terms are usually fluctuant71. 
Thus it is argued that this dominant institutional time takes priority upon both 
the temporality of Dasein, and that of immediate experience in the context of 
China, as officials tend not to appeal to aims and interests that may only be 
realised beyond their office term, and an individual’s immediate experience 
(the continuous flow of day-to-day life) is usually shaped by, and subject to, 
their rational plans within the dominant institutional time.  
The existence of this dominance institutional time thus reflects and 
embodies the earlier proposition that a person in the context where a 
dominant institutional time exists, due to the consciousness of his own finitude 
and, of the dominant institutional time, tends to appeal to interests that can 
only be realised within both the finite durée of the dominant institutional time 
and his life-cycle. 
The functioning of the dominant institutional time in practice is 
institutionally strengthened and complemented by the central-local relations in 
China. As Xu (2010: 5) argued, China’s fundamental institution is a regionally 
decentralized authoritarian regime (RDA), which is characterised as ‘a 
combination of political centralization and economic regional decentralization’. 
This regime has substantial centralized personnel governance and controls 
over state institutions at various scales on the one hand, and extensive 
devolutions and delegations of authorities and responsibilities for economic 
development and social governance to local state institutions on the other. 
The pivot of the RDA regime lies in the incentive device and the related """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
71 In my fieldwork, many local businessmen complained about the problems they had suffered when 
some local head officials were reallocated to some other places or positions, because this kind of 
change in many cases means the repudiation of various promises made by previous officials in relation 
to, for example, better administrative efficiency and preferential policies. These businessmen thus had 
to re-establish new personal connections with new local head officials with the aim of seeking new 
preferences to their businesses.  
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performance evaluation rules. Albeit never being explicitly published, the 
system of GDP-based bureaucratic promotion, which manifests and accords 
with the growth-oriented state ideology, has been widely acknowledged by 
most Chinese bureaucrats and officials since the mid-1990s. This 
performance evaluation system, on the one hand, acts as a key incentive to 
state institutions and officials in relation to regional and local development 
matters; and on the other hand, constrains/enables state institutions and 
bureaucrats to realise their political as well as economic interests within the 
temporal horizons prescribed by the evaluation system. Zheng (2013) claims 
that local bureaucrats in China usually do not possess a perspective of 
sustainable development, but rather stick to the task of delivering 
development in terms of local GDP growth within their own term of office. 
Such GDP growth is often achieved through various means of development, 
which are unhealthy and polluting, and through the commercialisation of 
essential social welfare services, and duplicate infrastructure constructions 
(Zheng, 2013: 17). 
Keynes’s words that ‘in the long run we are all dead’ may in the 
Chinese context be amended to: ‘in the long run no one will always be a 
bureaucrat’. Local bureaucrats are put into a position with substantial 
autonomous economic power, but are also subject to the career path control 
of the CPC and/or upper-level governments. As Burns (1994, cf: Xu, 2010: 
13) observed, there exists in China a nested network, within which the central 
party/state possess personnel control over provincial leaders, and provincial 
leaders extend such control down to municipal, county and township scales. 
As this nested network ties the promotion, rotation, and demotion of local 
bureaucrats with the local socioeconomic performance in their jurisdictions 
(Xu, 2010), it is argued that being pragmatic within one’s institutional time in 
dealing with socioeconomic performance therefore becomes a rational choice 
to as well a common consensus among state institutions and bureaucrats72.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
72 It must be noted that although China’s pragmatism ideology and its various institutional expressions 
do entail a variety of corruptions, corruptions and personal interests are not the objects of this research. 
As this research concentrates on the dynamic relational interactions between ideology/institution and 
regional uneven development, it must be made clear that these short-term particularistic interests bear 
strategic and structural characteristics, and can only be understood from an institutional perspective.  
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Another notable institutional change underlying China’s central-local 
relations is the tax redistribution reform of 1994. It is beyond this research to 
fully articulate the effects of this reform, but suffice it to say here that this tax 
redistribution system serves to strengthen central government’s financial 
revenue, and directly undermines regional/local governments’ tax-related 
capacities and their controls on local banks. But, local governments’ losses of 
tax revenue and banking control, as Xu (2010: 22) observed, were 
compensated by ‘extra-budgetary and non-budgetary revenues’, and by 
monopolistic controls on local land transfer and use. For a variety of reasons, 
before the beginning of the 2000s, most local governments had not yet found 
and made land their principal finance source and the main engine and 
leverage of local development. This can be reflected by the statistics provided 
by Sheng Huaren, the vice chairman of the National Congress of China. 
According to Sheng, the gross land-transferring fees at all local scales in 
China were 910 billion RMB during 2001 to 2003, whereas this revenue was 
only 6.7 billion RMB in 1998 (cf: Yuan, 2012: 24). This big discrepancy was 
partly caused by central government’s further appropriation of the enterprise 
profit tax since 2002, which, as Xu (2010: 56) suggests, ‘greatly 
disincentivizes local governments’ efforts to improve enterprise efficiency’. 
And, more importantly, as it is argued that the practices of institutional time do 
not rest in a vacuum, but are situated in a series of socioeconomic dynamics 
and relations, this discrepancy in some aspects revealed an essential change 
from the development zone-driven growth to a new chief growth pattern which 
is more feasible under, and compatible with, China’s alienated pragmatism, in 
particular, the dominant institutional time. This new local growth pattern refers 
to state-led land-economy in the form of urbanisation, which is looked at in 
more detail in the next subsection.  
Before going to the next section, there is, notably, a symbolic call 
against the consensus of concentrating on matters and interests within 
institutional time. This call refers to the claim made by China’s new vice-
premier, Wang Yang. According to his words, bureaucratic promotion-related 
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achievements need not be completed within his prefecture73. Wang Yang 
made this assertion as the CPC secretary of Guangdong province, which is 
the region with the highest local GDP in China. Known as a reformist in the 
CPC, Wang’s assertion indeed reflects the universal recognition of the 
opposite view. This issue will be expanded in the case study chapters.  
 
4.4.3 Institutional time and state-led, urbanisation-driven growth 
From a historical perspective, sociospatial relations have arguably been of a 
consistent, core significance to all the dynasties of China as well as to modern 
China. The land reform conducted by the CPC under Chairman Mao’s 
guidance pivotally contributed to the CPC’s reign. Later, the economic reform 
under Deng’s design was also initiated by, and based upon, a series of 
changes in sociospatial relations (decollectivisation in rural areas). When 
glancing at the critical roles and position of sociospatial relations at the third 
stage of China’s economic reform, the rare advantage enjoyed by China’s 
economic reform at its early stages, that is, free of vested interests in China’s 
political establishment, had been considerably undermined (Coase and Wang, 
2012: 79). This advantage was arguably replaced by a few new dominant 
complexes of institutions and actors, of which the structural selectivities and 
individual actions concentrated on exploiting and acquiring interests in terms 
of growth, performance and profits through producing and reproducing key 
sociospatial relations within the temporal horizon of the dominant institutional 
time. In other words, the changing dynamics of sociospatial relations provided 
an arena, upon which various new dominant scales of institutions and their 
capacities and interests were woven. Such changing dynamics of sociospatial 
relations were most vividly expressed by China’s state-led urbanisation. 
 While the focus of the rest part of this section will largely rest on 
urbanisation, it is argued that urbanisation and its entailed industries and 
developments shall by no means be seen as economic issues only and be 
analysed in pure economic terms. The city, as Giddens (1982: 144) claims, 
shall be understood ‘first and foremost in relation to the generation of power’. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
73 See the report of ‘contributing to a blest Guangdong province by strengthening social construction 
and innovating social management’ made by Wang Yang in the second general meeting of the ninth 
plenary session of the 10th party provincial committee of Guangdong province on July 12th 2011.    
121""
As previously argued, China’s economic reform served in general to restore 
and reinforce the party/state’s authority which was vitiated by the aggressive 
socio-ethical movements of the Cultural Revolution. It is therefore argued that 
exerting the party/state authority in the third stage of China’s reform began to 
be strategically and structurally connected with land development and the 
extensive commodification and capitalisation of land, in the name of state-led 
urbanisation.  
The strategic dimension of urbanisation can arguably be best identified 
by the so-called Policy Paper No. 18 [2003]74, which is seen as a landmark 
policy paper for the real estate industry, since it for the first time explicitly 
confirmed that the real estate industry had become a pillar industry of the 
national economy. Since then, the state-led, urbanisation-driven growth 
pattern was continuingly and universally adopted and implemented by most 
local governments, becoming a mainstream, chief contributor to local GDP 
and records of performance. And, regarding the structural dimension of 
urbanisation, land revenue in many cities and regions of China contributed 
more than half of their gross local revenues, in the context of the increasing 
proportion of state revenue within the gross national incomes. In general, local 
land revenue derives from land-transferring fees, which usually amount to 
20%-40% of the final housing prices, and also from transaction-related taxes 
which usually amount to 30%-40% of the final housing prices. This means that 
roughly 50%-80% of the market price of a real estate property may consist of 
various state revenues (Yuan, 2012: 24)75.  
As a pillar industry of the national economy, it is estimated that the real 
estate industry directly connects with and influences more than thirty other 
essential sectors including resource, service, material sectors etc. In a word, 
the real estate industry and its peripheral, complementary sectors, together 
with infrastructure development have been core elements and engines in 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
74 Policy paper No. 18 refers to the ‘The notice concerning the promotion of sustainable and healthy 
development of the real-estate industry market’, enacted by the State Council on August, 12th 2003.  
75 In 2009, the three cities (Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou city) in the south of Jiangsu province were 
all among the top 20 highest municipal land revenues in terms of land-transferring fees, whereas no 
city in the north of Jiangsu was listed (China real estate industry indicator data-base, cf: Chen, 2012: 
266).  "
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promoting and sustaining China’s urbanisation and in maintaining and 
consolidating the powers and interests of local state institutions.  
The strategic and structural importance of urbanisation does not derive 
from a sudden coincidence. As noted in Section 4.3, urbanisation was not the 
primary growth agenda at the second stage of reform, but was more like a 
derivative resulting form local industrialisation, and served to establish better 
infrastructures and environments in development zones for attracting inward 
investments, and accommodating migrant labourers. Toward the third stage of 
the economic reform, urbanisation began to break its nexus with local 
industrialisation. This is primarily because local governments realised that 
urbanisation alone could be not only a better endogenous engine, through 
which local GDP could be achieved more stably and efficiently within the 
dominant institutional time, but also an effective measure for strengthening 
autonomous local institutional authorities and financial capacities. 
When local governments came to realise that their powers on land 
purchase and transfer were effective in, and propitious to, promoting 
urbanisation in the light of the growing market demands for real estate 
properties and infrastructures, and that the realisation of those demands could 
dramatically generate high GDP rate and record of performance, it is not 
surprising that local governments, in a pragmatic way, all chose to make the 
real estate industry their pillar industry and a key revenue source.  
This similarity in local growth pattern eventually resulted in similar 
forms and contents of structurally inscribed strategic selectivities in different 
places, which then produced similar types of spatiotemporal fixes in Jessop’s 
(2004) terms. As Ye (2013: 21) observed, local governments in China all 
strived to promote urbanisation-driven growth, constructing cities with similar 
forms and plans, and building CBDs (Central Business District) to attract 
consumption resources from adjacent areas without taking into account the 
optimal allocation of such services.  
The homogeneity of greatly relying on urbanisation, which is mainly 
based on the endogenous element of land however resulted in the case that 
regional unevenness was evolving to a large extent quantitatively rather than 
qualitatively during the third stage of the reform. As the later case studies 
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show, the developmental disparities between the two cities/city-regions were 
in many key respects mitigated under the pervasive state-led, urbanisation-
driven growth.  
 Underlying the evolving quantitative regional uneven development, 
arguably, lies the visible hand of China’s dominant institutional time. It is 
argued that state-led urbanisation proceeded with the purpose of realising, 
within the dominant institutional time, quantitatively assessable records of 
performance that are linked to the relatively short-term interests of state 
institutions and sectors. Other interests and aims, which have to be realised 
beyond the temporal horizon of dominant institutional time, or can contribute 
less to records of performance, may thus be deferred, displaced, or omitted 
by local governments and powerful interest groups.  
Arguably, such practices critically reflect Jessop’s (2004: 42) view that 
the spatiotemporal selectivity of an institution ‘involves the diverse modalities 
in and through which … some practices and strategies are privileged and 
others made more difficult to realize according to how they match the 
temporal and spatial patterns inscribed’ in the institution at issue. Such 
practices occurred in China at all scales, not only because that the dominant 
institutional time is expressed in a top-down way, but also because the bond 
between China’s regime legitimacy and economic growth has left local 
governments few choices under the bottom-up bureaucratic accountability 
system. As Yuan (2012: 186) claims, ‘the very pressure in reality has forced 
Chinese government to make a hard balance between short-term and long- 
term risks. And, its choice of focusing on short-term interests seems to be 
based on, rather than some fine considerations of balancing, political 
incapability to establish economic strategies that can accord with long-term 
interests’. Governments in China, as Yuan states (ibid), are thus ‘dancing with 
shackles in a narrow space shaped by the reality, being incapable of getting 
rid of their addicted reliance on rapid, high growth’.  
 
4.4.4 Mitigated regional unevenness and exacerbated socioeconomic 
unevenness 
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Whilst it was argued that the regional unevenness in Jiangsu province was in 
many aspect being mitigated during the third stage, if looking at state-led 
urbanisation in each locality independently, it can arguably be seen that such 
local growth patterns had themselves become a generator of severe 
socioeconomic uneven development within the finitude of China’s dominant 
institutional time. In other words, the growth pattern in each city, by seeking to 
attain its own relative structural coherence, led to unevenness. How and to 
what extent such coherence might be secured, on the one hand, depended on 
the capabilities of the key local institutional complex in creating, enhancing 
and capturing the values for, and displacing, deferring and omitting the costs 
of, local development. On the other hand, the interactions of one generator of 
unevenness with other scales, places and networks also play important roles 
in shaping and affecting the unevenness between different generators of 
unevenness. This is particularly so when two or more generators of 
unevenness are sociospatially close to, and institutionally similar with, each 
other.  
 In promoting urbanisation-driven growth, local governments had all 
operated to defer and to displace the various costs of securing growth and 
coherence to a future temporal horizon, and to some other places, scales, and 
social stratums. For example, the numerous local debts now owed by many 
local governments largely reflected such practices76. China’s core official 
press, the People’s Daily (2013) recently addressed this, sharply criticising the 
fact that many local governments merely strived for short-term interests, and 
records of performance, whilst intentionally neglecting high loan burdens, and 
long-term and sustainable development. Regarding the displacement of the 
costs in sociospatial terms, as Wen (2011: 189) suggests, the process of 
migrating and industrialising rural surplus population, though having been 
manifested as a part of urbanisation, was actually a sociospatial displacement 
of poverty, because the various costs and tribulations of industrialisation and 
urbanisation had been born by migrant labourers, and rural residents who lost 
their land, whilst some special interest groups (such as SOEs and property """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
76 A discussion of the high risks brewed by the local debts owed by China’s local governments can be 
seen in Wu. L. (2012), ‘Local debtas, the sword hanging over China’s central government’, New View 
Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 600, pp. 5-7 
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developers whose wealth dramatically increased during the last decade) 
enjoyed the benefits generated from urbanisation. This view to some extent 
resonates with Ong’s (2006: 4) argument that ‘exceptions to neoliberalism 
exclude migrant workers from the living standards created by market-driven 
policies’ and ‘exclude noncitizens from the benefits of capitalist development’. 
It is in this sense to argue that the capabilities of deferral/displacement 
reflect the core importance of the dominant institutional time, as it is the 
institutional time that entailed the key incentive for local state institutions to 
exercise their structural selectivities that were pragmatically preferential to the 
interests that could be realised within short-terms. In other words, most state-
led local institutional complexes possess and exhibit similar temporal 
extensions and temporal horizons of actions under the urbanisation-driven 
growth pattern, and the basic boundary of these temporal extensions and 
temporal horizons of actions was defined and shaped by the dominant 
institutional time. 
Whilst such practices of local growth does not, in a prima facie view, 
invoke conflicts between different cities and regions since the costs of 
securing their relative structural coherence can be deferred to their own 
respective future temporal horizons, it is argued that the subjects, of which the 
interests are vitiated, and the very way, in which the costs are deferred, 
implied and entailed essential conflicts and causes of regional unevenness. 
Moreover, although the urbanisation-driven local growth pattern has enabled 
many local governments to successfully secure economic performance in a 
homogenous fashion, such economic growth and mitigation of regional 
unevenness attained throughout the last decade can arguably not be 
sustained because the growth pattern itself is not sustainable and, has 
resulted in severe sociospatial unevenness and conflicts. In order to decipher 
this point more clearly, the notion of China’s ‘pseudo-urbanisation’ needs be 
invoked.  
In a rough sense, China’s pseudo-urbanisation refers to the 
phenomenon that state-led urbanisation is mainly based on infrastructure 
investments and architectural modernisation, but neglects and deprives the 
interests and welfare of newly migrated urban population. During the last 
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decade, more than 70 percent of the newly increased urban population in 
China consisted of migrated agricultural/rural population. On the one hand, 
although most rural migrants have been in permanent residence in the cities 
or city-regions, China’s restrictive household registration system prevents 
them from enjoying equal public goods/services provided by local state 
institutions with standard urban households. And, rural migrants who do not 
possess urban household status are also constrained with respect to their 
political rights and opportunities, which in turn directly or indirectly undermine 
their incomes and living standards (Yu, 2010). On the other hand, as China’s 
pseudo-urbanisation was driven by the increasing demands for land, 
numerous rural migrants and urban residents lost their land through state-led 
land expropriation, and meanwhile did not obtain sustainable jobs. Although 
the call of reforming the household registration system has long been a hot 
issue addressed by many critics, most local governments showed reluctance 
to support and facilitate such sort of reform. This is largely because the 
household registration system justifies and helps local governments to omit, 
or at least to defer the huge costs of politically and socially urbanising 
migrants, out of the temporal horizon of the dominant institutional time.  
The negative effects of the deferral practice are further exacerbated by 
China’s pseudo-urbanisation itself. Urbanisation in China was expanded 
through appropriating and converting rural and arable land into urban use 
land. The compulsory purchase system in China enables local governments 
to legally purchase land at relatively low prices from rural residents and then 
to transform the land for urban development uses, which can be transferred to 
property developers at rather high prices. As Yuan (2012: 43) had criticised, 
under the compulsory purchase system, the treasure of land, which should 
have been a potential capital for rural residents to integrate into urbanisation, 
had, however, been asymmetrically absorbed into urban areas, in particular, 
into local governments and related interest groups. Xu (2010: 52) contends 
that ‘This (state-led land expropriations) often led to sharp conflicts between 
those who lost land without receiving proper compensation’, and property 
developers who could profit immensely from such transactions, thanks to their 
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close associations with local governments. And these issues are specifically 
reviewed and reflected in the case study chapters.  
At this point we thus need to again invoke the interactive dialectic 
relationship between the dominant state ideology and its institutional 
expressions and the recursive capabilities of utility bits to choose. It is argued 
that, compared to the earlier stages of China’s economic reform, the 
capabilities to choose of the majority population, that is, the colony of 
migrated rural labourers and residents, were most constrained at this stage. 
The constraints set upon their capabilities to choose derive from the triumph 
of the pervasive urbanisation-driven growth pattern which exhibits and entails 
a series of local spatiotemporal extensions with clear strategic institutional 
selectivities by which the interest-orientations of governments, SOEs, and 
other privileged interest groups have been critically shaped and sustained. 
Sun (2006b) describes this phenomenon of constrained capabilities to choose 
as an institutional tendency towards a rigid social structure and the loss of 
stratum fluidity. If looking into this institutional tendency through the lens of 
regional developmental unevenness, it is argued that under those normative 
guises of local economic growth, regional competitions, and urbanisation, the 
socioeconomic unevenness in Jiangsu province during the third stage evolved 
at a household scale, although often hidden behind aggregate regional scale 
statistics. This sociospatial pervasiveness of unevenness was, arguably, 
institutionally produced and reproduced by the politically distorted and 
spatiotemporally compressed practices of China’s utilitarianism within each 
local spatiotemporal extension defined by China’s pragmatism.  
As a crucial complement to utilitarianism, China’s pragmatism 
institutionally generated and also shaped a group of interconnected 
competitive spatiotemporal fixes, which ramified and intensified utilitarian 
practices within them. In other words, it was under this situation that the 
growth-oriented state ideology accomplished its full face in institutional and 
spatiotemporal terms. In simple terms, it can be interpreted as that the major 
institutions at all scales should operate to let some regions and peoples get 
rich first within every five years or less.  
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Regarding whether there exists any institutional or socioeconomic 
barriers to new regions and peoples, which wish to get rich in the successive 
five years in future, it is believed that Sun’s (2004) ideas of the rigid social 
structure and the loss of stratum fluidity and Coase and Wang’s (2012) 
observation of the vested interests in China’s political establishment, have 
answered this question. In practice, the answer to this question is reflected by 
the collapse of the public consensus on the growth-oriented economic reform 
(Li, 2011; Xu, 2010). It is important to recall Deng’s words here. As Deng said, 
‘Socialism shall not be that some minority gets rich whilst the majority stays 
poor. The greatest advantage of socialism is the richness of commonwealth, 
and this lies in the core essence of socialism’. And, ‘if the reform leads to 
polarisation, it means that the reform has failed, and turned out to be 
capitalism’77.   
Generally speaking, the key situation in China during this stage was 
definitely not the eventual richness of commonwealth. But it is also more 
complicated than Fred Hirch observed in his Social Limits to Growth, that is, 
‘material wealth increases, but the positional inequality remains’ (cf: 
Dahrendorf, 2008: 13). The very element that leads to the further complexity 
lies in the basic and underlying motive of the CPC in initiating the economic 
reform, because this motive directs, and meanwhile distorts, conventional 
government and market activities, or in Dahrendorf’s language, affects both 
entitlement and provision, though in an unconventional fashion. To 
Dahrendorf (2008: 15), the key connections between politics and economics 
lie in, inter alia, the questions of ‘what are the economic prerequisites of 
political freedom’, and ‘what are the political prerequisites of economic 
progress’. But the connections in terms of such questions do not merit much 
practical importance in the specific context of China, as political freedom had 
been radically ruled out from the top agendas of China’s reform since the 
Tiananmen Square incident. The later question posed by Dahrendorf shall 
arguably be adapted to that of what are the political and institutional 
prerequisites of relying on economic progress for strengthening and 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
77 See, ‘Selected works of Deng Xiaoping’, Vol. 3, p. 139, 364, and ‘The chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s 
life’, Vol. 2, pp. 1356-1357  
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sustaining regime legitimacy, in order to address China’s situation in a more 
precise fashion.  
Obviously, answering these adapted question requires, apart from the 
practice of state-owned enterprises, concrete institutional participation and the 
intervention of local governments in local socioeconomic development. As 
Zhang (2013: 160) suggest, in the process of land development, local 
governments tend to be both the chief actors of law infringement and the 
crucial engine for promoting institutional innovation. These two seemingly 
contradictory roles have arguably served the same twofold objective. The first 
part of the objective refers to securing and strengthening the party state’s 
leading role in local governance, as this is the very power and regime 
foundation, upon which the practices of all party/state institutions and 
individuals are premised. The second part of this objective is dealt with 
producing and reproducing at regional/local scales dominant institutional 
selectivities which not only accord with the first part in a macro sense and with 
the evaluation criteria for bureaucratic promotion, but can also endow local 
governments with certain degrees of autonomous maneuverability in 
managing developmental matters within the relevant institutional spatial and 
temporal horizons. Notably, the state practice of securing this twofold 
objective did not evolve in a linear fashion during the first two stages of the 
reform, since regional and local development during these periods witnessed 
a variety of institutional innovations and competitions, which expressed 
various comparative advantages respectively enjoyed and exerted by different 
localities. Although not all innovations and competitions resulted in economic 
success, most of them brought about more or less liberalisation and 
empowerment to peoples’ capabilities to choose (for example, the rural 
decollectivisation practice led to the rise of TVEs, and the rise of development 
zones led to the increase of inward investments and labour-intensive and 
high-tech industrial agglomeration in new and semi-urban areas). The 
realisation of such liberalisation and empowerment was, arguably, due to the 
fact that growth agendas expressed by local dominant institutional selectivities 
during these periods involved the extensive, institutional and industrial 
participations of rural labourers, whose recursively selected tactics and 
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actions not only contributed to improving the general living standard, but also 
promoted the economic and entrepreneurial foundations, which help local 
governments institutionally restructure their autonomies and authorities in 
relation to economic development.  
But, all these seemingly win-win institutional arrangements were 
broken when urbanisation pervasively became the key local growth agenda 
during the third stage of China’s reform. And, the local dominant institutional 
selectivities of the urbanisation-driven growth pattern expressed a rather 
narrowly defined interest-orientation, which privileged state institutions and a 
few newly formed interest groups, whilst depriving most migrant labourers and 
many other social groups who have to afford high house prices, of their 
capabilities to choose and opportunities to participate, in the context of the so-
called pseudo-urbanisation process.  
In brief, it can be summarised that the rural industrialisation-driven 
growth in Jiangsu province was characteristic of an interest-orientation toward 
the richness of commonwealth, and also an ambiguous but effective public-
private partnership in promoting regional economic development, whereas the 
urbanisation-driven growth revealed some features in terms of state-led 
growth and an oligopolistic interest-orientation. Hence, it is argued that the 
institutional deprival of the mass, and the privileging of the state and few 
interest groups, to the largest extent embodied the utilitarian characteristics of 
China’s growth-oriented state ideology in terms of ‘letting some peoples and 
regions be rich first’. Meanwhile, the practice of pragmatism served to 
geographically expand utilitarian institutions to different localities at various 
scales, and to compress local utilitarian practice within the temporal horizon of 
the dominant institutional time.  
It may further be argued that the evolution of regional development in 
terms of the changing institutional selectivities and the people’s capabilities to 
choose, reflects a strategic, sociospatial shift of the governments’ key 
emphasis on development, that is, from emphasising economic reforms in 
rural areas to concentrating on urban and semi-urban development. In more 
specific terms, during the second stage of China’s economic reform, this 
sociospatial shift was progressing in a relatively incremental, conventional 
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fashion in the context of intense inter-urban industrial and institutional 
competitions (although many local governments had begun to compulsorily 
purchase and industrially transform rural lands in their territories, which 
constituted key local leverages for attracting and using external resources for 
local growth). This shift was accelerated towards urban-oriented growth in the 
late 1990s, as a central-local institutional compromise had been reached, 
which enabled local governments to use their land not only as a leverage for 
absorbing external resources, but also as a fully controlled endogenous asset 
that can be commercialised and capitalised to stimulate and support local 
growth. The completion of this sociospatial shift at the third stage of the 
reform, as Huang (2013) observes, reflects the controversial tendency of ‘the 
state owned sectors advancing whilst private sectors retreating’. Huang 
(2013) then further observed that it was based on political considerations that 
China chose to pause and reverse the progress of rural industrial and 
financial reforms, incrementally shifting to urban-oriented reforms. This 
choice, albeit successfully helping China transform from a centrally planned 
economy into a ‘State Capitalist’ economy, did not result in a complete market 
economy transition.  
Although Huang’s observation rightly points out the general outcomes 
of the strategic, sociospatial shift between the rural and urban orientations, it 
fails to clearly articulate the actual political considerations underlying this shift. 
In fact, it is argued that there are no such decisive political considerations, at 
least, not in any concrete policy forms. What does exist in reality is a growth-
oriented state ideology, which is susceptible and subject to the objective of 
restoring and strengthening the party/state’s regime legitimacy.  
But this growth-oriented state ideology entailed no policy measures or 
any institutional arrangements directly, but a set of guiding rationales and 
criteria, with which all the concrete institutional expressions of the state 
ideology should be in accordance. For example, the institutional innovation of 
rural decollectivisation was, arguably, partly an individual, coincident case, 
and partly an inevitable outcome of the reform, as the restructuring of rural 
sociospatial relations had at the beginning of the economic reform been 
recognised as a priority. Successful rural industrialisation in some regions and 
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areas was indeed an additional institutional innovation entailed by rural 
decollectivisation. Those areas with successful rural industrialisation growth 
then became both model patterns and path-dependencies for other regions 
pursuant to China’s pragmatism. It was also during this era that regional 
unevenness began to be fostered and facilitated by the radical and extensive 
restructuring of rural sociospatial relations, across different temporal and 
spatial horizons respectively. But, the success of rural industrialisation in 
some areas did not lead to further substantive reforms in relation to the rural 
financial system and rural governance.  
Corresponding to the global trend of the rise of the city-regions, most 
local governments during this stage chose to adopt the development zone-
driven growth, which had been experimented internationally (for example, the 
UK’s enterprise zone) and domestically (for example, the Shenzhen Special 
Zone), to agglomerate local scattered rural industries into newly built city-
regions with the aim of furthering both urbanisation and industrialisation 
processes in a complementary and interactive way. During this stage, those 
local governments with better endogenous industrial growth and higher inward 
investment became more powerful in relation to their institutional and financial 
capacities. In other words, parallel to the regional unevenness at issue lies the 
evolving unevenness of local state capacities and this is also reflected in the 
bureaucratic evaluation system, which vitally relies on some GDP-oriented 
criteria to determine the promotion of local head officials.  
Despite inter-urban competitions, the rise of development zones 
eventually inspired local governments to find the quickest and easiest way of 
promoting their local GDP growth, that is, the land-oriented growth. And, this 
at the third stage of the economic reform became a common growth pattern 
that was adopted by most local governments at various scales. The 
emergence of urbanisation-driven growth indeed signifies the completion of 
the strategic, sociospatial shift, which makes urban areas the absolute growth 
pivot. It is also during the course of urbanisation that local state institutions, 
state-owned enterprises, and special interest groups have institutionally 
embedded their interests into local growth and governance models, and made 
them the very subjects, which local institutional selectivities mostly privilege. It 
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is also during this course that China’s party/state authorities have become 
ever stronger since the inception of the economic reform. But the 
disproportional growth rate between state income and local residential income 
indicates that only the first utilitarian part of Deng’s dictum has been realised, 
but the second part, that is, ‘eventually reaching the richness of the 
commonwealth’, is still largely neglected.  
 
4.5 Summary 
To provide a conceptual framework, this chapter has first adopted a historical-
abstract perspective to analyse the sharp transition from Mao’s reign of virtue, 
which is reflected by the guiding ideas and practices of China’s Cultural 
Revolution, to the growth-oriented state ideology, upon which China’s 
economic reform is premised. It is argued that China’s economic reform was 
triggered by a thorough alteration of its dominant state ideology, which 
politically reconstituted the regime legitimacy basis of the party/state, and this 
in turn resulted in modifications to the aims, functions, and structures of state 
institutions at various scales. Through this historical analysis, it can be seen 
that the basic task of China’s economic reform is to restore and strengthen 
the authorities and functions of the party/state of China, which was severely 
undermined by the Cultural Revolution.  
 After briefly clarifying the above issue, this chapter specifically 
articulated the two core ideas of China’s growth-oriented state ideology, 
namely, utilitarianism and pragmatism with unique Chinese characteristics. 
Regarding the relevance of these two ideas to regional uneven development 
in China, it is argued that both the institutional practices of utilitarianism, and 
pragmatism revealed prominent spatial and temporal elements and effects at 
different scales and during different periods. In more specific terms, China’s 
utilitarianism, whilst establishing a growth-orientation that assimilated the 
public rationality and individual actions, also laid out a path-strategy for 
realising economic growth. This refers to Deng’s political judgement of ‘letting 
some peoples and regions get rich first, and then bringing along and helping 
others to eventually arrive at the richness of commonwealth’. Although the 
first part of Deng’s judgement reveals a clear sociospatial preference in 
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utilitarian sense, which thus directly shaped and justified subsequent regional 
unevenness, it avoids in the second part the essential factor of the temporal 
horizon, within which the common richness can be realised. In addition, it is 
argued that the earlier form of China’s pragmatism also imposed certain 
spatial effects onto regional uneven development through the trial-and-error 
strategy, which is summarised by Deng’s words of ‘crossing the river by 
groping the stones’. It was seen in practice that, under this strategy, 
successful institutional innovations and experiments in some regions and 
places would quickly be transplanted to and adopted by other regions and 
places, although such highly empirical-oriented method may not guarantee an 
extensive applicability of such successful sample models. Instead, these 
sample models in terms of major local growth patterns and projects might turn 
out to be some sort of path-dependencies to regions, which adopted them. 
More importantly, as the rise of the cities and development zones in China 
during the second stage of the reform stressed on the strategic couplings 
between local assets and external resources, regions with homogenous 
growth patterns fell into intense inter-locality competitions. All these had 
hence decisively shaped the regional unevenness between the south and the 
north of Jiangsu province at the first two stages of the reform.  
 When China’s economic reform progressed to its third stage, it is 
asserted that China’s pragmatism was alienated by the emergence of a 
dominant institutional time, which complemented the ambiguous temporal 
horizon set forth by China’s utilitarian strategy on the one hand, and critically 
shaped the incentives and selectivities of state institutions and local growth 
patterns of this stage, on the other. It is proposed that this dominant 
institutional time covers a temporal horizon of five years or less. It consists of 
two largely overlapping institutional times: China’s ‘five-year development for 
the national economy’, and the term of party/government office. It is within this 
dominant institutional time that all the state institutions and officials are 
simultaneously constrained and/or empowered to deal with development 
matters in their jurisdictions within this temporal boundary.   
 The presence of this institutional time directly leads to the change of 
the major local growth pattern, which transits from development zone-driven 
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growth to state-led urbanisation-driven growth. It is the homogeneity of this 
growth pattern at local scales that defines the evolution of regional 
unevenness at this stage. The pervasive operations of this growth pattern, on 
the one hand, brought about a great deal of endogenous local growth that 
quantitatively undermined regional unevenness in Jiangsu province. And, on 
the other hand, they also entailed in each place pervasive sociospatial 
unevenness, which was institutionally produced and reproduced by the 
politically distorted and spatiotemporally compressed practices of 
utilitarianism in each local spatiotemporal extension defined by China’s 
alienated pragmatism. Hence, it is summarily proposed that it was under this 
situation that the growth-oriented state ideology accomplished its full face in 
institutional and spatiotemporal terms.  
In simple terms, it can be interpreted that the major institutions at all 
scales should operate to let some regions and peoples get rich first within 
every five years or less. This reveals the fundamental logic of the regional 
uneven development between the south and the north in Jiangsu province, 
and also, arguably, sketches out the key rationale of China’s economic 
reform. And, all the above conceptual articulations will be empirically reflected 
and discussed in the following case study chapters.  
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Chapter Five: Case Study One: Changzhou city and its 
sub-areas in the south of Jiangsu province (Part One: 
the first and second stages of reform) 
 
5.1 Introduction to the case studies 
The two case studies of the south and north of Jiangsu province serve to 
empirically explore how the growth-oriented state ideology has, in practice, 
interacted with various socioeconomic forces and processes to produce 
regional uneven development at different local/regional scales over different 
temporal stages. Among these forces and processes, industrialisation and 
urbanisation constitute the major engines of regional growth at respective 
stages of China’s economic reform, and their recursive interactions 
contributed substantially to regional unevenness and institutional change.  
Regarding the analytical structure of the two case studies, the chief 
aspects of the evolving development of the two city-regions will be temporally 
demarcated in accordance with the three-stage division of China’s economic 
reform set out in the previous chapters. As we will see, these correspond with 
key local growth patterns in each place at each stage. In brief, while the 
(uneven) development of the two city-regions during the first two stages 
largely involved industrialisation-driven growth, the analytical focus of the third 
stage is on state-led, urbanisation-driven growth. However, this research does 
not aim to merely present a historical-empirical record of regional uneven 
development in Jiangsu province, but instead, it has an analytical ambition to 
critically reflect on some key issues, which are of immediate significance to 
contemporary China and prospective regional uneven development in the 
near future. The two case studies thus give more analytical and empirical 
prominence to the third stage of China’s economic reform. It is in this sense 
that the case study of the south of Jiangsu is divided into two chapters. This 
Chapter will focus on the first two stages whereas the next chapter 
concentrates on the third stage. In addition, it is worth noting that whilst the 
two core ideas of the growth-oriented state ideology will be applied in the case 
study chapters to decipher the concrete evolution of regional uneven 
development, the TPSN framework, though may not be fully used in every 
stage, will also be applied to grasp those most essential parameters that have 
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shaped or affected regional unevenness at each stage of China’s economic 
reform. 
 
5.2 TVE-driven growth in Changzhou during the first stage of the reform 
Unlike the regions of the northern Jiangsu province, whose economies have 
risen and fallen over time, the south of Jiangsu has, since the Song dynasty 
(960AD - 1279AD), consistently been one of the most developed regions in 
China. For example, in the Qing dynasty (1644AD – 1912AD), Jiangnan 
province (which included the current southern Jiangsu, Anhui province, and 
Shanghai city) contributed about one third of gross national revenue incomes. 
At the end of Qing dynasty (1644AD - 1911AD), the Westernization 
Movement advanced by powerful local military groups had initialised local 
industrialisation in a number of key cities in the south of Jiangsu. This 
primitive industrialisation process was then continued during the pre-reform 
era under the CPC reign. As Wen (2011: 16) points out, by the end of the 
1970s, the three cities in the south of Jiangsu (Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou 
city) all possessed a relatively mature industrial structure, the composition of 
which ranged from chemical, textile and heavy industries to equipment 
manufacturing and steel industries. The south of Jiangsu thus established an 
urban belt with strong industrial isomorphism78. It must also be pointed out 
that, despite the presence of this industrialised urban belt in the south, the 
sub-regions of these three cities (their counties, towns and villages) had not 
established any rural-based industrial bases during the pre-economic era. 
This industrial vacuum in rural and semi-rural regions had accordingly made 
these regions ideal sociospatial sites for receiving the capital and 
technological spillage, which overflowed from their municipalities.  
The inception of China’s economic reform in some ways enabled and 
realised such urban-rural interactions, thus resulting in rather successful rural 
industrialisation in the south of Jiangsu during the first stage of the reform. 
While the most prominent region of reform and development at that stage was """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
78 In Coase and Wang’s (2012: 143, 144) words, such industrial isomorphism refers to the phenomenon 
of substantial duplicative investments in the same sectors, which, though incompatible with Ricardo’s 
conceptions of specialization and comparative advantage, helped to facilitate and spread social and 
industrial learning in terms of human skills and manufacturing technologies, which in turn contributed 
to the rise of China’s export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing sectors. 
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the Pearl River Basin, which was a flagship locality for implementing Deng’s 
‘Open Policy’, and received most state support in terms of having local 
autonomous powers for experimental institutional innovations, the south of 
Jiangsu was taking a lower profile in its local institutional changes for 
economic growth.  
Thanks to the innovation and expansion of China’s ‘household 
responsibility system’ 79 , agricultural production in many areas achieved 
dramatic growth during the first stage of China’s reform. But, compared to the 
widespread and common growth in agricultural sectors, the essential 
institutional change brought about by this system, namely, rural 
decollectivisation, led to far more complex and indeed uneven outcomes in 
relation to rural industrialisation in different regions. The south of Jiangsu 
might perhaps be the most successful region in China with respect to rural 
industrialisation, whose growth pattern was summarised and labelled by 
China’s leading sociologist, Fei Xiaotong 80  as the well-known ‘Southern 
Jiangsu Model’.  
Generally speaking, rural decollectivisation in China served to liberalise 
a set of rural resources, the subsequent operations of which were 
ideologically guided and institutionally justified by the growth-oriented state 
ideology. In other words, peoples’ capabilities to choose were to some extent 
emancipated so long as their chosen action was to improve local economic 
growth subject to relevant laws and policies. And, the weaker political 
importance of rural areas in terms of their bureaucratic scales and functions 
led the party/state to be more tolerable to those rural-based institutional 
innovations. Rural areas were endowed with much more manoeuvre than 
urban areas, in experimenting and establishing their innovative growth 
patterns at the outset of the reform. The devolution of such manoeuvre 
accords with Deng’s pragmatism in terms of ‘crossing the river by groping the 
stones’. The most prominent expression of such manoeuvres in institutional 
terms in the south of Jiangsu at this stage is the rapid rise of local township 
and village enterprises (TVEs). In his survey in Jiangsu province in 1983, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""79"See"Chapter(4"
80 Fei Xiaotong completed his PhD at LSE, and was in 1981 awarded the Huxley Memorial Medal of 
the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 
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Deng explicitly recognised the achievements made by the TVEs in Suzhou 
city in the south; and in 1987, Deng asserted that ‘the rise of TVEs is a totally 
unexpected success…not only did these enterprises achieved more than 20 
per cent annual output value, but also employed more than 50 per cent of the 
surplus rural labours and built up many new small towns’81. In this year, the 
gross industrial output of local TVEs in Jiangsu reached 79.7 billion RMB, 
which amounted to be more than half of the gross provincial industrial output. 
But this prominent economic performance of TVEs was based on an equally 
prominent regional unevenness. As the birthplace of TVEs, the south 
contained more than 90 per cent of local TVEs in Jiangsu in the 1980s 
(Chinese Territory Resource News, 2012). 
Thanks to the earlier form of China’s pragmatism, the success of TVEs 
in the south soon became an exemplar and a path-dependency for other 
regions in particular the north of Jiangsu (the reasons for unsatisfactory 
performance of TVEs in the north will be discussed in Chapter 7). It is in this 
sense argued that rural industrialisation in terms of TVE-driven growth 
constituted the essential manifestation that delineated the regional 
unevenness between the south and north in Jiangsu during the first stage of 
the economic reform. The following sections intend to shed some insights, 
from a TPSN perspective, on some key of the institutional logics and 
arrangements, which contributed to the success of TVEs in the south. In other 
words, it is proposed that the parameters of territory, place, scale and network 
critically, though not simultaneously, affected the regional and local growth in 
the south. And, in identifying their roles and practices underlying the different 
aspects of local growth, a clearer understanding of the key logics and 
evolution of regional (uneven) development in China can hence be grasped.  
 
5.2.1 Prerequisites for the success of TVEs in the south  
As already noted, China’s growth-oriented state ideology and the process of 
rural decollectivisation, in both an ideological and a physical sense, opened 
the possibility of rural industrialisation. The key question facing rural areas """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
81 Deng made this comment in his meeting with Stefan Korosec, member of the Presidium of the 
Central Committee of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia, on June 12th, 1987. This comment is 
included in the article—‘We Shall Speed up Reform in ‘Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 3 
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then lies in how to take advantage of this opportunity to use rural 
industrialisation to promote local economic growth. There were two basic 
issues that had to be tackled at the outset: first, what institutional 
arrangements were necessary for obtaining the requisite financial capital, 
technologies, and materials for initialising primitive industrialisation; and, 
second, what commercial and industrial connections needed to be built with 
urban systems for securing sustainable product distributions and 
reproductions.  
Regarding the first issue, most towns and villages at that time did not 
have much access to banking loans and credits, and they could only rely on 
the collective funds previously accumulated under the people’s commune 
system. This was the case for both the south and north of Jiangsu. For 
example, the Annual Statistics Book of Wuxi city in 1981 showed that the fund 
source of TVEs consisted of 95.4% self-funding, 2.9% local governments’ 
financial support, and 1.7% domestic banking loan. Xu and Zhang (1997), 
based on their empirical study, suggested that it was not until 1984 that debts 
and borrowings became TVEs’ chief financing measure. Compared to the 
limited availability of capital, rural areas in China possessed sufficient, low-
cost labourers. More importantly, although rural land, even now, cannot be 
capitalised and commercialised by town and village communities and 
households on the primary land market, such land was allowed to be 
disposed and used by local town and village collective organisations for 
locally based projects, like running TVEs. That is to say, TVEs, as collectively 
owned economic entities in appearance or in substance, usually did not have 
to pay rent for establishing their premises on their respective collectively 
owned rural land so long as such a piece of land is collectively decided to be 
used for non-agricultural uses, and is out of the reach of the household 
responsibility system. In a word, notwithstanding the shortage of financial 
capacity and support, which was at that time primarily enjoyed by state-owned 
sectors in urban areas, the rural areas of the south of Jiangsu made up for the 
lack of capital with effective organisations and mobilisations of rural labour 
and land in initialising rural industrialisation.  
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Wen (2011) conceptualised such effective organisations of rural 
collectivities for industrialisation as some sort of ‘organisational rent’, which 
refers to the surplus or additional interests generated from the effective 
collective, coordinated work of an organisation. While this may have to some 
extent sketched out certain initial reasons for the rise of TVEs, it does not 
explain the lagged development of TVEs in the north of Jiangsu since both the 
south and the north bore the institutional legacy of highly collectivised 
productive organisations left by the people’s commune system. It seems thus 
necessary to take a closer look at the institutional rationality and arrangement 
of TVEs in the south.  
It must be noted at the outset that, the TVE, as a key corporate form of 
rural industrialisation, has now largely become a historical fossil since the 
wide range of privatising restructuring of TVEs in the late 1990s. It is therefore 
relatively difficult to obtain primary data on local TVEs. But, thanks to the 
prominence of the Southern Jiangsu Model, it is possible to use much 
secondary data to explore the institutional rationality of TVEs’ success in the 
south.  
There are two essential institutional arrangements underlying TVEs’ 
success in the south. The first is TVEs’ unique public-private partnership. 
Many scholars have assessed this partnership from a property rights 
perspective, but the actual substance of it still remains a rather controversial 
issue. For example, Li (1995) proposed the notion of ambiguous property 
rights, and Weitzman and Xu (1993) proposed the notion of vaguely defined 
cooperatives, both attempting to explain the paradoxical question of how 
TVEs had achieved outstanding performance with their seemingly poorly 
constructed systems of corporate ownership and function. I have no intention 
of analysing TVEs’ success in the south from the property rights perspective. 
Rather, as has been noted, I will try to articulate, from the perspective of the 
TPSN approach, some important sociospatial advantages expressed by this 
public-private partnership in the course of TVEs’ development in the south.  
 
5.2.2 TVEs’ public-private partnership and the differences between the 
places of the south and those of the north 
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Whilst the public-private partnership of TVEs played a key role in the growth 
of local TVEs, the practice of this partnership was shaped by, and subject to, 
a variety of place related characteristics in the south, which were different 
from those in the north.  
First, it is argued that those villages in the south, which generated 
better TVE performance, tended to have smaller population and territory than 
most villages in the north. For example, the symbolic Huaxi village82 in the 
south of Jiangsu had less than 1000 farmers at the outset of its rural 
industrialisation, whereas villages in the north usually had around 3000 
residents. It is argued by Wen (2011: 26) that villages with smaller populations 
tend to reach collective agreements for industrialisation much easier and also 
bear less risks against external influences. In a rural community with relatively 
smaller territory and population, local governments at town and village scales 
could also intervene in the establishment and management of TVEs in a more 
efficient fashion. Such governmental intervention not only endowed TVEs with 
a political justification for responding to the central state’s concerns as to 
whether TVEs were compatible with China’s socialist ideology and regime, but 
also, more importantly, smoothed for TVEs a variety of administrative 
obstacles in relation to, for example, licensing approvals and contract 
disputes, and helped TVEs actively in connecting and coupling with external 
strategic resources (the importance of this is to be more concretely discussed 
later in dealing with the second basic issue for TVEs’ success). Li (1995) 
argued that such local state intervention was an efficiency in the development 
of local TVEs in a business environment with inadequate legal systems and 
extensive bureaucratic distortions. In brief, small territory and population 
amount to be a crucial advantage for the south to start its TVE growth. 
Regarding the private side of this public-private partnership, it is first 
argued that some special rural cultural factors particularly in the south of 
Jiangsu effectively helped TVEs’ primitive accumulation. Wen (2011) pointed 
out that there existed a set of unique local cultural habits in the south, which 
served to harmonise the orthodox conflict between capital and labour, 
resulting in further mitigation of labour costs for rural industrialisation, and """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
82 Huaxi village is widely known as the No.1 Village in China because of its outstanding entire 
economic performance and richness of each household in the village.  
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internal accumulation of generated profits for reproduction. It was this 
particularly place-bound rural culture that lowered the payment expectation of 
rural TVE labourers, and ensured that the labour input, as a key source for 
capital accumulation, could contribute to rural industralisation without invoking 
conventional capital-labour conflicts.  
In many rural areas in the south, TVE workers did not ask for monthly 
wage payments, but accepted an annual payment based on the workpoints 
sytem which was one of the institutional legacies of the people’s commune. 
Under this workpoints system, TVE workers received points for the jobs they 
did in a same way as farmers in conducting agricultural tasks. Indeed, many 
TVE workers were part-time, and also worked as farmers in certain months of 
a year. And, TVE workers in the south did not ask for payment at the same 
level as that of urban workers. Their salaries were almost the same or even 
less than farmers. Thanks to this system, TVEs in the south could on the one 
hand use those postponed salaries as some sort of bank loan at no interest, 
and on the other hand, even postponed annual payment till the end of the 
next year in the case of enterprise losses. The later situation is indicative of 
co-risk taking within the collectives.  
In their respective interviews, both Mr. S83, and Mr. W84 observed that 
the local culture in the rural places of the south was rather unique and played 
an essential role in the early days of TVE development. And, they maintained 
that the north of Jiangsu, because of socio-cultural and historical reasons85, 
lacked such cultural assistance to rural industrialisation. It was in this sense 
that central government credited TVEs as a great innovation made by farmers 
in towns and villages, and the south was the best role model of this innovation 
(Wen, 2011: 27).  
Apart from rural labour and cultural factors, the collective ownership of 
rural land was another key parameter in the rise of TVEs in the south. 
Generally speaking, it is argued that Ricardo’s theory of differential land rent 
is critical in relation to the transformative use of rural land for TVE-driven """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
83 Mr. S is a former head officer of the Planning Bureau of Wujing district of Changzhou city. 
84 Mr. W is a civil servant at the Administration for Industry and Commerce of Wujin district of 
Changzhou city. 
85 According to these two interviewees, people in the north of Jiangsu had lacked entrepreneurial spirit 
and skills.  
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industrialisation. It is obvious that the locational value and economic 
advantage inherent in the rural land in the south made the transformative use 
of rural land for industrial purposes a rather attractive option in economic 
terms. While the public-private partnership did enable TVEs to appropriate 
rural land, and to transform it for industrial use in a relatively convenient, but 
usually nonstandard or illegal fashion, Wen (2011) and Mr. S had both pointed 
out a curious phenomenon, that is, most towns and villages in the south, in 
initialising their local TVE operations, chose to maintain the largest proportion 
of their rural land for grain production rather than for industrial or vegetable 
production, which could nonetheless lead to products with higher added 
value. And, this general trend was not changed in the south until the mid-
1980s. This deviation to Ricardo’s law of rent was derived from a consensus 
reached by the public-private partnership, that is, preserving local autarkic 
agricultural sectors against the potential external risks of running local TVEs. 
This prudent choice in fact encouraged more local rural labourers to take part 
in TVE development. But, with the rapid growth and expansion of TVEs, more 
and more collectively owned rural land was used for industrial productions.  
Although land should have been one of the most expensive elements 
that local industrialisation had to bear in a conventional market economy 
system, most TVEs in the south could at the outset rely on the public-private 
partnership to appropriate rural land as their assets without costs. In other 
words, the public-private partnership of TVEs justified such appropriation of 
rural land, at least at local scales (Cai, 1995). The course of this sort of land 
appropriation indeed amounted to a process of land capitalisation, from which 
a large proportion of TVEs’ earlier profits were derived (Wen, 2011). Notably, 
although this quasi-land capitalisation was implemented under the veil of 
TVEs’ public-private partnership and tolerated by the central government, 
which encouraged any institutional innovations for growth in rural areas at that 
time, such processes had not been systematically and legally institutionalised 
and nationally regulated. Local governments at town and village scales in this 
situation possessed a great advantage which could be used to promote the 
economic efficiency and interest distribution of rural land capitalisation 
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through the public-private partnership system, which could in turn determine 
the long/short-term performance and function of TVEs.  
However, the low-cost occupancy of rural land did not spontaneously 
lead to the success of TVEs. Qiang and Gu (1987) argued that the root 
problem underlying the lagged development of Nantong’s TVEs in the north of 
Jiangsu was TVEs’ free occupancy of rural land, because these low standards 
of market access, albeit giving rise to many TVE establishments, resulted in 
inefficient and unproductive enclosures in terms of cutthroat competition, 
duplicate investments86, as well as high rates of TVE establishment and 
insolvency.  
Notably, the massive low-cost occupancy of collectively owned rural 
land for industrial production was eventually recognised by the central 
party/state as some sort of illegal abuse. According to the 1987 ‘Notice as to 
enhancing land management and prohibiting the abused appropriation of rural 
land’87, which was issued by the central party commission and the state 
council, abuse of rural land for non-agricultural use by TVEs had at that time 
in China become a common phenomenon. This notice therefore requested a 
thorough clearance to scrutinise such abuse of rural land according to the 
Regulation of State Confiscation of Constructive Land 1982. For example, 
Changshu, one of the most developed county-level cities in the south, found 
that all the 4277 local TVEs committed an abuse of rural land, illegal 
occupying 12.9 sq. km.. As Shen Ruiqing, the former District Party Secretary 
of Wujin district stated, Wujin district, as a birthplace of TVEs, suffered many 
problems in terms of the abuse of rural land and the absence of effective land 
use planning, these problems lasted for a long time till the 21st century88. 
While the illegal abuse of rural land by TVEs was revealed to be a common 
practice in the south, Wen (2011) sees that such abuse indeed reflects the 
self-capitalisation of land and the internal distribution of land-related value-
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
86 Whilst Coase and Wang (2012) saw duplicate investments in China helped facilitate and spread 
social and industrial learning in terms of human skills and manufacturing technologies, such activities 
were obviously subject to place-specific effects. As Huang (2003: 261) suggests, duplicate investment 
in China has resulted in the fact that ‘regions do not specialize along the lines of their comparative 
advantages’, ‘instead, they all push strongly into similar industries and product groups’. 
87 See the policy paper of ‘Central Issued, No. 7, 1987’.  
88 Quote from an internal speech paper of Wujin government. 
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added income, both of which primitively contributed to the rapid growth of 
local TVEs in the south.  
Scale is also a key factor in affecting TVE-driven growth in the south. It 
is argued that the low scale upon which TVEs were premised ensures the 
efficacy of the public-private partnership of TVEs. As their title suggests, TVEs 
were formed and run at the outset at village and town scales. This implies that 
rural industrialisation in the south did not follow the classic path, according to 
which industrialisation should start from household industrial workshop, which 
would then gradually transform into large scale manufacturing factories. In 
other words, TVEs in the south did not at the very beginning experience the 
household workshop stage. This can be contrasted with another prominent 
local growth model in China, that is, the ‘Wenzhou Model’, which was 
characterised by numerous household workshops that were subsequently 
transformed into clusters of enterprises, which represented the largest and 
most energetic group of private economies in China89. On the contrary, TVEs 
in the south had at the beginning been economically integrated into 
manufacturing sectors that served, and/or linked with, the industrial structures 
of their respective upper level municipalities. They were later sociospatially 
incorporated into the semi-urban areas of those municipalities during the 
second stage of the reform, which also saw the rise of development zones.  
From another perspective, Mr. S has suggested that had the public-
private partnership been operated at a higher scale during the first stage, 
there would have been too many ideological and institutional obstacles to 
allow TVEs with vague property rights and illegal actions to survive, let alone 
bloom. As he observed, urban economies at that time were almost entirely 
controlled by SOEs through the system of public ownership, which still 
ideologically signified China’s socialist regime. And, urban land was and still is 
state-owned rather than collectively owned. Local governments at the 
municipal scale could not dispose of urban land as flexibly as villages and 
towns did, at least until the late 1990s.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
89 The difference in the basic scale on which rural industrialisation was premised resulted in a variety 
of long-lasting, profound impacts to the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ and ‘Wenzhou Model’. Generally 
speaking, whilst local private enterprises under the latter model exhibited relatively better competitive 
strength and business flexibility, the local state institutions under the former model possessed better 
institutional governance and financial capability. 
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In a word, a TVE public-private partnership was not feasible in, or 
compatible with, the institutions of large-scale and more urbanised localities. 
In this sense we can propose that the success of TVE-driven growth under 
the public-private partnership is to some extent subject to the territory-, place- 
and scale-specificities of a region. 
 
5.2.3 Local state corporatism at county scales and below 
As noted before, there are arguably two pivotal institutional arrangements 
underlying TVEs’ success. The above section explained the question of how 
TVEs obtained the necessary capital, technologies and materials for 
initialising primitive industrialisation through their place- and scale-specific 
public-private partnership. The second pivotal institutions, namely, local state 
corporatism is of critical significance to answering the second key question. 
That is: what commercial and industrial connections need to be established 
with urban areas for securing TVE’s sustainable product distribution and 
reproduction? And, the answer to this question, arguably, concerns with the 
key factor of network that was enjoyed by the south in pushing forward its 
TVE-driven growth. 
The term ‘local state corporatism’ was first proposed by Jean Oi (1992) 
in her empirical research on certain TVEs in China. The most important 
implication of this conception lies in its emphasis on the critical role played by 
local state institutions in promoting TVE growth. In Oi’s (1992: 100) language, 
local state corporatism refers to ‘the workings of a local government that 
coordinates economic enterprises in its territory as if it were a diversified 
business corporation’. Oi’s (1992) study on TVEs in China articulated a set of 
institutional logics underlying the motives and actions of local governments in 
promoting TVEs-driven growth in the context of China’s fiscal reform in the 
1980s. This reform in general aimed to endow local governments at county, 
town and village scales with more independent fiscal capabilities subject to 
the imperative of submitting a specified portion of their revenue income to 
upper level governments. Notably, Jiangsu province had since the mid-1970s 
begun to carry out a similar fiscal reform at the provincial scale, which 
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considerably strengthened its fiscal autonomy 90 . This system was 
subsequently devolved to the sub-scales of the province by 1982. This 
devolution stimulated the process of rural industrialisation in the south at the 
local scale. As Chen Huanyou (1998), the former Provincial Party Secretary of 
Jiangsu, stated, there was a set of autonomous fiscal systems being 
established across Jiangsu by 1985 in all localities down to the township 
scale. This so-called policy that ‘the government of each scale shall have its 
own fiscal system at that scale’ enabled governments at local scales to 
autonomously arrange their own local developmental matters (Chen, 1988). It 
was under this nationwide contextual trend of institutional change that local 
state corporatism was brewed. Jiangsu province, and, in particular, the south, 
ran ahead of other regions in this respect.  
This institutional empowerment of local governments thus made it 
possible in practice for rural industrialisation in the south of Jiangsu to be 
economically linked to urban industrial structures through the medium of 
TVEs. Before the rise of TVEs, the entire industrial entities and resources 
were under state control, and sociospatially concentrated in urban areas. It 
was more ideologically and institutionally feasible for local governments at 
county scales or below to contact SOEs in urban areas to build and extend 
business networks for TVEs with the aim of acquiring the necessary material 
and technological resources as well as markets and other opportunities which 
TVEs needed for initiation and further growth. As Chen (2005: 58) states, 
there are, in general, three common ways for TVEs to acquire from state-
owned sectors resources and technologies. First, local governments at county 
scales or below could help TVEs to search for SOEs which need 
subcontractors to produce components and parts. In such a case, local 
governments usually also acted as the coordinator for any dispute resolution. 
Second, as local governments usually enjoyed better information, political 
reputation, and wider social relationships, many local governments acted as 
some sort of informal agencies to help TVEs to establish various economic 
and technological cooperation and partnerships with domestic universities and 
research units. Third, the most common way for a TVE to get help from SOEs """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
90 In 1977, Jiangsu province submitted 58% of its gross revenue to the central government, and retained 
the rest, and it submitted 57% and retained the rest during 1978 to 1980. 
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was that local state officials used their personal networks or private 
connections, to hire, under informal agreements, experts from SOEs to give 
specialised guidance and help to TVEs, often at weekends. As Yang (2008) 
noted, there was at the beginning of the Southern Jiangsu Model a group of 
so-called ‘Sunday engineers of Shanghai’, going to the sub-urban regions of 
Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou city in the south, to help local TVEs there, by 
offering advanced technologies and management experiences. Wen (2011) 
and Oi (1992) have pointed out that local governments also offered key 
assistance to TVEs in relation to matters of finance and shaping production 
strategies. For example, local governments usually serve as the guarantor for 
TVEs securing a bank loan, as it is unlikely for local banks to approve an 
investment loan without a local state’s support for a TVE project. And, local 
governments could also rely on their available resources and information to 
help shape local TVEs’ development strategy that could best use local 
support and couple local assets with external resources. Thus, as Wen (2011) 
observed, the efforts by local government to link their rural resources with 
urban industrial structures, led to an extensive and rapid rise of rural 
industrialisation in the south of Jiangsu. 
It may thus be argued that due to the active roles played by local 
governments in promoting TVEs, and the locational advantages enjoyed by 
the south of Jiangsu in terms of closer proximity to the existing urban 
industries, the south indeed possessed better relational processes and social 
structures than the north did, in advancing rural industrialisation. In saying that 
the south possessed better networks is indicative of an issue of relativity in 
spatial and temporal terms. In other words, local governments in the north 
could, and indeed did, in many respects, follow the successful path of the 
south in promoting TVEs. Such institutional transplantation and imitation 
accorded with China’s pragmatism in terms of the trial-and-error strategy. But, 
as will be seen in the case study of Nantong in Chapter 7, the successful TVE 
growth pattern turned out in practice to be more a path-dependency in the 
north than a path-shaping tool. Whilst the spatiotemporal disadvantages and 
some local, internal factors of the north are also articulated in the case study 
of Nantong, it must be pointed out here that these disadvantages for rural 
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industrialisation were intensified under the growth-oriented state ideology and 
some of its institutional expressions.  
In more specific terms, it is argued that, not only did the growth-
oriented state ideology liberalise and justify a set of institutional innovations at 
local scales in the south of Jiangsu for rural industrialisation and local growth, 
but also institutionalised a fundamental, growth-oriented criterion for all 
individuals, therefore shaping a rather competitive atmosphere, within which 
different localities and regions began to compete for securing better local 
growth. As Wen (2011: 54) argued, under China’s bureaucratic evaluation 
system, which made local economic growth the sole criterion for officials’ 
promotion, demotion and rotation, local governments which upheld local state 
corporatism, tended to concentrate their institutions and resources on pro-
growth matters. In the courses of competing for higher ranks and better 
records of economic performance, local governments of different regions and 
localities exhibited furious inter-regional competitions at various local scales. 
Wen (2011: 55) suggested that such growth-orientation should not be seen as 
an isolated practice by one or two state institutions, but rather as a common 
pursuance for the overall party/state system.  
Although during this earlier stage of reform, the competition between 
different localities had not yet been fully practiced within the dominant 
institutional time, and expressed at the municipal scale, local governments at 
county scales or below had begun to shape their institutions and actions like a 
quasi-company, competing with others across different spatial horizons. This 
can be demonstrated by a famous rating competition, namely, Top 100 
counties in China, the ranking of which is based on a group of indicators 
made by the National Bureau of Statistics. A list of these indicators can be 
seen in the table below: 
 
Table 5.1 The indicator system for evaluating Top 100 counties in China 
(Wen, 2011: 55) 
Local population 
Local urbanisation rate 
Gross parameters and indicators  
Local GDP 
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 Local within-budget state income 
 
Average income 
of urban 
residents 
Average income 
of rural residents 
Income 
Average salary of 
working persons 
Saving Per capita local 
saving rate 
Average 
parameters and 
indicators  
Resident 
Consumption Per capita 
individual 
consumption 
 
Per capita local GDP 
Per capita general 
budget revenue of local 
finance 
Per capita loan balance 
of local financial 
institutions 
Average parameters 
and indicators 
Locality 
Per capita local state 
fiscal expenditure 
 
Growth rate of local GDP  
Growth rate of local general budget 
Development rate 
Growth rate of local resident income 
 
 It is notable that under this system, there were 6 county-level units of 
the south of Jiangsu ranked in the national top 10 in 1991, and Wujin county 
(rescaled into county-level city in 1995, and then rescaled into municipal 
district in 2002) was No. 2. In 1992, 7 counties of the south were still ranked in 
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the top 10, and Wujin county was No. 7. In 1993, 7 counties were among top 
10, and Wujin county was No. 8. In 1994, 7 counties of the south were again 
ranked top in the 10, and Wujin county kept at No. 8. There were 8 counties of 
the north of Jiangsu listed in 1991. The one with the highest rank was 
Tongshan county in Xuzhou city, which was No. 32. Half of the listed northern 
counties were in Nantong city. Whilst the evaluation of the Top 100 counties 
in China reflects an absolute developmental lead of the south over the north, 
as we shall see, the central and provincial government during this stage did 
not put forward any concrete policies for mitigating this obvious and 
increasing regional unevenness.  
To the central party/state, the dramatic rise of TVEs in the south of 
Jiangsu was ‘a big, unexpected surprise’ in Deng’s words, as it quickly 
accelerated national industrialisation and enhanced industrial employment 
without incurring costs at urban scales91. To Deng, this unexpected surprise 
was, arguably, a successful practice that authenticated his political strategy of 
‘letting some regions get rich first’. And, to the provincial government of 
Jiangsu, the prominent success of TVEs in the south, although coexisting with 
the unsatisfactory growth of the north, was still a utilitarian achievement in its 
own terms of securing the greatest net balance of satisfying the diversified 
interests and interest appeals of different members across the spatial and 
temporal horizons within its territory.  
Regarding Deng’s words of ‘bringing along and helping other peoples 
and regions to eventually arrive at the richness of commonwealth’, Mr. S had 
pointed out in his interview that the provincial government at that time felt that 
the lagged development of the north was merely a problem of temporal 
backwardness and it would only be a matter of time for the north to catch up 
with the south in the near future. Whilst the reality did not match the provincial 
government’s expectation, the attitude of the provincial government was """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
91 As Li Ruihuan, the former Standing Member of the Political Bureau of CPC, and the former 
Chairman of the People’s Political Consultative Conference of China, observed (1991), one of the 
essential conditions of China’s industrialisation lies in the transformation of rural labourers into 
industrial ones. Having regard to China’s large number of population and rural labourers, how to solve 
the problem of arranging surplus rural labourers is of critical importance to China’s political stability 
and economic development. By 1991, there had been more than 90 million farmers employed by TVEs. 
The south of Jiangsu especially did well in this respect. Whilst these transformed farmers went into 
industrial sectors, the state did not suffer any high costs. Had these industrial employment issues been 
solely faced in urban areas, a great deal of costs would have been incurred and been born by the state.  
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arguably merited in the light of China’s earlier form of pragmatism. In brief, 
according to China’s pragmatism, it would have been another successful 
outcome of pragmatism to transplant the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ to the 
north, had the north adopted similar institutions and growth patterns for 
promoting its regional development. But, as we shall see in Chapter 7, the 
reality showed that the empirical-oriented methods of pragmatism did not 
work in the case of the institutional transplantation of TVE-driven growth 
pattern in Jiangsu.  
Because of the influences of utilitarian and pragmatic thinking, the 
provincial party committee in the 7th Congress of Party Representatives in 
1984 only proposed a nominal directive of ‘facilitating developing the north, 
and actively promoting the south’ without any concrete remedial policy 
instruments for the north. And, it was not until 1994 that the 9th Congress of 
Party Representatives put forward the strategic idea that ‘the modernisation of 
Jiangsu province is incomplete without the modernisation of the north’. It was 
in 2001 that a provincial coordination team was established to ensure the 
implementation of supportive policies towards the north in accordance with 
the official document of ‘furthering regional economic development in the 
north of Jiangsu’. In a word, while the somewhat unexpected rise of TVEs-
driven growth in the south of Jiangsu did give rise to a considerable regional 
unevenness during the first stage of China’s economic reform, such 
unevenness was triggered at the outset by the growth-oriented state ideology, 
and was later justified at both central and provincial scales by the utilitarian 
and pragmatic logics of this state ideology.  
The Chapter has taken a general perspective, looking at how the TVE-
driven growth pattern in the south of Jiangsu operated as a successful role 
model of the trial-and-error strategy, through some scale- and place-specific 
institutions, which were empowered and justified by China’s utilitarian growth-
orientation, and were in a certain aspect or extent not possessed by the north. 
The following section aims to take a more concrete view to articulate some 
individual experiences as to how local TVEs developed in Wujin county at this 
stage of the reform. It is believed that such personal views may to some 
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extent reflect how the state ideology and state institutions were in practice 
expressed, and recursively recognised by individuals.  
 
5.2.4 Brief notes as to TVEs development in Wujin county of Changzhou 
city 
I selected Wujin county as a case study because it is one of the birth places of 
TVEs and the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’. As such, it was regarded as a typical 
locality where economic growth was primarily driven by local TVEs. As a 
sample model of rural industrialisation, Wujin achieved prominence at the 
outset of reform. In 1981, the local TVE industrial output of Wujin had reached 
1 billion RMB, which was much higher than those counties closer to 
Shanghai. It is in this sense argued that locational advantages in terms of 
closeness to a regional growth pole was not a necessary condition to the rise 
of Wujin.  
As Shen Ruiqin, the former District Party Secretary of Wujin stated92, 
Wujin possesses a long, traditional local culture of entrepreneurship, which 
enables a large group of local residents to begin and expand business 
practices. It was this very entrepreneurship that triggered the rise of a 
massive number of TVEs in the earlier days of the economic reform. Mr. Dai 
Suofang is widely regarded as a typical local entrepreneur. In an interview, he 
suggested to me that there are two particular factors enabling the success of 
his TVE. Those are, the state institutional innovations, which encouraged rural 
industrialisation and production, and his personal interest in, and skills of, tree 
planting. Mr. Dai is locally known as the ‘King of Trees’, not only because of 
his leading TVE in tree planting industry, but also due to his speciality in 
growing trees and flowers. In Mr. Dai’s view, it was rural decollectivisation that 
first offered him the chance to build a tree-related business. His initial success 
in this industry encouraged a group of local practitioners. According to Mr. 
Dai, there have been more than one thousand distributors selling trees from 
Wujin across China, and more and more local farmers became involved in 
planting trees, as Mr. Dai helped ensure the marketing of their tree products.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
92 Quoted from an internal speech paper of Wujin government. 
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Thanks to Dai’s efforts, the tree and flower planting industry has now 
become one of the pillar sectors and a feature of Wujin district. In 2013, Wujin 
successfully held China’s 8th Flower Expo, and for the first time Changzhou 
city held an essential national-level exposition (previous ones were mostly 
held in Beijing and Shanghai). In evaluating the tree planting industry, Mr. T, a 
head local official of Jiaze village, in which most of Wujin’s tree-planting bases 
are located, suggested that the success of local tree-planting industry in Wujin 
revealed a typical feature of the earlier TVE growth pattern. That is, selecting 
and enabling a number of truly capable persons with particular specialities to 
lead and manage local TVEs. And Mr. T further argued that although the 
reform of rural decollectivisation liberalised large numbers of rural residents 
from agricultural sectors, most local governments were at that time still facing 
the question of assigning which person to lead and manage rather limited 
local resources for TVE development. Thanks to China’s relatively small, and 
closely connected rural society, local governments in Jiaze village, for 
example, did not find it too difficult to target someone capable to be 
empowered to run local TVEs. This system of using the right person rather 
than a relative, as Mr. Tang argued, was also a key to the rise of TVEs in the 
south of Jiangsu. Mr. S also echoed this view, arguing that the long business 
tradition provided the south with the advantage of finding some capable local 
businessmen whereas the north lacked such tradition.  
 In addition to the tree planting industry, the steel industry constitutes 
another pillar sector of Wujin’s economy. In an interview with Mr. Yuan, a local 
ironwork entrepreneur, he said that before privatisation, his ironwok was a 
typical TVE, which mainly produced steel parts for a number of urban-based, 
state-owned ironworks. The reason for him to be chosen under the public-
private partnership to manage the TVE at that time was partly due to his 
endeavour and risk-taking spirit, and partly because of his family tradition of 
being good at running businesses, which was known among the village. Mr. 
Yuan particularly emphasised that the quick rise of the local ironworks in his 
villages during the first stage of China’s reform, relied to a large extent on the 
business and technical interactions with, and help from, urban state-owned 
ironworks in Changzhou city. Thanks to the communication efforts made by 
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local state institutions, some local TVEs in Mr. Yuan’s village established a 
series of subcontracts with urban-based SOEs, and also received technical 
assistance from them. Mr. Yuan also suggested that apart from certain TVEs 
whose productions and products primarily emphasized local advantages, 
most TVEs in Wujin county at the outset interacted closely with urban SOEs in 
the south of Jiangsu. Although almost all the small and medium ironworks in 
Wujin district are now private enterprises, Mr. Yuan stated that, like his 
enterprise, most of them were TVEs before the privatization. It is this group of 
former TVEs that has been acting as the key driving force that has maintained 
Wujin’s high, persistent local economic growth since the inception of the 
reform.  
The importance of TVEs to Wujin county and Changzhou city during 
the first stage of the reform is evident. As Ye (2004) indicated, the industrial 
output of Wujin county of Changzhou, Jiangyin county of Wuxi city, and 
Changshu county of Suzhou city, all had exceeded 3 billion RMB in 1986. 
Even if setting aside the urban industrial output of the above three cities in the 
south, their 12 counties contributed to 13% of the national industrial output, 
and 56% of the provincial output in 1986. Indeed, this gross rural industrial 
output of the 12 counties was almost equal to the sum output of the three 
municipalities in the south. The prosperity of TVEs in the south makes it easy 
to conclude that the difference in local TVEs-driven growth is the most 
decisive cause of the regional unevenness between the south and the north at 
the first stage of China’s reform, and this is widely agreed among scholars 
(Wen, 2011; You, 1988; Xu, 2003; Hong, 2008).  
 
5.2.5 Critiques on TVEs and TVE-driven growth 
However, there are also some arguments criticising the TVE-driven growth 
pattern, the implications of which reveal certain interesting points in relation to 
the observations that were summarised in the above interviews. These views 
may also shed a useful light on the discussion of regional (uneven) 
development during the second stage of China’s reform. These critical views 
on TVE, from my perspective, are much more important than the repeatedly 
reiterated data and literature, which simply outlined in a statistical fashion that 
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the unevenness in Jiangsu in the 1980s was attributed to, and can be 
explained by, the regional difference in the qualitative and quantitative 
strength of local TVEs. A review of these critiques may, arguably, help provide 
another perspective on regional unevenness.  
For example, the famous anti-Cultural Revolution activist, Xiaokai 
Yang, who after the Cultural Revolution became a well-known economist, co-
wrote a work with Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo (2000: 453), which 
stated that ‘TVE is hardly innovative’ in an institutional sense. They (p. 455) 
claimed that the system of TVE ‘distorts the geographical location of firms and 
retards efficient urbanisation,’ and the resulting ‘coexistence of flexible TVEs 
with inferior technology and rigid, large state firms with superior technology 
implies a dilemma between the exploitation of technology and location 
efficiency and the exploitation of X efficiency’. Thus, they conclude that the 
impressively high growth rate achieved by TVEs is too costly and in fact 
inefficient. From my perspective, it may argued that Sachs et al.’s (2000) view 
is negligent of certain contextual and concrete factors to which TVEs-driven 
growth was subject during the first stage of China’s economic reform93. First, 
they overlooked the conservative role of China’s socialist ideology, which was 
at the time still a strong constraint on unorthodox institutional changes or 
innovations that could be recognised as capitalist-related. This was why after 
establishing a growth-oriented state ideology with high public consensus, 
Deng still had to interpret and practise it in a utilitarian and pragmatic fashion 
to confine the economic reform within limited spatiotemporal horizons. And, it 
was also why China’s economic reform was blooming at the outset through 
rural decollectivisation and rural industrialisation, since rural areas, as the 
places of less social and political sensitivity, bear less political risk in 
experimenting with essential institutional changes.  
In addition, as Huang (2013) observed, the fact that China’s economic 
reform started in rural areas was partly because a planned economy was """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
93 Regarding that Sachs et al. argued in the same paragraph that ‘Under a free enterprise system, many 
TVEs might be replaced by large private firms located in the urban areas, which are more competitive 
than large state firms in urban areas’, the whole expression of which indeed depicts what practically 
occurred during the second stage of China’s economic reform, it is thus reasonable to assume that the 
negative aspects of TVEs they are talking about are concerned with TVEs’ development during the 
first stage. 
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harder to run in rural areas than in urban localities, since agricultural sectors 
are highly subject to changing factors and parameters such as climate and 
soil conditions. And on the other hand, the political impacts of the Cultural 
Revolution mainly targeted urban places, thus leaving rural areas with some 
degrees of market economy-oriented activities, which were more likely than 
those strictly controlled urban places to revive economic reforms. Therefore, 
rural industrialisation should not be simply treated as a distorted geographical 
location of resources but a more feasible way of allocating resources in 
practice in the context of the first stage of the reform. Indeed, the dual track 
reform in urban industries since 1985 did give rise to severe institutional 
corruption, and then contributed to social discontent against such corruption, 
which in consequence led to the Tiananmen Square Incident.  
If one takes into account the global context at that time in terms of the 
serial collapses of communism in east Europe and Russia, it is by no means 
easy to deny the prudence and feasibility of China’s strategy of starting 
extensive industrialisation in rural areas rather than concentrating resources 
in private enterprises in urban areas.  
Second, it is argued that the strategic and institutional rationality of 
TVEs and rural industrialisation can be further supported by the nature of, and 
restraints to, the so-called incremental reform of China. In the situation that 
SOEs in urban places bore too much social welfare burdens and suffered low 
efficiency and high losses under the rigid control of planned economy, urban 
industrial structures could not form effective endogenous growth in the 
absence of technological advance and foreign and domestic capital support, 
but chose to spatially and technologically disperse their resources to rural 
areas during the first stage of China’s reform. That is to say, apart from 
political constraints, the reform at the first stage was also restrained by the 
absence of financial and technological resources, and thus had to pursue 
quantitative industrial expansion and growth in those sociospatial sites which 
possessed less or no industrial base. It is also argued that during this stage, 
the TVEs in the south of Jiangsu, at least, proved to be far more efficient than 
those more privatised enterprises and, of course, than urban SOEs. As Wang 
(2002: 81) pointed out, from 1984 to 1992, the annual GDP growth rate of 
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TVEs in Wuxi city in the south of Jiangsu was 31.2%, which was 4 times 
higher than that of SOEs and 1.5 times higher than that of Wenzhou city, 
which is widely known as the most prominent region in China characterised by 
its intense composition of private economies. Whilst it was true that TVEs in 
some regions, for example, in the north of Jiangsu, were far less efficient in 
promoting local growth, the existence of such regional unevenness in TVE 
efficiency, arguably, at least to some extent rebutted Sachs et al.’s 
generalised view as to the strategic and institutional defects of TVEs. On the 
contrary, it is argued that such unevenness is indicative of the presence and 
operation of some regional-specific factors that may vitally determine TVE 
performance, and this is what this section has particularly addressed.  
In more concrete terms, one of the most notable critiques invoked by 
Sachs et al. (2000: 455) states that ‘TVE shares all the common flaws of the 
enterprises system under local government control’ because it ‘generates 
unfair game rules’ and ‘the rule makers, the referee, and the player are the 
same local government’. If looking at this view in the light of TVE growth in the 
south, these common flaws, whilst essentially neglecting the scalar 
interactions, to which TVE can be subject, can, from a reverse view, constitute 
the strong points, on which local TVEs might rely for their initial rise and 
sustainable growth. First, regional unevenness between the south and the 
north in TVE performance indicates that it is a matter of individual 
governmental actions in particular places rather than a generalised 
assumption of institutional defects that may determine whether local 
government control is of assistance or detrimental to TVEs. For example, it 
has been illustrated that, without local state interventions, most rural 
communities would be unable to achieve primitive capital accumulation for 
their rural industrialisation, and could not establish economic links and 
interactions with urban industrial structures. As the case of Wujin has shown, 
local state control/intervention acted as a practically feasible, though not 
theoretically perfect, institution that ensured to some extent fair and efficient 
allocations of human resources, that is, selecting the right local persons for 
managing TVEs. The safe-check system on local state control, which was 
also overlooked by Sachs et al., lies in the party/state’s local performance 
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evaluation system, which was not matured in the earlier days of the reform. 
Notably, this performance evaluation system entails, in the present context, 
two implications. The first one refers to the fact that local governments did not 
enjoy full control of TVEs, as their imperatives and operations in practice were 
subject to the institutions and policies of governments at higher scales. For 
example, the clearance regulation on rural land abuse issued by central 
government exerted critical effects on local TVEs. And, as the case of TVEs in 
the south has shown, their business transactions were largely dependent 
upon urban SOEs’ subcontracts and technological assistance, so even where 
a local government might exert full control on a local TVE, it would not be the 
sole player in an economic or a political sense (senior managers of SOEs in 
China also possess state official ranks, and are superior to head officials of 
towns and villages). In other words, while TVEs were premised at town and 
village scales, their business operations were embedded within inter-scalar 
networks, which were far beyond a single local government’s reach.  
And, the second implication refers to the growth-oriented motivation of 
local governments under the performance evaluation system. This motivation 
effectively shaped local governments’ institutional selectivities and actions in 
operating TVEs in a market-like context of inter-locality competition. In other 
words, even maintaining the view that ‘the rule makers, the referee, and the 
player are the same local government’, local governments could be more or 
less constrained from institutional corruption as they faced competition 
horizontally with each other for attaining a better performance record. In 
dealing with their horizontal counterparts, local governments had to comply 
with some market-oriented rules rather than relying on political privileges. This 
was particularly so for localities within the same province. Thus, the 
competition between different local governments and localities should be seen 
as important remedies in dealing with Sachs et al.’s ‘common flaws’ of the 
enterprises under local government control. An extra notable point here lies in 
the fact that the critique by Sachs et al. (2000) seems to be derived from an 
aggressive political advocacy rather than from a pure economic consideration. 
They seem to argue that necessary westernised constitutional transition and 
democratic reform must be in place first before furthering healthy and 
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sustainable economic development. This may thus go back to the questions 
proposed by Dahrendorf (2008: 15), namely, ‘what are the political 
prerequisites of economic progress, and what are the economic prerequisites 
of political freedom?’  
The correlation between economy and politics, or in Dahrendorf’s 
language, between provision and entitlement is, pursuant to my view, more 
complicated than Sachs et al.’s (2000) advocacy of seeing economic 
transition as only a part of a large-scale shift of constitutional rules, which can 
determine economic performance in the long-run. In this regard, I agree with 
Dahrendorf’s (2008: 18) stance of invoking and adapting Max Weber’s 
concept of chance, and claiming that ‘the conflicts of modern societies are 
about life chances’, which can be defined as ‘a function of options and 
ligatures’, in particular, of alternatives of action, and of choices given in social 
structures. This topic will be revisited and elaborated in a more systematic 
fashion in the concluding chapter, which aims to advance a set of evaluative 
principles to assess the socioeconomic development in China in the light of 
the dialectic relation between institutional arrangement and resource 
acquisition and distribution. Suffice it to say here that the rise of TVEs in the 
south did ideologically and institutionally offer local rural residents a set of 
formal and informal life chances, which are combinations of entitlement and 
provision, or at least are more liberalised and widened capabilities to choose. 
But the actual practice and realisation of such life chances or capabilities to 
choose was subject to the requisite resources, available within the relevant 
spatial and temporal horizons, for growth purposes. The institutions of TVE-
driven local growth, although they effectively and feasibly mobilised and 
distributed available resources in the south, also gave rise to the emergence 
of regional unevenness in Jiangsu province during the first stage of China’s 
economic reform.  
 
5.2.6 Summary 
In a summary, Section 5.2, based on the empirical data and observations, 
articulated how the growth-oriented state ideology liberalised local 
productivities, and justified institutional innovations at county scales or above 
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(rural areas), for promoting growth in the south of Jiangsu province. Thanks to 
the growth-oriented state ideology, which assimilated individual ideas with the 
public rationality of concentrating on economic construction, places like the 
south of Jiangsu, which has long traditions of conducting businesses and 
entrepreneurial spirits, generated a series of institutional innovations at their 
county scales or below, where state-controlled economies exerted relatively 
less influences. TVE-driven growth, also known as the ‘Southern Jiangsu 
Model’ was the most prominent achievement among those innovations. The 
great success of TVEs in the south made it a typical region that demonstrated 
and approved Deng’s utilitarian strategy of ‘letting some regions and peoples 
get rich first’. However, compared to the institutional innovation of rural 
decollectivisation, which secured a wide applicability at the national scale, it is 
argued that the TVE model was in various aspects subject to place- and 
scale-specific factors, which might not be possessed by other regions such as 
the north of Jiangsu province. Indeed, the success of TVEs in the south was 
unique even against the national context. None of the regions in China 
achieved such growth through TVEs (the other two regional growth poles in 
China, namely, Guangdong and Zhejiang province adopted different growth 
patterns). And, this phenomenon arguably grasped the core essence of 
Deng’s utilitarian strategy. Moreover, under the influence of the earlier form of 
China’s pragmatism, the TVE model of the south then became a path-
dependency to the north after it widely adopted this model. As will be seen in 
the Chapter 7, the transplantation of TVEs in the north illustrates a somewhat 
negative aspect of the empirical-orientation in the methodology of China’s 
pragmatism, that is, what works in one place does not necessarily work 
elsewhere. In the next section, attention turns to the second stage of the 
reform, during which both the south and the north began to adopted new 
growth-patterns. The practice of such growth-patterns was unfolding at new 
and changing scales, and triggered rather intense inter-locality competitions 
between regions. All this has further affected regional uneven development in 
Jiangsu province.  
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5.3 Development zone-driven growth in the south and the entailed inter-
locality competitions 
The second stage of China’s economic reform witnessed a series of strategic 
changes, which not only relocated and rescaled the major local sociospatial 
sites for economic growth, but were also expressed as a set of new state 
institutional selectivities and actions. These served to address and promote 
the newly orchestrated chief agenda and engine for local growth in the context 
of the rise of the city-regions and development zones. Such strategic changes 
in the local growth pattern were experienced by Jiangsu province, and 
concretely shaped and contributed to the regional unevenness there. In brief, 
there were two prominent phenomena, by which the regional development in 
the south was characterised at this stage of the reform. These refer to: the 
institutional and sociospatial transition of local industrialisation, and the 
resulting intense inter-urban competition. These two phenomena were 
respectively linked with different key parameters of TPSN, and will be 
analysed in sequence in the context of the south of Jiangsu, with the purpose 
of articulating the essential institutions and forces that were of critical 
significance to shaping the regional unevenness in question.  
 
5.3.1 Institutional and sociospatial transition of local industrialisation  
As noted in the last section, Sachs et al. (2000) asserted that TVEs suffered 
from a number of common flaws and inefficient features. While their research 
can be criticised for neglecting certain contextual factors, which affected the 
feasibility of TVE operations, it should be acknowledged that TVE-driven 
growth was declining during the second stage of the reform, partly due to the 
general decline of TVE profitability and efficiency, and more importantly and 
also interactively, because of the sociospatial shift of the national state 
development strategies, that is, from rural decollectivisation and 
industrialisation to the nexus of interactive industrialisation and urbanisation.  
 From a dialectic point of view, the decline of TVEs in the south can be 
seen as a relative rather than an absolute issue. As already depicted, the 
active roles played by local state corporatism and public-private partnership to 
a large extent secured TVEs’ success during the first stage of the reform. But 
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the high involvement and intervention of local governments in TVE operations 
also entailed numerous non-business costs to local TVEs in order to support 
local state expenditures and local infrastructure.  
Whilst the State Council’s regulation of rural collective enterprises 1990 
states that no less than 60% of the after-tax profits should be used by TVEs 
for productive capacity, this ratio was hardly complied with in practice. 
According to Wen’s (1998) empirical research, many TVEs in the south had to 
transfer more than 70% of their after-tax profits for local government projects 
and other expenses. The heavy burden of non-business costs on TVEs 
weakened their sustainable profitability and growth. This affected the north 
even more as TVEs in the north exhibited lagged business foundations. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties suffered by TVEs, the regional growth in 
Jiangsu province did not stop. The rise of the cities, as a national strategy as 
well as a global trend, endowed the local state institutions and business 
communities of the south with new powers in promoting regional 
development. 
The national strategic shift in changing the major sociospatial sites for 
growth had been initiated from the late 1980s and been expanded and 
realised during the early 1990s. From 1985, central government directed the 
establishment of a series of experimental development zones in both the 
north and south of Jiangsu, according to the successful experience of the 
Shenzhen Special Zone in Guangdong province. Notably, all experimental 
localities were scaled at the level of regions, municipalities or county-level 
units, whereas no villages and townships, on which TVEs were premised, 
were involved. And, complementary to these macro regional development 
plans lies the enactment of the Land Management Act 1988, which specifies 
that land appropriation and use by TVEs must be sanctioned by local 
governments at county-level scales or above. As noted before, one of most 
key ways for TVEs to achieve primitive capital accumulation was to use the 
free occupancy and transformation of collectively owned rural land for 
industrial uses. This Act thus in effect deprived or at least highly restricted 
TVEs’ abuse of rural land. The actual motive underlying such restriction was 
also statutorily expressed in this Act, that is, putting forward the land 
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compulsory purchase or expropriation system, which would legally and 
institutionally enable local governments at county-level94 scales or above to 
expropriate land within their territories for economic development purposes.  
This rescaling of land disposition power was pervasively practised 
through the widespread establishment of development zones in urban, semi-
urban, and new urban areas. Wen (2011) suggested that this institutional 
change in land disposition meant that local governments no longer needed to 
directly or indirectly get involved in concrete operations of local TVEs to 
finance government expenditure and cost, but chose to primarily rely on fixed 
asset investment in development zones to promote local growth. Such 
investment attracted to development zones in the south during the 1990s 
derived from two major sources, those are, foreign direct investment 
(including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong), and domestic investment from 
TVEs.  
Xu (2003) used official data, sketching out a general picture of TVEs in 
the south during the second stage of China’s reform. According to his 
research, with the serial establishment of development zones in the south, 
TVEs were persuaded by governments to move and concentrate in local 
development zones. This concentration strategy radically undermined TVEs’ 
place-based characteristic, thus forcing TVEs to operate more in accordance 
with market economy rules. Xu then took Suzhou city in the south as the 
example, stating that by the end the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), there 
were in Suzhou city about 200 development zones, and more than 40% of 
local TVEs and around 80% of newly established enterprises had moved into 
these zones. 
In more specific terms, the strategy of gathering TVEs into 
development zones was not an isolated practice of industrial agglomeration, 
but was accompanied by a set of complementary strategies that had profound 
implications for the socioeconomic structure and development of the south of 
Jiangsu. It has been noted in Chapter Four that most county-level units in the 
south had started at this stage to implement the so-called ‘Three 
concentrations strategy’, that is, ‘concentrating TVEs into development zones, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
94 According to section 25 of the 1988 Act, county-level governments are authorised to approve land 
expropriation, the acreage of which is less than 0.49 for rural land, and 1.64 for other land. 
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concentrating agriculture sectors into planned areas, and concentrating rural 
population into cities and new city-regions’. For TVEs in the south, the 
concentration strategy, whilst depriving them of the advantage of occupying 
and using collectively owned rural land at low cost, and adding the cost of 
land acquisition fee for operating in development zones, could endow TVEs 
with a variety of benefits for their further growth. For example, in my 
interviews with local entrepreneurs in Wujin district whose enterprises were 
transformed from TVEs by privatisation, they all suggested that the separation 
of TVEs from local villages and towns under the concentration strategy not 
only resulted in the physical relocation of TVEs, but also to some extent 
undermined local state control on TVEs and therefore opened up the 
opportunity for privatisation. Mr. S suggested that in order to push forward the 
concentration strategy, the Planning Bureau of Wujin county made and 
implemented dozens of new urban development plans in the name of 
optimising and improving the capability of rationally using land; and some of 
the planned zones became the model zone of TVE concentration.  
Zhu et al. (2008) suggested that, whilst the trend of extensively 
establishing development zones had already spread across China from the 
early 1990s, the south of Jiangsu enjoyed a key advantage in industrial 
agglomeration, that is, an abundant source and foundation of rural 
industrialisation and local business communities formed during the 1980s. 
Zhu et al. (2008) further argued that the earlier development of TVEs in the 
south, though achieving good economic performance, had by the early 1990s 
began to exhibit showed the negative features of being scattered, small, and 
lacking coherence. These negative features made the concentration strategy 
necessary for further industrialisation and urbanisation in the south of Jiangsu.  
After concentrating and operating in development zones, most local 
TVEs in the south started to enhance their economies of scale and in many 
cases formed some sort of organised industrial clusters. For example, Mr. S 
pointed out in his interview that the earlier concentration of TVEs in Wujin 
county exhibited some specialised local industrial clusters, including the 
lamps and lanterns sector, the floor sector, the textile sector, and the tree and 
flower planting sector. Wujin was thus in sequence officially labeled by central 
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government as ‘the capital place of textile materials’, ‘the capital place of 
aggrandizement wooden floors’, ‘city of lamps and lanterns’, and ‘the town of 
flowers and trees’.  
All these TVE-concentrated sectors constituted in practice the major 
force that drove the growth of local development zones in Wujin. This 
essential advantage of having adequate local business communities for 
supporting development zones was not possessed by other regions such as 
the north of Jiangsu. The lagged development of local TVEs in the north at the 
first stage of the reform directly affected the development zones-driven growth 
there in the 1990s, and constrained the north from fostering effective 
endogenous growth. These factors thereby put the north in a rather 
disadvantaged position against the south for competing to attract inward 
investments from external sources.  
 
5.3.2 The nexus between industrialisation and urbanisation 
In addition, as already noted, the industrial concentration in the south was not 
an isolated policy practice. With the new power of land disposition and 
expropriation, local governments in the south started to link local 
industrialisation with urbanisation through the medium of development zones. 
Put differently, it is argued that the rise of development zones in the south not 
only entailed TVEs’ further industrialisation and later privatisation, but also 
caused an urban-oriented turn, which corresponded to both the national 
strategic change and the global trend for the rise of cities. Indeed, linking 
industrialisation with urbanisation served as one of the requisites for the 
realisation of TVEs’ increased economies of scale. As most of the TVEs in the 
south were in labour-intensive manufacturing industries, their further growth 
was thus dependent upon, and interactive with, the massive social migration 
and mobilisation encouraged and facilitated by central government. Such 
mobilisation aimed to transfer more than 200 million rural labourers into urban 
areas to undertake jobs in manufacturing and/or service industries. It was 
noted that in a CPC conference in December 1987, a policy opinion was put 
forward, pointing out that local TVEs in coastal regions should play a pivotal 
role in exerting China’s comparative advantage on the global market through 
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developing labour-intensive manufacturing. In practice, local TVEs, foreign 
subsidies and joint ventures within development zones did become the major 
destinations for these migrant labourers.  
Xu (2003: 47) suggested that the south had witnessed a low level of 
outward migration, and most TVEs in the south had started to use inward 
migrant labourers since the end of 1980s. As Song (2012) pointed out, the 
total migrant population in Jiangsu in 1990 was about 1.3 million, including 
0.52 million migrants from other provinces and 0.78 intra-province migrants, 
and in 2005, the migrant population in Jiangsu reached 15.32 million 
consisting of 11.10 million intra-province migrants and 4.22 million exterior 
ones. Song (2012) further stated that more than 80% of migrant labourers 
concentrated in the south of Jiangsu. It can thus be seen from the above data 
that although the south of Jiangsu was able to use the high employment of 
migrant labourers to develop labour-intensive sectors, it absorbed a large 
amount of human resource from the north, thus reinforcing the relatively 
lagged rural industrialisation of the north.  
Such intra-province labour migration could be seen as some sort of 
optimal distribution of human resource. Mr. Y of the Labour Bureau of Wujin 
however stated that the north suffered a severe impact from its outflow of a 
local workforce to the south. In fact, some cities in the north such as Nantong 
city were nationally well known for their outstanding high education and good 
performance in the National university entrance examination. But, a high 
number of local students in Nantong city, especially those who performed well 
in the entrance examination and were accepted by highly ranked colleges and 
universities such as those in the south, chose to work in the south after 
graduation rather than go back to their hometowns in the north.  
As a result, the concentration of industry, capital, and human resources 
in practice effectively promoted urbanisation in the south during the second 
stage of the reform. And, because of the strategic link between 
industrialisation and urbanisation, it was noted that the urban-oriented turn in 
the south presented a feature different to the classic urban growth pole model. 
In other words, rapid, extensive urbanisation in the south during this stage did 
not principally happen in municipal areas but occurred in county-level units, 
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where development zones were located. It was this very group of county-level 
units with outstanding economic performance that vitally contributed to the 
regional unevenness in question during this stage of China’s reform. In other 
words, it is argued that the county scale is the key to the understanding of 
regional unevenness in Jiangsu at this stage. 
According to a report by the provincial bureau of statistics (2004a), the 
total local GDP of the six county-level cities in the south of Jiangsu had even 
exceeded the provincial GDP of some provinces such as Xinjiang province, 
Gansu province, and Neimenggu province; and the local state income of 
these county-level cities in total had also exceed the provincial state income 
of certain provinces95. Notably, the industrial output of Jiangyin county of Wuxi 
city in the south alone had reached 135.5 billion RMB, which was almost 
equal to that of Guangxi province, and Jiangxi province respectively (ibid.). 
While in some ways the comparisons put forward by the provincial bureau of 
statistics are a marketing exercise, it does point out the presence of extremely 
strong local economies at the county scale in the south, which makes the 
comparison between the south and the north at county scales difficult to draw. 
The economic ascendance of the county-level units in the south is also 
revealed by their high ranks in the annual appraisals of China’s Top 100 
counties, in which only a few county-level units in the north were listed and 
ranked much lower. In comparison, those in the south always make up more 
than half of the top 10 counties. In a word, apart from the socioeconomic 
disparities at urban scales, the economic unevenness between the south and 
north in Jiangsu province during this stage of China’s reform owed much to 
the substantial disparity in economic growth at county scales. It must be 
emphasised here that the rescaled socioeconomic disparity at the second 
stage of the reform was not simply attributed to the legacy of unevenness at 
town and village scales accumulated during the previous stage. Rather, the 
regional unevenness at this stage was affected by, and subject to, institutions, 
policies and actors at multi-scales. 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
95 As this report points out, the gross local GDP of Kunshan county, Jiangyin county, Zhangjiagang 
county, Changshu county, Taichang county and Wujiang county reached 237.9 billion RMB, and their 
gross local state income reached 32.2 billion RMB. 
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The national strategic change in terms of the urban-oriented turn 
entailed a series of preferential sociospatial rescaling practices. In more 
specific terms, although the first two national development zones in Jiangsu 
were both established in the north, this first-mover advantage enjoyed by the 
north was soon offset after Deng made his survey trip to southern China in 
1992, claiming the strategy of furthering reform through development zones at 
various scales. The quick rise of development zones in the south was, 
arguably, a direct outcome of Deng’s insistence on the growth-oriented state 
ideology. As Deng stressed in his southern survey in 1992, ‘the reform and 
open policy must be insisted and be operated more liberally, bravely and 
rapidly’. Deng’s statement was soon expressed via some institutions and 
policies with clear strategic selectivities, according to which local state 
institutions, economic entities and actors reflexively reshaped their actions 
and tactics. Put differently, before Deng’s survey in 1992, development zones 
could only be formed within the 14 special zones. After 1992, the State 
Council only retained its authority for sanctioning national-level and some 
large scaled development zones, and delegated the authority of approving 
other local development zones to local state institutions. As Zhou (2009) 
pointed out, there emerged in the early 1990s a popular tide of forming 
development zones, which in turn entailed a variety of problems such as high 
inflation, soil erosion and over investment. Before the mid-1990s more than 
4000 development zones were formed across China, including more than 
3000 zones that were illegally established without proper approvals.  
 
5.3.3 The importance of high-tech zones to regional (uneven) 
development 
Notwithstanding this general development zone upsurge, we can also find a 
set of national political and economic privileges given to the south of Jiangsu. 
For example, since central government approval in August 1992 to upgrade 
Kunshan development zone, which was a county-level zone in Suzhou city in 
the south, into a national economic and technological development zone, 
another three national-level high-tech industry development zones had been 
established in Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou city respectively, and 68 
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provincial-level development zones had also been formed in the south of 
Jiangsu. Moreover, during the 1990s, numerous municipal and county-level 
zones were built in the south. As an official internal report pointed out, since 
the 10th Five-Year National Development Plan (since the mid-1990s), the 
growth of development zones in Jiangsu province had experienced a 
transition from quantitative extension to qualitative promotion characterised by 
the diversified roles of different types of development zones in different 
localities. This transition particularly refers to the establishment of those high-
tech industry development zones in the south, which were indicative of the 
precedence of the south over the north with respect to its industrial upgrading 
and restructuring process. As the provincial Bureau of Statistics of Jiangsu 
(2004b) states, high-tech industry provides a key criterion for evaluating the 
economic and scientific growth of a region. Developing high-tech sectors is of 
key importance to optimising local industrial structure, improving economic 
quality, and enhancing core competitiveness of a region or a locality. It is 
noted that by 2005 there were six high-tech industry development zones in 
Jiangsu, and all of these zones are located in the south. And in 2003, the 
gross industrial output of high-tech zones in the south96 reached 333.19 billion 
RMB, represeting 87% of that of Jiangsu province. There were by 2003 in 
Jiangsu 1791 large and medium sized high-tech enterprises, including 581 in 
Suzhou city, 402 in Wuxi city and 401 in Changzhou city (Bureau of Statistics 
of Jiangsu, 2004b). Among these high-tech enterprises in the south, a large 
proportion consisted of foreign, Hong Kong, and Taiwan invested enterprises 
(513 by the year of 2003), and local private high-tech enterprises (417 by the 
year of 2003). As the provincial government possesses the power of 
approving the establishment of local high-tech zones, and the State Council 
retains the authority of selecting potential zones and qualifying them as 
national high-tech industry zones, it is thus clear to see a privileged position 
given to the south in this respect. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
96 Notably, the south of Jiangsu referred here also includes Nanjing city, which is the capital city of 
Jiangsu, and Zhenjiang city, apart from Changzhou, Wuxi, and Suzhou city. This is because that the 
provincial Bureau of Statistics of Jiangsu adopts a pure geographical definition of the south of Jiangsu, 
which is different from the socioeconomic-oriented conception of the south of Jiangsu. Yet, the use of 
the south of Jiangsu in this research means the conventional regional group of Changzhou, Wuxi, and 
Suzhou city, unless it explicitly states otherwise. 
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The dominance of the south in high-tech sectors reflected, on the one 
hand, its strong local business communities and industrial bases, and also on 
the one hand, its institutional advantage of using high-tech industry zones to 
attract foreign investment and technology and coupling such investment with 
local assets.  
As Mr. G, the former leading official of Changzhou high-tech zone, 
asserted, the core strategy of the high-tech zone of Changzhou city could be 
summarised as seeking sustainable local development through, inter alia, 
export-oriented industries, scientific and technological advancement, and 
urbanisation. Within the high-tech zone of Changzhou, there emerged four 
industrial clusters, each of which concentrated on, respectively, the IT 
industry, new material production, advanced manufacturing, and biological 
and pharmaceutical industries. The industrial output of these four leading 
industries in 2008 contributed to 90% of the gross industrial output of the 
national high-tech zone of Changzhou (Wu, 2010). Wu (2010) argued that 
high-tech industry has already become one of the pillar industries of the 
national economy, and the gross industrial output of high-tech enterprises in 
2009 was 288.695 billion RMB, which constituted 48.29% of the gross 
municipal industrial output.  
In practice, the economic importance of high-tech zones lies in three 
main aspects. First, the industrial orientation of high-tech zones confers better 
institutional advantages in attracting domestic and foreign investments than 
normal economic development zones. Second, high-tech zones help promote 
local industrial structure with the purpose of enhancing local competitiveness 
in terms of better R&D capacity and higher value-added products and 
services. Third, high-tech zones receive better state support for fostering and 
promoting strategic sectors so as to ‘play the leading role for industrial cluster 
and radiation in a region’97. As Wang (2012) suggests, high-tech zones are 
different to other development zones since their functioning has in many 
respects reflected the conflict between the long-term national strategic 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
97 See the State Council’s policy paper – ‘Several policies on exerting the roles of national high-tech 
industry development zones in promoting economic development in a stable, rapid manner’. (State 
issued [2009] No. 9): http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2010/content_1547212.htm (accessed on 
Nov 15th, 2013) 
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objective of achieving industrial upgrading and innovation, and local growth 
agendas, which are usually spatially parochial and temporally finite. On the 
other hand, this conflict has generated, in a top-down fashion, more policy 
and resource support preferential to high-tech zones and enterprises. For 
example, high-tech enterprises running in high-tech zones can enjoy a variety 
of tax exemptions in relation to corporation tax, export and import tax etc98. In 
Changzhou high-tech zone, foreign invested enterprises are eligible for the 
so-called policy of ‘two exemptions and three reductions’99  
In his empirical research on national-level development zones in the 
Yangtze River Delta, Liu (2009: 12) suggests that, apart from Shanghai, the 
national high-tech zones in most regions of the Yangtze River Delta had 
better economic performance than national economic and technological zones 
in the same localities. And, the better performance of the high-tech zones 
mainly derived from the competitiveness of high-tech industries over 
conventional sectors such as textiles and agriculture. In addition to the crucial 
function of attracting more foreign investments and promoting high-tech 
industrial clusters, high-tech development zones in the south did not confine 
their institutional capabilities to pure industrial promotion and agglomeration, 
but extended and exerted such capabilities in larger territories and then 
eventually at higher scales through advancing high-tech zone-driven 
urbanisation and modernisation. It is indeed this strategic institutional link 
between urbanisation and industrialisation that reflects another facet of the 
utilitarian state policies and practices that were privileged in the growth of the 
south.  
Take the national high-tech zone in Changzhou and the provincial-level 
high-tech zone in Wujin district for example, Mr. S observed that there was a 
clear urban-oriented turn in the evolution of high-tech zones in Changzhou. 
The high-tech zone of Changzhou was initially established in November 1992, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
98 See, the policy paper by the Ministry of Finance of China, and China’s State Administration of 
Taxation – ‘The notice on the preferential policies for corporation tax’ (Finance & Taxation issued 
[1994] No.1): http://w1.mohrss.gov.cn/gb/zt/2006-01/18/content_103512.htm (accessed on Nov 15th, 
2013)  
99 This policy applies to foreign invested productive enterprises which run more than 10 years in China. 
According to this policy, the first and second year corporation tax on such enterprises can be exempted 
if such enterprises have been profitable. And, the corporation tax will be reduced to half for the third to 
the fifth year.  
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its planned territory only covered 5.63 sq. km., but in 1995 this territory was 
massively enlarged to 115.88 sq. km. as a result of the rescaling practice of 
upgrading the high-tech zone into the new urban district of Changzhou. In 
April 2002, this territory was again reshaped to cover 439.16 sq. km., thus 
becoming a standard municipal district of Changzhou city, which covered one 
sub-district office and certain towns at that time. As Mr. G stated, since 1998 
when he was in charge of the high-tech zone, the old developmental strategy 
of ‘growing through trade’ had then been changed to a five-fold strategy, 
which aimed to develop the high-tech zone through urbanisation, 
globalisation, educational and technological advancement, urban-rural 
interaction and sustainable development. Mr. G further stated that under the 
growth-oriented state ideology, the local government of the high-tech zone 
had by 2002 invested more than 3.5 billion RMB for infrastructure construction 
with purpose of holistically enhancing local urbanisation, and the high-tech 
zone had, after ten years’ development since its inception in 1992, emerged 
as a modern urban district complete with energetic growth, dynamic industrial 
foundation, and complete transportation networks (airport, railway, auto and 
water route). The following pictures will show some sights of the high-tech 
zone of Changzhou. 
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Figure 5.1: The expressway in the high-tech zone of Changzhou 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Factories in the high-tech zone of Changzhou 
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Figure 5.3: Football stadium in the high-tech zone of Changzhou 
 
 
 
The provincial high-tech zone of Wujin also exhibited a similar path of 
development. As Mr. S emphasised, the general development plan of Wujin 
high-tech zone had at the outset clearly expressed that the objective of this 
high-tech zone ‘is to build a new industrial city, which can integrate various 
functions of high-tech industrial agglomeration, modern tourism, urbanisation 
for residence and business’. Apart from industrial growth and urban 
development, the local high-tech of Wujin is also characterised by its ancillary 
education institution, that is, the so-called ‘City of universities and colleges’, 
which is officially called ‘Changzhou Science and Education Town’. The 
former Premier Wen Jiabao in his survey in Changzhou, gave particular 
recognition and evaluation to this local institutional complex of education and 
R&D, asserting that ‘the establishment of this college town takes a right path’ 
as ‘it provides an effective answer to tackle the balance between the state 
investment and support on economic growth and on education and 
employment’. The main reason for Premier Wen saying this lies in the pro-
industry nature of this education district. It is noted that all of the colleges and 
universities within this special district are oriented to education and training of 
177""
industry-related skills rather than pure academies. While the colleges and 
universities there do not enjoy high ranks, they have consistently ensured 
high employment rate for their graduates, as most of the graduates can be 
absorbed by those nearby enterprises in local development zones. Recent 
years have seen the town of colleges extensively promoting R&D centres in 
this district with the aim of linking the industrial promotion and upgrading of 
local enterprises with the R&D institutions. Notably, there have been a dozen 
top universities building up R&D centres in this special district, including 
Oxford University. In a word, it is argued that the high-tech zones in 
Changzhou have largely contributed to industry-driven urbanisation during the 
second stage and indeed third stage of China’s reform. The following pictures 
show some sights of the high-tech zone of Wujin.  
 
Figure 5.4: Factories in the high-tech zone of Wujin 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Residential areas in the high-tech zone of Wujin 
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Compared to the north, it can thus be seen that high-tech zones in 
Changzhou, and at large in the south of Jiangsu conducted a quicker 
extension of their institutional capacity to promote the urban-oriented turn 
through territorial and rescaling practices (which will be articulated in 
subsequent paragraphs). Wang (1999) suggested that at earlier stages, 
development zones in China tend to rely on preferential policies and foreign 
investment, exhibiting a lagged process of urbanisation which was shaped by 
the urban hierarchy produced by the influence of transnational capitals. In 
order to transit from this pre-mature status into effective industry-driven 
urbanisation, Wang (1999) then points out that as the urbanisation of 
development zones usually take the path of integrating into their municipalities 
or becoming satellite cities, three conditions must thus be present. These 
refer to, first, sufficient financial capacity for undertaking large scale urban 
infrastructure construction; second, effective local state institutions for 
coordinating economic coexistence and mutual benefits between 
development zones and their municipalities; and third, less administrative 
interventions and more delegated authorities from municipalities for 
development zones.  
Whilst it can be argued that the case of high-tech zones in Changzhou 
shows that development zones in the south tend to receive better institutional 
and financial support from their municipalities than those in the north, it may 
also be argued from a different perspective that lagged local industrialisation 
and less agglomeration of capital, technology and human resource in the 
north had already determined that industrialisation-driven urbanisation could 
by no means be as efficient as that of the south. As Zhang (2001) suggests, 
the urbanisation process driven by development zones in China is indeed 
different to traditional urban extension that serves to relieve and disperse 
overly crowded concentration in existing urban areas. As development zones 
in the Yangtze River Delta operated in a highly investment-driven fashion, the 
process of urbanisation driven by development zones in this region thus 
reflects the extent to which these zones have been effectively coupled with 
global resources and markets, and whether the industrial structure and local 
infrastructure in these zones can be attractive to local and external 
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professionals and labourers (Zhang, 2001). Zhang further points out that 
development zones in the three cities in the south of Jiangsu exhibited the 
same pattern in expanding their development zone-driven urbanisation. Under 
this pattern, development zone-driven urbanisation was evolving from a shape 
of connected plots into more dispersed areas. This can be illustrated in the 
three figures below, which show the evolution of the urban structures in Wuxi 
city, Suzhou city, and Changzhou city in sequence. These figures are taken 
from Zhang (2001). 
Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the urban territory of Wuxi city from 
the 1980s to the 1990s. The left is the existing urban areas of Wuxi at the 
beginning of the 1980s whereas the right shows how urbanised development 
zones had contributed to a much larger urban territory of Wuxi by the end of 
the 1990s. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show that how the urban territories of Suzhou 
city and Changzhou city were changing from the 1980s to the 1990s. 
Similarly, most of their newly increased urban territories were established 
through the rapid urbanisation of local development zones.) 
 
Figure 5.6: the evolution of the urban territory of Wuxi city from the 
1980s to the 1990s 
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Figure 5.7: the evolution of the urban territory of Suzhou city from the 
1980s to the 1990s 
 
 
Figure 5.8: the evolution of the urban territory of Changzhou city from 
the 1980s to the 1990s 
 
 
 
5.3.4 Rescaling practice and its implications on regional uneven 
development 
As mentioned before, the territory extension practice by development zones 
was on most occasions accompanied by the rescaling of local governments at 
county-level in the south, through which their institutional and financial 
capacities could be much strengthened. In 2013, the State Council published 
its policy document No. 24100 and this attracted wide social attention. This 
policy document ratified the administrative practice of rescaling Gaochun """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
100 The State Council’s NO. 24 policy document in 2013 is ‘The official reply as to the authorisation of 
the administrative division in Nanjing city in Jiangsu province’.  
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county and Lishui county of Nanjing into municipal districts of Nanjing. This 
practice signifies that there will be no county anymore in the ‘larger’ south of 
Jiangsu101. While the State Council’s policy document gave rise to some 
controversies, what is more notable for the present research lies in the fact 
that almost two decades ago before the 2013 policy, there was already no 
standard county in the ‘south’ of Jiangsu in a strict sense. Unlike the rescaling 
practice of Nanjing city in 2013, which aims to address the dilemma between 
rapid local urbanisation and inadequate land supply, the practice of rescaling 
the counties in the south into county-level cities in the 1990s bore and indeed 
produced much more complicated institutional and economic considerations 
and impacts in the evolution of regional uneven development.  
 The origin of county-rescaling practice lies in the Central Committee of 
CPC’s policy document No. 51 in 1982, namely, ‘Notice as to regional 
institution reform and implementing the system of subordinating counties 
under municipal control’. And this system was first experimented in Jiangsu 
province in 1983. This experiment and its subsequent expansion throughout 
the country not only made counties a part of the administrative territory of their 
municipalities, but also enabled municipalities to have strong control over 
local governments of their counties with respect to, for instance, finance and 
personnel matters. As Mr. J of the Office of Provincial Government of Jiangsu 
observes, the original purpose of the 1983 regional reform was to break down 
the institutional division and resource isolation between urban and rural areas 
so as to promote rural industrialisation and urbanisation. The situation in the 
south of Jiangsu, as Mr. J further suggests, quickly evolved out of the original 
expectation, since many counties in the south had exhibited by the end of the 
1980s prominent economic performance that was no worse than their 
municipalities. This inevitably led to certain conflicts between municipalities 
and their counties especially when they competed for various projects and 
resources, attempting to attract more into their own jurisdictions. Whilst 
central government eventually authorised the practice of rescaling counties 
into county-level cities in the 1990s to address the problems resulting from the 
rapidly increasing economic strength of counties in the south, the north of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
101 The south here Includes Nanjing and Zhenjiang city, both of which, though being geographically 
located in the south, are not conventionally and socioeconomically included in the south of Jiangsu. 
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Jiangsu had before this rescaling practice suffered difficulties in implementing 
the 1983 reform. This was because most counties in the north did not achieve 
satisfactory rural industrialisation and TVE growth as in the south, and most 
municipalities in the north of Jiangsu found they were both institutionally and 
industrially incapable of leading and promoting the counties within their 
respective territories. And, this led to the establishment of two new 
municipalities in the north in 1996 for relieving the heavy governance burden 
of regulating and promoting too many counties. Notably, by the end of the 
same year, all the counties in the south had finished their rescaling practice, 
becoming county-level cities. For example, in 1995, Wujin county of 
Changzhou city was rescaled into Wujin county-level city, Wuxi county of 
Wuxi city became Xishan county-level city, and Wu county of Suzhou city 
became Wu county-level city.  
Most local state officials, whom I interviewed, suggested that the 
extensive rescaling practice in the south during the 1990s was, on the one 
hand motivated by the central and provincial governments’ policy 
encouragement, and on the other hand due to the real, pragmatic situation 
that most counties in the south had at that time already possessed sufficient 
economic strength to qualify for the State Council’s criteria with respect to 
‘rescaling county into county-level city’. But, there are, arguably, more real 
interest-oriented considerations underlying such rescaling practices.  
A direct outcome of rescaling a county is the practice of upgrading local 
head officials’ bureaucratic ranks. In practice, the party secretary of a 
standard county is in most cases lower in his rank than that of a county-level 
city, because the party secretary of a county-level city is usually also a 
Member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee, whose 
official rank is under China’s bureaucratic system prior to party secretary of 
county/county-level city102.  
For example, Sheng Keqin was the Party Secretary of Wujin county-
level city between 2001 and 2002 and his prior official title during his office """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
102 A member of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee possesses the rights to 
speech and vote on all the essential matters, which must be discussed and collectively determined by 
the Standing Committee Conference of the Municipal Party Committee. This confers such a member 
who is also the party secretary of a county-level city with some powers to influence essential municipal 
policy decisions that may affect county affairs.  
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time in Wujin was not Party Secretary of Wujin but the Member of the 
Standing Committee of the Party Committee of Changzhou city. This was 
same for his predecessor Mao Weiming103, and his successor, Shen Ruiqin. 
On the contrary, for instance, Zhang Shushan was not a Member of the 
Standing Committee of the Party Committee of Nantong city during his office 
term of serving as the Party Secretary of Haian county. It can thus be seen 
that the practice of rescaling county into county-level cities became an 
institutional short cut through which the official ranks of a large amount of 
local state officials at county scale can be simultaneously rescaled upward. 
Moreover, as Mr. J of the Office of the provincial government of Jiangsu and 
Mr. S of the Planning Bureau of Wujin pointed out, the rescaling practice 
could result in both a variety of visible and latent benefits to local 
development. For example, the rescaling practice gives rise to the 
administrative advantage of receiving approvals from upper-level 
governments more easily with respect to application for financial support, 
quota for land expropriation and compulsory purchase and so on. More latent 
benefits could also be derived from the better locality image of being a county-
level city, which on many occasions could play a crucial role in marketing and 
inward investment campaigns. As Mr. J asserted, as the term ‘county’ in 
Chinese can still culturally lead to a first impression of being rurally related, 
many local officials were keen to pursue county-level status, prefer to be 
addressed as ‘mayor’ rather than ‘county magistrate’.  
 Notwithstanding the presence of all the above institutional advantages, 
it must be emphasised that in order to secure a precise, comprehensive 
understanding of those rescaling practices in the south of Jiangsu during the 
second stage of China’s reform, a dynamic, relational view shall be taken so 
as to reveal the reality that those rescaling practices in the south were not 
merely functionally specific to county scales, and more importantly, to analyse 
the question of to what extent the interactive contradiction between 
institutionally rescaled urban status and socioeconomically and historically 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
103 Notably, largely because of the satisfactory local economic performance of Wujin, Mao Weiming 
has later been promoted to be the Vice-Governor of Jiangsu province, and Sheng Keqin has later been 
promoted to be the Deputy Minister of the provincial Organisation Department of Jiangsu. 
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produced urban scales, had shaped the respective regional development in 
the south and the north, and the unevenness between them.  
In more specific terms, it is argued that the unique phenomenon of all 
counties in the south having been institutionally rescaled into county-level 
cities in the 1990s, though motivated by political considerations, reflects more 
the regional continuity in terms of the economic legacy of rural 
industrialisation that supported the local growth in the south during the second 
stage, and the regional change in terms of the rise of development zones, 
which linked local industrialisation with urbanisation. Thanks to the economic 
prominence at county scales in the south at this stage, rescaling these 
counties into county-level cities was, arguably, more like an institutional 
reflection or justification of the geographical materialisation of the economic 
and social relations in terms of rural urbanisation and industrialisation in these 
counties. Put differently, it can be justifiable to conceive of the regional 
development mainly driven by TVEs at township and village scales, and by 
various development zones at county scales in the south during the 
respective stages, as some sort of sociospatial restructuring process in Neil 
Brenner’s (2009) sense. This means that the sociospatial restructuring 
process was expressed in practice as growth-oriented territory-, place-, scale-
, and network-specific forms that were shaped by various selective 
institutional arrangements and privileged policies on the one hand, and 
empowered and restrained cooperative and/or conflictual actions that served 
to couple regional social, economic and even cultural assets with domestic 
and global resources and markets through rural urbanisation and 
industrialisation, on the other.  
Mr. J is right that in Chinese cultural sense the term of county is 
reminiscent of rural-based areas or issues. As those counties in the south had 
during the first two stages of the reform paved the way of transiting from 
highly rural places into semi-urban sociospatial sites through rural 
industrialisation and development zone-driven growth, these newly emerged 
and restructured socioeconomic relations at the county scales in the south 
had, irrespective of the institutional or nominal rescaling, reflected substantial 
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processes and practices, the scale-specificity of which went beyond both of 
the functional and scalar borderlines of a standard county.  
It is in this sense argued that there was in the south much less 
contradiction in terms of the institutional incompatibilities between the 
institutionally rescaled local urban status, and socioeconomically and 
historically shaped urban scales as well as the socioeconomic relations and 
processes thereby entailed. In other words, thanks to the processes of rural 
industrialisation and urbanisation, those counties in the south had already 
been factually rescaled into sociospatial sites in an ontological sense, and the 
institutional rescaling approved by the State Council constituted more nominal 
justification than concrete empowerment.  
The situation in the north differs considerably. Regarding for example 
the rate of rural urbanisation of the counties in the south and north 
respectively, Shen and Liu (2003) have adopted 16 indicators for assessing 
the rate of rural urbanisation of all the 64 county units in Jiangsu province. 
They then categorised all county units into four groups, namely, urbanised 
areas, quasi-urbanised areas, transitional areas, and rural areas. They noted 
that ten county units qualified as urbanised area, and nine of them are the 
county-level cities in the south, including Wujin county-level city. None of the 
county-units in the south fall into the third and fourth groups. Notably, Hainan 
county of Nantong is within the third group, being seen as a transitional area 
by 2001. Under the trend of rescaling counties into county-level cities, there 
had been 18 county-level cities formed in the north. But, none of these 
county-level cities achieved a high rate of rural urbanisation during the second 
stage of China’s reform.  
Having regard to the critical role of local development zones in 
concentrating the multifarious elements for promoting urbanisation, the lagged 
rural urbanisation at the county scale in the north during the second stage 
therefore, arguably, reflected the inefficient performance of development 
zones there. Indeed, the institutional rescaling practice in the north in some 
aspects became an institutional burden, the presence of which delineated 
both the apparent and latent incompatibility between the artificially founded 
scale and institutions, and the actual spatial expressions of the socioeconomic 
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relations and processes at the county scale in the north. The rescaling 
practice in the north during the 1990s was thus seemingly more like a balance 
of interests in the political sense between the south and the north of Jiangsu, 
rather than a reflection of socioeconomic reality. 
But, the discrepancy between institutional scalar arrangement and 
actual scalar expression of socioeconomic relations did result in a series of 
severe problems such as pseudo urbanisation, administrative confusion, and 
most severely, over expropriation of rural land by local governments at 
county-level scale. These problems then led to a sudden prohibition on the 
practice of rescaling counties into county-level cities, by the State Council in 
1997. Since the 1997 prohibition, although there had been persistent calls for 
lifting the ban on such rescaling practice104, the State Council only approved a 
few exceptional cases. This long-term prohibition arguably reflects the failure 
of the institutional rescaling practice in a general sense, with the somewhat 
unique exception of the south of Jiangsu. Therefore, it is proposed that both 
the active rescaling of the sociospatial relation and productive force through 
the rise of development zones, and the somewhat passive rescaling of 
changing county into county-level city, constituted one of the key causes to 
the leading position of the south of Jiangsu in regional/local development 
during this stage. In other words, scale in terms of social processes and 
relations matters in this context.  
Whilst the relative success of the county rescaling practice in the south 
was indeed dependent on the appropriate institutional manifestation of the 
pragmatic local socioeconomic relations and processes within the territories at 
county scale, it must be further pointed out that the dynamic materialisation of 
the sociospatial relations and economic processes at county as well as urban 
scales in the south had also expressed, and been horizontally and vertically 
embedded in, the complex interscalar effects and networks during the second 
stage of China’s reform. In other words, the local growth pattern driven by 
development zones had institutionally and substantively shaped both the 
county and urban scales during the second stage to interact more """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
104 Notably, Mrs. Shan Xiaoming, the present Party Secretary of Haian county of Nantong, put forward 
an official proposal in 2012 in the National People’s Congress, urging that the general prohibition on 
rescaling counties should be lifted so as to address the urban issues faced by counties in the new era. 
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competitively in the context of China’s insertion into the global market and 
worldwide interscalar networks. The materialisation of the diverse interscalar 
relations and processes, which were expressed as the increasing inter-urban 
competition through development zone-based investment attraction, 
enhancement and value-capture, also constituted a critical element, which not 
only led to the failure of rescaling counties in the north, but also more 
importantly, contributed to the regional uneven development during this stage. 
As Brenner (2009: 66) observed, ‘the linkages between urban and supraurban 
scales are today generally considered intrinsic to the very content of the urban 
question’. While his observation rightly points out the critical significance of 
vertical interscalar relations, the somewhat unique scene of local government-
led inter-urban competition in Jiangsu province delineated how the horizontal 
interscalar relations and processes might concretely shape regional 
unevenness. This is the major topic of the following section. 
 
5.3.5 Inter-locality competitions in Jiangsu province and the key 
importance of network to regional unevenness 
As noted before, there were two prominent phenomena, namely, the 
institutional and sociospatial transition of industrialisation and the resulting 
inter-urban competition, by which regional uneven development in Jiangsu is 
characterised at the second stage of the reform. This section focuses on the 
institutional expressions and implications of the latter with respect to the 
regional unevenness in question. 
 Contextually speaking, it is argued that the increasingly intensified 
inter-urban competition during the second stage of China’s economic reform 
was to a large extent a synthetic reflection and embodiment of the growth-
oriented state ideology and its institutional expressions in terms of specific 
regional/local development strategies and growth patterns. The major reason 
for conceiving of this phenomenon as a synthetic reflection lies in the fact that 
the inter-urban competition in China was shaped by, and taking place, in a 
state-led manner, across the dynamics and networks of a variety of scales 
(global, national, and sub-national scales). In a general, holistic view, whilst 
the world witnessed the rise of the cities in the 1990s and the ‘hollowing out’ 
188""
of the state (Jessop, 2004), China, thanks to its idiosyncratic path of starting a 
market-economy oriented economic reform without simultaneously advancing 
any radical, westernised political and legal reforms, exhibited, during the 
second stage of its economic reform, a unique picture that combined a 
pervasive but regionally and locally uneven rise of cities, and a hollowing out 
of central governance in terms of concrete developmental matters combined 
with a financial and revenue centralisation that ran counter to destatization. In 
the light of China’s authoritarian regime and the basic objective of China’s 
state-led economic reform, these dialectic central-local relations were thus of 
significance to the subsequent evolution of regional unevenness, and to the 
practice of the ambiguous notion of the ‘China Model’.  
The idiosyncratic nature and manifestation of China’s path 
methodologically forces the present research not to normatively rely its 
explanatory power upon those contingent, empirical trends at national and 
supranational scales, but, as MacLeod and Goodwin (1999: 515) have 
pointed out, to ‘stress the complex articulation of social, economic and 
political forces through space and across time’. This perspective also 
resonates, in a general sense, with Zhang and Peck’s (2014: 5, 6) view that 
‘national roles, functions and institutional ensembles must be understood in 
those multi-scalar terms through which they are profoundly co-constituted’. 
Zhang and Peck also claim that the Chinese model ‘must be understood to be 
plural rather than singular’ at regional/local scales because of ‘the patterned 
heterogeneity of the Chinese model of capitalism’. Zhang and Peck (2014: 6) 
point out that there are distinctive regional-capitalist formations and sub-
models in China, which are often to different degrees and in different ways 
‘reciprocally embedded in national regimes and constitutively connected to 
offshore economies and networks’, and these qualitative and quantitative 
differences have de facto essentially contributed to regional unevenness.  
However, such regional unevenness should neither be simply 
recognised as a plural-form consequence of incoherent local institutions that 
diverged from a national coherence, nor be attributed independently to the 
presence of various paradigmatically enumerated regional sub-models of 
economic growth. Arguably, it is also overly ideal and romantic to describe the 
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Chinese capitalism as what Zhang and Peck’s so-called oriental version of 
Michel Albert’s (1993) ‘capitalism against capitalism’. Despite the synthetical 
reflection and polymorphic expressions of regional uneven development in 
China, the supra logics of the growth-oriented state ideology in terms of 
utilitarianism and pragmatism were present throughout the entire economic 
reform, and empowered and/or delegated and restrained/confined the pace, 
patterns and propensities of all the state-led institutional innovations and 
competitions at different scales.  
In more concrete terms, whilst the pragmatic trial-and-error strategy led 
to the extension of rural decollectivisation and industrialisation, and the 
utilitarian strategy of developing some regions in priority led to the blooming of 
the special zone (the prototype development zone) in Shenzhen city in 
Guangdong province, Deng had at the outset of the second stage reinforced 
the growth-oriented ideology and applied it to the Yangtze River Delta. 
Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta were specified by Deng to be another 
region which should be empowered to develop and ‘get rich first’. As Deng 
asserted during his survey trip to the south in 1992, it was his mistake not to 
make Shanghai an economic special zone in the 1980s, but this could also be 
an advantage to learn from, and improve on, the experiences of Guangdong 
province. Deng also claimed that whilst the rural reform in terms of the 
household responsibility system had been proved by concrete practices as a 
successful attempt, the question of urban reform and development must also 
be answered by concrete practices. At the end of his survey, Deng notably 
emphasised to the head officials of Jiangsu province the key importance of 
grasping the opportunity for economic growth, and expressed his anxiety for 
the risk of missing important opportunities during this stage of China’s reform. 
Though not fully expressed, the developmental strategies widely practised at 
regional and local scales during this stage revealed that the opportunity 
pointed out by Deng means: establishing and extending extra-local relations 
and networks in order to embed local growth into global commodity chains 
and couple local assets with global strategic resources, through the new 
urban sociospatial sites, those are, development zones. In addition, Deng also 
explicitly stated that areas like the south of Jiangsu, which had secured better 
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developmental performance should continue to grow faster than other regions 
in the country.  
 As Deng had made it clear that China’s economic reform must be 
accelerated, and be re-orientated to urban development through embedding 
new urban sites in the global markets, inter-urban competition turned out to be 
an inevitable consequence, to which regional uneven development would be 
subject. As noted, the original purpose of setting up development zones was 
to attract and capture exogenous investment for forming and enhancing local 
endogenous growth. This very purpose is already indeed indicative of a strong 
tendency towards inter-locality competition. As most localities at various 
scales had been authorised to establish development zones since 1992, such 
relatively over-abundant supplies of platforms against limited investments 
naturally resulted in intense competitions for attracting and capturing 
investments. The problem of over supplies of development zones can be 
illustrated by the State Council’s action of revoking surplus zones. According 
to the ‘Notice as to clearing and reorganising various development zones and 
enhancing the management of constructive land’105 and the ‘Principles and 
conditions on clearing and reorganising development zones’106, the clearing 
campaigns managed to reduce 6866 development zones to 1568, and reduce 
the planning coverage from 38600 sq. km. to 9940 sq. km. by 2007. 
Regarding the clearing campaigns in Jiangsu province, Tao Peirong, the 
Director General of the provincial department of land and resources, stated in 
2005 in an official speech that by the end of 2004, 544 development zones in 
Jiangsu were revoked, accounting for 77.5% of the sum total. The reason for 
revoking development zones lies, as the Ministry of Commerce (2004) 
asserted, in the numerous abusive expropriations and illegal transfers of rural 
land, and the ultra vires and race-to-the-bottom problems, both of which 
frequently occurred in local investment invitation campaigns.  
Regarding the more concrete causes of inter-urban competitions in 
China, Tao (2011) suggests that there were in general three factors that have """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
105 Office of the State Council Issued, (2003) No.70, ‘Notice as to clearing and reorganising various 
development zones and enhancing the management of constructive land’. 
106 National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Land and Resources, and Ministry of 
Construction drafted, the State Council approved, NDRC issued, (2005), No. 1521. ‘Principles and 
conditions on clearing and reorganising development zones’ 
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decisively shaped inter-urban competition since the mid-1990s. First, the 
market-oriented reform after Deng’s survey in 1992 led to the quick 
emergence of FDI and private enterprises, thus considerably undermining 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) and TVEs’ competitiveness and profitability. 
As SOEs and TVEs gradually became a heavy burden and negative assets to 
local governments, their privatisation was inevitable. Extensive privatisation of 
SOEs and TVEs then transformed local governments from enterprise owners 
into tax collectors. Meanwhile, SOEs and TVEs were endowed with, and in 
the case of the south of Jiangsu encouraged to have, the mobility to relocate 
into development zones, as these zones usually provided better deals in 
terms of preferential taxation policies and land price. Tao further suggests that 
the tendency of establishing development zones since the mid-1990s was 
also entailed by the Tax Redistribution Reform in 1994, which largely deprived 
local governments of their revenue sources, enforcing them to seek new 
financial incomes through competing for manufacturing-related investments. 
The third cause refers to the motivation system underlying development zone-
based inter-locality competition. In a word, while local governments proposed 
many policies for attracting manufacturing-related investment, 75% of the 
value-added tax and the corporation tax would be collected by central 
government under the 1994 Tax system. As local governments would merely 
enjoy a small proportion of the tax income generated by manufacturing-
related investment, they needed not think prudently to offer a variety of 
preferential tax policies in the race-to-the-bottom competition. In fact, what 
most local governments were keen to obtain from inward investment, as Tao 
(2011) pointed out, was the spill over effects brought about by manufacturing 
sectors in the interest of the development of local service sectors. As Tao has 
not given a clear explanation on his notion of spill over effects, it is argued 
that such effects may better be interpreted, as the actual practices of 
development zones has demonstrated, as the effects of industrial 
agglomeration in the interest of urbanisation.  
Since industrial agglomeration and growth could result in the 
concentration of financial, technological and human resources, which in turn 
generated various, high demands for service sectors as well as infrastructure 
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constructions, local governments, from the taxation point of view, could thus 
acquire a large amount of governmental income through collecting the 
business tax generated from local service sectors, and from the land 
transferring fees through granting urban land for multifarious business uses. 
In practice, these incomes exclusively belong to local governments.  
Albeit Tao’s observation delineated some crucial logics behind 
development zone-based inter-urban competition, it is arguably flawed in 
some respects. First, it is argued that the privatisation of SOEs and TVEs 
must not be fused, but be separately deciphered, since most SOEs suffered 
difficulties in the 1990s whereas TVEs secured persistent high growth rates 
until 1994, when the new Tax Redistribution System was enacted (Li, et al., 
2013). This coincidence, according to Li et al. (2013), reveals that, as local 
governments under the 1994 tax redistribution system could no longer acquire 
extra-budgetary revenue from local TVEs as usual, the motivation to control 
and more importantly to support local TVEs quickly faded away, leaving TVEs 
in a rather less advantageous position in market-oriented competitions. Li et 
al. (2013) conceived that as the motivation for pursuing extra-budgetary 
revenue was the major cause that led local governments to build their major 
local growth patterns, it is thus unreasonable to see inter-urban competition 
for inward investment as pursuing prospective business tax revenue. This is 
because such revenue is within-budget income and can only be realised out 
of the office term of local head officials, because of the long-term turnover of 
most manufacturing firms. In other words, it may be argued that Tao’s 
observation has contradicted with the action logics of local governments 
under the growth-oriented state ideology. 
But, Mr. W confirmed in his interview that the local government of 
Wujin tended to exercise tolerant and flexible taxation practice with the 
purpose of fostering local industries and collecting prospective tax revenue on 
a much larger taxation base in the future, although Mr. Wu suggested that 
such practice is not a common one, and not seen much in those less 
developed regions such as the north of Jiangsu. He also stated that local 
governments tended to use the cheap land price of development zones in 
competing for exogenous investment. Yuan (2007) points out that, as a region 
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that attracted the largest amount of FDI, the south of Jiangsu was not only 
successful in inter-urban competition with respect to inward investment, but 
also the region which bore higher costs. These costs noted by Yuan mainly 
refer to the low land prices of development zones, which are below original 
land expropriation or construction costs. Yuan (2007) quoted an internal 
document of the provincial government of Jiangsu, suggesting that the land 
cost of a development zone in Suzhou city in the south of Jiangsu was 
200000 RMB per 666.67 sq. m., but the local government proposed the price 
of 150000 RMB per 666.67 sq. m. in investment invitation campaigns in order 
to attract more FDI than other localities. Such race-to-the-bottom competitions 
in turn resulted in a dispersal of sale on the land price of development zones. 
Indeed, when working as the Chairman Assistant in Shanghai People’s 
Enterprise (Group) Ltd., I experienced a lot of competition on the land price of 
development zones in dealing with the investment invitation campaigns 
initiated by different local governments. In reality, the very core issue in the 
negotiation between local governments and investors who are intended to 
establish their manufacturing in development zones lies in the land price, 
which is on most occasions attached with, or included in, a bundle of 
preferential policies relating to infrastructure, bank loan and state subsidy. In 
some inland, less development areas, local governments even offered zero 
priced land to attract exogenous investment. A municipal Party Secretary in 
Hubei province asserted in an investment invitation that whilst some nearby 
municipalities might offer zero priced land, his government could offer more 
competitive bundles of preferential policies107.  
 Notwithstanding these various motivations behind local governments’ 
actions, inter-urban competition was becoming normal throughout the second 
stage of China’s reform. And, from a retrospective view, the south of Jiangsu 
successfully renewed its major local growth pattern through such 
competitions, resulting in the so-called ‘New Southern Model’. As Hong (2008) 
observed, since the beginning of the 1990s, the economies of the south of 
Jiangsu continued to rise due to two major forces. The first force refers to the 
various development zones, which made the south of Jiangsu the region with """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
107 I took part in this campaign in Oct. 2010. 
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most dense agglomeration of FDI and investment from Taiwan. The other 
refers to the rapid growth of privatised TVEs, and of those TVEs which formed 
joint-ventures with foreign companies. Regarding the privatising tide of TVEs 
in the south, Hong (2008) conceives of it as an institutional innovation entailed 
by China’s further reform towards market economy. TVEs in the south, after 
their privatisation, did not suffer hostile depressions and competitions from the 
foreign investments attracted by local governments, as Hong further argued, 
because development zones in the south provided privatised TVEs with the 
opportunities and platforms to establish effective business cooperation and 
joint ventures with foreign invested companies. This mixed entrepreneurial 
structure constituted the micro-economic and industrial foundation of the 
economy of the south of Jiangsu, and it endowed the south of Jiangsu with 
more advanced industrial technologies and larger enterprise scale than other 
regions (Hong, 2008). While Hong has presented a quasi-official view on the 
success of the south in capturing and coupling global resources with local 
assets to promote endogenous growth during the second stage of the 
reform108, it must be emphasised that the relative success of the south is also 
to a large extent indicative of the relative failure of other regions, in particular, 
the north, because of its closeness to the south in terms of its territory, place, 
scale, and path-dependency, in the context of highly intense inter-urban 
competition. In order to further articulate this point, we need to explain more 
about the properties of inter-regional/urban competition in China. 
Zhang and Peck (2014) are quite correct in pointing out that regional 
styles of capitalist development in China are differently embedded within 
global markets and production and commodity chains. But they have made a 
misreading of China’s inter-regional competition. The ‘variegated capitalism 
approach’ they used provides them with a semi-political perspective, which 
confines their attention to certain prominent (mainly economically and some 
socio-politically) local growth patterns that did not indeed interact much, let 
alone directly compete with each other. Inter-regional/urban competition in 
China only occurred between localities with similar or path-dependent growth """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
108 Hong Yinxing serves as the Chancellor and Party Secretary of Nanjing University (top 1 University 
in Jiangsu province), and the quoted view was published on the party official press, Xinhua Daily. It is 
thus reasonable to say that Hong’s view here represents a quasi-official position.  
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patterns at various sub-national scales. For example, Zhang and Peck’s 
(2014) so-called war between the Guangdong-style and Chongqing-style is 
only meaningful, and concretely expressed in the course of competing for 
inward investment. Despite the combination of social welfare enhancement 
and economic growth, which occurred in Chongqing, its low rank of regional 
GDP makes its so-called war against Guangdong province (top 1 regional 
GDP in China) more like a pseudo-thesis under the growth-oriented state 
ideology. It is proposed that the impacts and role of inter-regional/urban 
competition can only be analysed through the lens of institutional 
arrangements and practices that are functionally identical, or path-dependent 
with, each other. It is this kind of inter-regional/urban that entails substantive 
difference in the network of a region that contributes in practice to regional 
unevenness.  
Hence, if taking a more concrete insight, looking into the extra-local 
relations and processes of the south of Jiangsu, it is by no means hard to find 
that development zones in the south achieved prominent performance in 
attracting, enhancing, and then capturing values of inward investments during 
the second stage of the reform whereas the north, as the APA report (2006) 
admits, lagged further behind. In a macro view, in 2003 (the end of the second 
stage of China’s reform), the south of Jiangsu contributed 6.7% to the national 
GDP, 12.1% of the national total volume of foreign trade, 7.1% of the national 
fixed asset investment, and 25% of the disbursement of foreign capital in 
China; and indeed, the regional GDP of the south of Jiang alone would be 
fourth in the national rank of regional GDP109 (Cao, 2004). And, by 2005, 
there had been 178 Fortune Global 500 companies establishing branches in 
the development zones of the south (91 in Suzhou city, 58 in Wuxi city, and 
29 in Changzhou city); and in 2004 the regional volume of foreign trade and 
the disbursement of foreign capital of the south110 amounted to 91.4% and 
75.8% of the provincial total sum (Cao & Gu, 2006). In other words, the south 
had achieved outstanding preponderance over the north with respect to the 
extra-local relations and processes in terms of coupling local assets with 
global strategic resources and networks. And, this preponderance was """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
109 The south of Jiangsu referred by Cao (2004) here includes Nanjing city and Zhenjiang city. 
110 The south of Jiangsu referred by Cao and Gu (2006) here includes Nanjing city and Zhenjiang city. 
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substantively secured through development zone-based inter-urban 
competition for inward investment.  
If looking at Changzhou city in the south in particular, it can be seen 
that its extra-local relations and processes were shaped by, and resulted 
from, a variety of multi-scalar actors and practices. At the meta-level, the 
national strategy of putting China’s domestic development into the grand 
circle of the global economies through promoting export-oriented 
manufacturing industries in coastal regions derived from a prominent internal 
report, namely, ‘the possibility of, and conditions on, the economic 
development strategy of integrating in the grand circle of the global economy’, 
which was drafted by Wang Jian (1987). Wang’s (1987) strategic 
contemplation in terms of embedding China’s massive migration of rural 
surplus labourers in the global market through promoting export-oriented, 
labour-intensive manufacturing sectors, had soon become the theoretical 
underpinning to the national strategy of developing economies of coastal 
regions. In January 1988, Deng ratified the policy paper as to ‘accelerating 
open policy and economic reform in coastal regions’ which conceived of local 
TVEs as the key players in conducting export-oriented businesses. In order to 
support the export transactions for local manufacturing enterprises, the State 
Council approved in 1987 the establishment of a series of ‘united exporting 
goods production enterprises’. There were 41 such enterprises in Jiangsu 
province, and 32 of them were in the three cities in the south (6 of them in 
Changzhou, and half of them were located in Wujin county). These state-
owned trade companies then helped local TVEs in the south accumulate their 
earlier experiences in conducting export transactions. In a word, the south 
had, till the end of the first stage of the reform, already been recognised by 
central government as the sociospatial and economic forefront through which 
regional economies and assets could be embedded in, and coupled with, 
global production and market networks. And the subsequent quick rise of 
development zones throughout the second stage of the reform institutionally 
strengthened these extra-local networks and processes in Changzhou city.  
The official data (Zhang & Geng, 2002) shows that after a decade of 
growth, the high-tech zone of Changzhou city in 2001 achieved prominent 
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performance in attracting inward investment (a protocol FDI of 0.5 billion USD, 
and a realised FDI of 0.16 billion USD), and enhancing local industrial output 
(12.4 billion RMB). Whilst the protocol FDI attracted by the high-tech 
development zone amounted to 43.58% of the municipal sum total in 2001, 
more than 45.71% of the large-scale projects (the amount of investment 
reached 10 million USD) in Changzhou city were located in the high-tech zone 
(Zhang & Geng, 2002). Indeed, the high-tech zone of Changzhou was the first 
one in China that established the joint venture cooperation model with a 
foreign investor 111  to develop industrial and residential infrastructure in 
development zone. In 1993, the municipal government of Changzhou 
approved the establishment of four local-level development zones 
respectively in its county-level cities and urban districts. This included the 
establishment of the high-tech zone of Wujin.  Apart from the two downtown 
districts of Changzhou, other urban districts and county-level cities also had 
established provincial-level zones or national development zones by 1996.  
As Wen (2011) observed, there are four vital factors that determine the 
level of transaction costs in relation to FDI, and in turn determine the local 
attractiveness to FDI. These refer to industrial foundation, infrastructure 
construction, geographical location, and policy preferences. Changzhou and 
the other two cities in the south were well placed compared to most other 
regions in China with respect to the above four factors, and hence the south 
of Jiangsu achieved more effective inward investment campaigns than all 
other regions. This effectiveness, as Wen (2011: 132) suggested, is another 
key characteristic of the so-called ‘New Southern Jiangsu Model’. Moreover, 
the success of the ‘New Southern Jiangsu Model’ set up some institutional 
criteria and costs in terms of infrastructure and policy conditions, which the 
local governments of other regions usually could not afford. All these physical 
and institutional barriers imposed upon inward investment campaigns could 
not only put other regions in a disadvantaged position in inter-urban 
competitions, but also considerably undermine the financial status and social 
stability of other competing localities. In a word, inter-regional/urban 
competition had not only caused those less developed regions to suffer less """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
111 This refers to Sun Hung Kai & Co., a large Hong Kong company. 
198""
inward investment, but also directly and indirectly brought about social 
conflicts and discontent.  
For example, the famous Oji Paper Incident in Nantong city in the north 
of Jiangsu in 2012 is a typical case of social conflicts resulting from inward 
investment campaigns. This Incident derived from the local government’s 
approval of the Oji Paper’s local sewage disposal project in Qidong county-
level city of Nantong city. As the local residents expressed serious 
environmental concerns with the side effect of this project, an aggressive 
massive protest quickly emerged, resulting in a trespass into the local 
government building and the illegal and violent detention of both the Party 
Secretary and Mayor of Qidong. Oji Paper Group is one of the largest foreign 
investors attracted by the local government of Nantong, and Oji Paper 
Group’s production in Nantong constitutes its largest investment. This incident 
also resulted in about 10 local state officials being investigated for corruption.  
Apart from those environment-related problems, the state-led actions of 
land expropriation and compulsory purchase also constitute a primary source, 
from which local social conflicts and discontent frequently occurred. Despite 
the political sensitivity of land expropriation conflicts and news blackouts on 
such incidents, the high frequency and severity of such incidents has in 
practice led to some institutional innovations. For example, in a group 
discussion with the local officials in Nantong municipal government, it was 
mentioned to me that a land dispute settlement centre has been established 
in Nantong’s national economic and technological development zone to deal 
with the conflicts caused by land expropriation and compulsory purchase 
issues.  
It was admitted by those local officials that such conflicts frequently 
occurred throughout the evolution of development zones in Nantong in the 
north, in the forms of mass disturbance, collective petition at municipal, 
provincial and even national scales and sometimes even violent confrontation. 
Establishing this dispute settlement centre aimed to mitigate these social 
conflicts, which are of severe political threats to local head officials’ 
performance record. Indeed, this land dispute settlement centre in Nantong is 
the first such institution established in Jiangsu province. In an investment 
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invitation campaign conducted by Gangzha district of Nantong city, in which I 
myself participated, the core issue in the negotiation between the district 
government and the company I served, focused on the price of the land 
transferring fee, and on what time this fee could be fully paid. But, these two 
seemingly finance-oriented questions were indeed directly related to the state-
led process of land expropriation and compulsory purchase. This was 
because, a large proportion of the land transferring fee would be used by the 
local government to defray the costs of local compulsory purchase, that is, the 
compensation and arrangement fee for those residents who would lose their 
land and houses in the course of establishing development zones. This cost 
could fluctuate according to the actual power and method of the specific local 
state institution and the bargaining position of specific local residents. As a 
local official explicitly said to me in an interview, the quicker the land 
transferring fee could be fully paid to the local government, the more efficient 
the land expropriation process would be. Similar situations were encountered 
in other campaigns, in which I was involved, in those less developed regions 
such as some cities in Heilongjiang province, Liaoling province, and Hubei 
province. In a word, it is argued that all such social conflicts and financial 
burdens/losses should be conceived as of some sort of institutional costs that 
are likely to be born by less developed regions, and are directly or indirectly 
generated by the path-dependently shaped development zone-based inter-
urban competitions during the second stage of China’s reform. 
A further point that must be elaborated here lies in the positive effect of 
inter-scalar competition within the territory of a municipality or a region with 
high degrees of socioeconomic connections and industrial isomorphism. 
While Cheung (2009) has argued that inter-locality competition amounts to an 
essential institutional impetus to China’s economy, he confines his analytical 
perspective to the competitions at county scale horizontally across a general 
territory. A potential flaw of Cheung’s assumption lies, as the above 
paragraphs illustrated, in the various costs bore by regions, which do not 
perform well in inter-locality competition (albeit it may be argued that the path-
dependent institutional transplantation and competition can in the long run 
strengthen the local economic performance and institutional thickness of less 
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developed regions). More importantly, there is another potential flaw inherent 
in Cheung’s generalisation of inter-locality competition in China. This refers to 
the positive effect of local growth brought about by inter-scalar competition in 
the south of Jiangsu. Generally speaking, the unique administrative status of 
county-level cities and the prominent economies of those county-level cities in 
the south of Jiangsu have made the coexistence of county-level cities and 
their municipalities more nuanced than standard urban and sub-urban 
relations in other regions of China. The strong economic strength not only 
provided these county-level cities in the south with autonomous financial 
capacity, but also in many cases endowed them with the essential power of 
bureaucratic personnel control, which should have been retained by their 
municipalities112.  
An anonymous official of Wuxi municipal government mentioned to me 
that, because of the competition and conflict between Wuxi city and its 
county-level city, Jiayin city (frequently ranked as Top 1 county-level city in 
China), the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Jiayin city 
usually tended to procedurally veto municipal appointment decisions on local 
head officials, as such appointments are seen by Jiayin as the intervention 
made by Wuxi municipal government to Jiayin’s local affairs. With the relative 
autonomy on financial and personnel matters, these county-level cities in the 
south were, arguably, standing in an almost equal position against their 
municipalities in the context of inter-urban competition. Whilst TVEs at the 
outset provided these county-level cities with decent economic strength, the 
extensive rise of development zones in these localities endowed them with 
further institutional capacities to pursue growth and prevent municipal 
intervention. Ms. M of the Office of Wujin district government suggested that 
most development zones in the county-level cities in the south attempted to 
seek more autonomous powers at their inception, so as to be immune from 
municipal intervention.  
As the south of Jiangsu was the most dense region attracting FDI and 
fostering TVEs (which were all later privatised), the equal position between """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
112 For instance, the development zone of Kunshan county-level city, which belongs to Suzhou city, 
possesses a quasi-municipal administrative rank, which makes this development zone a province-
controlled unit, whose head official is concurrently the Party Secretary of Kunshan county-level city. 
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municipalities and their county-level cities in this region stimulated inter-scalar 
competition among these localities, and in turn greatly optimised resource 
allocation and improved institutional thickness. In other words, inter-scalar 
competition in the south turned out to be some sort of positive-sum game 
between entrepreneurial cities in Jessop’s (2000) sense. In addition, the 
strong presence of these county-level cities in the south prevented the trend 
of concentrating all resources into several urban poles. The situations in the 
south of Jiangsu had exhibited a series of healthy competitions characterised 
by dispersed sociospatial sites with even resources and rationally disposed 
industrial clusters with identical structures and sectors. In the rank of Top 100 
counties in China, those county-level cities with prominent economic 
performance in the south of Jiangsu consistently and firmly seized the top 10 
or even top 5 positions. It is noted that all the county-level units in Jiangsu in 
total in 2001 contributed to 56.8% of the provincial GDP; and regarding 
Suzhou city and Wuxi city in the south, their respective county-level cities 
contributed to 82% and 69% of their respective GDP and 67% and 51% of 
their respective local state incomes (Wang, 2002). And, the gross GDP of the 
three county-level cities of Changzhou city in 2001 contributed to 63% of 
Changzhou’s GDP (Data from the Provincial Bureau of Statistics of Jiangsu, 
2002). Indeed, it is argued that the inter-scalar competition in the south of 
Jiangsu amounts to the ideal sample of Cheung’s (2009) conceptualisation of 
‘inter-locality competition’, which is of key institutional engine to China’s 
growth.  
The situation in the north of Jiangsu in relation to the inter-scalar 
competition within its territories is entirely different from that in the south, 
because of the absence of any county-level cities with prominent economic 
strength. In a series of interviews conducted for this research, many local 
officials in the north suggested that due to the agricultural dominance of its 
industrial structure, and lagged rural industrialisation, many local governments 
in the north of Jiangsu not only encountered the problem of lacking 
endogenous industrial and business supports, but also, in the context of inter-
urban competition, lacked the necessary experience to conduct effective 
campaigns to attract more inward investment. The larger municipalities in the 
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north suffered these difficulties as well as county-level units. A vice-Mayor of a 
municipality in the north once asserted that lectures about economic 
globalisation should be presented in the south rather than the north, since it is 
beyond the pace of the north to engage in such development (Wang, 2010).  
Gu (2005)113  suggested that the lagged development in the north  
derived from strategic limits in terms of confining its development to the 
domestic territory of Jiangsu province, which had in practice resulted in a 
series of failed institutional imitations and transplantations from the ‘Southern 
Jiangsu Model’. In other words, Gu (2005) pointed out that, whilst those local 
governments in the north of Jiangsu did also operate inward investment 
campaigns, the north did not actively and strategically attempt to embed 
regional development and local assets into the global production chains and 
industrial restructuring. In a word, the north of Jiangsu during the second 
stage not only directly lagged behind the south in inter-urban competition, but 
also indirectly lagged behind because of the inter-scalar competition within the 
south. That is to say, the south possessed better networks at county scales or 
above than the north in attracting, enhancing, and capture the value of 
coupling local assets with strategic external resources. And, this considerably 
contributes to regional unevenness.  
And, a notable point worth mentioning lies in the inward investment 
practice by Qiu He, the former Municipal Party Secretary of Suqian city, which 
is in the north of Jiangsu province, and is known as the least developed city in 
Jiangsu. Although a municipal party secretary is usually not able to attract 
national attention, Qiu was an exception, because of his unique investment 
invitation campaigns. In 2002 during his office term in Suqiu city, Qiu 
implemented a series of policies that required one third of all local state 
officials to temporally give up their normal routine tasks in order to attract 
inward investment, and another third of local state officials to conduct various 
business transactions on a rotating base. Moreover, high-rank local officials 
who could not achieve the task of attracting more than 5 million RMB inward 
investment would thereafter be removed from their offices. The controversial 
policies adopted by Qiu and the political and social attention he attracted """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
113 As Gu Weidong serves as the Director of the Policy Research Office of the Provincial Commission 
of Development and Reform of Jiangsu province, his views principally represent the official position.  
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arguably reflects the inadequate institutional thickness in the north with 
respect to investment invitation. As Qiu (2006) himself observed, the key 
importance of promoting economic performance in less developed regions lies 
in changing from primarily relying on state-owned capitals to initialising the 
leverage of private capitals through both fostering local enterprises and 
attracting external ones. It is particularly noted that, whilst Suqian city has not 
yet changed its lowest rank in Jiangsu province, Qiu He, as a controversial 
official, was promoted in 2006 to be the Vice-Governor of Jiangsu Province, 
and in 2007 re-appointed as the Municipal Party Secretary of Kunming city 
(the capital city of Yunnan province) and in 2011, was promoted as the Vice-
Provincial Party Secretary of Yunnan province. 
 
5.3.6 Summary 
Section 5.3 looked at how the regional uneven development between the 
north and south in Jiangsu was evolving in a more complicated manner at the 
second stage of the economic reform. It first looked at the institutional and 
sociospatial transition of local industrialisation in the south. Generally 
speaking, while local TVEs were still playing essential roles in promoting local 
growth, their leading roles were at this stage replaced by the rise of the cities 
and development zones, which institutionally and sociospatially rescaled rural 
industrialisation from the low scales of village and town up to county scales 
and above. These rescaling practices, whilst contributing to the concentration 
and subsequent privatisation of local TVEs, exerted more important influence 
on the local growth patterns of both the south and the north. In other words, 
as the major force and agendas of regional/local growth rested on 
development zones, development zone-driven industrialisation quickly led to 
the agglomeration of various resources in terms of capital, technology, labour, 
and others. Such agglomeration in turn gave rise to the possibility and 
consciousness of promoting urbanisation in these areas, since local 
urbanisation is not only a necessary complement to the industrial 
agglomeration in newly established development zones, but also an essential 
tool for local governments to realise their performance records and in many 
cases their particular interests.  
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And, the prominence of the development zone-driven growth that 
occurred in the south was, on the one hand, premised upon its industrial base 
previously accumulated through local TVE, and, on the other hand, supported 
and justified by the utilitarian propensity of ‘letting certain regions get rich first’. 
This is particularly reflected by the spatially asymmetric establishment of 
national high-tech development zones in Jiangsu province. The north suffered 
because of the lack of such zones in its territory.  
Another key aspect of regional unevenness lies in the substantial 
difference in the economic competitiveness of the places at the county scale 
between the north and the south. The three cities in the south were all 
attached to extremely strong county-level units, whose economic strength was 
not only equal or even better than their own municipalities, but also stronger 
than that of some provinces in China. These strong county-level units in the 
south derived their economic performance partly from the industrial legacy of 
TVEs, and partly from their relatively successful transition in the 
implementation of the ‘three concentration strategy’. The presence of these 
strong county-level units resulted, in the 1990s, in a series of rescaling 
practices which made these counties become county-level cities that were 
more autonomous in terms of institutional capacity, and finance and personnel 
power. Whilst this rescaling practice was also witnessed in the north, in some 
aspects it became an institutional burden, the presence of which delineated 
both the apparent and latent incompatibility between the artificially founded 
scale and institutions, and the actual spatial expressions of the socioeconomic 
relations and processes at the county scale in the north. 
More importantly, as both the north and the south at this stage adopted 
a set of homogenous growth patterns and local state institutions, which were 
largely oriented to seeking inward investments with the purpose of coupling 
local assets with external strategic resources to promote local growth, it 
inevitably led to intense inter-regional competition. In other words, the two 
parameters, namely, scale and network, were in practice playing critical roles 
in shaping and affecting regional unevenness in Jiangsu province. Section 
5.3.5 specifically looked at a variety of factors and issues that were underlying 
the phenomenon of inter-locality competition in Jiangsu. And, it was not 
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surprisingly that the south took great advantages in such competitions thanks 
to its economic strength and institutional thickness at various local scales. In a 
word, the south of Jiangsu during the second stage delivered prominent 
economic performance at the county and municipal scales, and in 
development zones, which resulted in further regional unevenness. The 
empirical analyses of the first and second stages of reform with respect to 
regional uneven development in the south of Jiangsu province constitutes the 
first part of the Case Study One. The next chapter will put forward the second 
part, which concentrates on urbanisation-driven growth in the south during the 
third stage of China’s economic reform. 
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Chapter Six: Case Study One: Changzhou city and its 
sub-areas in the south of Jiangsu province (Part Two: 
the third stage of reform) 
 
6.1 A general context of state-led urbanisation-driven growth in the 
south of Jiangsu 
As we have seen, the main theme of the second stage of China’s economic 
reform is characterised by industrialisation driven by development zones at 
local scales in the context of inter-urban competition. Although this theme 
continued to play an essential role in regional (uneven) development, its 
dominance was fading, and replaced by a new major theme after the State 
Council published on August 31st, 2003 the so-called policy paper No. 18114, 
which for the first time explicitly confirmed that the real estate property 
industry had become a pillar industry of the national economy. On the day 
after this policy paper was issued, the Woking conference on the national real 
estate market was held in Beijing, and a number of high-ranking officials 
elaborated this policy paper. As Xie Jiajin, the director-general of the sub-
ministry department of real estate suggested, ‘the core spirit of this policy 
paper lies in activating China’s real estate market’. Wang Guangdao, the 
Minister of the Ministry of Construction stressed that ‘this policy paper 
amounts to a programmatic document that guides for now and a future period 
the development of the domestic real estate market’115. The speech by the 
Vice-Premier Zen Peiyan was particularly noteworthy as it showed a 
discrepancy with the evolving reality, and was at odds with the expectations 
and control of the original intention and design of this policy paper. The first 
issue refers to Zen’s observation that since 1998 the national institutional 
reform of replacing the welfare housing system with the commercialised 
housing market, China’s real estate industry and its related sectors had 
secured rapid growth, but in some areas, real estate investments started to 
overheat under inadequate state supervision. It will be seen later that such """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
114 The No. 18 policy paper refers to ‘The notice by the State Council as to promoting China’s domestic 
market of real estate property in a optimal, sustainable fashion’. State Issued (2003) No. 18. 
115 The officials’ speeches and statements are quoted from an internal minutes of this conference. 
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incidents by no means qualify as overheated when viewed against the 
structurally overheated real estate industry across the whole country 
throughout the third stage of China’s economic reform. The second issue is 
concerned with Zen’s emphasis that the implementation of the policy paper 
No. 18 must be based on a demand-orientation with the aim of modifying the 
supply structure of the real estate industry. Zen then further clarified this by 
stating that the key aim of the real estate industry is to build and supply more 
residential properties at medium and low prices and restrict land supply for 
luxury and large real estate projects at high prices. This policy requirement 
turned out to be highly meaningless in practice as, first, the relatively low 
growth rate of residential incomes, and the pervasiveness of raised house 
prices meant that high proportion of migrant labourers and new graduates 
were unable to afford even the so-called properties of low/medium prices. 
And, local governments, which monopolised primary land supplies, adopted a 
set of institutional interpretations of the land supply restriction in their own 
interests with the purpose of enhancing land transferring fees by reducing the 
supply of residential and commercial land. Notwithstanding these 
discrepancies between policy intentions and realistic practices, this policy 
paper did politically and institutionally stimulate the domestic real estate 
industry, and thus symbolically opened up the third stage of the economic 
reform, which is characterised by state-led, urbanisation-driven growth across 
the temporal horizon of the pragmatic, dominant institutional time116. 
 As noted, during the first two stages of China’s reform, urbanisation 
had not yet become a pivotal growth agenda of local governments, but was 
more a derivative of industrialisation, which served to establish better 
infrastructures and environments in development zones for attracting inward 
investment.  Since the real estate industry was explicitly recognised as a pillar 
industry of the national economy, urbanisation had rapidly turned out to be of 
a key significance to local governments and to regional (uneven) 
development.  
The rise of the state-led, urbanisation-driven local growth pattern had 
arguably broken the nexus between industrialisation and urbanisation since """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
116 The notion of the dominant institutional time in China is articulated in Chapter 4. 
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local governments realised that urbanisation alone could be not only a better 
endogenous engine, through which local GDP could be achieved more stably 
and efficiently within the temporal horizon of the dominant institutional time, 
but also an effective way to strengthen autonomous local institutional 
authorities and financial capacities. In other words, urbanisation was no 
longer a spatial ancillary or derivative produced by the expansion and 
concentration of industrialisation. Its process at this stage was underpinned by 
a set of institutional innovations in terms of new forms of local control, 
planning and use of land, and new institutional selectivities. In more specific 
terms, the broken nexus was economically manifested as an increasingly 
over-supplied and over-heated real estate market, the demands of which were 
shaped by investment needs rather than the needs of residents, and also 
institutionally expressed as pseudo-urbanisation that overly focused on urban 
physical modernisation, rather than on the generalisation of urban public 
goods and services.  
In addition, as the endogenous growth of urbanisation has become a 
common agenda of local development, it will hence be seen that network is no 
longer of key importance to local governance and growth. Instead, territory 
and scale, which are of key requisites to local urbanisation, exhibited 
prominence in the processes of state-led urbanisation throughout the third 
stage of reform.  
It is argued that the local growth pattern driven by urbanisation was 
premised upon a distorted urban land use structure and constrained land 
supplies under a state monopoly on extensive land expropriation. Its distortion 
can be practically illustrated by two dimensions.  
 
6.2 The first dimension of the distorted urban land use structure 
6.2.1 Local growth leveraged by monopolistic land supply  
First, it is argued that, notwithstanding the broken nexus between 
industrialisation and urbanisation, the local growth pattern driven by 
industrialisation was still of critical path-dependency to local development 
during the third stage of the reform. As Tao (2011) asserted, the land use 
structure of China exhibited an extreme imbalance between urban industrial 
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land and urban residential/commercial land. This imbalance refers to both the 
differences in the respective land transferring fees and land supplies of those 
two general categories of urban land. It is estimated that the national urban 
industrial land had covered 7900 sq. km. by 2004, and this reached 9853 sq. 
km. by 2008, which constituted 25% of the gross national urban constructive 
land117 (Tao, 2011; Dai, 2006). As Qi (2014) pointed out, Jiangsu province 
possessed a higher figure than the national one, reaching almost 30%, which 
is much higher than the global average convention of 10-15%. The following 
tables showed the composition of China’s urban constructive land between 
2004 and 2009 (The statistical yearbooks of Chinese urban and country 
construction, 2004-2009), and a comparison between Changzhou city in the 
south and Nantong city in the north with respect to their urban land use 
compositions in 2006 (Qi, 2014). 
 
Table 6.1 the composition of China’s urban constructive land between 
2004 and 2009 
Ratio/Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Urban 
constructive 
land 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Residential 
land  
31.6% 31.4% 30.8% 30.9% 30.8% 31.1% 
Public facility 
land  
12.3% 12.5% 13.3% 13.0% 12.7% 12.5% 
Industrial land  25.7% 25.4% 25.2% 25.3% 25.2% 25.4% 
External 
Transportation 
land  
5.6% 4.9% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.3% 
Road and 
square land  
9.7% 10.1% 10.6% 10.8% 11.0% 11.3% 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
117 The notion of urban constructive land under the Chinese laws indicates to the generic terms of urban 
residential land, public facility use land, industrial use land, storage use land, external transportation 
use land, road and square use land, municipal facility use land, green land, and special use land.  
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Municipal 
facility land  
3.4% 3.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.4% 
Green land  9.3% 9.8% 9.9% 10.0% 10.3% 10.0% 
Special land  2.5% 2.3% 2.2% 2.1% 2.2% 2.0% 
 
Table 6.2 A comparison between Changzhou city in the south and 
Nantong city in the north with respect to their urban land use 
compositions in 2006 
 Changzhou city Nantong city 
Residential land 22.94% 12.05% 
Public facility land 9.91% 11.54% 
Industrial land 26.06% 61.30% 
Storage land use 3.08% 4.20% 
External Transportation 
land 
9.95% 2.37% 
Road and square land  13.04% 6.90% 
Municipal facility land  3.74% 0.11% 
Green land 10.72% 1.53% 
Special land  0.57% 0.00% 
 
As seen in this table, the proportion of industrial land use of 
Changzhou was a slightly higher than the national average rate, whereas that 
of Nantong was almost 2.5 times larger than the national average rate. 
Notwithstanding the substantial amount of urban industrial land in Nantong, 
the amount of its gross industrial investment in 2006   was 79.618 billion 
RMB, whereas the respect amounts of the three cities in the south were 
115.87 billion RMB (Suzhou city), 81.276 billion RMB (Wuxi city), and 56.290 
billion RMB (Changzhou city). And the gross industrial output of Changzhou in 
2006 was 422.271 billion RMB, whereas that of Nantong was 294.953 billion 
RMB (Data from the provincial and municipal bureaus of statistics). In a word, 
having regard to the fact the territory of Nantong is almost twice larger than 
that of Changzhou, the larger territory of Nantong’s urban industrial land had 
neither led to a larger amount of local industrial output, nor attracted 
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appreciably more industrial inward investment for Nantong. The reason here, 
according to Mr. S of the Wujin Planning Bureau, lies in the way that land 
expropriation was abused by many local development zones in the north of 
Jiangsu, which led to the inefficient use of land. Mr. S further argued that 
thanks to the high appreciation potential of urban constructive land, the 
phenomenon of abusively expropriating land and leaving it unused had been 
common since the end of 1990s.  
As a bulletin of the Ministry of Land and Resources (2005) said, by the 
end of 2004, 72000 hectares of land in China were unused, 54800 hectares of 
land were idle, and 135600 hectares of land had been nominally approved but 
not supplied. All of these amounted to 7.8% of the gross urban constructive 
land. As Shu Kexin (2006), the head director of the Sub-Ministry of Land Use, 
stated, the uneconomic, extensive development of development zones vividly 
exemplified the problem of land abuse in China, as the large territory and 
substantial infrastructure of most development zones did not match their local 
capacities to attract and use inward investment. In other words, Shu sees 
such land abuse as a contradiction between the over expropriation and use of 
land on the one hand, and low and lagged regional and local development on 
the other.  
Indeed, central government has issued a series of policy papers to 
address the distorted structure of urban land use at regional/local scales. For 
example, in April 2006, the Ministry of Land and Resources issued the ‘Notice 
of the national land use plan in 2006’, reiterating the fundamental national 
policy of ‘rationally using land and cogently protecting rural land’118. The next 
month, another ‘Urgent notice as to further advancing the present strict land 
management’ was issued by the Ministry of Land and Resources, which 
rigorously specified a series of prohibitive measures against, inter alia, illegal 
expropriation of rural land, exceeded use of local land quota, prior land supply 
to luxurious real estate projects and illegal use of land in development 
zones119. And in December 2006 the Ministry of Land and Resources and the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
118 Ministry of Land and Resources (2006), ‘Notice of the national land use plan in 2006’, MLR Issued, 
No. 53 
119 Ministry of Land and Resources (2006), ‘Urgent notice as to further advancing the present strict 
land management’, MLR Issued, No. 17 
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National Development and Reform Commission issued the bundle of the 
‘Index of Restrictive Projects of Land Use’ and the ‘Index of Prohibited 
Projects of Land Use’, which specified that certain categories of real estate 
projects such as golf course, villa residence, and local recreation centres 
should be prohibited from being built120. And in September 2006, the State 
Council issued the ‘Notice as to strengthening land use control and 
regulation’, addressing the problems of the over-expansion of low cost 
industrial land and the illegal abuse/occupation of rural land, through, inter 
alia, the head official accountability system, the fiscal mechanism of putting 
land transferring fees (which were previously extra-budgetary revenues) 
within the local state budget scheme, and establishing the system of 
publishing the standard lowest conditions for industrial land transfer121. In a 
word, the territory of different kinds of local urban land has become essential 
sources of conflicts and forces in relation to urbanisation-driven local 
development.  
These central policies, though having more or less worked in mitigating 
those abusive expropriations of land at local scales, were implemented, from 
the perspective of Rhodes’s (1990) policy network approach, through a variety 
of interest mediations of integrated policy communities, which were, arguably, 
institutionally woven by the preferential structural selectivities of the 
urbanisation-driven local growth pattern and local governments at various 
scales122. In more specific terms, such local structural selectivities could, 
arguably, be primarily reflected by the interest orientations of local 
governments under the local land use structure. Indeed, the above imbalance 
between the high proportion of urban industrial land in urban territory and the 
relative low one of urban residential and commercial land was a highly 
manipulated outcome that was produced and sustained by local governments 
so as to maximise the land transferring fees of urban residential/commercial """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
120 Ministry of Land and Resources (2006), ‘Index of Restrictive Projects of Land Use’ and ‘Index of 
Prohibited Projects of Land Use’, MLR Issued, No. 296 
121 State Council (2006) ‘Notice as to strengthening land use control and regulation’, State Issued, No. 
31 
122 In saying local governments at various scales, it will be later seen in the famous case of ‘Iron 
Event’, in which the provincial government of Jiangsu, the municipal government of Changzhou city, 
and the district government of Xinbei possessed a set of interrelated interests, which led them to 
collude in this case. Because of the ‘Iron Event’, all the local governments that were involved received 
explicit criticism and punishment from the State Council. 
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land through depressive and controlled supplies of such land. For example, 
Tao (2011) quotes the official data, indicating that in 2006 the national 
average price of urban land was about 1544 RMB per sq.m., and, those of 
urban commercial land, residential land, and industrial land were respectively 
2480 RMB per sq. m., 1681 RMB per sq. m., and 485 RMB per sq. m.. Rapid 
urbanisation entailed a sharp increase in the national average prices of urban 
commercial land and residential land, which were raised to 5185 RMB per sq. 
m. and 4245 RMB per sq. m. respectively in 2010, whereas the average price 
of urban industrial land only suffered a slight increase, being 629 RMB per sq. 
m. in the same year.  
Regarding the situation in Jiangsu province, Gan (2006) points out that, 
while the average prices of residential and commercial land of Jiangsu in 
2005 were both higher than the national averages, the average price of 
industrial land in Jiangsu was notably below the national average. During 
2000 to 2005, the growth rates of the prices of commercial and residential 
land were respectively around 5%-10% and 5%-12% in Jiangsu, whereas that 
of industrial land was about 1%-2%. This low growth rate, according to Gan 
(2006), is at odds with the prominent economic and industrial development of 
Jiangsu province.  
From a prima facie view, this discrepancy in the prices of different 
types of land revealed the broken nexus between industrialisation and 
urbanisation during this stage of the reform, because the former process was 
highly subject to inter-urban competition, whereas the latter process largely 
became an endogenous growth engine which could homogenously be 
adopted by different regions for effectively promoting local growth. And, if 
taking a more profound view, it is argued that local governments were using 
their institutional monopoly on the primary market of land supply to selectively 
control the quantity and location of urban commercial and residential land that 
is available for transfer in order to pursue, in a standard utilitarian fashion, the 
greatest net balance of local state revenue and record of local performance, 
through maximising transferring fees of commercial and residential land. In 
addition, apart from acquiring substantial amounts of local state revenues, 
premises and projects that developed upon commercial and residential land 
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could, more often than not, generate more locally collected revenues, and 
result in a more efficient output of regional/local GDP within the temporal 
horizon of the dominant institutional time than development zone-based 
industrial projects, which on most occasions involved relatively longer 
construction and turn-over terms for contributing to local GDP.  
As many local officials mentioned in the interviews, and in the 
investment invitation campaigns in which I was involved, one of the most 
essential reasons that the projects of Wanda Plaza (the major businesses of 
Wanda Group, whose Chairman, Wan Jianlin was ranked in 2013 as the 
richest man in China) are extremely popular, and welcomed by, all local 
governments lies in the guarantee made by Wanda Group that a project of 
Wanda Plaza will be completed in any city within less than 18 months. As 
most commercial complexes in China need more than two years for their 
construction and preparation before starting business, Wanda Plaza’s 
outstandingly short term of completion ensures that its projects can more 
often than not be finished within the office-term of state officials.  
The pervasive utilitarian practices of pursuing the greatest net balance 
of local land transfer fees through monopolistic, regulated supplies of urban 
land, revealed the increasing importance of the so-called land economy to 
local governments during the third stage of the economic reform. Tang (2010) 
has cited Zou Xiaoyun’s123 comment, observing that, since the land transfer 
fees were exclusive of central governmental collection, and became the chief 
local revenue source for local growth, such fees had, on average, constituted 
around half of the gross local state revenues in most localities, and in some 
cities in less developed regions, local land revenues can be about 80% of 
their gross local revenues. As Zhen and Li (2013) pointed out, whilst the 
national land transfer fee revenues increased about 20 times from 52.714 
billion RMB in 1999 to 1025.980 billion RMB in 2008, the gross quantity of the 
transferred land during the same period only increased about 20% from 
99017 pieces to 123358 pieces. But, the increase of 24341 pieces of 
transferred urban land during the period of this decade covered 22448.59 """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
123  Zou Xiaoyun is the Vice-Chief Engineer of the College of Geo-Information Science and 
Engineering of China. "
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hectares, indicative of around a 50% increase in the volume of the transferred 
land. This suggests that the increased pieces of transferred land during the 
decade from 1999 to 2008 tend to have a larger coverage and generate more 
revenues for local governments.  
This tendency, from a general perspective, reflects, on the one hand, a 
sharp increase in the local governments’ land-related revenues, and, 
arguably, on the other hand, the emergence of strong local institutional 
selectivities towards certain highly profitable sectors, powerful actors and 
interest groups, which not only shaped their tactics and actions in accordance 
with local institutional selectivities, but also exerted privileges or even 
monopolies on acquiring and developing urban residential and commercial 
land.  
As Sun (2006) and Chen (2012) stated, the real estate interest group 
has now been widely recognised as one of the most matured interest groups 
in China, against which the general public has expressed most hostility and 
discontent. It is estimated that local land transfer fees plus various local taxes 
on the construction and sale of real estate properties amount to between 
50%-80% of the final price of a property on the real estate market (Chen, 
2012). As such high local state revenues may both politically and 
economically justify the control of land supply as a rational choice under the 
growth-oriented state ideology, it is by no means hard to understand that local 
institutional selectivities were strategically shaped to be of preference to the 
real estate industry. Tu (2008: 185, 186) exemplifies some more latent, 
delicate local state manipulations in local land supply transactions. As he 
points out, a local government in Jiangsu province invited some real estate 
enterprises to be sham bidders to take part in the bidding of local land with the 
aim of deliberatively driving up the land prices; and if such a piece of land is 
eventually obtained by any of these sham bidders, then local government 
could simply take the land back by claiming administrative flaws in the bidding 
process. While local institutional selectivities towards the real estate industry 
can explain why less urban land supply generates much larger land transfer 
fees during the third stage of the economic reform, a further explanatory point 
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is the increasing semi-oligopolistic phenomenon in the real estate market in 
China.  
For example, notwithstanding the existence of a massive number of 
real estate enterprises in China, the gross sales of the Top 100 real estate 
enterprises amounted to 26.9% of the gross sale of all real estate enterprises 
in 2010, and indeed, the Top 10 enterprises accounted for 12% of the gross 
sales in 2010 (Evaluation report of top 500 real estate enterprises of China, 
2011). And, in 2011, whilst the sold floor areas of the Top 500 real estate 
enterprises only amount to about 20% of the nationally sold floor areas, the 
sales income of the Top 500 enterprises amounted to 38.5% of all the gross 
sales income (Evaluation report of top 500 real estate enterprises of China, 
2012). It is also noted that most of the top 100 real estate enterprises make 
their major business residential property development rather than commercial 
property development. More notably, regarding state-owned enterprises, 
which possess industrial and institutional monopolies after SOE’s strategic 
restructuring, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) reported that among the 113 central SOEs, 21 SOEs 
have their major businesses as real estate development. Yet, there are also 
78 SOEs who have extensively conducted real estate businesses, even 
though this is not their majors. Although the SASAC had in March 2010 
issued an administrative order requiring those 78 SOEs to withdraw from the 
real estate market, very few had done so by the end of 2013. The ignoring of 
the SASAC’s order was caused by the extremely high profitability of the real 
estate industry which has been institutionally, politically, and also 
economically embedded, in utilitarian and pragmatic fashions, into the widely 
implemented state-led, urbanisation-driven local growth pattern. Zhou 
Fangsheng, the former Vice-Director of Enterprise Reform Bureau of the 
SASAC, suggested that SOEs’ collective involvement in conducting real 
estate businesses was motivated by both the pursuit of high profits and the 
state evaluation system on the performance of SOEs. Whilst the average 
profit rates of most SOEs’ major businesses usually do not exceed 10%, that 
of real estate businesses can more often than not be higher than 30-40%. 
This high profitability drives large SOEs such as China Railway Group, 
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Sinopect, China Oil & Foodstuffs Corporation, and National Petroleum 
Corporation to get involved in the real estate market. In a word, the semi-
oligopolistic tendency and the involvement of most central SOEs in the real 
estate market have intensified the privileged direction of local institutional 
selectivity towards the real estate industry, and had in turn strengthened the 
state-led, urbanisation-driven local growth pattern. 
Regarding the more concrete situation of the real estate industry in 
Changzhou city and in Jiangsu province, a rapid acceleration of the real 
estate investment growth occurred in Jiangsu province in 2002, and this has 
largely persisted. Before 2002, the annual investment growth rates of the real 
estate industry in Jiangsu between 1997 and 2001 were 3.8%, 21.5%, 10.1%, 
8.5%, and 14.8%. But this rate suddenly reached 31.5% in 2002 (JSSB, 
2003). Whilst the gross real estate investment in Jiangsu was only 54.47 
billion RMB and ranked No. 5 in 2002, it has reached 555.27 billion RMB a 
decade later in 2011, becoming No.1 in China (JSSB, 2012). Among this 
substantial amount of the real estate investment in Jiangsu, 408.59 billion 
RMB were invested in residential property development, constituting 73.6% of 
the gross investment. From an intra-provincial perspective, Xiong (2005) 
points out that the rapid growth of the real estate market in Jiangsu also 
exhibited regional unevenness, since more than 60% of the real estate 
enterprises were all in the south, whose annual sale contributed to more than 
75% of the gross provincial sale by 2005.  
Notwithstanding this unevenness in the real estate investments and 
enterprises, Ms. J of the provincial broadcasting of Jiangsu supplied me with 
some official ranks of the average house prices of each municipalities in 
Jiangsu, stating in her interview that such unevenness did not decisively affect 
average house prices. As Ms. J pointed out, the average house prices of 
Yangzhou city and Nantong city, both of which are in the north, in 2012 were 
ranked No. 3 and No.5, whereas that of Changzhou city was No. 6. And, in 
2013, the housing price of Nantong reached No. 3, whereas that of 
Changzhou city was again No. 6. As Ms. J observed, the high house prices in 
northern cities such as Yangzhou and Nantong, in which local residents made 
less GDP per capita, and received lower annual income than those of the 
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south, arguably reflected the existence of severe real estate bubbles in terms 
of over-heated investments and speculation activities in those cities. Ms. J 
further argued that although the rapid rise of house prices in the north 
revealed that the lagged development of the real estate industry in the north 
begun to accelerate and catch up with the south in recent years, it was, 
however, also indicative of the regional unevenness in terms of the weaker 
foundation of development zones in the north, which turned out to be a 
negative path-dependency during this present stage.  
The line of reasoning of Ms. J’s argument mainly lies in the fact that, 
due to the previous inefficient operation of development zones in the north, 
these zones had therefore failed to deliver sufficient urbanisation, which could 
have been generated by a concentration of resources in development zones. 
Unlike the south where most sociospatial sites at county scales had 
completed rudimentary, derivative urbanisation through expansions of 
development zones during the second stage of the reform, most city-regions 
in the north had to face the very costly and troublesome problem of land 
expropriation, house demolition, and state compensation at county-level 
scales and in development zones, the operations of which had not only 
generated high economic costs and social conflicts, but also given rise to 
rather large demands of residential properties advocated by local residents 
whose houses and land were expropriated and demolished. And such 
economic costs and social conflicts, as well as local demand all contributed to 
the dramatic rise of local housing prices in the north during the third stage of 
the reform.  
 
6.2.2 Local growth shaped by rescaling practice 
Arguably, Ms. J’s view can be institutionally reflected by a comparison 
between two similar rescaling practices which occurred in Changzhou city and 
Nantong city during the third stage of economic reform. In more specific 
terms, although the State Council had since 1997 rescinded any practices of 
rescaling counties into county-level cities, the rise of urbanisation-driven 
growth motivated many local governments to initialise and implement a 
different type of rescaling practice, which served to institutionally extend 
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municipal control over the land of a larger territory, and to nominally enhance 
the rate of urbanisation of municipalities. This practice refers to that of 
rescaling a county into a district of a municipal-level city. The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs issued in 2003 a draft policy of ‘The conditions for establishing 
municipal districts’ which specified a set of prerequisites to such practices, 
including, for example, having achieved a local GDP and financial state 
revenues that are no less than the average levels of those districts of the 
municipality in the previous year. But, this draft policy had not been issued as 
a formal policy, thus reducing the institutional barriers for such rescaling 
practices. Between 1998 and 2004, 62 county-level units were rescaled into 
municipal districts. Regarding the two comparative examples at issue, in 
2002, Wujin county-level city in the south was institutionally rescaled into a 
district of Changzhou, whereas in 2009, Tongzhou county-level city was 
rescaled into a district of Nantong.  
There are arguably a variety of motivations that drove municipalities to 
pursue county-district rescaling practices. These include, most importantly, 
exercising and extending their institutional capacity in relation to land use, 
local budget control, and bureaucratic personnel control onto county-level 
units. As Mr. S observed, there were two crucial considerations underlying the 
municipal government’s decision to rescale Wujin county-level city in 2002. 
The first related to the municipal strategy of more effectively coordinating 
urban land use and supply within the territory of Changzhou in order to resist 
any attempted provincial control over county-level units. The second one was 
based on the aim of concentrating all urban resources to pursue better GDP-
oriented local performance within a shorter timescale, that is, less than the 
temporal horizon of the dominant institutional time. Notwithstanding these 
municipal strategic considerations and calculations, it was noted that Mr. S 
and several other local state officials and businessmen in Wujin district all 
expressed a common negative attitude towards the rescaling practice. This 
attitude had indeed been common among most county-level cities in the 
south124. Certain local state officials in Wujin district pointed out that after 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
124 For example, Jiayin county-level city has resisted the plan of rescaling it into the district of Wuxi 
city for many years, having regard to the unsuccessful precedent of Xishan county-level city, whose 
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being rescaled, Wujin, as a municipal district, no longer qualified for 
participating in the annual rank of Top 100 county-level units, which then 
undermined Wujin’s image in inward investment campaigns. And, Wujin’s 
previous autonomous institutional capacities and economic development also 
became increasingly subject to municipal interventions. It is particularly 
noteworthy that an anonymous local official of Wujin district mentioned an 
unorthodox system that was core to the compromise made by Wujin in the 
rescaling practice, that is, a temporary independent local financial capacity. 
This independent financial capacity ensured that Wujin district could to some 
extent maintain its autonomies in relation to local development matters, in 
particular, local urbanisation. There were many rumours as to the length of 
this temporary arrangement, ranging from 3 to 5 years. This uncertainty, as 
this local official suggested, has, since the rescaling practice, led to an 
accelerated process of local urbanisation in Wujin, particularly, in respect of 
the state-led local infrastructure construction projects, because local 
infrastructure construction involves and entails much space for local 
manoeuvre, and such manoeuvre will be lost if this temporary institutional 
arrangement is rescined125. 
Regarding the urbanisation process of Wujin, it was officially estimated 
that in 2002 Wujin’s urbanisation rate was 38%126, and in the same year, that 
of Changzhou was 55.8%. Urbanisation evolved in a consistent, quick pace in 
Changzhou city after the rescaling of Wujin district. In 2007, the urbanisation 
rate of Changzhou was 60.90 %, and in 2009, it was 61.16% (Wu, 2011). 
According to the ‘Report of the quality of China’s urbanisation’ (2013), 
Changzhou city was ranked No. 13 (and regarding the other two cities in the 
south, Suzhou city was No. 9, and Wuxi city was No. 14).  
It can be argued that the rapid growth of urbanisation in Changzhou 
reflects two points. On the one hand, urbanisation in Wujin evolved, together 
with the old municipal areas, in an efficient fashion after its rescaling practice. """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
economic competitiveness and administrative autonomies were critically undermined after the county-
district rescaling practice. 
125 I personally contacted the Financial Bureau of Wujin district, and this financial autonomy is still in 
effect at the end of 2013.  
126 In China, the official statistical method for urbanisation rate usually resorts to the ratio between the 
number of urban residents in a city and that city’s total population.  
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And, on the other hand, the official method of calculating urbanisation rate is 
in some ways imprecise in assessing a highly industrialised county-level unit 
such as Wujin. This methodological impreciseness mainly derives from the 
way of relying on the quantity of local urban residents to estimate urbanisation 
rates. Although this method can be applicable to most conventional county-
level units in China, of which the sociospatial composition is usually 
characterised with a large proportion of rural land, rural population, lagged 
urban and industrial constructions, it may underestimate places such as Wujin 
with respect to indicators of local infrastructure, per capita purchasing power, 
local GDP and industrial output. Put differently, it is argued that most towns in 
Wujin, thanks to their high levels of rural industrialisation accumulated during 
the first two stages of China’s economic reform, had, before the rescaling 
practice, already established fairly developed urbanised and semi-urbanised 
physical and socioeconomic conditions. The rescaling practice of Wujin had 
not generated any heavy burdens in terms of financial support and physical 
construction on the municipal government of Changzhou city in promoting 
urbanisation in Wujin. Instead, urbanisation has become an administrative 
measure for Wujin to maintain its own local financial autonomies. Similar 
cases could be seen in other highly developed regions with prominent local 
economies at county scales127.  
In contrast to the county-district rescaling practice in developed 
localities such as those in the south of Jiangsu, such practices in the north of 
Jiangsu did not function well, and usually led to no more than a nominal 
appearance of pseudo-urbanisation128, because the local sociospatial and 
industrial structures at county scales in those less developed regions had not 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
127 For example, regarding Guangdong province, whose the regional GDP is No. 1 in China, Shunde 
county-level city in Guangdong exhibited an outstanding local economic performance, which enabled 
it to compete with Jiayin county-level city in Jiangsu for the No.1 rank of China’s best county-level 
city for many years. In 2003, Shunde county-level city was rescaled into a municipal district of Foshan 
city. And, since then, Shunde had suffered a variety of economic deceleration and administrative 
inefficiency. Yet, on the other hand, the urbanisation process of Foshan city, after the rescaling 
practice, had accelerated towards the strategic aim of being the third largest municipality in Guangdong 
province. The declining competitiveness of Shunde district received a wide range of social attention, 
and in 2011, the provincial government of Guangdong issued an experimental policy, which rescaled 
Shunde from a standard municipal district into a provincially-regulated county-level unit with respect 
to its institutional and financial capacities.  
128 The conception of pseudo-urbanisation was touched in Chapter 4, and will be articulated in detail 
later in this chapter.  
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yet been fully integrated into municipal networks. Mr. J of the provincial office 
of Jiangsu had suggested that, as most of local governments at county scales 
serve to deal with rural and agricultural issues, county-district rescaling 
practices can end up distributing this function, because most municipal 
governments had at this stage made state-led, urbanisation-driven growth 
their prior task.  
Thus, regarding the practice of rescaling Tongzhou county-level city 
into a municipal district of Nantong city in 2009, it can be seen that the 
urbanisation rate of Nantong city in 2007 was 48% whereas in 2011 this rate 
sharply increased to 57.6%. This is the fastest growth rate among all cities in 
Jiangsu province. And, this rapid local urbanisation process was largely 
ascribed to rescaling Tongzhou into a district of Nantong city. Although this 
urbanisation model based on scalar and territorial measures in Nantong did 
endow local government with a much larger urban territory, such a utilitarian 
growth pattern, which pursued the greatest net balance of economic 
performance within China’s dominant institutional time, led to economic 
inefficiency and social conflicts.  
In more concrete terms, as Zhang (2011) pointed out, the urbanisation 
process of Tongzhou after the rescaling practice, was constrained not only by 
the existing low urbanised level of Tongzhou, but also by the intense 
inconsistency between the local development plan of Tongzhou and the new 
municipal development plan of Nantong city, which had not been completed 
after the rescaling practice. Zhang alludes to the problem that many rural 
residents in Tongzhou were reluctant to migrate into urban areas through 
transferring their rural land to the local government. Indeed, it is argued that 
the large proportion of rural land and population in Tongzhou district was the 
true reason that hindered local urbanisation.  
In an official project report of the district Party School of Tongzhou, 
Zhang and Zhang (2014) asserted that if estimating the urbanisation rate of 
Tongzhou district by looking at the number of local urban residents, its 
urbanisation rate was only 39% by the end of 2012. Whilst this low level of 
local urbanisation entailed the necessity of conducting a wide range of rural 
land expropriation and construction, a side effect could be identified. As the 
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high costs of undertaking extensive land expropriation and compensation 
were transferred into final house prices, many urban residents and rural 
residents, who lost their land in land expropriations, could hardly afford such 
high prices. Ms. J quoted the official data, suggesting that whilst the average 
house price of the properties in the peripheral urban areas in Nantong city had 
reached around 10000 RMB/sq. m. by the end of 2010, the average annual 
income of urban residents in Nantong was only 23541 RMB. This could be 
sharply contrasted with the situation in Changzhou. By the end of 2010, the 
average price for the properties in the urban area of Changzhou was 7506 
RMB/sq. m., whereas the average annual income of urban residents in 
Changzhou in the same year was 26269 RMB. In other words, residents in 
Changzhou city in the south possessed higher annual incomes, whilst 
enjoying less expensive housing costs. Morever, the average house price of 
Nantong quoted above was that of the properties in the peripheral urban 
areas. Properties in downtown areas were much more expensive.  
More severely, an anonymous local official released a piece of internal 
news that some town and village governments in Tongzhou district frequently 
conducted land expropriations through issuing IOU notes to rural residents. 
Indeed, Tongzhou has been a sensitive district, which generated numerous 
conflicts caused by state-led land expropriation and house demolition. In 
2013, Lu Honglai, the former party secretary of Pingdong town of Tongzhou 
district was convicted for the offences in relation to land expropriation, and 
recevied seven and half years imprisonment. But, notwithstanding all these 
troubles and difficulties in promoting local urbanisation, land expropriation has 
still been of paramount importance to the routine of the local governments of 
Nantong. This can be seen in the 2012 policy paper of the ‘Notice as to the 
evaluation mechanism on land/house expropriation and demolition in 
Nantong’ 129  issued by the Bureau of Housing Security and Property 
Management of Nantong. This notice specified a set of criteria for evaluating 
the performance of each district government in Nantong in conducting land 
and house expropriation.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
129 The Bureau of Housing Security and Property Management of Nantong, (2012), ‘Notice as to the 
evaluation mechanism on land/house expropriation and demolition in Nantong’. 
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The comparison between the two county-district rescaling cases 
revealed that, whilst both rescaling cases exhibited the institutional 
selectivities towards advancing and extending state-led local urbanisation, 
regions subject to the path-dependencies in terms of local industrialisation 
and its derivative urbanisation during the earlier stages of regional 
development tended to suffer administrative and economic inefficiencies, and 
social conflicts and costs. These inefficiencies and conflicts were expressed in 
the course of urbanisation in terms of inter alia sociospatial and institutional 
rescaling, state-led urban land planning, expropriations, supplies and 
constructions.  
Put differently, although both Changzhou and Nantong city had initiated 
their county-district rescaling practices with the same strategic objective of 
institutionally controlling and acquiring more urban land to extend urbanisation 
at a larger scale to secure better economic growth and political records under 
the growth-oriented state ideology, their respective rescaling practices 
developed quite unevenly because their counties accumulated during the 
previous stages of the reform different levels of local industrial foundations, 
business communities, and urban constructions.  
Wujin’s existing prominent industrialisation and urbanisation could 
provide a variety of agglomerations of resources with the municipal 
government to advance and realise the strategy of extending municipal 
urbanisation in a relatively economically efficient and socially harmonious 
fashion. In this sense, it is argued that these various agglomerations of 
resources brought about by development-zone driven local growth also 
delivered certain path-shaping effects to Wujin’s subsequent urbanisation 
during the third stage. Tongzhou district, on the contrary, though being 
rescaled 7 years later than Wujin, could only serve to supply a great deal of 
land to its municipality. And, the expropriation and development of the newly 
increased territory immediately led to numerous financial burdens and social 
conflicts, which the local governments had to tackle.  
The comparison of the two local rescaling practices may in some 
respects be reminiscent of the differences between the practices of rescaling 
counties into county-level cities in the south and the north of Jiangsu during 
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the 1990s. Yet, it must be pointed out that whilst these two types of rescaling 
practices at two different stages of China’s economic reform and the concrete 
outcomes of these rescaling practices were all shaped by, and subject to, the 
utilitarian propensity of the growth-oriented state ideology, county-district 
rescaling practices at this stage were less directly affected by utilitarian 
institutions at the national scale. This is because state-led, urbanisation-driven 
local growth was mainly leveraged by the endogenous resource of local land, 
which was under the monopolistic control of each local government. And, this 
growth pattern did not, as development zone-driven growth did, involve many 
intense inter-urban competition and strategic couplings of local assets with 
global networks and processes.  
Moreover, it must be noted that the state-led, urbanisation-driven local 
growth pattern itself had functioned to institutionally express utilitarianism at 
local scales. As the following section articulates, this practice was counter to 
the political assertion of central government with respect to the difference 
between what urbanisation ought to be, and what it had been in reality during 
the third stage of China’s economic reform.  
 
6.3 The second dimension: pseudo-urbanisation130  
As noted, local governments in advancing urbanisation-driven local growth 
tended to adopt and conduct distorted and monopolistically controlled land 
supply and rescaling practices in order to maximise urban territories and 
residential/commercial land value. Both processes are of key importance to 
the actual performance of this local growth pattern, subject to the path-
dependencies accumulated during the earlier stages of the economic reform. 
But, these institutional selectivities in terms of distorted urban land uses and 
supplies towards residential and commercial property development have not 
fully explained how utilitarianism was intensively practised locally or touched 
on how these institutional selectivities interacted with key actors and their 
reflexive tactics in the course of urbanisation. These issues will be reviewed in 
the following sections.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
130 A brief discussion of China’s pseudo-urbanisation can be seen in Chapter 4.  
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As we noted earlier, the policy paper No. 18 in the 2003 explicitly stated that 
the real estate industry has become a pillar industry of the national economy. 
And, it was also clearly indicated that the real estate industry should be 
promoted towards a demand-orientation proportional to the purchasing 
capabilities of the general public. This demand-orientation of the real estate 
market could arguably be seen as a rational, strategic discretion, which 
corresponded to the migration of numerous rural surplus labourers entailed by 
rural industrialisation and the extension of development zones.  
The reality of the third stage of China’s economic reform, however, 
evolved along a different path, and as a result, Li Keqiang, the new Premier of 
China, has to re-emphasize, 10 years after the issue of the No. 18 policy 
paper, that urbanisation in China should proceed in a people-oriented fashion 
with the aim of solving three key problems: namely, ‘promoting the settling 
down of the 0.1 billion rural migrants in urban areas, renewing and reforming 
the shanty towns and villages-in-city, in which 0.1 billion urban residents are 
living, and helping direct 0.1 billion residents to be locally urbanised in the 
mid-western regions of China’131. Premier Li’s reiteration, whilst sketching out 
what China’s urbanisation ought to be, criticised the discrepancy between an 
ideal urbanisation and what had actually occurred during the last decade.  
 It is argued that this discrepancy can be reflected by two key conflicts, 
which are pervasive in China’s urbanisation-driven growth at various local 
scales. These two conflicts refer, first, to central-local conflicts in promoting or 
suppressing the real estate industry and its markets at different scales132, and 
second, to the urban-based socioeconomic conflicts between interest groups 
that institutionally benefited most from urbanisation, and a majority of migrant 
urban residents whose capabilities to choose, and socioeconomic interests 
and welfares, were substantially constrained and deprived. These two critical 
conflicts interactively and decisively shaped how urbanisation-driven regional 
(uneven) development evolved during the third stage of the reform, and """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
131 Premier Li’s speech is quoted from his ‘Government Work Report’ presented in the 12th National 
People’s Congress on March 5th, 2014.  
132 It has been noted that the regulation policies by the central government towards the real estate 
markets were usually diversified according to the scale of the city. For example, capital or quasi-capital 
cities like Beijing and Shanghai received real estate policies that were different from those standard 
municipalities such as Changzhou and Nantong city.  
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concretely expressed the actual forms and contents of China’s pseudo-
urbanisation. 
 
6.3.1 The conflict of central-local relations in relation to urbanisation 
Regarding the first conflict, its expressions were often confined, in a nuanced 
fashion, to various policy regulations and manipulations in relation to 
administrative, fiscal, and economic matters. In other words, while central 
government has made its mind to allow and use the land economy-oriented 
urbanisation process to be the major growth engine for promoting regional 
and local development, the practical realisation of these policy measures can 
usually be subject to local governments’ interpretations and implementations. 
Premier Li has already asserted on a variety of occasions that the realisation 
of central policies at local scales was a long existing problem, which was hard 
to tackle, but must be addressed133. Although this is hardly indicative of any 
administrative efficacy between the central-local administrative operations, 
there is, arguably, an institutional reason underlying Li’s assertion. This refers 
to the fact that local governments are responsible for a large amount of 
welfare, infrastructure and development activities based on a rather small 
proportion of taxes and revenues. It is this contrast between local autonomy 
over economic growth and a lack of local fiscal autonomy that fuelled high 
volumes of local re-interpretations of central intentions and policies, and 
entailed the heavy reliance of local governments on urbanisation-driven 
growth.  
In more concrete terms, the central government’s position in this 
central-local conflict was indeed shaped by China’s growth-oriented state 
ideology, which, on the one hand, had at the third stage been primarily 
sustained and realised by urbanisation-driven growth, and on the other hand 
was institutionally expressed as the bureaucratic evaluation mechanism that 
mainly targets and assesses local GDP-based performance achieved within 
the dominant institutional time. In other words, central government formulated 
policies on urbanisation, in particular, the real estate industry and market. 
Such central policies can thus been seen as sub-measures, which may often """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
133 See, for example, Li’s speech in the conference of provincial economies on June 6th, 2014, and Li’s 
speech in the standing meeting of the State Council on May 30th, 2014. 
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be subject to local institutions and strategies, which could better embody the 
growth-oriented ideology, even though such local institutions and strategies 
could conflict in some technical aspects with the original intention of central 
government.  
In a word, central-local relations at this stage of reform were embodied 
as the conflict between the keen motive of local governments to use 
urbanisation to drive local growth and record of performance on the one hand, 
and the attempt by central government to relieve the over-heated real estate 
market and the social discontent resulted from inter alia, high house prices, 
unfair wealth distribution, as well as land expropriation.  
In practice, a large proportion of central policies on the real estate 
industry and markets were issued through bank-led financial measures, which 
aimed to inter alia raise the financial institutions’ benchmark deposit and 
lending rates, raise the requisite sum of down payment for buying real 
properties and acquiring land, and extend the tax categories in relation to real 
estate transaction. Apart from the above measures, land use quota 
restrictions, local land transferring procedures, and mandate requirements on 
building government subsidised houses for low-income residents can impose 
more direct effects on local governments.  
However, these remedial policies were, on the one hand, undermined 
by the massive scale and quantity of investment-driven local economies that 
were motivated by high profitability, supported by excess liquidity, led by local 
governments and the real estate industry134, and, on the other hand, partly 
repudiated, and then replaced with more stimulating policies towards the real 
estate industry under the impacts of the financial crisis, which severely 
affected China’s export-oriented manufacturing industries. As Tao (2011) 
pointed out, notwithstanding central government’s policy regulations, the 
annual growth rate of house prices in China had been sustained at over 10% 
since 2004, and the attempt at cooling down such growth were relinquished 
following the State Council’s publication of its ‘Four Trillion Stimulus Plan’ on 
Nov. 5th, 2008, which further exacerbated the overheated domestic real estate 
markets and urban infrastructure construction projects.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
134 According to the estimation by the national bureau of statistics of China, since 2007, investments 
have contributed more than 50% to the national GDP of China. 
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An effort was recently made by central government to recalibrate the 
central-local conflict via the ‘Notice as to modifying/improving the evaluation 
on the record of performance of local party/state head officials’ issued by the 
CPC’s Organisation Department on Dec. 10th, 2013. This policy explicitly 
specified that the evaluation of local head officials should focus more on the 
conditions of state loans within office terms, preventing local governments 
from conducting any irrational and inefficient investments, which are aimed at 
pursuing short-term records of performance. Whilst this policy addressed the 
issue of the dominant institutional time by encouraging local officials to pursue 
long-term achievements, which cannot be done within their office terms, it is 
argued that the state-led, urbanisation-driven local growth pattern may not be 
given up or changed until more radical institutional innovations can be issued 
by central government.  
Thus, in a word, having regard to the financial importance and 
institutional convenience of using local urban land as the major engine and 
leverage for promoting local growth, the homogeneous adoption of the state-
led, urbanisation-driven growth pattern could be recognised as a politically 
and economically rational choice by most local governments during the third 
stage of the economic reform. And, this rational choice was politically justified 
by, and economically and institutionally embodied the growth-oriented state 
ideology.  
However, this seemingly rational choice by local governments has 
imposed an increasingly risky burden, which forced local governments to have 
no choice but to insist on their current urbanisation-driven growth pattern. This 
burden clearly refers to the massive local debts accumulated by local 
governments in promoting urbanisation. There are various estimations of the 
precise amount of the present local debts. The National Audit Commission of 
China suggests that by the end of 2010, local debts owed by local 
governments in China had reached 10700 billion RMB, to which local 
governments at provincial, municipal and county scales respectively 
contributed 3210 billion, 4660 billion and 2840 billion. The Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences in its report of the State Balance Sheet of China stated that 
by the end of 2012, gross local debts had reached 19940 billion RMB, which 
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amounted to 38% of China’s national GDP135. As Xu Shaoshi (2013), the 
Chief Director of the National Development and Reform Commission, 
asserted in the report of the 12th Five Years Plan in the National People’s 
Congress, some regions relied too much on investment-driven growth, which 
resulted in over-scaled local debts. Although the Ministry of Finance and other 
departments of central government jointly issued the ‘Notice as to the 
prohibition on local governments’ illegal and irregular financing actions’136, as 
yet no positive policies have been issued by central government to solve the 
problem of local debt. In a report released by the National Audit Commission 
in June 2013 which addressed the auditing outcomes of local governments’ 
debts, 17 provincial capital cities proposed to meet their liabilities through 
local land transfer fees, with tacit central government support of the 
continuance of urbanisation-driven growth.  
This problem of high local debts was extremely severe in Jiangsu 
province, which by the end of 2013 owed the largest local debts in China, 
albeit its debt ratio was in the middle among all provinces thanks to its 
prominent economic performance. Since 2012, the provincial government of 
Jiangsu had, whilst admitting that the repayment of the local debts relied on 
land transfer fees, claimed that the risk of debts was under control. According 
to the report of auditing outcome released by the provincial government of 
Jiangsu in January 2014, most of the local debts in Jiangsu were used for 
local infrastructure and public facility constructions, land banking, and 
government-subsidised house constructions. Zhao (2013) argued that quasi-
municipal bonds which mainly attracted civil investment to sustain urban 
infrastructure projects, were one of the key causes that resulted in high local 
debts in Jiangsu. Zhao (2013) also released a series of statistics, indicating 
that, by July 2012, Suzhou, Changzhou, and Wuxi city in the south 
respectively possessed debts of 42.8 billion RMB, 35.4 billion RMB, and 34.0 
billion RMB, which were ranked as No. 1, No. 3 and No. 4 in Jiangsu """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
135 The data proposed by the National Audit Commission of China and the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences were reported by China Central Television:  
http://jingji.cntv.cn/2013/12/25/ARTI1387965383884610.shtml""
136 The Ministry of Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission, the People’s Bank of 
China, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, ‘Notice as to the prohibition on local 
governments’ illegal and irregular financing actions’, MOF Issued (2012), No. 463 
231""
province. And, the local debts of Changzhou in 2012 amounted to 93.4% of its 
local revenues, whereas that of the national average in 2012 was only 69.23% 
(Zhen, et al., 2013). As most local debts had been incurred for constructing 
urban infrastructure and public facilities, Changzhou had became a nationally 
well-known example of a so-called ‘ghost city’, the phenomenon of which was 
widely witnessed in China in many regions. This was caused by the conflict 
between the oversupply of houses, and the inadequate purchasing 
capabilities of the general public on Chinese real estate markets. Whilst both 
Nantong city in the north and Changzhou city in the south had been criticised 
for constructing ghost cities, the situation in Changzhou was in some respects 
different to that of Nantong where not only the oversupply of local properties, 
but also extremely high house prices contributed to a distorted local real 
estate market. In order to explain the situation in Changzhou, it is necessary 
to invoke the articulation of the second key conflict, by which China’s pseudo-
urbanisation was characterised. Such conflict, as noted before, occurred 
between interest groups that institutionally benefited most from urbanisation, 
and the majority migrant urban residents whose capabilities to choose, and 
socioeconomic interests and welfares were substantially constrained and 
deprived. 
 
6.3.2 The ‘Tieben Event’ 
Before turning attention to the second conflict, a typical incident, which shows 
how central government was acting in conflict with the interest community of 
local governments at different scales in Jiangsu and in Changzhou, needs be 
exposed. While this incident exhibited an extreme situation, in which central 
government adopted some rigorous administrative measures to deal with 
central-local conflicts in relation to local land uses and supplies, it vividly 
shows how the various interest groups with different institutional and financial 
capacities and at different scales, colluded and conflicted with each other in 
seeking some particular and illegal interests under the state-led, urbanisation-
driven local growth pattern. This incident was referred as the ‘Iron Event’ or 
‘Tieben Event’ (the name of the iron enterprise at issue) of Changzhou city.  
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In May 2002, Tieben iron company submitted to the local government 
of the development zone of Changzhou city a project plan to acquire land and 
establish iron factories. As central government retained its administrative 
approval rights in relation to large pieces of rural and urban land expropriation 
and to iron projects, Tieben’s application should have been passed on to 
upper level governments to avoid ultra vires. However, the local government 
of Changzhou national high-tech zone colluded with Tieben, deciding to split 
the iron project into a dozen sub-projects in order to encapsulate these within 
local jurisdictions. During the course of project splitting, the Tieben company 
expanded its original project plan with the encouragement of the municipal 
government of Changhzou. Eventually, Tieban iron company increased its 
earlier investment plan from 1-2 billion RMB to 10.6 billion RMB, and then 
extended its planned land coverage from 1.3 sq. km. to 4 sq. km.. In 2003, 
state institutions at municipal and provincial scales approved these split 
projects. Notably, the provincial department of land and resources of Jiangsu 
approved, within only two days, all the applications of land transformation and 
expropriation submitted by the government of Changzhou, through 42 
approval operations.  
These provincial approvals on land transformation and expropriation 
then caused more than 6000 rural residents to lose their rural land and 
houses. And it was the letters of complaint sent by some of those rural 
residents to the national news agency that exposed the illegal actions of local 
governments and the Tieben company. After investigations, the State Council 
issued a series of administrative punishments, the severity and breadth of 
which was unusual during China’s economic reform. As an outcome, Fan 
Yanqing, the Municipal Party Secretary of Changzhou, received a party 
discipline of serious warning137; Gu Heilang was removed from the post of the 
Vice-Director of the municipal People’s Congress of Changzhou; Cao Jianxin 
was removed from the posts of the Vice-Director of the high-tech zone of 
Changzhou and the Vice-Party Secretary of Xinbei district of Changzhou; 
Wang Mingxiang received a serious warning and a record of a major 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
137 Generally speaking, there are five measures for enforcing the CPC discipline, including: warning, 
serious warning, removal from party posts, probation within the Party, and expulsion from the party. 
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demerit138, and was then required to resign from the post of the Vice-Director 
of the provincial Department of Land and Resources of Jiangsu; Qin Yanjiang 
was removed from the post of the Vice-Director of the provincial Development 
and Reform Commission of Jiangsu; and Wang Jiangguo was removed from 
the post of the Chief Director of the Bank of China Changzhou Branch.  
It is argued that the ‘Tieben Event’ in Changzhou city was not merely a 
case concerned with improper and illegal administrative operations. Rather it 
reflected how utilitarianism and pragmatism were concretely institutionalised 
at local scales through a set of practices, which exhibited strong strategically 
inscribed structural selectivities towards local economic growth leveraged by 
land. In the light of local governments’ position, the purpose of approving and 
supporting the Tieben company’s projects was to pursue prominent local 
growth and a positive record of performance. In order to achieve this, the 
municipal government, provincial government and certain bank branches 
together intentionally shaped the administrative and financial prerequisites for 
the projects of the Tieben company in an utilitarian fashion.  
In more specific terms, although the projects of Tieben gave rise to 
extremely large demands for land supply, which had to be realised through 
land transformation and expropriation, the local government not only reduced 
the land transfer fees of the relevant pieces of land to less than the average 
market price, but also started the land transformation and expropriation before 
the whole project was approved by the upper governments. The reduced land 
transfer fees directly undermined the available amounts of state 
compensation fees paid to the rural residents whose land and houses were 
expropriated and demolished. It is thus argued that both the capabilities to 
choose and socioeconomic interests of over 6000 rural residents, which were 
largely attached to, and expressed through, their rural landholdings, were 
weighted against the economic and political potential of the project. The 
residents had also been sociospatially displaced through the institution of 
improper land expropriations in exchange for realising a greatest net balance 
of local economic performance within the temporal horizon of the dominant 
institutional time.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
138 China’s administrative sanctions include: a warning, record of demerit, record of a major demerit, 
demotion, removal from office, and discharge.  
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It was this dominant institutional time articulated by common office 
terms and the consecutive five years development plans that had shaped and 
reinforced local utilitarian institutions in a pragmatic fashion. Pursuant to the 
official report on the ‘Tieben Event’ by the news agency of China, it was 
admitted by some local officials that, had the standard administrative 
procedures been strictly followed, it would have taken at least one to two 
years for the local government to draft, submit, and wait for the State Council 
to approve or decline, respectively, land transformation and expropriation, 
private-owned iron projects, and environmental assessment result. This is on 
the condition that all applications are submitted and examined simultaneously.  
It can thus be seen that, although the Tieben project could have been 
legally approved by central government, local government choose not to 
comply with the standard procedure, since the time consumed for obtaining 
such approvals might, more often that not, result in the completion of the 
project outside the temporal horizon of the dominant institutional time. In other 
words, if standard procedures are adopted, the realisation and output of the 
Tieben project was likely to be a record of performance that would not belong 
to those local officials who initiated this project, but rather to those who came 
after them. It was this pragmatic consideration that had arguably motivated 
the local governments at municipal and provincial scales to take the risk of 
infringing administrative rules to conduct improper and illegal procedures in a 
utilitarian way to pursue local growth.  
Some anonymous local officials and businessmen said to me that, if 
Tieben’s projects had been successfully established and operated, 
Changzhou city would have achieved much better growth with respect to its 
local economic scale and industrial structure, since the impacts of the ‘Tieben 
Event’ deterred local government from adopting any aggressive institutional 
innovations and large-scale industrial projects during the whole third stage of 
the reform. Some even observed that, as Fan Yanqing, the municipal Party 
Secretary of Changzhou, had politically suffered in this event and lost the 
prospect of being promoted, he choose to only adopt conservative policies in 
promoting local economies during the decade of his office term.  
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An anonymous local state official particularly observed that there was a 
latent consideration underlying the ‘Tieben Event’, that is, the attempted state 
monopoly on essential industries like the iron industry. The rise of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) since the national policy of ‘strategically 
restructuring SOEs’ in the late 1990s, had transformed SOEs into a group of 
extremely large companies, which enjoyed various monopolistic powers on 
economic matters. As the National Development and Reform Commission 
claimed in 2004 in an official document that the prerequisites of market 
access to the iron industry should be enhanced, and no new iron enterprises 
would, in principle, be allowed to be built (Liu, 2004). It was noted that soon 
after the ‘Tieben Event’, certain SOEs including China Resources Enterprise, 
which had recently been investigated by the Central Discipline Inspection 
Commission, tried to acquire some of the Tieben’s subsidiaries. It is argued 
that, in a conflict between local utilitarian practices and national utilitarian 
practices in terms of giving preference and priority to the development of 
SOEs, which are an essential economic pillar to the reign of the CPC, the 
latter more often than not took priority. The presence of SOEs illustrates the 
complicated situation in China. Whilst local government can rely on 
urbanisation to promote growth and retain autonomy in central-local conflicts, 
central government can use SOEs to control all the essential sectors and 
markets of the national economy. An anonymous local official of Wujin district 
has suggested to me that recent years have seen in Wujin a great deal of 
acquisitions initiated by SOEs towards those local private enterprises which 
performed well. While these acquisitions had more or less further 
strengthened SOEs’ monopolies on the national economy, private enterprises 
had been qualitatively and quantitatively undermined. This resulted in the fact 
that domestic and overseas capital flowed not into local manufacturing 
industries, but into those real estate projects.  
As Wu and Ma (2012) suggested, the new form of monopoly of SOEs 
exhibits an essential incompleteness of China’s market economy reform. In a 
word, we can discern from the ‘Tieben Event’ some typical characteristics of 
China’s economic reform expressed in the form of regional development. 
Those are: first, utilitarianism and its institutional expressions and specific 
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practices at local and national scales, and second, pragmatism and its 
institutional expressions which decisively shaped the key motivations of local 
governments in seeking local growth and records of performance within 
relevant spatial fixes and temporal horizons; and third, the key thematic tone 
of China’s reform, which seeks to use economic and institutional measures to 
restore and strengthen the authorities and functions of the party/state of 
China, in order to secure and sustain the regime legitimacy of the CPC. 
Moreover, it is argued and admitted by most local officials whom I interviewed 
that the failure of the Tieben project was only because that it was not 
conducted at the right time. Had this project been initiated in the mid- or late-
part of the third stage, in which urbanisation and large scale rural land 
expropriation had become more usual, and hence a phenomenon that could 
be better addressed by local governments, there could have, arguably, been 
an entirely different outcome.  
 
6.3.3 The conflicts between interest groups and migrant urban residents  
Whilst urbanisation has become a common growth agenda accepted and 
adopted by a wide range of local governments in China at the third stage of 
the economic reform, it is argued that this common agenda has been 
implemented, in utilitarian and pragmatic fashion, to structurally expand and 
consolidate the political and economic benefits of interest groups at various 
local scales on the one hand, and to undermine and deprive massive 
numbers of migrant urban residents, of their capabilities to choose, and also 
of their social welfare and economic interests. Premier Li Keqiang, in 
describing his notion of new urbanisation, stressed that this must be a people-
oriented urbanisation, which institutionally urbanises those migrant rural 
labourers who have become urban residents 139 . Though not yet widely 
institutionalised in practice, Premier Li’s notion of new urbanisation has been 
critical of previous practices of urbanisation that did not fully take account of 
the interests of the ‘people’, but were oriented to the interests of something 
else. While Premier Li has not, because of political sensitivity, attempted to 
define or clarify explicitly the core properties and propensities of China’s """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
139 See the speech by Li Keqiang in the Central Conference of urbanisation works, on Dec. 14, 2013: 
http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-12/14/content_2547880.htm  
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previous urbanisation, it is not hard to discern that the ‘people’, whose 
interests should be particularly addressed by new urbanisation, refers to 
migrant rural labourers whose rural land had been expropriated by local 
governments in a utilitarian fashion that did not provide these labourers with 
adequate socioeconomic compensations that should have been more 
proportional to the eventual market values of their land.  
As Zhang (2011) argued, one of the most severe problems of China’s 
current urbanisation is concerned with residents who lived in the rural and 
semi-urban areas and had lost their land due to land expropriation. Zhang 
(2011) further stated that in order to obtain more financial revenues, most 
local governments tried to lower state compensation fees for land 
expropriation and house demolition. In the subsequent distribution of the 
added value generated by the expropriated land, local governments and real 
estate developers usually relied on their respective strength to obtain massive 
interests, whereas local residents, who lacked rights to information and 
advocacy, were often in a disadvantaged bargaining position neither capable 
of resisting unfair expropriation agendas, nor possessing enough social 
welfare protection for future security.  
Tao (2011) agreed with this view, further observing that, in order to 
capture more inward investments, local governments tended to, on the one 
hand, omit labour rights and protections and be reluctant to provide public 
goods and services to migrant labourers, and on the other hand, deprive the 
dispossessed of their rights and interests which should have been attached to 
urbanisation, through the state monopoly on land use and supply. Tao thus 
defined those dispossessed as people who are both unemployed and land-
lost.  
Cui (2007) estimated that, between 2000 and 2005, around 71.8% of 
the newly increased urban residents should be institutionally viewed as ‘rural 
residents’ because they hold rural households which do not enable them to 
have the level of social welfare that can be enjoyed solely by urban 
households. This is why Chen Xiwen (2010), the Director of the Office of 
Central Rural Work Leading Group, asserted that the de facto rate of China’s 
urbanisation has been over-estimated as there were around 0.2 billion urban 
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residents (including 0.15 billion migrant rural labourers) among the 0.6 billion, 
who do not enjoy the standard welfare rights of urban citizens. Director Chen 
pointed out that, whilst the process of land-urbanisation through transforming 
massive rural land into urban constructive land had been rapidly advanced in 
recent years, the process of people-urbanisation lagged far behind, resulting 
in billions of migrant rural labourers being isolated from urban social welfare 
and rights.   
Director Chen’s assertion has recently been collaborated by an internal 
report of the District Party Committee and the Direct Government of Wujin in 
August 2013140. This report explicitly states that the urbanisation of Wujin 
district should be transited from physical urbanisation to human urbanisation, 
in particular, from land-oriented urbanisation to rural resident-oriented 
urbanisation. This report admitted that some places in Wujin lacked such 
long-term plans and considerations in the course of their development, 
concentrating on pursuing short-term interests, thus resulting in conflicts with 
local residents in relation to land expropriations and house demolitions.  
In more specific terms, while it is hardly possible to quantitatively work 
out to what extent migrant rural labourers have economically suffered by 
losing their land in the course of urbanisation, it is, however, not hard to find 
out the disparities between the amounts and growth rates of the incomes of 
local governments, economic entities, and the majority of local residents in the 
context of China’s urbanisation. Generally speaking, Zhou (2009) argues that 
since 2000, the income of state revenues has grown most rapidly, 
continuingly extending its disparity with the income of normal residents as well 
as with the growth rate of national GDP. According to the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, national state revenues have increased from 1730 billion 
RMB in 1998 to 10800 billion RMB in 2009, and its proportion of the national 
GDP has also increased from 20.4% to 32.2%141. This phenomenon occurred 
both in Nantong and in Changzhou city the third stage of the reform142. The """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
140 The District Party Committee and the Direct Government of Wujin (2013), ‘Report on the situation 
of modern small town constructions in Wujin district’. Internal Report 
141 See the news: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, (2010), ‘The state revenues have been one third 
of China’s gross GDP’: http://news.163.com/10/0913/01/6GE59HTJ0001124J.html (Accessed on Jan, 
13th, 2014)  
142 The situation in Nantong will be discussed in Chapter Seven."
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following table demonstrates the comparison between the amounts and 
growth rates of local state incomes and resident incomes of Changzhou from 
2005 to 2007.  
 
Table 6.3: the comparison between the amounts and growth rates of 
local state incomes and resident incomes of Changzhou from 2005 to 
2007 
Year Residential 
Income 
Growth Rate Local State 
Income  
Growth Rate 
2005 14589 RMB 13.4% 22.00 billion 
RMB 
25.9% 
2006 16649 RMB 14.1% 27.73 billion 
RMB 
25.8% 
2007 19089 RMB 14.7% 41.40 billion 
RMB 
33.0% 
(Data collected from the municipal Bureau of Statistics of Changzhou, and the 
annual government reports made by the Mayor of Changzhou city in the 
relevant years) 
 
Indeed, the growth rates of the annual urban residential income of 
Changzhou even decreased after 2007, turning out to be 13.1%, 10.0%, and 
10.6% in 2008, 2009, and 2010 respectively. The reason that no further 
comparisons are made in relation to the local state revenues of Changzhou 
lies in that, after 2007, the annual government report of Changzhou no longer 
released the exact amounts of its local state revenues, but only published its 
general budgetary incomes instead 143 , which do not include local land 
transferring fees. Having regard to the substantial amount of such fees, it may 
be argued that the disparity between the state revenues and the residential 
incomes could be even greater in recent years in Changzhou.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
143 This change arguably derives from the central policy, which requires that, since 2007, all the land 
transferring fees should be managed and audited under the local fund budget system. In other words, all 
such fees, in principle, should only be used for paying state compensations, constructing infrastructures 
and other public facilities, and supporting rural lives and sectors.  
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In a word, the conflicts between the interest groups (mainly including 
local governments and real estate developers) and the majority migrant rural 
labourers, have been intensified by the overly high housing prices and the 
unfair and disproportional distribution of wealth. For example, the average 
house price in 2011 in Changzhou was around 8100 RMB per sq. m., 
whereas the annual residential income in 2011 was 29710 RMB. Thus, in 
order to buy a normal flat that covers 100 sq. in Changzhou, it costs an urban 
resident’s 27 years annual income to complete the purchase. Buying a flat in 
urban areas constitutes the primary method for migrant rural labourers to 
obtain urban registered permanent residence. As estimated by the 
Development Research Centre of the State Council, by 2007, only 1.7% of the 
migrant rural labourers had become permanent urban residents (cf: Tao, 
2011: 21). It is clear that such a low rate of so-called ‘people urbanisation’ 
was largely caused by the barrier of high housing prices. High housing prices 
directly restricted consumption-driven growth and, more importantly, had 
constrained urban residents from choosing to conduct socioeconomic 
activities that can bear more innovative elements, but forced most of them to 
devote a large proportion of their lives and activities to repaying their housing 
mortgages.  
As overly high house prices are both an outcome of most local 
governments’ utilitarian and pragmatic practices, and an obstacle to the 
socioeconomic integration of rural labourers into urban lives and residence, it 
was rather ironic to find that the regional unevenness between the south and 
the north of Jiangsu province was more even in this critical aspect of regional 
development during the third stage of China’s reform. In other words, whilst 
the south exhibited higher average annual residential incomes than the north, 
residents in the south also suffered higher average house prices. As we saw 
Nantong city in the north turned out to be an exception, which exhibited higher 
average house prices than the two cities in the south of Changzhou and Wuxi. 
It will be seen in the next chapter that such an exception only revealed a more 
severe distortion in the local land supply mechanism and the local real estate 
market in Nantong.  
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6.4 Summary 
Generally speaking, the evolution of regional (uneven) development in 
Jiangsu at this stage was mainly shaped by pervasive state-led urbanisation-
driven growth, which replaced the development zone-driven growth at various 
local scales. As this growth pattern largely relied on the endogenous element 
of land, the south and the north revealed high levels of homogeneity in their 
growth pattern, and the unevenness between them was seen at this stage 
largely in quantitative terms. In other words, it is argued that regional 
unevenness was being reduced, albeit in an unsustainable fashion, which 
entailed increasingly large local debts and severe social discontent and 
conflicts.  
 The causes of this derived from both the distortions in the urban land 
use structure, characteristic of a state monopoly on urban land supply, and by 
the county-district rescaling practice, and the deviation from human- and 
demand-oriented urbanisation to building- and investment-oriented 
urbanisation. These resulted in an urbanisation that was a pseudo-one both in 
nature and in manifestation.   
 Taking an institutionalist perspective to look into urbanisation in the 
context of regional (uneven) development, it is proposed that the pervasive 
adoption of such a growth pattern by local governments was an inevitable 
rational choice, having regard to the fact that local governments were 
commonly motivated by a growth-oriented state ideology to seek performance 
records in the utilitarian sense within the dominant institutional time. 
Urbanisation-based projects such as local infrastructures, residential and 
commercial properties, and various service sectors all constituted the 
subjects, to which the local strategic institutional selectivities gave 
preferences, and, from which a variety of interest groups benefited, because 
the growth of these projects could realise local utilitarian and pragmatic 
practices, and strengthen the institutional and financial capacities of state 
institutions.  
 Whilst state institutions and interest groups both benefited from 
urbanisation, the costs and side effects were arguably born by the majority of 
the general public, in particular, rural migrants who worked and lived in city-
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regions. Urbanisation-driven growth, in its nature, can thus be seen as a 
localized practice of utilitarianism within a clarified temporal horizon. And, the 
pervasive localisation of the state-led utilitarian and pragmatic practices 
through urbanisation, is indicative of another dimension of reduced regional 
unevenness, that is, migrant rural labourers in both regions suffered losses of 
land, and constraints on capabilities to choose, in exchange for the greatest 
net balance in terms of local GDP growth within the dominant institutional 
time. It is this negative aspect, which was suffered by the migrant rural 
labourers in both the south and the north, which makes the difference in the 
urbanisation rate between these two regions a de facto meaningless issue. In 
other words, notwithstanding the various disparities and discrepancies in 
relation to physical aspects like urban infrastructure, commercial and 
residential establishment, and to the effects of local institutions such as 
county-district rescaling practice, both the south and the north now have to 
address the critical problem of how to feasibly and efficiently institutionalise 
Premier Li’s people-oriented new-urbanisation in the future. 
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Chapter Seven: Case Study Two: Nantong city and its 
sub-areas in the north of Jiangsu province 
 
7.1 An overview of Nantong’s development, and the structure of this 
Chapter 
The evolution of Nantong’s socioeconomic development was in many aspects 
tied to the Yangtze River Delta, the contextual dynamics of which shaped the 
rise and fall of Nantong. The short-term urban-industrial prosperity of Nantong 
city at the beginning of 1900s stimulated by the plan and practice of Zhang 
Jian, the famous entrepreneur, quickly declined, since Nantong’s water 
transport system was marginalised by other areas in the Yangtze River 
Delta144.  
The inception of China’s economic reform in the late 1970s resulted in 
a series of regional developmental policies and strategies, which reshaped 
and rescaled inter-regional socioeconomic cooperation and competitions. 
Under Deng’s utilitarian and pragmatic political guidelines of ‘Letting some 
peoples and areas get rich first’, and ‘Crossing the river by groping the 
stones’, the Yangtze River Delta was chosen, by no means surprisingly, as, 
inter alia, an essential experimental area for initiating regional economic 
reform and promoting regional growth. Whilst China’s economic reform at the 
first stage concentrated on the Pearl River basin where the special economic 
zones took the lead in a variety of institutional innovations, the Yangtze River 
Delta also witnessed some pro-reform, strategic institutional changes at this 
stage. These include the Shanghai Economic Zone and the Shanghai 
Economic Zone Planning Office that were established in 1982 and 1983 
respectively. The Shanghai Economic Zone covers both Shanghai, as the 
core city-region, and its peripheral city-regions, including the three cities in the 
south of Jiangsu, and, notably, Nantong city.  
The Planning Office, which was directly accountable to the State 
Council, was dissolved and later restructured as the Directors Caucus of the 
Yangtze River Delta Economic Coordination Commissions (Offices). This 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
144 These areas included the south of Jiangsu province, and Shanghai. 
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indeed reflected the difficulties of coordinating regional economies in a top-
down fashion in the context of the uneven rises of different city-regions. Some 
regions, such as the south of Jiangsu, emerged as stronger economic actors. 
On the contrary, the economies of Nantong, as the report by APA (2006: 8) 
indicated, lagged far behind ‘the rapid rise of southern Jiangsu cities such as 
Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou’ which ‘made Nantong’s growth pale’, and 
Nantong’s ‘share in Jiangsu’s economy dropped from 10.7% (1983) to 7.9% 
(2004)’.  
Nantong’s land area and population respectively accounted for 7.3% 
and 9.3% of the Yangtze River Delta, but by 2005, Nantong’s regional GDP 
was only 4.3% of Yangtze River Delta’s total GDP, and its regional GDP per 
capita was 47.1% of the Yangtze River Delta average (APA, 2006: 8). The 
proportion of Nantong’s contribution to the regional GDP in Jiangsu 
persistently declined from 10.7% in 1983 to 9% in 1989, and to 8.6% in 2000, 
and then to 7.9% in 2004 (APA, 2006: 9). In a word, Nantong could be 
regarded, during the first two stage of the economic reform, as an 
underdeveloped region both in Jiangsu province and in the Yangtze River 
Delta. And, Haian county of Nantong city, during these stages, was somewhat 
jokingly described as the ‘Little Sixth’145 because of its lowest position in 
economic terms among all the districts and counties in Nantong city.   
There are various arguments why Nantong and the north of Jiangsu 
lagged behind the south. Quite interestingly, among those local state officials 
of the south whom I interviewed, most of them felt that social and cultural 
factors were most important in contributing to the regional unevenness 
between the south and north. For example, Mr. W had argued that many 
officials in the north are less administratively efficient and entrepreneurially 
competent compared to those of the south, and local labourers in the north 
tend to be less educated. Mr. W particularly stressed that whilst both the 
south and the north may possess similar or even identical institutions, the 
south was more competent in implementing and realising policies. According 
to Mr. W, this led to a disparity in the capability to promote regional """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
145 See China’s official press, Jiefang Daily, ‘The Little Sixth now becomes The Big First – The 
integration of limited resources by Haian county for promoting enterprises and employment’, 2011 
May 9th 
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development between the local endogenous institutions of the south and the 
north. When interviewing some local enterprises with experiences of investing 
in the northern city-regions of Jiangsu, they complained about how their 
routine transactions suffered various obstacles and damages caused by local 
bureaucracy in the north. One quoted a famous saying: ‘open up for attracting 
investment and then close doors to beat dogs’, which vividly illustrated the 
way that local governments in the north treat external investors.  
Although these opinions provide rather parochial and superficial views 
on the causes of the lagged growth in the north, the fact of regional 
unevenness, as the APA’s (2006:9) report set out, has existed for some time. 
As the report said, Nantong city’s development, though the best among the 
north, witnessed a widening gap with the south of Jiangsu; and ‘therefore, the 
city remains in the mid-industrialisation’. Given that the APA collaborated on 
the report with Nantong municipal government, the conclusion that Nantong 
was only in mid-industrialisation during the first two stages of China’s 
economic reform can be taken to represent the official position. 
This Chapter explores this lagged development based on a series of 
findings and discussions drawn from my empirical research in Nantong city 
and its sub-region, Haian county, using the same periodization in terms of the 
three stages of China’s economic reform146. The first two stages focus on 
Nantong’s relatively inefficient and slow industrialisation, which occurred at 
local scales. It shows how inefficient local industrialisation driven by path-
dependent TVEs and by development zones under inter-locality competition 
contributed to lower level of economic growth in the north, and, how such 
growth evolved unevenly against that of the south. The third stage is mainly 
characterised by state-led, urbanisation-driven growth, which was similar to 
the major growth pattern of the south. The third section of this Chapter 
concentrates on how urbanisation in Nantong has led to a reduction in uneven 
development. And, it will be seen that the evolution of regional development in 
the north, and its uneven performance against the south were shaped and 
affected by China’s utilitarianism and pragmatism.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
146 These are: the first stage (the late 1970s – the earlier 1990s), the second stage (the mid-1990s – the 
earlier 2000s), and the third stage (the earlier 2000s – 2013). 
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7.2 Slow and inefficient rural industrialisation in Nantong city147   
From a general perspective, it is argued that Nantong city’s lagged 
industrialisation during the first two stage of the economic reform was caused 
by, on the one hand, its local population composition and industrial structure, 
and on the other hand, its path-dependencies on the south of Jiangsu with 
respect to the TVE-driven growth pattern, and the development zone-driven 
growth pattern. In addition, from the perspective of the TPSN framework, as 
we have seen in Chapter Five, it is argued that those place- and scale- 
specific advantages for promoting TVE-driven growth were widely absent in 
Nantong city and in the north of Jiangsu at large.  
First, regarding the local situations in Nantong city, the municipal 
bureau of statistics of Nantong (2009) suggested that the highly planned 
economy system had separated and restricted the rural-urban interactions in 
terms of labour movement since the founding of the PRC. By 1978 when 
China’s economic reform began, there were 6.72 million agricultural residents 
among Nantong’s population of 7.22 million. Such a large proportion of 
agricultural/rural population determined the agriculture-orientation in 
Nantong’s industrial structure. Nantong was therefore known as a key 
agriculturally driven city at that time. In a word, Nantong city did not possess a 
well-fostered local base for industrialisation. This can be contrasted with the 
situation in the south during the same period. For example, by 1978 
Changzhou city had its local industry largely underpinned by inter alia the 
textile industry, the machine building industry, electronics, and the chemical 
industry. Each of these four sectors amounted to 34.9%, 35.6%, 11.95%, and 
13.3% of Changzhou’s gross industrial output value respectively148.  
The high proportion of agricultural population and industry forced the 
local governments of Nantong to make rural industrialisation its priority 
throughout the early stage of reform. According to Mr. L of the Municipal 
Office of Nantong city, the principal strategies of rural modernisation in """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
147 When conducting fieldwork and secondary research, it was quite difficult to acquire precise data 
and information as to rural industrialisation in Nantong during the first two stages of the economic 
reform. Since local governments in the north acknowledged that the north did economically lag behind 
the south, they tended to avoid addressing these issues, and only emphasised in official documents the 
economic achievements they secured at the third stage of the economic reform. 
148 See the Chorography of Changzhou (1995)  
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Nantong involved the migration of rural labourers into urban areas, and the 
transformation of rural labourers into industrial populations. In practice, the 
effects of these strategies varied geographically within Nantong city. The 
migration of rural labour in the three northern counties (including Haian) 
progressed in a slower pace than that of its southern counties. Although the 
aggregate number of transformed rural labourers in Nantong reached 1.44 
million by 2007, this was far from efficient compared with the situation in the 
south of Jiangsu (Municipal bureau of statistics of Nantong, 2009). It is argued 
that the inefficient transformation of rural labourers in Nantong was mainly 
attributed to its slow rural industrialisation and backward industrial 
agglomeration, which could not absorb substantial number of local rural 
labourers. As we saw in Chapter Five, in contrast to the context of inefficient 
industrialisation in the north of Jiangsu, the south, during the 1980s and 
1990s, witnessed the rapid rise of TVEs and development zones respectively. 
But, the north arguably lacked at that time the necessary place-specific 
conditions for rural industrialisation, and thus for TVE-driven growth.  
 In an overview of the industrialisation process of the north of Jiangsu, 
Xu and Liu (2009) suggest that, whilst Jiangsu’s provincial development 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s had a clear propensity to economic growth 
rather than regional balance, and resulted in high agglomeration of resources 
in the south, exacerbating the regional unevenness, the north itself also made 
certain mistakes in promoting growth. This particularly refers to the effort of 
attempting to imitate the so-called ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ in the north. Su 
and Huang (1999) had suggested that the failure of the north to copy the 
‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ was largely due to the inadequacy of human 
resource in the north, in particular, a lack of skilled local labourers for 
supporting TVE-driven growth and development zone-driven growth.  
 First, regarding the TVE-driven growth, as the 10th Five-Year Plan for 
TVEs in Jiangsu province149 suggested, in 1995, the total numbers of TVEs in 
the five cities150 in the south amounted to 64.2% of all TVEs in Jiangsu, and to """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
149 The 10th Five-Year Plan for TVEs in Jiangsu province, see:  
http://www.jste.gov.cn/zjfg/zcwj/1007589.htm (accessed on Nov 18th, 2013)  
150 These five cities are Nanjing (the provincial capital city), Zhenjiang, Changzhou, Wuxi, Suzhou. 
Whilst Nanjing and Zhenjiang are not conventionally included in the south of Jiangsu in an economic 
sense, they are geographically in the southern region of Jiangsu. 
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59.6% in 2000. In 1995, 51% of the employees working in the TVEs in the 
south consisted of migrated or transformed rural labourers, whereas the figure 
in the north was about 24%, and both figures had not changed much by 2000. 
The differences in the number of local TVEs and migrant labourers sketched 
out one aspect of the regional unevenness in TVE-driven growth. More 
importantly, it is argued that the prominence given to the ‘Southern Jiangsu 
Model’ by both central and provincial governments exerted more profound 
institutional influences, in a path-dependent way, on the regional growth of the 
north (Yang & Zheng, 2006).  
 Generally speaking, since the ideas of reform and growth became a 
semi-state ideology upheld by China’s central government, pursuing growth 
and seeking ways of promoting growth had naturally been key tasks of local 
governments at all scales. As noted earlier, the institutional practice of the 
growth-oriented state ideology exhibited strong utilitarian and pragmatic 
characteristics. The earlier forms of pragmatism can be summarised as 
Deng’s words of ‘crossing the river by groping the stones’, which is indicative 
of a trial-and-error strategy, which encourages local governments to make a 
variety of institutional experiments in promoting growth. This strategy 
successfully led to the rise of TVEs in the south of Jiangsu, which dramatically 
stimulated growth. As a role model of local growth pattern, TVE-driven growth 
under the name of the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ became not only a reference 
point for the north, but also some sort of institutional path-dependency, to 
which rural industrialisation of the north was highly subject.  
 It is argued that, although the economic prominence of TVEs in the 
south of Jiangsu represented a successful outcome of the utilitarian and 
pragmatic practices of the growth-oriented state ideology at the national scale, 
a rigid transplantation of such success at local scales in the north was 
incompatible with the national and provincial utilitarian propensities of 
establishing regional economic polarisation. In addition, it is further argued 
that the rigid transplantation of the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ revealed the 
parochial empirical-orientation in the methodology of the trial-and-error 
strategy. There can be potential risks of endowing a particular empirical 
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exemplar of success with political legitimation151 and presuming its wider 
applicability, since empirical successes in one place cannot guarantee that 
such successes may be copied in other places. 
  In the case of Jiangsu province, the presumption of the wider 
applicability of the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ by both the provincial and local 
governments, seemed to have overlooked the fact that the growth of TVEs in 
the south was on the one hand attributed to very particular unique 
characteristics in terms of places, scales, and networks that were equipped 
with the south, but not in presence in the north152. And, on the other hand, the 
operations of TVE-driven growth in the south had established certain 
spatiotemporal fixes that had their own structural coherence, and the costs of 
securing such coherence were displaced to other external sociospatial sites, 
whereas the welfare and interests generated by them were largely internally 
distributed and digested.  
In other words, whilst the precedence of TVE-driven growth in the 
south was largely attributed to its local institutional innovations and unique 
elements, it also drew on, and deprived, other regions of the resources and 
opportunities for promoting effective TVE-driven growth themselves. As 
Cheng et al. (2007) showed, TVE-driven growth in different regions in China 
revealed a large unevenness. Most provinces were below the average level, 
apart from three distinctive regions, namely, the south of Jiangsu, the south of 
Zhejiang province, and Guangdong province (Cheng et al., 2007)153. And, it 
must be emphasised that, although TVEs in other provinces might receive 
their own provincial supports, the situation for the north of Jiangsu was much 
more narrowly defined. The geographical adjacency between the south and 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
151 In his survey in Suzhou city in the south of Jiangsu in 1983, Deng expressly acknowledged the 
achievement made by local collective enterprises which were later known as TVEs; and in March 
1984, the Central Party Committee and the State Council approved and published the ‘Report as to 
creating a new situation for collective enterprises’, which officially legitimised collective enterprises, 
renamed them as township and village enterprises, and institutionally empowered TVEs’. See, The 
Provincial Party History Office of Jiangsu, (2009), ‘The evolution and inspiration of TVEs since 
China’s economic reform – TVEs in Jiangsu between 1978-1992’, in The No.3 Research Department 
of the Central Party History Office (ed), Rural reform and development in the new era, Beijing, CPC 
History Press. 
152 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2 
153 As Wen (2011) states, the developments of private enterprises in the south of Jiangsu province, the 
south of Zhejiang province, and the Pearl River Basin, represent the three outstanding growth models 
emerged throughout China’s economic reform. 
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north of Jiangsu gave the north no choice, but to adopt the ‘Southern Jiangsu 
Model’. And, the provincial government would not give any effective support to 
the north. In other words, the adoption of the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ by the 
north should be seen as a rigid generalisation of a particular precedent, 
subject to utilitarian marginalisation effect.   
 However, notwithstanding the contextual utilitarian practices, which 
favoured the south, this does not mean that the north was not totally 
unsuitable for adopting the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ for promoting its growth. 
Indeed, if we stand in the position of local governments in the north at that 
time, it may seem that adopting the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ was a rational 
choice, in the absence of any thorough analyses of the prospects of 
transplanting the Model in the north, which were not practically and 
theoretically feasible owing to China’s highly unique situation154. Hence, we 
need to have a closer look at those local parameters, which negatively 
contributed to TVEs’ growth in the north.   
 There are a lot of observations on the local, internal shortcomings of 
the north in fostering TVE-driven growth. Many of them agreed with my 
interviewees, saying that both the informal local culture and the formal state 
institutions in the north did not fit with the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ (Yang & 
Zheng, 2006; Fan & Yu, 1994; Xu, 1988). These critics often focused on local 
phenomena such as blindly following the trend of establishing and running 
TVEs, making false reports of the performance of TVEs, improper 
interventions by local state institutions, and the lack of modern 
entrepreneurship and management systems. In a report on Nantong city’s 
TVEs in the 1980s, Qiang and Gu (1987) pointed out that the root problem 
underlying the lagged development of Nantong’s TVEs was TVEs’ free 
occupancy of rural land. The free occupancy of rural land amounted to a key 
supportive measure to the initial starting of TVEs, as it reduced the cost of 
market access155. Qiang and Gu (1987), however, noted that the low standard """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
154 In Chapter 8, an evaluation on the dialectic between a region’s institutional empowerment and that 
region’s capacities of acquiring and distributing supportive resources will be specifically elaborated to 
unravel the mystery of China’s rapid, persistent growth, which also theoretically inspires the question 
of making an effective pre-assessment on the choice of local growth path. 
155 This point was proved by the experiences of the south in initiating TVEs. See, section 5.2, Chapter 
5. 
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of market access resulted in many inefficient and unproductive enclosures, 
which brought about vicious competitions, duplicative constructions, and high 
rates of TVE establishment and insolvency in the north.  
This problem of free occupancy of rural land also occurred in the south, 
but it is seen by Wen (2011: 31) as a process of land capitalisation, from 
which a large part of the profits made by the TVEs in the south derive156. A 
notable point here lies in the ways of distributing the profits generated by land 
transformation and capitalisation. Wen (2011: 34) noted that most TVEs in the 
south chose to retain and use the added value of land capitalisation for further 
industrial development rather than for collective dividends; and this way of 
value distribution was in many cases supported by local governments and 
rural collectives. This can be contrasted with the situation in the north. As Xu 
(1988) described, certain local governments in the north tended to draw too 
much capital from TVEs for non-business or private purposes, and many 
TVEs in the north lacked market-oriented consciousness and entrepreneurial 
spirit, but relied heavily on state support in financial and material terms to 
sustain their inefficient operations. For example, in Haian county of Nantong, 
the gross debt of all 873 local enterprises (including both state-owned 
enterprises and TVEs) reached 4.26 billion RMB, and the gross loss was 0.16 
billion RMB by the end of 1994 (Dongtai Daily, 2008). While the local 
government of Haian made ‘saving enterprises’ its top priority and established 
teams for supporting local enterprises, most local enterprises had not 
improved their performance by the end of 1990s (Dongtai Daily, 2008).  
 In a word, it is argued that the relatively slower and inefficient 
development of TVEs in the north should be seen as a logical outcome that 
stemmed from the path-dependent and rigid transplantation of the ‘Southern 
Jiangsu Model’ in the north. However, the lagged development of TVEs in the 
north did not mean that TVEs did not contribute to regional economic growth. 
As Chen (1992) suggested, although the TVEs in Nantong grew less 
inefficiently than those in the south, they had still made crucial contributions to """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
156 The free occupancy of rural land by TVEs serves to transform rural land into industrial land without 
costs, and thus increases the economic value of the land. The collective-ownership nature of rural land 
ensures that the added value of industrially transformed land accrues to the corresponding TVEs, 
becoming the primitive accumulation for rural industrialisation (Wen, 2011: 34). See, section 5.2, 
Chapter 5. 
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Nantong’s development. In 1991, TVEs in Nantong secured a gross industrial 
output value of 11.5 billion RMB, which accounted for 42.9% of the gross 
municipal industrial output value, and contractually introduced foreign 
investment of 27.73 million USD, accounting for 31.3% of the gross amount of 
the municipality (Chen, 1992: 34). Regarding the issue of further promoting 
TVEs’ development in Nantong, Chen (1992) argued that the key institutional 
innovations for this lie in, inter alia, optimising Nantong’s institutional 
environment, in particular, by making use of Nantong’s preferential status as 
one of the 14 coastal open cities initially identified by central government, to 
couple domestic resources with foreign investment. Chen thus stressed the 
importance of the role of development zones in Nantong.  
Although Chen (1992) had to some extent pointed to the right path for 
TVEs’ further development, the realities turned out to be more complex. It was 
the south, rather than the north, during the second stage of the reform, which 
exhibited a better use of development zones to promote local and regional 
growth in the context of increasingly intense inter-locality competitions. 
 
7.3 Restricted development zone-driven growth in the north  
The 1990s witnessed the expansion of development zones throughout China. 
As the most active regional growth engine, development zones not only 
played a paramount role in shaping regional economic performance157, but 
also vitally affected subsequent urbanisation in different cities.  
Unlike the path-dependent transplantation of the ‘Southern Jiangsu 
Model’ in the north of Jiangsu, it can be seen that, during the early stage of 
development zone campaigns, Nantong city was, among all the cities in 
Jiangsu, the first one chosen to adapt the Shenzhen special economic zone to 
establish a development zone within its territory. Although this central decision 
of choosing Nantong to some extent reflected the utilitarian orientation of 
‘letting some regions get rich first’ from a national perspective, the adaption 
and transplantation practices at local scales again exhibited the deficiency of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
157 It is generally agreed that the average GDP growth rate of development zones in China secures 2 to 
3 times higher than China’s national annual GDP growth rate. See Coase and Wang (2012: 141); Liu 
(2007). 
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the earlier form of China’s pragmatism, that is, the high uncertainty of 
generalising a local institutional success to wider scales/places.  
Moreover, the subsequent rise of inter-urban competitions after China’s 
initial development zone campaign quickly led to a radical shift of the 
utilitarian orientation from favouring the north to privileging the south. As Fang 
and Cui (2004) argued, in the 1990s the advantages generated by central 
government’s preferential policies for Nantong were soon taken over and 
partitioned by Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou in the south. This was because 
development zones in the south, though being set up a little bit later than 
those in Nantong city, quickly surpassed their counterparts in the north in the 
qualitative and quantitative senses in competing for inward investment and in 
producing industrial outputs.  
Among the various kinds of development zones, economic and 
technological zones played a leading role in regional development. As the 
most common type, an economic and technological zone is not only indicative 
of a city-region’s preferential status as a regional growth pole, but also is 
attached with a variety of state authorised preferential policies with respect to 
taxation, land use, and administrative approval. The aim of establishing 
economic and technological zones was officially summarised as the so-called 
guideline of ‘three majors, one dedication’, which was later amended as ‘three 
majors, two dedications, and one furtherance’. This means that such zones 
‘mainly serve to attract foreign investments with high qualities, to promote 
modern manufacturing industries, and to optimise the export structure; 
dedicate to promote both high-tech industries and high value-added service 
industries; and further the transition of economic and technological zones into 
multi-functional, comprehensive industrial zones’ (Ministry of Commerce of 
the PRC (MOC), 2004). Reading these bureaucratic descriptions in simpler 
words, the actual role of such zones lies in a well-known phenomenon, 
namely, ‘investment invitation’, which turned out to be the most essential task 
for local government at all scales throughout the second stage of the 
economic reform. The quality and quantity of inward investment thus 
determined the condition of a development zone, and on most occasions 
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determined the performance record of local state officials under China’s 
bureaucratic evaluation system.  
Parallel to the rise of development zones in China during the 1990s, 
the global scale had witnessed increasing economic interactions and 
interdependences leading to greater economic globalisation. It was in this 
global context that China started to gradually engage in, and be embedded 
within, global markets and commodity chains through exerting its comparative 
advantages, principally in terms of export-oriented labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries, towards, at first, the east Asia markets and, then the 
US and EU markets. Development zones were widely seen as the critical 
local institutions for exerting such comparative advantage158. But, institutions 
alone cannot generate productivity, the question lies in the extent to which 
such institutions can practically attract and use capital, technology, and 
labour, and entrepreneurially coordinate all those factors to generate 
productivity and growth.  
Regarding the source of the above factors, whilst most state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) at this stage were struggling with state plans, welfare 
burdens, or restructuring and privatisation, TVEs, which absorbed a massive 
number of labourers and mostly ran labour-intensive manufacturing business, 
were the most active players in initiating and promoting development 
zones159. In other words, apart from foreign direct and indirect investments, 
the quality and quantity of TVEs in a given locality largely determined the 
conditions of a development zone.  
Not surprisingly, the legacy of TVEs accumulated by the south during 
the first stage of the refrom greatly empowered this region to update and 
revive its growth pattern and engine through development zones at this stage 
(Zhu et al., 2008). On the contrary, the relative underdevelopment of TVEs in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms in the north directly undermined its 
sources of inward investment and business communities.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
158 For example, Liu (2009) observes that the year of 1992 represents the turning point for the Yangtze 
Delta River’s improved engagement in the globalisation through development zones-driven growth. 
159 As Coase and Wang (2012: 140) suggest, development zones served to create ‘fresh opportunities 
for entrepreneurship outside the existing economic structure where state enterprises tended to prevail. 
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Notwithstanding having the first national economic and technological 
zone in Jiangsu province, Nantong’s development zones, together with other 
earlier economic and technological zones in China, did not secure outstanding 
performance. As the MOC’s (2004) report commented, economic and 
technological zones before 1991 suffered from many difficulties such as 
underdeveloped infrastructures, insufficient foreign investment, and lack of 
experiences. The gross industrial output value of the 14 initial national 
economic and technological zones was 14.59 billion RMB, and they achieved 
a gross export value of 1.14 billion USD160  (MOC, 2004). By 1991, the 
accumulated foreign investment attracted and utilised by the 14 zones 
was1.37 billion USD (MOC, 2004).  
The relatively unsatisfactory performance of the initial batch of 
economic and technological zones still triggered an extensive rise of 
development zones after Deng made his second survey trip to the south of 
China in 1992. Deng give the political legitimation to further economic reform 
and openness as well as the express claim of establishing a socialist market 
economy at the 14th Congress of the CPC justified and stimulated a new 
round of growth-oriented local experiments. This was characterised by, inter 
alia, the emergence of more development zones with different functions and 
orientations and, perhaps more importantly, at various scales. That is to say, 
the central state power of planning and approving development zones was 
partly devolved to regional and local scales. Such devolution then in effect 
encouraged and empowered local governments to competitively undertake 
and generate a range of growth models in accordance with China’s 
pragmatism, and also served to confirm the utilitarian propensity on the other 
hand, albeit in a seemingly devolved manner.  
Whilst the former view on the pragmatist nature of devolution is easier 
to understand, the latter one regarding the utilitarian propensity entailed by 
devolution can be more difficult to comprehend. As Coase and Wang (2012: 
148) observed, ‘Once Beijing gave up its claim on a monopoly of truth in """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
160 If viewing the national economic and technological zone of Nantong alone from an evolutionary 
perspective, the official data indicates that after a decade since 1991, it achieved a gross value of export 
of 0.358 billion USD, whereas its counterparts in the south of Jiangsu, for example, Suzhou industrial 
park achieved 11.885 billion USD gross value of export in 2004 (MOC, 2004), which was more than 
10 times larger than that of Nantong. 
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economic policy and allowed experimental policy-making, regional 
competition was able to take hold’. It is argued that it is this very phenomenon 
of regional and urban competition that institutionally realised the utilitarian 
propensity. In defining the very objects local governments compete for in 
regional competition, Coase and Wang (2012: 148) correctly pointed out that, 
in competing for investment to promote their development zones, ‘local 
governments also vie over different ideas of economic development’. Those 
growth models and policies, which failed to attract investment or to promote 
entrepreneurship, would then be of institutional obsolescence. The intense 
context of regional competition washed out those failed developmental ideas 
and practices, and then forced those local governments who did not secure 
good development zone-driven performance to be more or less path-
dependent on relatively successful local growth models. In other words, those 
city-regions with better historical-concrete business community supports again 
acquired utilitarian preference in terms of policy and business resources 
through pan-devolution and market-oriented practices.  
If we apply these lines of reasoning to the context of Jiangsu province, 
the devolution of powers on development zones did in effect revitalise the 
‘Southern Jiangsu Model’ to foster endogenous growth through coupling local 
business assets and networks with global commodity chains. And, this made 
the state’s preference of firstly establishing the national development zones in 
the north of Jiangsu more like a political compromise between the reformist 
and conservative forces who did not wish to take an experimental risk in the 
key regions of the Yangtze River Delta. We saw in the first case study that 
devolution fostered a series of highly endogenous growth engines in the south 
at county scale or below. And, these socioeconomic sites at lower scales 
possessed a very strong competitiveness that was no less than municipal-
scales. They exhibited one of the key differences between the south and the 
north at this stage of the economic reform161.  In a word, it is argued that the 
devolution of powers on development zones, whilst promoting the south, 
resulted in further institutional path-dependence in the north to, and moreover, 
further intensely competition with, the south.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
161 See Section 5.3.4, 5.3.5 in Chapter 5. 
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As Yang and Zheng (2006) suggest, since the mid-1990s, the north of 
Jiangsu had been strongly influenced by the growth-path of the south, thus 
making inward investment the only way of promoting economic performance. 
And they further argue that in the light of the asymmetries between the north 
and south with respect to, for example, the presence of TVEs, skilled 
labourers, management, and infrastructure, the north was in a disadvantaged 
position against the south in seeking inward investment. The APA’s (2006) 
report also says that although external investment has significantly 
contributed to the growth of Nantong in recent years, its exogenous 
investment, as the following table shows, did not exceed endogenous 
investment until 2004. 
 
Table 7.1: 1993-2005, Nantong Investment structure analysis (APA, 2006: 
12) 
 Total fixed 
asset 
investment 
Billion (RMB) 
Endogenous 
investment 
Exogenous 
investment 
Exogenous 
investment 
proportion to 
the total 
investment 
(%) 
1993 8.9 5.6 3.3 37.5 
1994 12.6 7.9 4.3 37.0 
1995 19.3 10.7 8.6 44.3 
1996 19.9 12.2 7.7 38.7 
1997 22.2 13.3 8.9 40.2 
1998 25.7 14.4 11.3 42.2 
1999 21.2 15.4 5.8 27.3 
2000 24.0 16.9 7.1 29.5 
2001 25.8 18.6 7.2 27.9 
2002 31.0 20.4 10.6 34.2 
2003 44.8 23.2 21.6 48.3 
2004 60.6 28.2 32.3 53.4 
2005 81.0 33.9 47.1 58.2 
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In 2000162, for instance, Nantong attracted exogenous investment of 7.1 billion 
RMB (this includes both FDI and domestic investment from other regions) 
(APA: 2006). In the same year, the FDI attracted by Suzhou, Wuxi and 
Changzhou (the three cities in the south of Jiangsu) was 2.88, 1.08, 0.56 
billion USD respectively, whereas Nantong attracted FDI of 0.083 billion USD 
(Wen, 2011: 154; Zhang et al., 2008). And, at the county scale, Wujin county-
level city of Changzhou attracted FDI of 115.9 million USD in 2000, whereas 
Haian county of Nantong had 7.6 million USD (statistical year book of Jiangsu 
2001). Such disparities in inward investment reflected the unevenness 
between the north and the south with respect to both the quality and quantity 
of their development zones, and to, arguably, their local institutional thickness.  
As Wang163 (2012) pointed out, one of the chief problems faced by 
Jiangsu in relation to development zones lies in the unevenness between the 
development zones in different provincial regions. From a general 
perspective, in describing the evolution of development zones in Jiangsu over 
the two decades since 1984, an internal report by the Commerce Department 
of Jiangsu (CDJ) suggested that Deng’s speech in 1992 triggered the 
blooming of the export-oriented economy of Jiangsu province, resulting in the 
sequential establishments of 4 national high-tech industry development zones 
in Nanjing (the provincial capital city) in 1991, and in the three cities of the 
south in 1992’. Alongside forming a series of provincial-level economic 
development zones in county-level cities in the south, the industrial park of 
Suzhou (the leading city in the south) was established in 1994 by the 
cooperation between Singapore and the local government of Suzhou, the 
economic performance of which proved to be one of the best across China164. 
On the contrary, there is only one development zone in the north that was 
addressed by this report, and that is Nantong economic and technological 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
162 The annual average exogenous investment attracted by Nantong between 1993 and 2001 was 71.3 
billion RMB (APA, 2006). 
163 Wang serves as the vice-director of the provincial department of commerce of Jiangsu province. 
164 As the best-performing development zone in China, Suzhou industrial park in the south of Jiangsu 
achieved a regional GDP of 190 billion RMB, a gross import and export volume of 80.46 billion USD.  
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zone thanks to its inward investment from the Oji Paper Group165 (the largest 
paper manufacturer in Japan). 
 This internal report by the CDJ, whilst summarising the evolving 
situation of development zones in Jiangsu during the 20 years since 1984, 
also pointed out certain key clues to the regional unevenness at issue. As the 
report noted, ‘since the 10th Five-Year National Development Plan (since the 
mid-1990s), the growth of development zones in Jiangsu province had 
experienced a transition from quantitative extension to qualitative promotion’. 
This qualitative transition was primarily seen in the diversified orientations of 
the different development zones. This inter alia referred to the serially 
established ‘high-tech industry development zones’ solely in the south, the 
operations of which reflected the precedence of the south over the north with 
respect to industrial upgrading and restructuring. By 2005 there were 6 high-
tech development zones in Jiangsu, all of them located in the south. As 
provincial government possessed the authority of approving the establishment 
of a local high-tech zone, and central government holds the authority of 
selecting potential qualified zones and identifying them as national high-tech 
zones, it is therefore easy to see a privileged position given to the south in this 
aspect166. But it may be argued that a reverse logic is at work here. In 
identifying a high-tech zone, local governments have to assess and identify 
whether a firm can qualify as a high-tech under the supervision of provincial 
departments 167 . A dense agglomeration of high-tech enterprises is the 
prerequisite for a high-tech zone. That is to say, whilst central and provincial 
governments are entitled to make final decisions on institutional issues, the """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
165 It was noted that in 2012, Oji’s investment in Nantong gave rise to a severe local protest and then 
social riots because of the local concerns on the pollution caused Oji Paper Group’s manufacturing in 
Nantong. 
166 The economic importance of high-tech zones lies in three main aspects. First, high-tech zones 
exhibit a greater advantage in inviting foreign investments in terms of capitals, networks, and 
technologies, than normal development zones. Second, high-tech zones can serve to help promote local 
industrial structures with the purpose of enhancing local competitiveness in terms of better R&D 
capacity and higher value-added products and services. Third, high-tech zones can usually receive 
better state support for fostering and promoting pivotal, strategic sectors so as to play the leading role 
for industrial cluster and radiation in a region. A more specific discussion of the importance of high-
tech zones to regional uneven development can be seen in Section 5.3.3 in Chapter 5. 
167 The rules and policies as to high-tech industrial development zones are articulated by ‘the State 
Council’s notice on the approval of national high-tech industry development zone and other relevant 
policy rules’. See: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/17/content_2587962.htm (accessed on 
Dec 2rd, 2013).  
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very composition of local business and industrial communities is a 
prerequisite to the establishment of a high-tech zone.  
 In the context of furious inter-urban competition, most city-regions have 
made the promotion of high-tech industries their key developmental 
orientation according to the national strategy of industrial upgrading. This on 
the one hand had resulted in industrial isomorphism and duplicate 
construction in the south of Jiangsu. On the other hand, Liu (2009: 13) argued 
that it has caused an intense scrabble for high-tech zones among local 
governments. The institutional path-dependency of the north on the growth 
models of the south had obviously put the north in a lagged position in relation 
to high-tech zones-driven growth. In other words, development zones in the 
north faced difficulties in competing with the south for attracting high-tech 
enterprises to their localities. In a group interview with the officials of Haian 
county, Mr. X168 and Mr. Z169 emphasised the critical importance of Haian’s 
high-tech industries to local growth. And, Mr. L170 also indicated that Nantong 
city has in recent years tackled the problem of lacking high-tech industries 
through establishing a series of cooperation development zones, which were 
collaboratively built and operated by both Nantong city and cities in the south 
or Shanghai171 . But at the second stage of the economic reform, most 
development zones in Nantong, and in the north of Jiangsu were still largely 
driven by low-tech traditional industries with small and low scales of 
production and investment.  
In an internal report provided by the Statistics Information Network of 
Jiangsu (the provincial statistics bureau), it was pointed out that, during the 
period of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1995-2000), economic development in 
Nantong city, especially in its northern region (where Haian county is located), 
was largely constrained by its low-level industrialisation and unbalanced 
industrial structures, which were characterised by local enterprises with low-
tech and low value-added productivities. The primitive and lagged industrial 
accumulation in the north of Jiangsu meant that city-regions in the north were """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
168 Mr. X serves as the director-general of Haian government office. 
169 Mr. Z serves as the director-general of Haian Development and Reform Committee."
170 Mr. L serves as the Vice-director of Nantong municipal office. 
171 These issues will be dealt more specifically when articulating Nantong and Haian’s development at 
the third stage of China’s reform. 
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disadvantaged in the context of the inter-locality competitions between 
development zones at different scales. This disadvantage was characterised 
by the difficulties encountered by local governments in enhancing local 
productivities of high added value and high-tech goods, and large-scale 
industrial agglomeration on the one hand, and also by the incapacity of local 
development zones to attract exogenous investments that could be coupled 
with local assets for promoting local endogenous growth.  
It must be further noted that, whilst the inadequacy of rudimentary 
industrial base was a substantive, concrete disadvantage to the north in 
relation to development zone-driven growth, some light must also be shed on 
the institutional capacities of different development zones. In other words, 
apart from historical, concrete industrial disparities, development zones also 
exhibited different levels of institutional capacity in conducting investment 
campaigns, which in turn contributed to the regional uneven development 
between the south and north. 
 If we see development zones as the basic physical premise for 
industrialisation via inward investment, local governments in China then play a 
leading role in inviting and attracting investment into such development zones. 
From a general point of view, this role was a direct outcome of the devolution 
of economic governance powers and autonomies to local state institutions at 
the beginning of the 1990s. Parallel to this devolution, there had been 
persistent centralised personnel control by the central state, and, since 1994, 
the tax redistribution system. These two parallel institutions in effect motivated 
and reinforced the local state practice of attracting inward investment. The 
priority of attracting inward investment often marginalised a variety of social 
welfare functions of local governments, as local governments all tried to 
mobilise a great deal of party/state human and financial resources to search 
for and secure external inward investment. Based on my personal 
experiences 172  in relation to investment invitation campaigns, local """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
172 When serving as the senior manager of Shanghai People Enterprise (Group) Ltd. (a top 500 Chinese 
company), I was practically involved in a series of investment invitation campaigns, communicating 
and negotiating with certain local governments who attempted to invite the company to establish some 
manufacturing bases in their localities. These local governments include, inter alia, Gangzha district 
government of Nantong city, Xuzhou municipal government, Huangshi municipal government, 
Haierbin municipal government, Panan county government of Jinhua city, Panshi county government 
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governments (both in the north and south of Jiangsu, and in other regions in 
China) usually exhibited similar patterns and features in conducting such 
campaigns. For example, such a campaign is often at the outset led by a 
head official of a local government together with his local cabinet, who will 
warmly introduce the general situations and advantages of the place, and 
propose a series of preferential offers in relation to land cost, tax exemption, 
and other state support. Manufacturing industries are on many occasions 
preferred, as factories may absorb a considerable amount of local labourers 
and entail fixed investment in local places, and they are particularly attractive 
to governments in less-developed regions. Whilst governments in more-
developed regions (such as in the south of Jiangsu) usually possess better 
business networks, and state officials with better professional skills, at the 
outset of investment invitation campaign, the presence of local head officials 
is more important to investors, as such presence provides potential investors 
with feelings of being well recognised and respected, and most local 
governments have adopted this pattern.  
Mr. W173  and Mr. S174  both pointed out to me in their respective 
interviews that the amount of inward investment had become a core criterion 
for evaluating relevant state officials’ performance, and the lower the scale of 
a government is at, the wider the applicability of this criterion is. That is to say, 
state officials at county scale or below tend to be most widely involved in 
investment invitation campaigns. And Mr. S particularly mentioned that 
although the aforesaid criterion concerned the amount of investment 
attracted, it did not take the actual performance and side effects of such 
investment into consideration in assessing an officials’ performance record. In 
other words, so long as inward investment can be financially or physically 
attracted to local sites, and result in a local GDP record, a positive record of 
an official’s performance will be secured.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
of Jilin city, Wenling county government of Taizhou city, Dandong municipal government, and so on. 
On the other hand, when serving as the personal interpreter for the Vice-direct chief of Wujin district of 
Changzhou city, I was also involved in certain investment invitation campaigns towards overseas and 
Hong Kong companies.     
173 Mr. W is a civil servant at the Administration for Industry and Commerce of Wujin district of 
Changzhou city. 
174 Mr. S is a state official served in the Labour Bureau of Wujin district of Changzhou.  
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 This emphasis on the amount of inward investment, rather than on the 
actual performance or side effects of them, is understandable if we take 
account of the finite temporal horizon of the dominant institutional time in 
China175. To local head officials, maximising GDP performance within their 
jurisdictions is of central importance to their career path, but to those basic 
functionaries, apart from fulfilling tasks assigned by their superiors, the issue 
of how to increase their personal interests through rent-seeking in the courses 
of state-led and regulated economic affairs is also important. In my interviews 
with local businessmen in Changzhou in the south, they all suggested that 
although they did receive a warm welcome from local head officials when 
being invited to invest in the north, their actual business operations 
encountered various troubles and obstacles directly or indirectly imposed by 
local functionaries after investing. Although these obstacles do not often fall 
into standard rent-seeking, they still harm entrepreneurship and industrial 
efficiency without offering the benefits of pro-business actions. On the 
contrary, Mr. W suggests that the district government of Wujin in the south 
has long adopted a tolerant, flexible attitude toward enterprises in local 
development zones with respect to, inter alia, taxation issues. According to 
Mr. W, this attitude may be seen as some sort of long-term strategy, which 
can be termed as ‘offering extra water to let fish grow up’. This means that 
local governments during a certain starting period shall tolerate the tax 
evasion actions of enterprises within their jurisdictions, with the purpose of 
allowing some enterprises to grow up, and then acquiring adequate taxes 
from them at later stage when they have become much larger tax bases. And, 
such tolerant tax policy can foster a better environment for business initiation, 
and in effect attract further investment. Suffice it to say that, whilst the priority 
of inward invitation is manifested at the national scale as a widespread 
tendency, when it was practically institutionalised at local scales in a top-down 
fashion, different places with diverse local territories and socioeconomic 
spaces and pro-entrepreneurial networks, could exhibit rather diversified 
outcomes in terms of regional economic performance, even though these 
places might possess identical forms of institutions.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
175 The articulation of the dominant institutional time is in Section 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 in Chapter 4. 
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 In summary, it can be seen in this section that Nantong city and the 
north of Jiangsu had been actively involved in the rise of development zones 
during the second stage of the economic reform, and development zones in 
Nantong did contribute to local growth through industrialisation and 
investment attraction. But, Nantong’s development also revealed a relatively 
backward tendency in the context of increasingly intense inter-locality 
competitions. If we see Nantong’s growth from an isolated perspective, the 
industrialisation process at the county scale and above was progressing. But, 
if we compare it with the regional growth in the south, which was 
characterised by the substantial attractions of global financial and 
technological resources, and their strategic coupling with local assets (local 
TVEs and development zones), it can be argued that the north did not achieve 
a satisfactory growth, and was restrained by the south, in a path-dependent 
fashion, with respect to both the contents and capacities of local growth 
patterns and local state institutions.  
In more specific terms, whilst Nantong city and the north also 
attempted to promote development zone-driven growth, such growth was 
arguably constrained by the national and provincial preferences given to the 
south, in the forms of establishing high-tech zones and approving county 
upgrading and rescaling176. In an official article written by the Research office 
of Nantong Party committee, Huang and Zhang (2000, cf: APA, 2006: 38) 
suggest that at a provincial scale, the conventional asymmetric and 
disproportional development strategy adopted by Jiangsu province visioned 
and attempted to preferentially promote the south, and then to radiate and 
help drive the north through a ripple effect. But, the north was rigidly 
influenced by the ‘Southern Jiangsu Model’, and was also short of 
complementary industrial collaboration. Thus, the north did not receive any 
effective dispersal of industry, and faced an even more disadvantaged 
position in terms of inefficient competition and duplicate construction (ibid.). 
Huang and Zhang (2000) concluded that since the provincial government of 
Jiangsu put forward the idea of ‘actively promoting the south, and accelerating 
the north’ in 1984, the emphasis of provincial development had always been """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
176  The issue of upgrading and rescaling counties in the south and its influence on regional 
development is discussed in Section 5.3.4 in Chapter 5. 
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on the south. The rapid growth of the south had not, as expected, stimulated 
the north to bloom as well. These outcomes, as a whole, arguably reflected 
the practices of China’s utilitarianism and earlier form of pragmatism. 
Indeed, Huang and Zhang’s observation correctly sketch the dilemma 
faced by the north, which lacked both endogenous growth and exogenous 
investment. This situation had not changed much until China’s economic 
reform approached its third stage, which was characterised by pervasive 
urbanisation-driven growth across different scales. As the APA’s report (2006) 
noted, thanks to fixed investment-driven growth, Nantong’s economy started 
to accelerate from 2002. This stage, arguably, not only witnessed the rise of 
local party and state’s authorities and functions, but also delineated the birth 
and progress of a convergent local growth pattern with a series of strong 
structural selectivities across local spatiotemporal horizons. It was also during 
this stage that China’s utilitarianism and pragmatism expressed their matured 
forms of institutional practices, which delivered prominent nominal growth 
figures on the one hand, and entailed a variety of intense socioeconomic 
conflicts on the other. All these issues are discussed in the next section.  
 
7.4 The mitigated regional unevenness at the third stage of the 
economic reform 
7.4.1 Brief introduction to China’s urbanisation 
Potter et al. (2008: 145) and Friedmann and Weaver (1979: 91) pointed out 
that most developing countries in seeking to catch up with developed states 
should, and indeed, did associate development with industrialisation and 
accelerated urbanisation. Whilst continuously involved in the actions of import 
substitution industrialisation (ISI) and industrialisation by invitation (I-by-I), 
regional (uneven) development in China at the third stage witnessed, and was 
mainly driven by the other growth engine described by Friedmann and 
Weaver (1979), that is, urbanisation.  
Generally speaking, urbanisation in China was mainly a state-led 
process. The essential presence of the party/state of China in socioeconomic 
matters distinguished China’s urbanisation from other westernised patterns. 
The label of ‘state-led’ entailed more than merely state interventions in 
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regional/local development, but new forms of central-local relations and 
interactions, new functions of local state institutions, and new local growth 
patterns, which rewove and redistributed socioeconomic rights and interests, 
and thus reshaped the properties and propensities of regional unevenness in 
Jiangsu. It is this complex state-led urbanisation process during the last 10 
years or so that has carved out the current regional socioeconomic situations 
in China, and shaped the institutional path-dependencies, to which future 
development is subject.  
 In terms of development, urbanisation is often seen as a process jointly 
occurring with industrialisation (Potter & Lloyd-Evans, 1998). This was also 
true in the context of China. In more specific terms, rural industrialisation 
decollectivised rural labourers, and the rise of development zones then 
geographically concentrated the flow of these labourers. Such agglomeration 
of migrant labourers, and of capital and other elements triggered and 
sustained a derivative form of urbanisation. The above line of reasoning can 
be illustrated by the so-called ‘three concentrations strategy’, which had 
widely been implemented in the south of Jiangsu province since the mid-
1990s177.  
At the first two stages of reform, urbanisation had not yet become a 
pivotal growth agenda to local governments, but was more a derivative of 
industrialisation. However, since central government asserted that the real 
estate industry had become a pillar industry to the national economy, 
urbanisation alone transited into a hegemonic growth agenda encouraged by 
governments at all local scales178. This is because that urbanisation-driven 
growth is mainly leveraged by local land. And, local governments in China 
usually exert full control over the expropriation and disposal of land within 
their territories. Chi (2013: 17) suggested that, during the last decade (2003-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
177 A detailed articulation of the ‘three concentration strategy’ in the south of Jiangsu province can be 
see in Zhu, W., Zhan, Y. & Han, Z. (2008). 
178 In a recent BBC report, Peston (2014) exemplifies the urbanisation of Wuhan city in China, pointing 
out that ‘The rate of infrastructure spending in Wuhan alone is comparable to the UK’s entire 
expenditure on renewing and improving the fabric of the country’, and ‘In this single city, hundreds of 
apartment blocks, ring roads, bridges, railways, a complete subway system and a second international 
airport are all being constructed’. Wuhan is located in Hubei province in the middle of China, which is 
relatively less developed compared with Jiangsu province, particularly the south of Jiangsu. Wuhan’s 
rapid, extensive urbanisation, as Peston (2014) argued, reflects a broader story of China’s widespread 
urbanisation, which is characterised by substantial development of infrastructure and commercial and 
residential properties. 
267""
2012), local areas in China had a common growth agenda, which was 
characterised by three factors. These are: an orientation towards GDP-
growth; the motivating and restraining system for assessing local financial 
income and cadre performance179, and strong administrative facilitations and 
interventions in regional economic development. The leading role played by 
local governments in urbanisation, according to Gu (2013: 19), is indicative of 
a critical imbalance in China’s investment structure, as government 
investments had become the major growth engine for regional development. 
In other words, China’s local governments, no matter whether they are 
located in developed or less developed regions, find that they all possess a 
substantial number of assets, which can be interchangeably transformed into 
resources and properties, as well as capital. In other words, territory and scale 
became the pivotal elements for development at the third stage of reform. 
And, the state monopoly on the primary market of land ensured and enabled 
each local government to exercise some strategic selectivities to privilege 
some types of actions and actors without seeking external resources.  
All these institutional selectivities on the meta-level accorded with the 
growth orientation, since they served to promote local economic growth. They 
also revealed clear utilitarian characters, as they tended to privilege a small 
number of actors180 with the aim of securing, within the dominant institutional 
time, a greatest net balance of satisfactions in terms of the best regional 
economic performance records. But in many other aspect, they have 
restrained, marginalised, and damaged the capabilities, rights and interests of 
the 0.21 billion migrant rural surplus labourers181. That is to say, state-led, 
urbanisation-driven growth is in accordance with the utilitarian and pragmatic 
features of China’s growth-oriented state ideology, and with the thematic tone 
of China’s economic reform182.  """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
179 This system in Chi’s terms indeed means China’s bureaucratic evaluation system, which determines 
local state officials’ promotion or demotion upon the criteria of local GDP-oriented performance.  
180  These usually include: local governments themselves, state-owned enterprises, real estate 
developers, and other related industrial sectors and companies. 
181 This may be reflected by the sharp decline in the contribution rate of the gross domestic 
consumption to China’s GDP. According to the Nobel Laureate Michael Spence, in China in 2000, 
‘private consumption accounted for 46 percent of GDP, but by 2012, it had fallen to a mere 36 percent 
of GDP’, see, Schlefer (2014). 
182 The authorities and functions of China’s state institutions (including the party and government 
organisation and state-owned sectors) evolved rather quickly and extensively during the third stage of 
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Notwithstanding the various problems caused by China’s urbanisation, 
it did lead to pervasive growth in most places at different scales in China at 
the third stage of economic reform. Such pervasive local economic growth 
and the homogeneity in local growth patterns resulted in some reduction in 
regional unevenness in Jiangsu province. The next section will explore how 
Nantong city and its sub-region Haian county developed under the 
urbanisation-driven local growth pattern, and made their unevenness with the 
south be reduced. 
 
7.4.2 Revival of the economy of Nantong city in the north subject to its 
previous lagged development  
7.4.2.1 Restrictive factors to Nantong’s urbanisation 
In the first case study in Chapter 5, we briefly glanced at some aspects of 
urbanisation in Nantong city, such as its extremely high house prices, and 
aggressive expropriation of rural land. Here we will take a more detailed view, 
looking into some local-specific factors that have shaped and affected 
Nantong’s urbanisation.  
Since 2002, there has been a sudden but quite persistent revival of the 
local economy of Nantong city (APA report, 2006). As Mr. L183 suggested, 
Nantong has been taking the lead in the north of Jiangsu in regional 
development during the third stage of reform. But, Guan (2009) suggested 
that the local growth in Nantong city could not conceal its lagged urbanisation. 
For instance, the overall urbanisation rate in Nantong in 2007 was only 
48.6%, which was 4.6% lower than the average provincial level184. Indeed, the 
10th Municipal Congress of the Party Representatives of Nantong thus made 
catching up with the south with respect to the urbanisation rate an official task.  
 Mr. L pointed out two essential factors relating to Nantong’s relatively 
low urbanisation rate. The first one lies in Nantong city’s large territory. As 
noted before, the territory of Changzhou city in the south is nearly half of that """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
the reform. This may be simply reflected by the increasingly larger personnel composition of state 
institutions, and the sharply increasing number of the applicants in the state examinations in recent 
years.  
183 Mr. L served as the vice-director of Nantong municipal office. 
184 According to a rank list proposed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Suzhou city, Wuxi 
city and Changzhou city, which are the three main cities in the south of Jiangsu, are all listed in top 20 
with respect to their urbanisation level.  
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of Nantong, and only includes 2 county-level cities. Nantong, on the contrary, 
covers 8001 km², including 2 counties, 3 county-level cities, and 1 economic 
and technological development zone, apart from the municipal districts. The 
existence of so many county-level units within its relatively large territory 
lowers the average rate of Nantong’s urbanisation. Indeed the administratively 
planned urban area of Nantong in 2002 was only 355 km², which was even 
smaller than that of Changzhou, and this small urban area was not extended 
until 2009, when Nantong municipal government rescaled one of its largest 
county-level cities, Tongzhou, into a municipal district. While this rescaling 
practice in a nominal sense extended Nantong’s urban coverage to 1521 km², 
its urban residents by 2009 were only 2.3 million, which was the same as that 
of Changzhou185 (NBS, 2012).  
This large difference in the density of urban population between 
Nantong and Changzhou reveals some key aspects of Nantong’s lagged 
urbanisation. For example, despite a similar urban population, Nantong’s 
larger urban area resulted in less per capita urban roads than in Changzhou, 
and in similar per capita floor space in urban areas with that of Changzhou186.  
According to Mr. L and Ms. C187, all these problems were closely 
related to the substantial amount of urban land in Nantong, which was 
undeveloped, but which had been administratively planned and approved by 
governments at upper scales. In 2010, such land in Nantong covered 2156 
hectare (5327.6 acre), and this ranked as number two in Jiangsu province. 
Ding188 et al., (2012) observed that the presence of this undeveloped land in 
Nantong was mainly caused by inter alia ongoing demolition resettlements, 
changes of development plans, unrealised and delayed projects, and 
operational land reservations, while this reflected inefficient development of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
185 The discussion of Nantong’s rescaling practice can be seen in Chapter 6.  
186 By 2009, the per capita urban road possession of Nantong and Changzhou are 18.8 m² and 20.2 m² 
respectively, and the per capita floor spaces in urban areas of the two cities are 35.5 m² and 37.8 m² 
respectively. These official statistics came from a report by Nantong’s Municipal Party Secretary and 
Mayor. See, Ding, D. W., Zhang, G. H. & Huang, W. D. (2012), ‘Accelerating modernisation and 
making new achievements: an analytical study on Nantong’s modernisation practice’, The Office of 
Nantong Municipal Party Committee (ed), Investigation and study of the essential projects as to 
Nantong’s development. (Internal Document not for publishing) 
187 Ms. C served as a chief officer in the Municipal Bureau of SMEs of Nantong. 
188 Ding was the Mayor of Nantong city.  
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approved land, but also meant that Nantong had much potential for 
prospective urbanisation and development.  
It is argued that, although Mayor Ding may be right about the potential 
of such undeveloped land, the realisation of this potential, as Liu et al. (2013: 
120) pointed out, requires the support of extremely large amounts of state-led 
investments, which usually may only be financed by mortgaging or selling 
land. Notwithstanding Nantong’s large territory, the commercialisation and 
capitalisation of local urban land is also subject to local governments’ debt-
paying abilities. As local debts in China had become too large because of 
rapid urbanisation at all local scales during the last ten years, central 
government in July 2013 urged an immediate audit of all local debts to 
prevent further state borrowings189. In a word, the presence of numerous local 
debts institutionally constrained Nantong’s land-leveraged urbanisation.  
 The second factor referred to by Mr. L concerned the population 
constraint on urbanisation in Nantong. An internal report of the Municipal 
population and family planning commission of Nantong stated that by 2010 
Nantong city had a population of 7.28 million, which is about 1.7 times larger 
than that of Changzhou city. And, among the 7.28 million, 1.24 million are 
working in agricultural sectors, 2.13 million are industrial practitioners, and the 
rest of the working population are all in service sectors. This made the 
commission conclude that Nantong suffered from a lagged urbanisation, 
compared to the three cities in the south of Jiangsu190. Moreover, this report 
also suggests that Nantong is a population-exporting city, which is different 
from most cities in the Yangtze Delta that more often than not tend to absorb 
rural migrants labourers to support local manufacturing sectors.  
In a word, there were numerous local people (usually young labourers 
and graduates) migrating out of Nantong each year, since ‘Nantong’s built 
urban area is too small to have sufficient labour-absorbing capacity’ (NPFPC, 
2012). In addition, although Nantong enjoys a nationally well-known """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
189 The conclusion by central government’s audit was that by 2010, local governments’ debts had 
accumulated to about ten thousand billion RMB, which approximately accounted for 25% of China’s 
GDP; and the IMF estimated that China’s actual government debts could have reached 50% of its GDP 
(Liu et al., 2013: 126). 
190 China’s official criteria for assessing a city’s urbanisation rate are mainly based on, inter alia, the 
percentage ratio of urban population among its total population, and on that of the industrial and 
service sectors’ outputs among its local GDP. 
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reputation for its high school education, the annual rates of graduated high 
school and university students who return to Nantong to work are only 
respectively 40% and 1% respectively (ibid.) Mr. W and Mr. Y. confirmed this 
phenomenon, observing that many students who are from the north and 
studied in the south tended to work and live in the south after their graduation, 
rather than go back to their hometowns. Another notable point that limited 
Nantong’s urbanisation is the average age of local residents. Whilst the 
enhancement of Nantong’s urbanisation rate requires more labour transfer 
from local agricultural sectors into service sectors, the NPFPC (2012) 
questioned in its report the feasibility of such transfer since about 81.2% of all 
the local agricultural labourers are above the age of 50. That is to say, even if 
all the 0.23 million local young and middle-aged agricultural labourers transfer 
to local service sectors, the percentage ratio of service sector labour among 
Nantong’s total labourers is still much lower than that of the three cities in the 
south. This can be seen in the following table, which shows a comparison 
between Nantong and the three cities in the south in 2010 with respect to their 
respective labour market structure (NPFPC, 2012:).  
 
Table 7.2: A comparison between Nantong and the three cities in the 
south in 2010 with respect to their respective labour market structure  
Region Total 
Labourers 
Regional/Local 
GDP 
Ratio of 
the 
agricultural 
labourers 
Ratio of 
the 
industrial 
labourers 
Ratio of 
the 
service 
labourers 
Jiangsu 
province  
44.86 
million 
4090.3 billion 
RMB 
22.8% 44.0% 33.2% 
Nantong 
city 
4.61 
million 
341.7 billion 
RMB 
27.1% 46.2% 26.7% 
Suzhou 
city 
6.62 
million 
916.8 billion 
RMB 
3.8% 64.2% 32.0% 
Wuxi city 3.75 
million 
575.8 billion 
RMB 
5.0% 60.4% 34.6% 
Changzhou 2.68 297.6 billion 12.0% 55.3% 32.7% 
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city million RMB 
 
 
Generally speaking, the two major factors 191  that had constrained 
urbanisation in Nantong, and indeed, in the north of Jiangsu province at large, 
were to some extent interrelated, and followed from Nantong’s previous 
lagged regional development. In more specific terms, Nantong’s slow and 
insufficient rural industrialisation during the first stage of reform led to a weak 
growth of TVEs in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and then, this weak 
endogenous business community could not support the growth of 
development zone-driven economies in the context of intense inter-urban 
competitions for inward investment and new technologies. Therefore, its 
insufficient rural industrialisation meant that a large amount of rural labourers 
could not be transferred into industrial sectors, but chose to migrate to other 
city-regions (on many occasions, to the cities in the south). In a word, 
Nantong’s lagged development with respect to local TVEs and development 
zones exerted, in a path-dependent fashion, critical constraining effects on its 
state-led urbanisation growth.  
These arguments indeed differed in some aspects from the official view 
which asserted that Nantong’s industrialisation was just lagging behind its 
urbanisation192. It is argued that this official view over-simplifies and neglects 
the causalities in terms of path-dependency between Nantong’s major local 
growth patterns at different stages of reform. However, a notable point must 
be recalled here. This refers to the broken nexus between industrialisation 
and urbanisation under the urbanisation-driven local growth pattern at the 
third stage of China’s economic reform193. Although Nantong’s urbanisation 
was constrained by some path-dependencies, it was, as will be seen in the 
following discussion, still playing a key role in promoting overall local 
economic growth. In other words, although industrialisation in a lagged status 
undermined some rudimentary elements for promoting Nantong’s urbanisation """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
191 These refer to: a substantial amount of undeveloped urban land and the high percentage ratio of 
agricultural labourers. 
192 This official conclusion can be seen in, for example, the APA report (2006), and a series of official 
speeches made by the Party Secretary of Nantong, and the Mayor of Nantong.  
193 See section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5.  
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in a conventional way, the broken nexus between these two key processes 
enabled Nantong’s urbanisation to progress, just like all other city-regions 
which adopted the urbanisation-driven growth pattern, in a utilitarian and 
pragmatic fashion to contribute to high GDP growth, and a consequent unfair 
socioeconomic distribution and unevenness within its own territory.  
 
7.4.2.2 Achievements and side effects of Nantong’s urbanisation 
According to the 12th Five-Year Plan Summary for Nantong’s Economic and 
Social Development194 (2011), ‘during the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan 
(2006-2010), Nantong had secured great achievements in terms of the 
successful establishment and utilisation of Su-Tong Bridge, which connects 
the south and north of Jiangsu province across the Yangtze River, the 
successful building and utilisation of the three principal seaports in Nantong 
city, the large-scaled urban construction, and the growth of large development 
zones’195.  
Notably, the four prominent achievements addressed by this plan 
summary are all concerned with projects related to infrastructure and property 
construction, and the underlying motivation of focusing on these two sorts of 
projects is arguably premised upon both economic and political 
considerations.  
Regarding the economic consideration, it has been suggested in 
Chapter 6 that residential and commercial property development in many 
cities in China contributed more than half of their gross local revenues. Local 
land revenue derives from a land-transferring fee, which usually amounts to 
20%-40% of the final real estate price, and from transaction-related taxes, 
which usually amount to 30%-40% of the final real estate price. This means 
that roughly 50%-80% of the actual market price of a real estate property 
consists of different state revenues (Yuan, 2012: 24).  
As the Plan Summary (2011: 2) observed, Nantong’s gross state 
incomes grew dramatically from 17.11 billion RMB at the end of the 10th Five-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
194 This Plan Summary was passed on Feb 24th, 2011 in the forth conference of the 13th Municipal 
People’s Congress of Nantong.  
195 This paragraph is expressed at the very beginning of the Summary Plan, which serves to deliver an 
official evaluation, defining the most crucial and obvious characteristic of Nantong’s socioeconomic 
development during a specified period. 
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Year Plan (roughly the year of 2005) to 71.34 billion RMB at the end of the 
11th Five-Year Plan (roughly the year of 2010). An interesting comparison may 
be found. It is noted that although Nantong’s gross state income increased 
more than four-fold during the five years from 2006 to 2010, the average 
annual income of the urban and rural residents in Nantong, only increased 
about 1.8 times during the same five years period196.  
The big difference between the increasing rate of local government’s 
income and that of local residents’ income reflects, on the one hand, the 
financial importance of land and property development to local government, 
as well as an extremely unfair distribution of the gross regional wealth among 
the local state institutions, property development related practitioners, and the 
majority of urban and rural labourers. On the other hand, as a big portion of 
local government’s financial income derives from the land transferring fee and 
property development related taxes197, the dramatic rise in such income 
indeed also reflects the prosperity of Nantong’s urbanisation.  
Regarding the political consideration, the enhanced local state income 
did not favour the majority population in egalitarian ways, but was spent on 
most occasions on urban infrastructure projects, which could bring about 
better performance records under China’s performance evaluation system. As 
Wu and Deng’s (2013) empirical research on 283 municipal-level cities in 
China pointed out, local state investments in urban infrastructures and 
encouraging residential/commercial property development were the most 
effective measures that can be used by municipal party secretaries and 
mayors to get promoted, whereas state investments on, for example, 
environment protection matters tended to undermine promotion prospects.  
After briefly clarifying the political and economic considerations that 
motivate local governments to promote urbanisation mainly through 
infrastructure and property development, we will look into these two sorts of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
196 The average annual income of urban residents in Nantong increased from 11590 RMB to 21825 
during the period from 2006 to 2010, and the average annual income of rural residents in Nantong 
increased from 5501 RMB to 9914 RMB during the same period.  
197 Albeit there is no data directly showing the precise proportion of Nantong’s gross land transferring 
fee within the local government’s gross financial income, it has been found from separate sources that 
Nantong’s gross land transferring fee in 2010 is about 45.4 billion RMB (see data collected by the 
www.soufun.com which is one of the largest real estate agent website in China), and Nantong local 
government’s gross financial income in 2010 is 71.3 billion RMB. Thus, it is calculated that land 
transferring fee accounts for about 63.7% of the local state financial income. 
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projects more closely to see how they affected the local development in 
Nantong city.  
Regarding the infrastructure construction in Nantong, Mr. C198 puts 
forward a dialectic view of Nantong’s massive infrastructure investment during 
the third stage of the reform. He suggests that, while the massive local 
infrastructure investment in Nantong reflects a common trend of using 
infrastructure investment to enhance local GDP and secure better 
performance records for state bureaucratic promotion, some of them were 
built for one specific aim, that is, the municipal strategy of ‘economically 
integrating into the south of Jiangsu province’. Such projects include, for 
example, the Su-Tong Bridge199, which was started in 2003 and completed in 
2008, and a series of cooperation development zones co-established by 
Nantong and the cities in the south of Jiangsu. The strategic importance of the 
Su-Tong Bridge lies in the fact that, with the successful completion of the 
bridge, there is now a motorway directly connecting the territory of Nantong 
with that of the south of Jiangsu province. A chief director of the Gangzha 
District of Nantong once mentioned to me a famous joke that, although 
Nantong in Chinese literally meant ‘go through to the south’, the reality was ‘it 
cannot go through to the south because of the Yangtze River’. Indeed, many 
interviewees said that the absence of any bridges between Nantong and the 
south made Nantong geographically isolated and marginalised from the south 
and Shanghai. They all saw this as one of the key reasons resulting in 
regional unevenness. Notably, when I asked why a railway was not integrated 
into the Su-Tong Bridge200. Mr. C says that although railways can contribute 
more to inter-urban industrial and economic cooperation, the authorities of 
planning and constructing motorways and railways under the current central 
institutional arrangements fall into the different Ministries, including, the 
Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
198 Mr. C serves as a division director of Shanghai Railway Bureau, who supervises all the railway 
matters within Nantong’s territory. 
199 The full name of this bridge is Su-Tong Yangtze River Bridge, which has a span of 1,088 meters, 
and it was the cable-stayed bridge with the longest main span in the world. Its two side spans are 300 
meters each, and there are also four small cable spans. See:  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sutong_Bridge (accessed on March 5th, 2014) 
200 Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge, which was built in the 1960s and connects the south and north of 
Jiangsu, has built-in railways together with motorways. There should not be any technical problems for 
doing this.  
276""
and the Ministry of Railway. This separation of power at the central and local 
scales may give rise to difficulties for carrying out ministerial cooperation. 
Another reason for not having a railway bridge, according to Mr. C, lies in the 
local industrial structure and resource endowment in Nantong. The principal 
industrial outputs of Nantong for Shanghai and the south of Jiangsu are 
agricultural products such as vegetables and eggs, and these do not entail the 
necessity of having railway transportation. Mr. C also says that, compared to 
increased multi-track railways in the south, which reflects dynamic local 
economies there, most railways in Nantong are still of single track. And, an 
anonymous local head official of Nantong observed that, while the opening of 
the Su-Tong Bridge does contribute to integrating Nantong into the 
sociospatial and economic circle of the south of Jiangsu, the prominent 
Shanghai-Nanjing Intercity High-Speed Railway201, which started to operate in 
2010, has in effect marginalised Nantong and the north of Jiangsu as a whole 
again from the south.  
Compared to the Su-Tong Bridge, cooperation development zones in 
Nantong have more complicated implications for Nantong’s growth and 
attempted integration into the south. Zhang Guohua, the current Mayor of 
Nantong proposed in an internal municipal meeting that the development of 
Nantong should focus on promoting and transiting local development zones 
through effectively coordinating industrialisation and urbanisation, with the aim 
of building Nantong into a modernised new city with first-class development 
zones202. In addition, Mayor Zhang stressed the importance of complementary 
interactions between industrial operations in development zones and urban 
lives. Whilst Mayor Zhang seemed to attempt to re-connect the broken nexus 
between urbanisation and industrialisation, some doubts emerge as to the 
feasibility of Mayor Zhang’s strategy. This strategy is indeed highly identical to """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
201 The Shanghai-Nanjing High-Speed Railway is a 301 kilometres (187 miles) long high-speed rail. 
The construction of this high-speed railway began in July 2008. The line went into test operations in 
early April 2010, and opened for full service on July 1, 2010. The line has a design speed of 350 km/h 
(217 mph). The journey time between the two cities has been shortened from 120 minutes to 73 
minutes on non-stop service. According to the arrangements of related departments, 120 pairs of trains 
are operating on the line, and the time interval between the services is 5 minutes at the shortest. The 
railway links some major cities in the Yangtze River Delta, including Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, and 
Zhenjiang, effectively making the southern Jiangsu city-belt operate like a single metropolitan region. 
See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai–Nanjing_Intercity_Railway (accessed on Mar 4th, 2014)  
202 See, The speech in municipal the meeting as to the open up policy issues, by Mayor Zhang Guohua, 
Sep 27th, 2012.  
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the chief growth pattern of the south of Jiangsu during the second stage of the 
reform, in particular, to the ‘three concentration strategy’ extensively adopted 
in the south. As Nantong had not been able to secure a prominent local 
economic performance during the second stage in the context of inter-urban 
competitions, it is reasonable to doubt whether a return to the old growth 
pattern may work.  
Mayor Zhang’s answers to these doubts seem to lie in the very 
transition from previous inter-urban competition to present inter-urban 
cooperation. Such cooperation is specifically embodied by, inter alia, the Su-
Tong technology industrial park and the Xi-Tong technology industrial park, 
which are being collaboratively constructed and run respectively by Suzhou 
and Nantong (Suzhou is in the south of Jiangsu) and Wuxi and Nantong 
(Wuxi is also in the south of Jiangsu) (Zhang, 2012). As most of these 
cooperation development zones in Nantong are still under construction during 
the third stage of the reform, their impacts on regional unevenness cannot be 
assessed in this research. Suffice it to say that the most important event that 
directly triggered this institutional transition from regional competition to 
cooperation is the most recent global financial crisis. Generally speaking, the 
financial crisis has profoundly affected China’s export-oriented growth engine, 
resulting in a series of severe and interrelated problems such as the extensive 
recession of the export-oriented manufacturing sector, and the reflux of 
unemployed migrant labourers back from urban/semi urban regions to rural 
and inland areas. The reduction of global market demands and the increase in 
the various transaction costs for running a labour-intensive manufacturing 
enterprise, together forced a great number of enterprises in the south of 
Jiangsu, to either upgrade their products and production, or sociospatially 
transfer their production bases to less developed regions, which can provide 
lower land costs and more labourers thanks to the return of migrant labourers. 
Nantong’s 12th Five-Year Plan Summary has outlined a strategy to selectively 
receive industrial transfers from Shanghai and the south of Jiangsu as a key 
part of Nantong’s regional cooperation strategy. It is thus against this global 
background that some regional cooperation projects between the south and 
the north became possible. But, to what extent such cooperation can 
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contribute to the reduction of regional unevenness remains a doubtful 
question.  
Mr. A, who is a chief manager of a large chemical factory, suggested to 
me that the factory run by his family was a typical TVE located in Suzhou city 
in the south, which was later privatised. His factory suffered quite severely 
during the financial crises and had been mandated by local government to 
transfer out of Suzhou by 2011 because of new environment-protection 
policies. Eventually, his factory was transferred to Nantong city. As Mr. A said, 
most factories transferring out of the south are in the labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries and they are also environmentally contaminating. 
There have recently been a lot of local concerns over such transfers. It was 
noted in Chapter Six that an aggressive local protest against the 
establishment of a paper manufacturing enterprise, occurred in Qidong, which 
is a county-level city in Nantong, on July 28th, 2012. In this protest, the Mayor 
of Qidong city was caught and put under detention by local protestors who 
forced him to express a position against the establishment of such factories. 
The outcome of this event was that the Nantong municipal government issued 
an official notice to rescind the paper factory project203. Mr. A admitted that 
this protest resulted in a delay to the transfer of his factory. It is fair to 
conclude that although regional cooperation in the form of industrial transfer 
could contribute to regional growth of the north, but it might also give rise to 
many negative effects. 
Regarding property development in Nantong city, since the land supply 
aspect of the real estate industry has already been assessed in Chapter Six, 
this section hence only focuses on the issues related the house prices in 
Nantong. Generally speaking, it is argued that the financial capacities of the 
majority of urban and migrant residents are directly and/or indirectly 
undermined by the prosperity of the real estate industry. As noted before, high 
land transferring fees are included in the final house prices, which are born by 
consumers. Hence, it can be reasonably assumed that the dramatic rise of 
Nantong’s state income leads to a high average house price in Nantong.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
203 See, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/0728/c70731-18618626.html (accessed on March, 6th, 
2014) 
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But, the reality has turned out to be even worse than this assumption. 
Ms. J204 pointed out that Nantong’s average house price was unique among 
the so-called third tier cities, as its average price was even higher than many 
second tier cities. But, this high average price does not reflect high market 
demands in Nantong. On the contrary, Ms. J suggested that Nantong’s real 
estate market in recent years has suffered consistently low trading volumes, 
usually about 900 flats/houses per month. Notably, the average house price of 
Nantong has been consistently higher than that of Changzhou for more than 7 
years. Its average house price in 2010 was 7541 RMB, which was No. 30 
among the top 100 cities of high house prices in China, whereas Changzhou 
was ranked at No. 40 with an average price of 7087. In 2013, Nantong’s rank 
was raised to No. 21, whereas Changzhou’s rank was No. 32 and Wuxi205 
was ranked after Nantong as well206. Ms. J observed that Nantong’s high 
house prices and low trading volumes and occupancy rates, while contributing 
to extraordinary local GDP growth, entailed the risks of inefficient land 
development and house bubbles.  
And, high house price tended to drain investment away from the ‘real 
side’ of China’s national economy, driving it into real estate sectors to pursue 
higher profits. This greatly damaged investment in China’s labour-intensive 
manufacturing industry, and then directly gave rise to massive unemployment, 
low incomes for the majority of migrant labourers, and incapability to achieve 
industrial upgrading. This also reveals the broken nexus between China’s 
urbanisation and industrialisation.  
From a micro-perspective, high house prices also affect domestic 
purchasing powers of the majority, further widening the wealth gap and 
reducing the contribution made by consumption to the national economy. 
Whilst the urbanisation-driven local economy encouraged the prosperity of the 
real estate sector in Nantong, the overly high house prices had, as the 
People’s Daily (2013) criticised, increased the costs and obstacles to further 
sustainable urbanisation. Arguably, Nantong showed at this stage of the 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
204 Ms. J is a senior journalist of the provincial official broadcasting of Jiangsu (JSBC). 
205 Wuxi city is also located in the south of Jiangsu. 
206 The house prices of all cities in China were shown by the data of the Chinese real estate information 
system (CREIS) collected and published by the State Council of China.  
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economic reform a typical form of pseudo-urbanisation, which was critically 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
7.4.2.3 Regional uneven development during the third stage of economic 
reform 
Notwithstanding the side effects of Nantong’s urbanisation-driven growth, it is 
argued that, from a holistic perspective, regional unevenness between 
Nantong and the south of Jiangsu was in some aspect being reduced. This 
can be illustrated by the following comparisons.  
In viewing Nantong’s overall development against that of the south at 
the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan, Ding et al. (2011: 7) observed that, by 
2010, Nantong was approximately equal to the average level of the south in 
2007 in some key economic performance indicators, and regional unevenness 
was in many aspects being reduced. As Ding is the current Party Secretary of 
Nantong, his observation largely represents the official view. The charts below 
illustrate this reduced unevenness at the third stage of China’s economic 
reform.  
 
Table 7.3: The comparison between the regional GDP of Nantong and 
the average of the south of Jiangsu province from 2003 to 2010 (Ding, et 
al., 2011: 8) 
Year The regional 
GDP of Nantong 
(billion RMB) 
The average 
GDP of the south 
The ratio of 
Nantong against 
the average of 
the south 
2003 98.018 156.298 62.7% 
2004 119.574 191.640 62.4% 
2005 148.380 231.781 64.0% 
2006 178.839 273.285 65.4% 
2007 216.369 324.838 66.6% 
2008 259.313 382.230 67.8% 
2009 287.280 423.058 67.9% 
2010 246.567 503.708 68.8% 
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Table 7.4: The comparison between the gross state income of Nantong 
city and the average of the south of Jiangsu province from 2003 to 2010 
(Ding, et al., 2011: 9) 
Year The gross 
governmental 
income of 
Nantong (billion 
RMB) 
The average 
gross 
governmental 
income of the 
south 
The ratio of 
Nantong against 
the average of 
the south 
2003 11.699 24.411 47.9% 
2004 13.872 31.608 43.9% 
2005 17.119 39.779 43.0% 
2006 21.757 49.358 44.1% 
2007 30.071 63.466 47.4% 
2008 39.021 79.577 49.0% 
2009 48.610 95.750 50.8% 
2010 71.336 148.271 48.1% 
 
If we compare Nantong city with the south in 2005 and 2010 respectively with 
respect to some key economic indicators such as gross fixed asset 
investment, gross local consumption, and gross value of exports and imports, 
all such indicators show that Nantong has consistently been reducing regional 
unevenness in most aspects except two, those are, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and disposable personal income (DPI) of local urban residents (Ding, et 
al., 2011: 8). If we use Changzhou as the specific counterpart to Nantong, it 
can be seen that Nantong lagged behind with respect to per capita local GDP, 
DPI of local urban and rural residents, and the rate of urbanisation by 2009 
(Ding, et al, 2011: 5).  
It is thus argued that, while the lagged general socioeconomic 
development of Nantong may be attributed to its path-dependent growth of 
TVEs and inter-locality competition-constrained growth of development zones, 
its low urbanisation rate and low personal income were ascribed to its 
unreasonably high local house prices. And, although local state institutions 
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and a few interest groups had benefited from high house prices, not only were 
the generalizable interests of the majority of local and migrant residents 
undermined, but they also produced a risky economic bubble that made this 
growth pattern unsustainable. It is noted that Changzhou in the south has also 
suffered extremely high vacancy rates in residential property. And, this 
reflects the homogeneity in their local growth patterns.  
 Finally, a crucial consideration, which has to be taken account in 
comparing Nantong and Changzhou, is that Nantong has a larger population 
as well as almost twice the territory of Changzhou. Thus, although Nantong 
has secured a larger gross local GDP than Changzhou, it still lagged behind 
Changzhou in almost all the per capita socioeconomic indicators except some 
trivial and ambiguous issues such as the number of PC ownership per 100 
households, overall social satisfaction to public security etc. (Ding, et al., 
2011). But regarding the key indicators such as per capita GDP, Nantong has 
even fallen behind some cities in the north. The following table shows a 
comparison on the per capita GDP between Nantong and Changzhou in 
recent years (Ding, et al., 2011).  
 
Table 7.5: A comparison on the per capita GDP between Nantong and 
Changzhou 
Year/ per capita 
GDP 
Nantong city / rank in the 
province 
Changzhou city / rank in 
the province 
2008 36199 RMB / No. 7 51746 RMB / No. 3 
2009 40231 RMB / No. 7 56861 RMB / No. 3 
2010 48083 RMB / No. 7 67327 RMB / No. 3 
2011 56005 RMB / No. 7 77485 RMB / No. 3 
2012 62506 RMB / No. 7 85040 RMB / No. 4 
 
During the third stage of China’s reform, Wuxi city and Suzhou city 
interchangeably occupied the first two ranks in Jiangsu province with respect 
to per capita GDP, and, it is also noted that, Nanjing city (which is the capital 
city of Jiangsu), Zhenjiang city (which is located in the south but not 
conventionally included in the core economic circle of the south), and 
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Yangzhou city (which is located in the north, and is famous for its tourism and 
being the hometown of Jiang Zemin the former Chinese president), have all 
been ahead of Nantong city. This in some ways reveals that not only Nantong 
city, but also other cities in Jiangsu province are also contributing to reduced 
regional unevenness. 
In order to address this disproportionality in terms of unequal 
population and territory in analysing regional unevenness, Haian county of 
Nantong will be analysed in more detail, since it possesses a similar territory 
and population to those of Wujin county-level city of Changzhou.  
Before we move into the analysis of Haian county, a brief summary of 
Nantong at the third stage of the economic reform is worth outling. The whole 
course of Nantong’s development at the third stage was primarily 
characterised by its rapid urbanisation, which was exemplified by a series of 
big infrastructure projects, and a large number of high-priced local real estate 
projects. Local state institutions played a leading role in shaping and pushing 
forward these projects. As noted in Chapter Six, such leading roles were 
based on, and realised by, a state monopoly over a distorted local land 
supply. Although Nantong’s urbanisation was in some aspects constrained by 
its lagged industrialisation at earlier stages, the extensive scale of 
urbanisation within Nantong’s large territory still helped to considerably 
improve its local growth. This revealed a clear tendency of reducing regional 
disparity although in a somewhat unsustainable way.  
The reason for saying Nantong’s urbanisation-driven growth is 
unsustainable lies in three issues. First, local growth that is based on large 
infrastructural investment has resulted in a substantial amount of local debts 
born by local government. As local government officials do not have to be 
responsible for local debts that go beyond their office term207, many local 
governments in China now have huge debts, which have forced central 
government to limit this growth pattern.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
207 The CPC Organisation Department has recently issued a policy paper, stating to change the old 
bureaucratic evaluation system by making local state officials be responsible for all local debts, which 
are borrowed within their office terms. See: ‘Notice as to modifying/improving the evaluation on the 
record of performance of local party/state head officials’, CPC Organisation Department Issued [2013]  
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Second, whilst local governments and real estate developers have 
benefited from urbanisation, the unfair distribution of wealth, and the removal 
of rural residents from their land have given rise to increasingly intense social 
discontent and conflicts. These have led to challenges to the public 
consensus on the growth-oriented state ideology, and in turn to the regime 
legitimacy of the party/state of China.  
Third, rapid urbanisation together with industrialisation, have brought 
about increasing environmental concerns, which can also limit the continuity 
of such growth pattern.  
 
7.4.3 Haian’s local development at the third stage of the economic 
reform 
It was noted at the beginning of this Chapter that Haian county was, during 
the first two stage of the economic reform, regarded as a so-called ‘Little 
Sixth’208 because of the lowest economic performance among all the districts 
and counties in Nantong. This began to change when approaching the third 
stage of China’s reform, and when, perhaps to some extent coincidentally, 
Zhang Shushan became the County Mayor of Haian in 2002, and later the 
Party Secretary of Haian in 2006.  
To particularly stress Zhang seems to contradict my research 
epistemology, as it is inclined to focus on the rationales and roles of state 
ideologies and institutions, and their essential logics and parameters within 
China’s 30 years of economic reform. However, this does not mean that the 
actions of individual officials may be neglected. On the contrary, local official 
leaders are endowed with great power, but are not subject to sufficient official 
scrutiny. But, in promoting local development, most local official leaders tend 
to hold a conservative position, adopting those mainstream growth patterns of 
the day. As most local head officials’ office terms are subject to the temporal 
horizon of the dominant institutional time, which covers five years or less, not 
all local head officials have the time and the courage to bear the political risk 
of experimenting radical reform initiatives for local development. Thus, whilst """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
208 See China’s official press, Jiefang Daily, ‘The Little Sixth now becomes The Big First – The 
integration of limited resources by Haian county for promoting enterprises and employment’, 2011 
May 9th 
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local governments often interacted through inter-urban competitions, such 
competition do not involve conflicts between institutional innovations with 
substantive differences. This has been particularly so since China explicitly 
clarified the ideological issue of establishing the socialist market economy in 
1994. And, this is how the phenomenon of the homogeneity of local growth 
patterns becomes possible209.  
Quoting the above issues serves to identify the practical economic 
difficulties and political risks facing local head officials who dare to attempt to 
make institutional innovations. This is one of the major considerations, which 
leads me to concentrate on state institutions and ideologies. But although 
there is no such a thing as the ‘Haian Model’, it seems that some distinctive 
features expressed by Zhang’s strategies and practices for local growth in 
Haian should not be overlooked, because of, not only Zhang’s long term of 
office in Haian, but also the outstanding economic performance attained by 
Haian at the third stage.  
In a seminar held for my fieldwork, Mr. D210 emphasised that the leap 
of Haian county, since the inception of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), 
had relied on, and empowered by, the local industrialisation strategy in the 
interest of both Haian county and its local residents. A key implication of Mr. 
D’s statement lies in the fact that, during the third stage of reform, Haian still 
focused on local industrialisation, even though urbanisation had become a 
pervasive local growth engine in many places. Mr. Z211 suggested in this 
seminar that the industrialisation-oriented local development strategy was """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
209 Since the mid-1990s, only two local growth/governance models with outstanding characteristics and 
performances have attracted national attention, and been named after the relevant cities/regions. These 
are: the Chongqing Model and the Guangdong Model. Chongqing city is one of the 4 direct-controlled 
municipalities along with Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin city. The Chongqing Model was formed and 
promoted by the famous former party secretary of Chongqing, Bo Xilai, who has recently been arrested 
and sentenced during his office term in Chongqing. The Guangdong Model was promoted by the 
former party secretary of Guangdong province, Wang Yang, who currently serves as the vice-premier 
of China. And, Wang is the one who first puts forward that ‘promotion-related achievement needs not 
be completed within his prefecture’. The Guangdong Model was confined to, and experimented in, 
Guangdong province, which has always been the most open and liberalised region in China’s economic 
reform. Contrary to the emphasis on economic growth and open environment, Bo’s Chongqing Model 
was characterised mainly by its stress on social justice and fair distribution. But, even these two models 
had now largely decayed. Guangdong province has since the reform always been the most developed 
region in China, and this fact, arguably, makes the Guangdong Model less innovative. The Chongqing 
Model stands out under the growth-oriented state ideology, and has been criticised by Bo’s political 
opponents, who claimed that it is reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution. 
210 Mr. D is the current Mayor of Haian county. 
211 Mr. Z serves as the Director of Haian’s Development and Reform Commission."
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chiefly determined by Haian’s Party Secretary Zhang, and this strategy indeed 
reflected both Haian’s advantages and disadvantages.  
In more specific terms, Haian is in a disadvantageous position with 
respect to its geographical location, as it has no link to the Yangtze River and 
has a rather short coastline (8.55 km). And, Haian’s rural industrialisation and 
development zone growth ranked the lowest among all the 6 counties and 
districts of Nantong city. One of the most severe factors that restricted Haian’s 
local industrialisation at that time was the highly scattered local administrative 
division. This factor also financially and institutionally constrained Haian from 
conducting extensive urbanisation. As Mr. U212 pointed out in the workshop 
that, by the end of 1984, Haian consisted of 42 towns and villages; and by the 
end of 1995, this was rescaled into 34 towns and villages. Since 2000, more 
aggressive rescaling practices had been carried out. By 2001, there were 22 
towns and villages. In 2004, this number had been reduced to 14. Finally, by 
the end of 2011, Haian’s administrative territory was rescaled to include 10 
towns and 3 development zones (one National development zone, one high-
tech industry zone, and one new urban zone).  
It can thus be seen that the general trend of Haian’s internal local 
rescaling practice during the last decade was to rescale and merge small 
villages and towns into larger towns. This pattern of rescaling practice, as Mr. 
Zhang noted, serves a twofold objective. This refers, first, to rescaling the 
scattered administrative places, and then integrating their local assets and 
resources, with the purpose of forming a number of prominent units, and 
strengthening the physical facilities and institutional capacities of these units, 
which may in turn help promote industrial fostering and agglomeration; and, 
second, to accomplishing this rescaled territorial and institutional 
arrangements in order to prepare for, and facilitate, Haian’s future extensive 
urbanisation. It can thus be argued that from the perspective of the TPSN 
approach, territory, scale and rescaling of institutions played a key role in local 
development in Haian, they made difference to the sociospatial foundation, 
upon which Haian’s industrialisation and urbanisation can be processed.  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
212 Mr. U serves as the Director of Haian County Office. 
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Zhang’s strategy is indicative of an interactive and balanced 
development plan between local industrialisation and urbanisation. That is to 
say, rather than promoting the state-led, urban property- and infrastructure-
oriented pseudo-urbanisation process, Zhang, during his ten years term, 
focused on optimising the strategic territorial and scalar composition for 
Haian’s rural industrialisation on the one hand, and, on promoting a set of 
industrially specialised, endogenous industrial agglomerations that fit with the 
local territorial and scalar composition on the other. In Zhang’s words, 
‘Haian’s urban and rural planning shall be designed in a strategic way, not 
only corresponding to the national strategies, but also to coordinate the local 
land use plan and the urban construction plan, and thus to promote local 
industrial agglomeration’. In short, Mr. Zhang sees industrialisation as a key 
prerequisite to proper urbanisation. 
In practice, Zhang’s local growth pattern did give rise to a highly 
accelerated local development in Haian county, and this prominent 
performance record has led to a promotion for him (Mr. Zhang now serves as 
a Member of the Standing Committee of Nantong Municipal Party Committee, 
and the Director of Propaganda Department of Nantong Municipal Party 
Committee). Before elaborating certain specific issues about Haian’s 
development during the third stage of reform, two seemingly connected issues 
are worth mentioning. First, Zhang’s 10 years term of office (5 years as the 
County Mayor and 5 years as the County Party Secretary) in one place was 
by no means a common practice in China. According to a report by the First 
Finance Daily (2013), the average office term of county party secretary in 
Jiangsu province between 1998 and 2010 was 3.53 years, and this had been 
one of the longest average office terms in China. It is thus argued that 
Zhang’s long, consistent office term in Haian provided him with sufficient time 
to initiate and realise some policies with long-term effects. This is indeed a 
great advantage, which is not usually enjoyed by other local head officials, 
who tend to comform to the dominant institutional time and choose to conduct 
short-term GDP-oriented policies. The second issues lies in the fact that, after 
Zhang’s promotion, Haian county passed its holistic urban development plan 
for the period between 2012 and 2030, and the local government of Haian 
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now begins to concentrate much more on urbanisation, seeing it as a new, 
key growth engine (Lu & Zhou, 2013). Whilst this official expression of 
prospective growth strategy may only nominally serve to correspond to the 
new Premier Li Keqiang’s national strategy of making new-urbanisation the 
chief growth engine, it must be noted that Mr. Zhang’s political legacies 
(including: rescaled and integrated territorial composition, enhanced local 
industrial bases and business communities, and agglomerated and 
specialised development zones) have not only made Haian county already 
prepared for extensive urbanisation, but also prevented Haian from suffering 
the problems of unsustainable local debts and severe environmental 
contamination, which are now pervasively faced by many local governments 
in China. In a word, it can be argued that the length of a local head official’s 
term of office is of importance to the performance of his territory. 
In turning our attention to the specific local growth pattern of Haian 
during the third stage of China’s reform, Mr. Zhang points out three key 
elements, apart from the serial territorial rescaling and integration. The first 
key element refers to fostering and promoting more local enterprises with 
unique local competitiveness with the purpose of creating strong an 
endogenous growth engine. In practice local government tried to target a 
number of local private SMEs with the most potential, and provided them with 
a series of preferential policies and financial support with the aim of fostering 
them to be examples for others.  
In targeting and fostering local SMEs, local government did not choose 
to promote multifarious sectors, but instead concentrated on a few sectors, 
which exhibit unique local features and exert local productive 
competitiveness. After investigations, the local government made textile, 
equipment manufacturing, and high-tech industries the three principal sectors. 
As a result, during the period of the 10th Five-Year Plan, Haian attained 32.5% 
annual average industrial output growth rate. This is 1.6 times more than 
planned. And, Haian’s local gross industrial output reached 45.4 billion RMB 
in 2005, which is 4 times that of 2000. By 2005, there were 55 local large-
scale enterprises in Haian, whereas there were only 6 enterprises of this scale 
in 2000.  
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The second key element refers to regional cooperation. In the 8th 
Conference of the 10th County Party Committee of Haian in 2005, local 
government for the first time proposed the aim of ‘socioeconomically 
integrating into the south of Jiangsu, and competing for being in the Top 100 
counties in China’. As Mr. Zhang suggests, the strategy of socioeconomically 
integrating into the south of Jiangsu does not mean being path-dependent on 
the growth pattern of the south. On the contrary, it will not follow the path of 
the south, since this may lead to industrial isomorphism, and Haian has no 
advantage in competing with the south in similar sectors. According to Mr. 
Zhang, the critical significance of integrating into the south lies in the other 
two key strategies, namely, establishing specialised development zones, and 
promoting high-tech industries and cooperation. As he states, there have 
been four industrial districts constructed in Haian since 2005, and all these 
industrial districts are not rigidly confined by local town boundaries and urban-
rural thresholds, but are constructed in accordance with the various 
sociospatial and industrial features of the respective regions, within which the 
relevant industrial district is located. In order to improve the industrial output of 
each industrial district, local government has set out some policy regulations, 
specifying that all the industrial projects operated in industrial districts should 
involve no less than 1.6 million RMB investment per mu (1 mu is equal to 
666.67 square meters), and the plot ratio must be no less than 0.6. Any 
unqualified projects will be punished.  
In practice, local government is now facilitating the construction of the 
Xi-Hai industrial park (cooperatively constructed by Wuxi city in the south of 
Jiangsu, and Haian) and the Yangpu (Haian) industrial park (cooperatively 
constructed by Yangpu district of Shanghai, and Haian), and making these 
two industrial parks an example for attracting more investment and projects 
from Shanghai and the south of Jiangsu. Haian’s consistent emphasis on rural 
industrialisation and development zone eventually leads to the establishment 
of Haian national economic and technological development zone, which is the 
first county-based national-level development zone in the north of Jiangsu. As 
mentioned, the establishment of a national development zone is indicative of 
central government’s recognition of the local economic performance of a 
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city/county. In addition, the presence of this development zone confers on 
Haian a series of entitlements to supra-county administrative powers and 
preferential status, which may further promote the local growth of Haian.  
The third key element refers to the local government’s emphasis on 
fostering and promoting high-tech industries. In the group seminar with the 
local head officials of Haian, all of them particularly mentioned the various 
efforts made by the local state institutions in supporting high-tech industries. 
As Mr. Zhang suggested, Haian has in recent years established a series of 
scientific and technological fostering bases, which cover an area of 390000 
square meters, and serve to provide various financial, legal, and technological 
assistances to local high-tech enterprises. These bases can be seen as some 
sort of state-supported R&D centres which closely cooperate with high-tech 
enterprises with the purpose of realising technologies into actual products with 
high competitiveness. In order to achieve this aim, Haian county government 
put forward a set of performance evaluation criteria for all the head officials of 
each town of Haian.  
In more specific terms, town-level head officials are required to contact 
local enterprises within their respective jurisdiction to learn their technological 
needs and difficulties, and to visit universities and colleges in Jiangsu or even 
other provinces to establish certain partnership projects for helping solve local 
enterprises’ technology-related problems. Universities in the south of Jiangsu 
are often the first choice. For example, the Institute of Technology of 
Changzhou city, the University of Changzhou city, and Nanjing Agricultural 
University have respectively signed 40 production and research partnership 
agreements with the towns and districts in Haian. By 2013, more than 20 local 
enterprises reached specific cooperation agreements with colleges and 
universities in the south of Jiangsu, on R&D issues. This has in practice 
helped solve 62 technological problems for local enterprises.  
Moreover, local government conducted a series of talent attraction 
projects to import some high-level professionals and researchers to work in 
Haian. For example, in 2012, Dr. Su Xuping from University of Changzhou, 
and Dr. Hong Yaoliang from Suzhou, both national-level talents, are attracted 
by Haian government from the south of Jiangsu. As a result, Haian has now 
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become one of the five model counties in Jiangsu for effectively advancing 
technological development, and it is ranked No. 1 among all the 
districts/counties of Nantong in the municipal evaluation of local head officials 
for the works in relation to advancing technological development for the last 7 
years. By 2012, there have been 39 local high-tech enterprises located in 
Haian development zone, and this amounts to about one third of all the local 
high-tech enterprises in Nantong city. In 2010, Haian industrial park was 
entitled by the Ministry of Science of China as the ‘International base for 
scientific and technological cooperation’, which is the only one in the north of 
Jiangsu, while the other two are in the south. As Haian’s internal official 
document shows, by 2009 it had secured 343 research & production 
partnership projects, resulting in additional annual output of 14.89 billion RMB, 
and considerable local growth.  
In a word, Haian’s local development during the third stage of the 
reform, as Mr. Zhang suggests, has taken a path that is principally 
characterised by the dynamic, positive interactions and collaboration between 
local rural industrialisation and town-urbanisation. Local government has 
always made the link between industrial planning and urban planning a pivotal 
starting point for all the urban residential/infrastructure and development zone 
constructions and investments. That is to say, Haian refused the common 
pattern of urbanisation-driven growth, which focuses on infrastructure and 
property investment. Its growth pattern is by no means the common one 
adopted by other county-units and districts of Nantong and by most other 
cities in the north of Jiangsu. It is thus argued that regarding the experience of 
Haian, less developed areas do not have to follow the path of a developed 
region, and do not have to necessarily be path-dependent upon those 
prominent models such as the Southern Jiangsu Model. Places like Haian 
county can their own appropriate local growth pattern.  
It is argued that Haian has effectively completed the course that most 
cities in the south had accomplished during the first two stages of the reform. 
To what extent the regional unevenness213 between Haian and other county-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
213 If comparing Haian with Wujing district in the south with respect to their local GDP and local per 
capita GDP, there still exists a considerable disparity. For example, in 2009 Haian’s local GDP is 30.08 
billion RMB, whereas Wujin achieved a local GDP of 96.5 billion RMB, three times more than that of 
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level units in the south may evolve in the future depends on what growth 
patterns Haian may use, and to what extent such growth can be effectively 
and sustainably promoted.  
Finally, it is worthy mentioning that viewing the regional development of 
the north from a holistic view, although state-led, urbanisation-driven growth 
has helped the north in many aspects approach to reduce regional 
unevenness, this achievement, though in a narrow sense has fulfilled the task 
of restoring and strengthening the authority of the CPC, makes the traditional 
phenomenon of regional uneven development in Jiangsu a less critical issue. 
This is because that regional unevenness is nowadays being shaped by 
spatially interspersed utilitarianism and temporally compressed pragmatism in 
the context of China. Put differently, each locality has itself become a 
generator of intra-unevenness between different social stratums and groups. 
Whilst some few groups are privileged, the majority of the general public is 
deprived of their interests in terms of fair distribution of wealth, and more 
importantly, their capabilities to choose.  
 
7.5 Summary  
This chapter articulated the evolution of the relatively lagged regional 
development in the north of Jiangsu province in comparison with the south 
during the three stages of China’s economic reform. Generally speaking, 
because of the utilitarian propensity inherent in the national strategy of letting 
some regions become rich first, the north, as a region with lagged 
industrialisation and urbanisation, did not receive sufficient support from both 
the provincial and central governments. The prominent economic 
performance achieved by the south through TVE- and development zone-
driven growth to some extent concealed or, more likely, justified the 
unevenness within the province. Moreover, such unevenness was 
exacerbated by a series of institutional practices in terms of the rescaling 
practice and inter-urban competition. Whilst the TVE- and development zone-
driven growth patterns proved to be relatively efficient in the south, they also """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
Haian county. And, the per capita GDP of Haian in 2009 is 32104 RMB, whereas that of Wujin is 
97900 RMB. It can thus be seen that although Haian has been one of the best counties in the north in 
relation to local economic performance, it still lags behind the south from a general perspective. 
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became some sort of path-dependencies for the north under the influence of 
China’s trial-and-error based pragmatism. Some empirical data indicated that 
the north did not possess the necessary local conditions for copying the TVE-
driven pattern of the south, and the north failed, more often than not, in 
competing with the south in attracting inward investment. In a word, during the 
first two stages of economic reform, the north not only suffered a lagged, slow 
rural industrialisation, the results of which then also led to the less competitive 
development zones in the north. It is noted that Neil Smith’s (1984) theory of 
uneven development based on the see-saw of capital has only a partial 
explanatory strength here. Although the regional unevenness in Jiangsu 
province did witness many examples of labour and capital concentration in the 
south, it was an outcome that was heavily contributed to by the growth-
oriented state ideology on the one hand, and the quasi-market-based actions 
of local state institutions in terms of inter-urban competition on the other. That 
is to say, even at the scale of urban units, which Smith (1984) declared the 
greatest applicability of his theory, the explanation of the see-saw of capital 
cannot fully explain the primitive cause of the capital concentration in the 
south. And, before Smith’s theory can be empirically tested with respect to the 
second part of the see-saw trend, the explanatory power of his theory was 
further  undermined by the broken nexus between local industrialisation and 
urbanisation at the third stage of economic reform. The seemingly mitigation 
of regional unevenness at the third stage does not owe much to the see-saw 
of the capital, but more to the endogenous growth engine of state-led 
urbanisation, which could bring about more GDP-based performance record 
for local head officials within their five years or less office term. Thanks to this 
endogenous resource-based growth pattern, the north of Jiangsu, in 
particular, Nantong city, quickly arose, though subject to a variety of side-
effects of state-led urbanisation, such as the inefficient use of land, intense 
conflicts entailed by land expropriation, and most importantly, the increasing 
socioeconomic disparities between a small number of special interest groups 
and the majority of the normal urban residents (including migrant labourers). It 
is therefore argued that while the state-led urbanisation-driven growth pattern 
did help reduce regional unevenness in Jiangsu province, this growth pattern 
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is no longer sustainable because of the large local debts and the pervasive, 
intense social discontent.  
 Notably, the development of Haian county, under the governance of 
Mr.Zhang Shushan, took a somewhat different path to the mainstream growth 
pattern. Haian’s development during the last decade was based on an 
interactive and balanced development plan between local industrialisation and 
urbanisation. Rather than promoting the state-led, property- and 
infrastructure-oriented pseudo-urbanisation process, Haian county focused 
more on optimising the strategic territorial and scalar composition for its rural 
industrialisation on the one hand, and, on promoting a set of industrially 
specialised, endogenous industrial agglomerations that fit with the local 
territorial and scalar composition on the other. It is thus argued that regarding 
the experience of Haian, less developed areas do not have to follow the path 
of a developed region, and do not have to necessarily be path-dependent 
upon those prominent models such as the Southern Jiangsu Model. Places 
like Haian county can their own appropriate local growth pattern. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
This Chapter aims to discuss four topics. First, it puts forward a summary of 
all the findings of this research. Second, it reiterates the importance of 
introducing the meta- and macro-level elements in terms of China’s growth-
oriented state ideology into this research, and then justifies this analytical 
stance. Third, it sets out some critical reflections on China’s regional (uneven) 
development in relation to the global trends and processes of neoliberalism. 
Finally, based on the justification of my analytical stance and the reflection on 
the ‘China Model’, it proposes a critical dialectic between institutions and 
resources that may inspire and illuminate future research and practice in 
relation to China’s governance and growth models. In a word, towards the end 
of this research, I would like to quote what Rousseau once said: ‘All my ideas 
are connected, but I could not expound them all at once’214.  
 
8.1 Summary of the findings of this research 
This research critically and empirically studied how regional uneven 
development in Jiangsu province, in particular, between the south and the 
north, was evolving under China’s growth-oriented state ideology during the 
economic reform era. Based upon a set of political-philosophical and historical 
analyses, it critically articulated that, as the foundation of China’s regime 
legitimacy in the reform era, the growth orientation of China’s dominant state 
ideology consisted of two key rationales, those are, China’s utilitarianism and 
its pragmatism. Both of these are mainly orchestrated and expressed through 
Deng’s key political judgments and decisions, which take the highest priority 
in all state institutions, policies, and strategies in the context of China’s 
political sphere. China’s utilitarianism is primarily expressed through Deng’s 
strategy of ‘letting some regions and peoples get rich first, and then bringing 
along and helping other peoples and regions to eventually arrive at the 
richness of commonwealth’. And, pragmatism at the earlier stage of China’s 
economic reform was primarily embodied as a trial-and-error test strategy, 
which attempted to find some successful institutional innovations, and then """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
214 See: J. Rousseau (1998: 36) 
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spread such institutions to other places. At the third stage of China’s reform, 
pragmatism was alienated by a dominant institutional time, which 
complemented the ambiguous temporal horizon set forth by China’s utilitarian 
strategy on the one hand, and essentially re-shaped the incentives and 
selectivities of state institutions and local growth patterns of this stage, on the 
other. Regarding the relevance of these two ideas to regional uneven 
development, both the institutional practices of utilitarianism, and pragmatism 
revealed prominent spatial and temporal elements and effects at different 
scales and during different periods. For example, Deng’s utilitarian political 
judgment exhibits a clear sociospatial preference, which has shaped and 
justified the evolution of subsequent regional unevenness, but fails to set out 
any explicit temporal horizon for when the generalisability of the interest in 
terms of the richness of commonwealth can be realised. Under the earlier 
form of China’s pragmatism, successful institutional innovations and 
experiments in certain places would quickly be transplanted to, and adopted 
by, other regions and places, although such highly empirical-oriented method 
may not guarantee an extensive applicability of such successful sample 
models. More clearly, the alienated form of pragmatism expresses a dominant 
institutional time that generally covers a temporal horizon of five years or less. 
This dominant institutional time involves two largely overlapping institutional 
times. Those are China’s ‘Five-year development for the national economy’, 
and the term of party/government office. It is within this dominant institutional 
time that all the state institutions and officials have been simultaneously 
constrained and/or empowered to deal with development matters in their 
jurisdictions within this temporal boundary.  
Corresponding to the influence of the growth-oriented state ideology, 
there are different kinds of strategically inscribed structural selectivities being 
expressed during different stage of the economic reform. Such selectivities 
are mainly exhibited by, and practised through, the dominant local growth 
patterns/engines of the respective stage of the reform. Those are: TVE-driven 
growth, development zone-driven growth, and state-led, urbanisation-driven 
growth. Whilst the actual practices of these local growth patterns all decisively 
(re)produced and (re)shaped regional unevenness between the south and 
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north of Jiangsu province, they exhibited, and were subject to, polymorphic 
and multidimensional sociospatial relations and processes which may be 
explored from the perspective of the so-called TPSN framework.  
For example, under the TVE-driven growth pattern, it has been seen 
that the factors of place and scale are of critical importance to the success of 
the south in terms of its outstanding TVE performance. The subsequent rise 
of development zones across China made inter-locality competitions the key 
to regional/local socioeconomic development. At this stage, scale and network 
proved to be more decisive factors on whether local governments could 
couple local assets with external strategic resources to attract, enhance, and 
capture the value of inward investment to promote local growth.  
Apart from this general phenomenon, regional unevenness in Jiangsu 
province was affected by a further layer of path-dependency. As the south 
had achieved a well established industrial foundation at the first stage by local 
TVEs, the rise of development zones encouraged or mobilised the industrial 
and sociospatial rescaling practice, which not only agglomerated scattered 
local TVEs into industrial clusters in development zones, but also rescaled all 
the counties in the south into county-level cities, which possessed 
strengthened institutional capacities together with more financial autonomies 
for promoting local growth in an increasingly intense inter-locality competition. 
Whilst the north also initiated a series of sociospatial rescaling practices, such 
practices did not lead to satisfactory outcomes. The difference derives from 
the fact that, in the south, rescaling county to county-level city reflects more 
the regional continuity in terms of the economic legacy of rural 
industrialisation that supported the local growth in the south during the second 
stage, and the regional change in terms of the rise of development zones, 
which linked local industrialisation with urbanisation. Put differently, it is 
argued that there was in the south less contradiction in terms of the 
institutional incompatibilities between the institutionally rescaled status of 
county, and the socioeconomically and historically shaped local socio-
economic relations and processes. In the north, the rescaling practice is more 
like a political compromise, which does not actually reflect the local 
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socioeconomic situations, and thus brought about an incompatibility between 
institutions and realities.  
When economic reform came to the third stage, state-led urbanisation-
driven growth was essentially leveraged by local endogenous element, 
namely, the territory of urban land. In order to obtain more land for sustaining 
urbanisation, territory became the major factor that determined the growth 
rate of a place. And, the enlargement of urban territory was chiefly achieved 
through land expropriation and rescaling county-level units into municipal 
districts. Thanks to this local growth pattern which relies more on an 
endogenous resource than external ones, regional unevenness between the 
south and the north has in many respects slowed down and been reduced. 
However, it is argued that although the urbanisation-driven local growth 
pattern does enable many local governments to secure economic 
performance in a homogenous way, this seeming reduction of regional 
unevenness can hardly be sustained because the growth pattern itself is not 
sustainable and, has resulted in severe sociospatial unevenness and conflict. 
China’s state-led urbanisation is to a large extent pseudo-urbanisation as it is 
based upon infrastructure investments and architectural modernisation, but 
neglects and deprives the interests and welfare of the newly migrated urban 
population. It is argued that under those normative guises of local economic 
growth, regional competitions, and urbanisation, the socioeconomic 
unevenness in Jiangsu province during the third stage evolved at a household 
scale, although often hidden behind aggregate regional scale statistics. And, 
this sociospatial pervasiveness of unevenness was arguably institutionally 
produced and reproduced by the politically distorted and spatiotemporally 
compressed practices of utilitarianism within each local spatiotemporal 
extension defined by China’s pragmatism.  
 In a word, this research found that during the economic reform era and 
against the background of the rise of global urbanisation and globalisation, 
China’s growth-oriented state ideology in terms of utilitarianism and 
pragmatism exercised decisive influences on the regional uneven 
development between the south and the north in Jiangsu province. And, the 
evolution of such unevenness was embedded within the multidimensional and 
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polymorphic local sociospatial relations and processes that can be understood 
in terms of TPSN which played roles with different degrees at different stages 
of China’s economic reform. 
 
8.2 A brief justification of the analytical approach of this research 
As noted in Chapter 1, this research aimed not just to present a mere 
empirical record as to how regional unevenness between the south and north 
of Jiangsu province evolved in the context of China’s economic reform. In 
order to analytically avoid this descriptive orientation, this research has 
introduced into its explanatory framework certain meta- and macro-level 
parameters, which have, from my perspective, exerted a decisive influence on 
regional uneven development and growth patterns of China. This helps to not 
only endow the research outcome with wider spatiotemporal applicability, but 
also provides a better insight into the actual rationales of the so-called ‘China 
Model’, which seemingly deviates from a variety of conventional political and 
economic ideas and paradigms.  
 The core parameters utilised in this research refer to two interrelated 
concepts, namely, the dominant state ideology of China, and its key 
institutional expressions or practices. Under China’s state regime which differs 
considerably from the mainstream regimes of representative democracy, 
these two concepts and their relations are worth particular attention.  
An institution, as John Rawls (1971: 55) observed, is ‘a public system 
of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, 
powers and immunities, and the like’; and, it ‘exists at a certain time and place 
when the actions specified by it are regularly carried out in accordance with a 
public understanding that the system of rules defining the institution is to be 
followed’. The important relevance of Rawls’s words to the present context 
lies in the nature of the public understanding, and the subject, which such a 
public understanding targets. Not surprisingly, Rawls seems to have woven 
his definition in the context of a westernised democratic regime. Thus the 
subject, which his so-called public understanding targets, seems to refer to a 
set of foundational or constitutional rules that can procedurally determine 
whether a proposed institution may be legitimated. In other words, the public 
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recognises a set of rules for establishing institutions rather than directly 
consents to the actual contents of institutions. Whilst this is how 
representative democracy works, the situation in China is different. In the 
absence of de facto representative democracy, and following the decline of 
Mao’s reign of virtue, the public understanding of China during the era of 
economic reform, which is called by many215 as ‘the consensus on reform’, 
targets less procedural issues216, but more the substance and propensity of 
China’s top political judgments. Put differently, China’s public understanding 
interacts, rather than through representative mechanisms, directly with the 
contents of the dominant ideological orientation, and of some key institutional 
expressions of the dominant state ideology, upon which the regime legitimacy 
of the party/state of China is premised. This was made possible for two 
reasons.  
The quasi-authoritative nature of China’s regime does not at the outset 
provide the general public with an institutional channel, through which they 
can shape the constitutional and procedural prerequisites for the production 
and operation of key institutions. Second, the emergence of China’s growth-
oriented state ideology was, to a large extent, a political necessity to address 
China’s legitimation crisis following the Cultural Revolution. It is thus a state 
ideology that deeply relates to what Samuel Huntington (1991) calls 
‘performance legitimacy’. This means that the state ideology itself involves 
less constitutional or procedural rules but a clear general path as to how 
public rationalities and individual actions can be exercised in an assimilative 
fashion, and some specific contents of national development. In some ways, 
the initialisation of China’s growth-oriented state ideology can be seen as the 
exercise of some sort of Lockean ‘prerogative power’, which happened to be 
widely recognised by the general public in China. In saying that the state 
ideology happened to be publically recognised triggers the complex notion of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
215 The term of public consensus on reform is not only used by the official press, but also advocated by 
civil scholars. See, for example, the report of ‘agglomerating the consensus on reform’ by Guangming 
Daily, Mar. 24th, 2014: http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0324/c1003-24715806.html, and the 
‘proposition of consensus on reform’ proposed by 70 Chinese scholars at the Forum of Consensus on 
Reform, which was held by Beijing University in Nov. 2012." 
216 This has been particularly so since the Tiananmen Square incident, which makes any westernised 
constitutional discourses taboos in China.  
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Locke’s ‘consent’ 217 , which here concerns the nature of the public 
understanding/recognition of China.  
It has been noted in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4 that the utilitarian 
dimension of the growth-oriented state ideology serves to assimilate personal 
desires and actions with one prior public rationality, which is in Rawls’s 
language ‘a shared highest-order preference’. It may simply say that the 
general public in China, during the reform era, keeps giving ‘tacit consents’ in 
Locke’s sense to the growth-oriented state ideology, because both state 
institutions and most Chinese people did follow and concentrate on the public 
rationality in terms of growth in their routine actions. But, this simplified saying 
does not help to clearly decipher the fact of the coexistence of dramatic 
growth and increasing socioeconomic unevenness, and to perceive the 
recursive and reflexive cognition to this coexistence from the perspective of 
the general public, and of an academic observer without ideological/political 
bias.  
As clarified, the subject of China’s public understanding in the reform 
era is a set of specific orientations and contents rather than a set of 
constitutional rules. Thus, peoples’ consents are also content-oriented, and 
directly related to, or susceptible to, the nominal assertion and practical effect 
of the growth-oriented state ideology and its institutional practices. This 
means that the majority of the general public was, at least, at the beginning 
exhibiting some sort of active consent through their concrete actions that were 
in line with the public rationality of promoting growth. Indeed, even before 
Deng set aside the ideological obstacle of orthodox socialism to the path of 
capitalist growth218 , people in certain rural places in China had already 
expressed the intention of replacing egalitarian modes of production with the 
growth pattern that stressed the protection of private property. Their actual 
practice, though controversial, was later justified by central government, and 
widely expanded across China. This practice, of course, refers to the so-
called ‘household contract responsibility system’219. There were also other 
examples of such active consents which were embodied in practice as some """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
217 This refers to what John Locke specifically discussed in Second Treatise of Civil Government.  
218 See the discussions in Sections 4.3.3.2 and 4.4 in Chapter 4. 
219 The discussion of this system can be seen in Section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4. 
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sort of pro-growth actions. The rise of TVEs and the tide of resigning from 
public posts to start businesses in the 1980s and 1990s all reflect a public 
understanding of the growth-orientation which in a top-down fashion 
liberalised and encouraged the realisation of these consents. This is why 
many asserted that a consensus on reform that was based on the majority of 
the public was fostered and most stable in the 1980s and the first half of the 
1990s (Fang, 2012; Zhang, 2012; Huang, 2012). 
The fact that the consent of the Chinese people is directly related to the 
contents of the state ideology and its institutions, rather than the rules for 
making or declining them, has two essential implications. First, such consents 
can be relatively less durable and stable than those given to procedural rules 
as the former are affected by the eventual performance of, rather than the 
initial legitimation of, state ideologies and institutions, within a given 
spatiotemporal horizon. In other words, such consents can be repudiated in 
case of institutional failures in terms of unsatisfactory economic performance, 
or if, perhaps more importantly, people’s capabilities to act or choose in 
promoting their own interests are disproportionally and unevenly constrained 
by state institutions. Second, such consents have presumed the possibilities 
and capabilities of exerting prerogative powers in institutional practices, as 
state institutions need no pre-legitimation. Even the outcome-oriented 
legitimation can be set aside by, or justified by, factors such as the temporal 
delay of the realisation of institutional performance, path-dependencies on 
exemplary growth patterns220, and also the unevenness inherent in state 
institutional selectivities and developmental strategies. In a word, there exist 
critical dynamics between China’s growth-oriented state ideology and its 
institutional expressions, and the majority of Chinese peoples’ understanding 
of, and also reflexive actions to, this state ideology and its institutions. And, as 
all these above factors have been of ontological presence in practice in 
China’s economic reform, it is thus argued that, in order to have satisfactory 
explanatory strength in deciphering regional uneven development in Jiangsu 
province in China, it is not sufficient to solely focus on local contextual """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
220 For example, although the TVE-driven growth pattern did not work well in the north of Jiangsu, it 
was adopted and encouraged by local governments there since this pattern had proved successful in the 
south of Jiangsu.  See, Chapter 5.  
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parameters. And, these parameters must be analysed within the ontological 
context of China’s growth-oriented state ideology and its institutional 
expressions, which (re)produce and (re)calibrate local growth patterns in 
shaping regional uneven development. This research has therefore been 
conducted within this line of reasoning in order to articulate these analytical 
parameters.  
In addition, it is worth pointing out that the assumption that Chinese 
people are giving some sort of active consent to China’s growth-oriented state 
ideology and its key institutional expressions, is indicative of something more 
which may inspire and illuminate future research and practice in relation to 
China’s growth and governance models, which I will briefly elaborate it in 8.4.  
 
8.3 A critical reflection on China’s economic reform in relation to the 
global trends/processes of neoliberalism 
As noted in Chapter Two, the rise and wide expansion of neoliberalism and its 
variable institutionalised practices in different countries had in many respects 
influenced the concurrent process of China’s economic reform throughout the 
1980s, the 1990s, and also the first decade of this century. David Harvey 
(2005) considered China’s economic reform as a rather important example of 
neoliberalism, albeit with distinctly Chinese characteristics. Ong (2006) takes 
a more cautious view, delineating China’s reform practice as a mixed product 
of ‘neoliberalism as exception’ and ‘exception to neoliberalism’. Indeed, both 
of the above views on the ‘China Model’ seem to indicate that China’s growth 
was on the one hand shaped and driven by those orthodox market economy 
rules in terms of free markets, free trade, and private property rights, but was, 
on the other hand, negligent of the distributive justice, preservation of welfare 
benefits, and neoliberal political rights. As Ong (2006: 3) suggests, neoliberal 
practice should be seen as a technology of government which ‘is a profoundly 
active way of rationalizing governing and self-governing in order to optimize’. 
Whilst these sorts of views to some extent point out the prima facie characters 
of China’s economic reform and the ‘China Model’, their explanatory strength 
was, arguably, mitigated by, and subject to, the periodization of the different 
stages of China’s economic reform. That is to say, at the different stages that 
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are specified by this research, the state and the individuals were playing quite 
different roles in qualitative and quantitative senses, according to the primary 
local growth patterns of the respective stage. There are hence no simple ways 
of looking at China’s reform through the lens of some conventional neoliberal 
values, or of using these values as basic criteria to determine the success and 
failure of China’s reform.  
In more specific terms, the criterion of seeing liberalism as governance 
technology cannot fully explain, for example, the state’s roles/actions at the 
first stage characterised by TVE-driven growth, since such growth was to a 
large extent a ‘marginal revolution’ (Coase and Wang, 2012) that was out of 
the expectations of the state and, of course, it’s governance technologies. 
Neither can the concept of ‘neoliberalism as exception’ answer why different 
countries’ neoliberal practices resulted in multifarious socioeconomic and 
political consequences even within an increasingly globalised context. 
Arguably, a more proper view of studying the ‘China Model’ requires a careful 
scrutinization and conceptualization of the state’s properties and roles across 
different spatiotemporal horizons.  
This implies that notwithstanding its critical significance, neoliberalism, 
albeit being a pervasive global trend, cannot be simply presumed to be the 
actual major force underlying China’s growth, nor can it be used as the sole 
analytical tool for deciphering the causalities as well as the consequences of 
China’s economic reform. There are two crucial reasons for this. First, there 
exists throughout China’s economic reform one dominant growth-oriented 
state ideology, of which the core ideas are different from, are an antithesis to, 
neoliberalism. This growth-oriented state ideology exerts its own spatial and 
temporal effects, which in turn interacted with a variety of regional and local 
parameters explored here through the lens of TPSN. And, it was such a 
process of interaction that reflexively and recursively orchestrated the major 
institutional expressions and growth patterns that dynamically defined the 
evolution of China’s regional (uneven) development. The presence of the 
dominant institutional time with a horizon of five years or less, for example, is 
by no means a value or feature of neoliberalism, as it exhibits a leading role 
of, rather than the hollowing out of, the state in developmental matters. 
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, it has been argued that the thematic 
tone of China’s economic reform rests with the objective of restoring the 
party/state’s authority and functions, which had been undermined by the 
Cultural Revolution. It is this basic objective that distinguishes the purpose of 
China’s growth rather than the conventional neoliberal growth pattern, which 
serves to tackle the decline of Atlantic Fordism and Keynesianism. As Deng 
stated, both capitalism and socialism are just tools for development, and 
growth is not only an economic issue, but also of political importance to the 
regime legitimacy of the CPC221. It is not hard to see from Deng’s words that 
economic growth in China interacts with political legitimation and people’s 
consents, rights and capabilities in a somewhat unique fashion which differs 
from the general pattern of western democratic system. In brief, whilst 
economic performance may only be one of the determinants to which general 
elections are susceptible under a representative democracy system, the CPC 
relies on economic growth much more heavily, treating it as the primary, if not 
the sole, legitimation measure in the economic reform era. One corollary of 
the above observation lies in the fact that most of the institutions and 
practices with neoliberal characteristics in China are more or less expedient 
measures under either the external influences or the domestic pressures, and 
they are neither premised upon rigid neoliberal values, nor pursuant of any 
orthodox neoliberal aims. This may to some extent explain the incremental 
progress of economic reform and the retardation of political reform in China, 
as economic reform is serving for, and embedded in, China’s political 
legitimation agendas. In fact, it may be in this sense argued that those 
adapted neoliberal practices in China such as free markets and trade, 
neoliberal urbanism, and development zones should be seen as concurrent or 
lagged experimental reflections of the global trends, but are also subject to 
China’s growth-oriented state ideology. Whatever reason such practices were 
initiated, their ongoing progress has been critically reshaped by China’s state 
ideology, and by the orientation of the interests of the party/state in terms of 
political legitimation and authority restoration.    
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
221 See ‘Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping’, Vol. 3, and Vogel (2011). 
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In a word, 30-years of China’s economic reform has shown a variety of 
neoliberal features and was embedded in a broad global neoliberal trend. But 
it is by means indicative of a dominant position of neoliberalism in directing 
and shaping economic reform. On the contrary, neoliberal practices and 
institutions in China may better be seen as a series of expedient experiments 
highly subject to the growth-oriented state ideology and the party/state 
interests. Moreover, the diversification of the leading local growth patterns at 
different stages, and the complexity of the state’s roles at different scales and 
over different spaces and times can also undermine the explanatory strength 
of any analyses solely based on neoliberalism or adapted neoliberalism in the 
case of China. This is to some extent similar to Smith’s (1984) theory of 
uneven development, but Smith does not effectively take account of the role 
of the state in shaping and reproducing regional unevenness.  
A notable point deriving from the above arguments is that although an 
analyses based on China’s growth-oriented state ideology and the TPSN 
framework does possess a satisfactory explanatory strength in deciphering 
what has happened in China in the last three decades with respect regional 
uneven development, and the core logics and causalities underlying economic 
reform, such analyses do not provide an effective evaluative criterion for 
assessing the efficiencies and flaws of China’s economic reform and 
development from a political/ideological-free perspective. In other words, it is 
argued that future research on uneven development in China may elaborate 
some general rules/theorems, which can evaluate whether and to what extent 
certain kinds of institutions and practices are feasible and optimal, subject to 
external and internal influences. This is what I will try to articulate in the next 
section.  
 
 
8.4 Inspirations for prospective research and practice: the dialectic 
between institutions and resources 
In recent years, most studies of China’s consistent and rapid economic growth 
have resorted to critiques of China’s unorthodox regime that is built on a 
hybrid model of capitalist growth model and authoritarian governance system. 
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These tend to note that despite the lack of de facto democracy, China has 
formed a new type of growth model in terms of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ that 
differs from, and even outstrips, the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. It 
however seems to me that all such views and studies either bear strong 
political propensities that deliberately over-stress China’s political deficiencies 
and their relations to economic growth, or reveal overly optimistic perceptions 
to China’s miracle, thus neglecting the true reasons and risks of China’s 
development.  
A proper reading of the successes and problems of the ‘China Model’ 
requires an analytical perspective that is free from the arbitrary political 
prejudice of China’s political regime, and also from one-sided optimism on the 
superficial prosperity of China’s economy. In other words, some objective 
analytical hypothesis must be put in place to find out the key prerequisites for 
socioeconomic development of a state or a region, and then to scrutinise 
China’s situation under such hypothesis with the aim of seeing whether and to 
what extent China’s successes and problems can be linked to the presence 
and/or absence of these prerequisites. And, this hypothesis can, arguably, 
inspire future research and practice as to China’s economic reform. 
In brief, it is proposed that, in managing socioeconomic development, 
the state institutions of a country should be proportional to, and compatible 
with: 
(i) that country’s actual capacity of competing for, and acquiring, key 
resources from domestic and global scales, for satisfying peoples’ appeals 
and desires to participate in different socioeconomic activities, and for 
meeting any constitutionally prescribed welfare demands; 
(ii) that country’s actual capacity of digesting and distributing such key 
resources and the interests attached to, or generated by, the use of such 
resources, in a socially just and economically efficient fashion. 
 While there are clear institutionalist features inherent in the above 
proposition, which in some ways echoes Amin’s222 conception of institutional """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
222 As Amin (1999: 365, 370) argued, compared to conventional ‘firm-centred, standardized, incentive-
based, and state driven’ policies, institutionalist informed approaches mainly aim to promote ‘the 
wealth of regions with upgrading of the economic of the economic, institutional and social base 
considered as the prerequisite for entrepreneurial success’. See also: Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1994), 
and Amin, A. and Thrift, N. (1995). 
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thickness, it is argued that this proposition is by no means fully prone to the 
ideas of institutional thickness. I indeed agree with Wood and Valler’s (2004: 
12) critiques that it is unclear whether institutional thickness stimulates 
economic growth or whether strong regional economies cultivate institutional 
thickness. Amin and Thrift’s theory does not answer the question why some 
regions with well-developed institutions have not produced satisfactory 
economic performance.  
Arguably, many questions raised by neo-institutionalism in explaining 
the roles of institutions in relation to economic development are caused by the 
basic methodological orientation of institutionalism. This refers to the fact that 
neither does institutionalism, as Hodgson (1998) observed, seek to build an 
all-embracing theory, nor ‘does it constitute a discernible school of thought 
that necessarily manages to integrate disciplines or in some cases even to 
unite one’ (MacLeod, 2004: 58, 59). Although this self-restrictive orientation 
does not prevent the use of interdisciplinary explanation, it does more or less 
undermine and/or restrain the explanatory strength and applicability of 
institutionalist approaches, since such approaches tend to overly emphasis 
empirical contingencies and contextualities, thus isolating their analyses from 
larger scales and higher dimensions. In other words, whilst securing an insight 
into local-specific institutional features and arrangements, the empirical 
evidence-based methodology of institutionalism fails to take further steps 
towards clarifying the supra-logics of institutions in relation to growth. And, 
this observation to some extent echoes with MacLeod’s (2004: 68) idea223 of 
‘thin political economy’. Indeed, my proposition as to the key prerequisites for 
determining whether institutions may effectively promote socioeconomic 
development aims to, inter alia, broaden the applicability of the so-called 
‘institutional turn’. Now I begin to elaborate the basic logics of this proposition.  
 As noted, many critical observations of China’s socioeconomic 
development more or less touched on the element of democracy. Some see 
that the absence of de facto democracy in China vitiates or restrains China’s 
growth, whereas some others see the authoritarian regime of China as the 
key momentum of the China Model. It is argued that the institutional practice """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
223 As MacLeod (2004: 68) suggests, the ‘most obvious analytical lacuna is the failure to connect urban 
regional change with the changing nature and scalar configurations of the state’. 
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of democratisation, indeed, has more profound implications since it 
simultaneously conflicts with, and contributes to, the continuous, constant 
processes of capital accumulation and sociospatial expansion in modern 
societies.  
In saying this, modern democratisation is seen as an incremental 
process of institutionally extending the political composition and popular 
foundation of a society through bringing more and more subjects in terms of 
social stratums, groups, and communities into existent institutions with the 
purpose of not only endowing these subjects with constitutionally prescribed 
rights, but also providing them with institutionalised positions and paths to 
advocate and appeal for political rights, economic interests, and social 
welfare. Such conceptualisation of democratisation is based on a historical-
political perspective that summarises the experiences of major western 
countries, in particular, the democracy in America224. Although this process of 
sociopolitical expansion and empowerment can contribute to enhancing 
regime legitimacy and social stability through reflecting, in a dynamic fashion, 
peoples’ demands and appeals generated by the changing economic 
structure of production and consumption, its effectiveness with respect to 
promoting a country’s economic growth is critically subject to increasing state 
burdens and socioeconomic costs in terms of the key resources 225  for 
satisfying peoples’ appeals and demands.   
 In more specific terms, apart from the constitutionally prescribed costs 
such as public goods and services, once a person’s rights are institutionally 
embedded into the democracy system, such rights are reasonably expected 
to transit into various appeals for having the necessary capabilities to choose 
or to conduct socioeconomic activities that may satisfy or fulfill that person’s 
hierarchical needs in Maslow’s sense226 . Along with the development of """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
224 See, for example, E. Foner, (1998), ‘The story of American freedom’, New York, W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., and A. Tocqueville, (2003), ‘Democracy in America’, London, Penguin Books Ltd.  
225 The notion of ‘key resources’ used here generally refers to those most dispensable resources for 
sustaining modern industrialised civilizations. Petroleum, gas, essential minerals are all such sort. The 
importance of such resources can be demonstrated by some crucial national strategies of those most 
powerful countries in the world (for example, the US’s interventions in the Middle East, China’s 
strategies in Africa, and the importance of oil & gas in the EU-Russian relationship).  
226 The essence of Maslow’s (1943, 1962) theory lies in that motivation is based on a number of human 
needs. Such needs are illustrated by his famous hierarchical model with basic needs at the bottom and 
higher needs at the top. In general, they include (from the lowest to the highest): 1. Physiological needs 
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production and technology, the amount of resource required for sustaining 
peoples’ socioeconomic activities and their needs is increasing as well. In a 
word, the expansive institutional empowerment of democratisation and the 
development of human civilisation together contribute to the dramatic rise of 
resource demands 227 . This rise of resource demands entailed by 
democratisation is not merely a socioeconomic phenomenon, but bears 
political importance for regime legitimation. It is argued that regime legitimacy 
is critically subject to the question of whether and to what extent sufficient 
resources are present to address the appeals and demands of the 
institutionally empowered individuals and entities. In other words, the 
institutional empowerment process under democratisation must not make a 
‘political promise’, which exceeds the state’s capacity in terms of resource 
possession in satisfying the static cost of social welfare, and more importantly 
the dynamic appeals and needs of choosing or conducting socioeconomic 
activities in the course of social production and capital accumulation.  
It is argued that a shortage of resource possession in supporting 
expansive institutional empowerment is likely to damage regime legitimacy, 
resulting in pseudo- or defective democracy, which is characterised by 
political tension and unsatisfactory economic performance. In some countries, 
some sort of semi-political mechanisms are adopted to constrain the 
institutionally empowered demands and appeals in order to maintain the 
balance between institutions and resources. These include, for example, the 
Caste system in India, and many rigid religious systems that play a quasi-
political role in shaping peoples’ capabilities to choose and act.  
There is, apart from revolutionary technological development, another 
common way of getting rid of the domestic limit of resource, that is, 
geographical expansion through physical occupation, or institutional control. 
The evolution of the modern history witnessed the latter method gradually """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
– needs for food, sleep, 2. Safety needs – needs for stable environment, warmth, and order, 3. Love 
needs – needs related to affectionate relations with others and status within a group, 4. Esteem needs – 
need for status, self-respect and the esteem of others, and 5. Self-actualisation needs – needs for self-
fulfilment. Maslow’s theory considerably influenced the development of management theory during 
the 1950s and 1960s.  
227 Notably, it is argued that revolutionary technological innovation in relation to resource application 
can radically change the structure and efficiency of existing resources. Such innovations include, for 
example, the use of steam power, electricity, and nuclear resource.  
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replacing the former. It is argued that the necessity of spatial expansion is 
indicative of the limited and relatively homeostatic nature of the amount of all 
the key resources in the world. It is under this situation of limited resources 
that competitions between countries with their respective resource demand for 
meeting the increasing appeals generated by institutional empowerment 
become inevitable. In the case that some most developed countries happen to 
be those with most comprehensive and extensive institutional empowerment, 
it is unlikely that the rest may acquire their necessary proportions of key 
resources for meeting the interest appeals resulted from extensive institutional 
empowerment. This is arguably why many states that transplant western 
democratic institutions cannot reproduce socioeconomic prosperity and 
stability. This may also to some extent explain why some regions like the 
north of Jiangsu province could not achieve similar growth as the south, even 
after it adopted a similar growth pattern.  
 In the context of China’s economic reform, it can be seen that China’s 
success in terms of its economic growth is by no means a miracle but the 
outcome of a nuanced balance (though not necessarily intentionally made) 
between the process of institutional empowerment and the presence of key 
resources. For example, rural decollectivisation at the outset of China’s reform 
served as quasi-empowerment of the majority of Chinese people. Rural 
labourers were empowered under the growth-oriented state ideology to 
conduct business activities through TVEs, and such capabilities to choose do 
not exist in the pre-reform era. As illustrated in Chapter 5, the key element 
that triggered the low-cost starting of TVEs is collectively owned rural land. 
Such land becomes the key resource, which can be sufficiently provided by 
the state to satisfy the interest demands generated by institutionally 
empowered rural labourers and TVEs. But, notwithstanding such 
empowerment, there were institutions that simultaneously constrained rural 
labourers’ capabilities to choose. This refers to China’s household registration 
system which even today prevents rural residents and migrant labourers from 
receiving the same social welfare as urban residents. Indeed, the 
entrepreneurial form of TVE is itself some sort of restrictive institution that 
serves to constrain people from conducting businesses that exceed the 
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available amount of key resources. Having regard to China’s extremely large 
rural population (0.8 billion in the 1980s), such institutional constraints were 
arguably quite necessary at that time. In urban areas, there were also 
restrictive institutions. In the earlier days of reform, sole traders were not 
allowed to hire more than 8 employees. And, private firms did not enjoy same 
level of access to productive resources as SOEs. All these institutional 
constraints effectively, though not necessarily efficiently in the economic 
sense, made a nuanced balance between limited institutional empowerment 
and resource supply. It must also be noted that, during the 1980s, China 
could not access external resources and was not capable of acquiring key 
resources from the global scale. 
 The rise of local development zones signified that China had begun to 
attract external resources and to couple them with local assets to promote 
economic growth. The increase of key resource possession was also 
accompanied by extra institutional empowerment in relation to capabilities to 
choose and conduct business activities. For example, a lot of TVEs were 
privatised during the second stage of China’s economic reform, and a 
substantial number of different types of firms and business communities were 
established in development zones at various scales. The political culmination 
of such institutional empowerment is reflected by the so-called ‘Speech of July 
1st’ made by Chinese president Jiang Zemin who indirectly asserted that the 
class foundation of the CPC must be broadened to allow, for example, 
business practitioners (capitalists) to be included228. Pursuant to President 
Jiang’s theory of ‘Three Represents’, the CPC shall always represent the 
development trends of advanced productive forces, and the orientations of an 
advanced culture. In order to make these possible, institutionally empowering 
China’s quasi-capitalist class and other groups of social elites is hence an 
inevitable outcome.  
 However, national economic growth alone is neither necessarily 
indicative of a prosperity that is enjoyed by the majority of a society in a socio-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
228  See the Speech of July 1st by Jiang zemin (2001): 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5792/ President Jiangsu pointed out that whether an 
individual such as a private entrepreneur can become a CPC member does not depend on his class but 
his political belief. In other words, the major criterion as to whether one can be a CPC member lies in 
whether they can spontaneously dedicate their life to the struggle of the CPC’s rules and paths.  
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politically just way, nor affirmative of sustainable socioeconomic development. 
The final key objective of President Jiang’s ‘Three Represents’ declares that 
the CPC shall always represent the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the people of China. Arguably, whether this can be 
achieved returns to the second part of my proposition.  
Whilst it has been proposed that institutional empowerment should not 
exceed resource possession, it should neither lag behind in order to distribute 
key resources and the interests attached to, or generated by, the use of such 
resources, in a socially just and economically efficient fashion. As noted, 
China’s process of institutional empowerment has not, since its reform, 
proceeded in a western style in terms of standard democratisation. It carefully 
manipulates the contents and effects of empowerment strictly in accordance 
with the growth-orientation. That is to say, whilst some groups of peoples and 
entities were institutionally empowered within the realm of choosing and 
conducting socioeconomic activities in line with the public rationality of 
promoting growth, such empowerment does not touch the ‘sacred realm’ of 
regime legitimacy. In other words, it does not offer some generalised 
institutions for people who, for a variety of generic and social reasons such as 
pure misfortune, born in poor families, and born later than the golden age of 
the economic reform, are not capable of appealing for their interests and 
needs within and against the already formed interest framework229. Here I 
partly agree with, and correspond to, John Rawls’s challenge in terms of 
‘difference principle’ and ‘distributive justice’, to John Locke’s meritocracy and 
equality of opportunity.  
We have seen since the mid-1990s the emergence of an increasingly 
solid social structure in China, which is characterised by vested interests in 
socioeconomic and political establishments that prevent or constrain the 
majority from accessing key resources and positions. In a word, China’s 
socioeconomic development over the last decade or more was suffering an 
extremely unfair distribution of key resources that could critically hinder further 
sustainable economic growth, and more severely, give rise to social unrest 
and discontent that may in turn challenge the regime legitimacy of the CPC. It """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
229 The reason for lacking such generalised institutions lies in that, inter alia, both the growth-oriented 
ideology and peoples’ consents to this ideology are content-based rather than rule-based.  
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is thus proposed that the ‘China Model’ should in its prospective practice 
particularly address the issue of how to expand institutional empowerment in 
a way that is proportional to, and compatible with: 
(i) China’s possession of key resources, for satisfying peoples’ appeals and 
desires to participate in different socioeconomic activities, and for meeting any 
constitutionally prescribed welfare demands; 
(ii) Using and distributing key resources and the interests attached to, or 
generated by, the use of such resources, in a socially just and economically 
efficient fashion. 
In brief, a dynamic balance must be sustained between resources and the 
institutions that acquire and distribute them. And, for China, this serves to re-
conceptualise the core constitutive elements of a good society, and to push 
forward democratisation and socioeconomic development to a higher level.  
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Appendix 1. "
The historical annual average exchange rates between USD and RMB (from 
1978 to 2011) (in the format of 1 USD = X RMB) 
1978=1.5771 
1979=1.4962 
1980=1.5303 
1981=1.7051 
1982=1.8926 
1983=1.9757 
1984=2.3270 
1985=2.9367 
1986=3.4528 
1987=3.7221 
1988=3.7221 
1989=3.7659 
1990=4.7838 
1991=5.3227 
1992=5.5149 
1993=5.7619 
1994=8.6187 
1995=8.3507 
1996=8.3142 
1997=8.2898 
1998=8.2791 
1999=8.2796 
2000=8.2784 
2001=8.2770 
2002=8.2770 
2003=8.2774 
2004=8.2780 
2005=8.1013 
2006=7.9718 
2007=7.6040 
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2008=6.9451 
2009=6.8310 
2010=6.7695 
2011=6.4588 
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